

KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE

in the philosophy of F. H. Bradley

by
T. S. ELIOT

FABER AND FABER
24 Russell Square
London

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CHAPTER I

On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience

It is not my intention in the present paper to cover the whole field of epistemology, or even to hint at the existence of many questions of which my subject seems to demand some discussion. The formation of general ideas, the theory of judgment and inference, probability and the validity of knowledge, fall outside the scope of my attempt. And the problem of error will seem to receive very slight treatment. In the present chapter I wish to take up Bradley's doctrine of 'immediate experience' as the starting point of knowledge. Then the rest of the essay will occupy itself with the development of subject and object out of immediate experience, with the question of independence, and with the precise meaning of the term 'objectivity'.

Bradley uses the term 'experience' and the term 'feeling' almost interchangeably, both in *Appearance* and in the essay 'On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience'* which is the most important *locus* for my present chapter. In the use of these terms we must observe the greatest caution. We must be on guard, in the first place, against identifying experience with consciousness, or against considering experience as the adjective of a subject. We must not confuse immediate experience with sensation, we must not think of it as a sort of panorama passing before a reviewer, and we must avoid thinking of it as the content or substance of a mind. And 'feeling' we must remember, is a term of very wide application, so that in some of its quite legitimate uses it is cer-

* In *Essays on Truth and Reality* (referred to as *Truth and Reality* in subsequent notes).

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tainly not identical with 'experience'. We must accustom ourselves to 'feeling' which is not the feeling of psychologists, though it is in a way continuous with psychological feeling. And when we are told (*Appearance*, p. 406) that feeling is 'the immediate unity of a finite psychical centre' we are not to understand that feeling is merely the feeling of a mind or consciousness. 'It means for me, first, the general condition before distinctions and relations have been developed, and where as yet neither any subject nor object exists. And it means, in the second place, anything which is present at any stage of mental life, in so far as that is only present and simply is. In this latter sense we may say that everything actual, no matter what, must be felt; but we do not call it feeling except so far as we take it as failing to be more.' (*Appearance*, pp. 406-7.)

Keeping these quotations in mind, we turn at once to the words with which the whole theory is summed up in the essay to which I have referred. Experience, we are told, 'is not a stage which shows itself at the beginning and then disappears, but it remains at the bottom throughout as fundamental. And further, remaining, it contains in itself every development which in a sense transcends it. Nor does it merely contain all developments, but in its own way it acts as their judge.'¹ In these words we have expressed the whole difference between Bradley's view of experience and those of certain other contemporary philosophers. For, in the first place, immediate experience is not at any stage of consciousness merely a presentation which can be isolated from other elements also present or subsequent in consciousness. It is not 'sense-data' or sensations, it is not a stream of feeling which, as merely felt, is an attribute of the subject side only and must in some way be 'related' to an external world. And it is not, lastly, more pure or more immediate in the animal or the infant mind than in the mind of the mathematician engaged upon a problem. Whether there is a stage at which experience is merely immediate, Bradley says, we have agreed to leave doubtful. But here, I feel sure, he has understated his case, and we may assert positively that there is indeed no such stage. This point is worthy of some elucidation.

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We are forced, in building up our theory of knowledge, to postulate something given upon which knowledge is founded. And we are forced to a certain extent to consider this construction as something which takes place in time. We think, on the one hand, of material presented to our notice at every moment, and of the whole situation in knowing as a complex with this datum as one of the constituents. And we think also of the development of consciousness in biological evolution as a development of knowledge. And if there is any problem of knowledge at all, neither of these points of view is irrelevant. But we are apt to confuse the two: from the genetic point of view, all of the stages are actualities, whereas the various steps in knowing described in an actual piece of knowing in the mind of an adult man are abstractions, not known as separate objects of attention. They all exist at the same time; there is no priority in our experience of one element or another. When we turn to inspect a lower stage of mind, child or animal, or our own when it is least active, we do not find one or another of these elements into which we analyse the developed consciousness, but we find them all at a lower stage. We do not find feeling without thought, or presentation without reflection: we find both feeling and thought, presentation, redintegration and abstraction, all at a lower stage. And if this is the case, such study of primitive consciousness seems futile; for we find in our own knowing exactly the same constituents, in a clearer and more apprehensible form.

But on the other hand, if all the same constituents were present in every case of knowing, if none were omitted in error, or if none had any temporal precedence over another, all analyses of knowing would be equally tenable. There would be no practical difference: for when there are no bones, anybody can carve a goose. If we did not think that at some moments our consciousness is nearer to 'pure' experience than at others, if we did not think of 'sense-datum' as prior to 'object', if we did not feel that 'act' or 'content', or 'immanent' and 'transcendent' object were not as independent of each other, as capable of entering into different contexts as a table and a chair, the fact of their difference would be a perfect

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example of useless knowledge. In the philosophy of Bradley we shall find this difficulty in an aggravated form, although a form no more fatal, I think, than the form which it may take in any other philosophy. There is immediate experience, contrasted with ideal construction; which is prior, and in some sense, certainly, prior in time, to the ideal construction. But we go on to find that no actual experience could be merely immediate, for if it were, we should certainly know nothing about it; and also that the line between the experienced, or the given, and the constructed can nowhere be clearly drawn. Then we discover that the difference in no instance holds good outside of a relative and fluctuating point of view. Experience alone is real, but everything can be experienced. And although immediate experience is the foundation and the goal of our knowing, yet no experience is only immediate. There is no absolute point of view from which real and ideal can be finally separated and labelled. All of our terms turn out to be unreal abstractions; but we can defend them, and give them a kind of reality and validity (the only validity which they can possess or can need) by showing that they express the theory of knowledge which is implicit in all our practical activity. And therefore we allow ourselves to hold both that a lower stage of mere feeling is irrelevant and that knowledge is based upon and developed out of feeling.

We may say, then, on turning our attention to lower levels of being, that what we find is not a subtraction, but a general impoverishment. The animal may be as Mr Bradley says 'immersed in practice'; but this is by no means the same thing as immersion in feeling. The animal acts; and any feeling which is acted upon so far goes beyond mere presentation. No stage can be so low as to be mere feeling; and on the other hand man surely feels more than the animal. There is no greater mistake than to think that feeling and thought are exclusive—that those beings which think most and best are not also those capable of the most feeling.

Although there is no stage of life which is more nearly immediate experience than another, and although we are unacquainted with any element in our experience which we can single out as immedi-

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ate; although we cannot know immediate experience directly as an object, we can yet arrive at it by inference, and even conclude that it is the starting point of our knowing, since it is only in immediate experience that knowledge and its object are one. The fact that we can to a certain extent make an object of it, while at the same time it is not an object among others, not a term which can be in relation to anything else: this throws our explanation into the greatest embarrassment. We are forced to use terms drawn out of it, to handle it as an adjective of either subject or object side, as *my* experience, or as the experienced world. The monistic account is apt to take the first course, pluralism the second. But whether we say 'the world is my experience' or (James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, p. 27) that experience 'is made of *that*, of just what appears, of space, of intensity, of flatness, brownness, heaviness, or what not', we have been in either case guilty of importing meanings which hold good only *within* experience. We have no right, except in the most provisional way, to speak of *my* experience, since the I is a construction out of experience, an abstraction from it; and the *thats*, the browns and hards and flats, are equally ideal constructions from experience, as ideal as atoms. An *élan vital* or 'flux' is equally abstracted from experience, for it is only in departing from immediate experience that we are aware of such a process. In short, we can only discuss experience from one side and then from the other, correcting these partial views. This preface is necessary if we are to understand Bradley's use of such terms as 'feeling', 'psychical' or 'spiritual', all of which seem to emphasize the subject side of experience.

The real, we are told, is felt. 'To find reality we must betake ourselves to feeling. It is the real, which there appears which is the subject of all predicates.' We must be careful not to identify reality with feeling, either *my* feeling, or collective feeling, or an impersonal current of feeling. Feeling is to be taken (*Appearance*, p. 419) 'as a sort of confusion, and as a nebula which would grow distinct on closer scrutiny'. That of which it is a confusion, and into which it can be analysed, is (*Appearance*, p. 405) 'speaking broadly ... two great modes, perception and thought on the

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perception or thought

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one side, and will and desire on the other side. Then there is the aesthetic attitude . . . and . . . pleasure and pain'. Feeling is 'the general state of the total soul not yet at all differentiated into any of the preceding special aspects'. And again it is 'any particular state so far as internally that has undistinguished unity'. Thus immediate experience seems to be in one aspect a condition of the conscious subject. The real appears in feeling, and feeling is 'the general state of the total soul' though we find elsewhere that the soul is itself not real. And even this statement does not tell us that feeling is reality, or even that feeling is real. Feeling is not (*Appearance*, p. 407) a 'consistent aspect of reality' although reality is that which we encounter in feeling or perception.

The reasons for denying that feeling is consistently real are briefly as follows. Mere feeling is something which could find no place in a world of objects. It is, in a sense, an abstraction from any actual situation. We have, or seem to have at the start a 'confusion' of feeling, out of which subject and object emerge. We stand before a beautiful painting, and if we are sufficiently carried away, our feeling is a whole which is not, in a sense, *our* feeling, since the painting, which is an object independent of us, is quite as truly a constituent as our consciousness or our soul. The feeling is neither here nor anywhere: the painting is in the room, and my 'feelings' about the picture are in my 'mind'. If this whole of feeling were complete and satisfactory it would not expand into object, and subject with feelings about the object; there would, in fact, be no consciousness. But in order that it should be feeling at all, it must be conscious, but so far as it is conscious it ceases to be merely feeling. Feeling therefore is an aspect, and an inconsistent aspect, in knowing; it is not a separate and isolable phase. On the one hand, feeling is an abstraction from anything actual; on the other hand the objects into which feeling is differentiated have a kind of union which they do not themselves account for; they fuse into each other and stand out upon a background which is merely felt, and from which they are continually requiring supplementation. In order that these developments — thought, will, pleasure and pain, objects — may be possible, feeling

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must have been given; and when these developments have arrived, feeling has expanded and altered so as to include them. (*Truth and Reality*, p. 175: 'At every moment my state, whatever else it is, is a whole of which I am immediately aware. It is an experienced non-relational unity of many in one.') This is what we mean by saying that feeling is self-transcendent.

Now it is easy to fall into the error of imagining that this self-transcendence of feeling is an event only in the history of souls, and not in the history of the external world. It is hard to disabuse ourselves of the prejudice that feeling is something subjective and private, and that it affects only what feels, not what is felt. The reason for this is not far to seek. Feeling itself is properly speaking neither subjective nor objective, but its development into an articulate whole of terms and relations seems to affect the conscious subject, but not the objects of which the subject is conscious. I have the familiar sensation of red, which develops into a bull in a field; and this may well be an important event to me, affecting my course across the field, without making any impression upon the bull. The only reality which feelings can have, it is thought, is in a consciousness; we do not think of the external world as dependent upon feeling, unless we go so far as to say that it is dependent upon being felt — unless, that is, we think of it as the adjective of some transcendental self. On one side the history of the world is the history of my experience, on the other my experience itself is largely ideal, and requires the existence of much which falls outside of itself. Experience is certainly more real than anything else, but any experience demands reference to something real which lies outside of *that* experience.

We may express the difficulty briefly in this way. In feeling the subject and the object are one. The object becomes an object by its felt continuity with other feelings which fall outside of the finite centre, and the subject becomes a subject by its felt continuity with a core of feeling which is not related to the object. But the point at which a line may be drawn is always a question for partial and practical interests to decide. Everything, from one point of view, is subjective; and everything, from another point of

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view, is objective; and there is no *absolute* point of view from which a decision may be pronounced. Hence any history of the process must be only relatively true: it must be a history of the object side, postulating the subject, or a history of the subject side, postulating the object side. For feeling, in which the two are one, has no history; it is, as such, outside of time altogether, inasmuch as there is no further point of view from which it can be inspected. In time, there are the two sides, subject and object, neither of which is really stable, independent, the measure of the other. In order to consider how the one came to be as it is, we are forced to attribute an artificial absoluteness to the other. We observe, first, the development of mind in an environment which *ex hypothesi* is not dependent upon mind; and second, in order to conceive the development of the world, in the science of geology, let us say, we have to present it as it would have looked had we, with *our* bodies and our nervous systems, been there to see it. To say that the world really was as we describe it, a million years ago, is a statement which overlooks the development of mind. To say that mind, in its beginnings in child or aborigine or animal, really was as we describe it, is to commit oneself to a relative truth of the same sort. In the same way in our theory of knowledge, when we leave the moment of immediate experience, we are forced to present our account either as the history of mind in its environment, or as the history of the world as it appears to mind.

What I have said is in defence of the use of the word 'feeling'. In describing immediate experience we must use terms which offer a surreptitious suggestion of subject or object. If we say presentation, we think of a subject to which the presentation is present as an object. And if we say feeling, we think of it as the feeling of a subject about an object. And this is only to make of feeling another kind of object, a kind of object which will be discussed in a later chapter. Nevertheless we can arrive at this metaphysical use of the term feeling in its psychological and current use, and show that 'feelings', which are real objects in a world of objects, are different from other objects, are feelings, because of their participation in the nature of feeling in this other sense. The feeling

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which is an object is feeling shrunk and impoverished, though in a sense expanded and developed as well: shrunk because it is now the object of consciousness, narrower instead of wider than consciousness; expanded because in becoming an object it has developed relations which lead it beyond itself.

Although I speak of 'feelings' as shrunk and impoverished, I do not admit that every feeling was at any stage the whole content of consciousness. The majority of feelings have never succeeded in invading our minds to such an extent as completely to fill it; they have from first to last some objectivity. I do not mean that they are any the less intense for this, or that they disappear under attention. A toothache, or a violent passion, is not necessarily diminished by our knowledge of its causes, its character, its importance or insignificance. To say that one part of the mind suffers and another part reflects upon the suffering is perhaps to talk in fictions. But we know that those highly-organized beings who are able to objectify their passions, and as passive spectators to contemplate their joys and torments, are also those who suffer and enjoy the most keenly. And most of us are able to give a name to some of our feelings, to recognize in a vague way love and hate, envy and admiration, when they arise in our own minds. This naming of feelings, while it may give a very imperfect clue to their nature, is nevertheless of the greatest importance. It is obvious that we can no more explain a passion to a person who has never experienced it than we can explain light to the blind. But it should be obvious also that we can explain the passion equally well: it is no more 'subjective', because some persons have never experienced it, than light is subjective because the blind cannot see. We can explain it by its relations; by its effect upon the heart-beat, its toxic alterations of the system, by its effects in conduct and social intercourse. Without these relations, which give the feeling its whatness, the feeling could not be said to exist. Over and above all relations, it is true, the feeling must be a *that*, merely there; although strictly speaking not anywhere or at any time. But this aspect of mere existence does not distinguish feeling specifically from any other object. No object is exhausted

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by its relations, and this aspect of mere existence, in all objects as well as feelings, is what we call immediate experience. This aspect of immediacy, of bare existence, is a character of even the most restricted feelings, though they may be at every moment the object of consciousness as well.

We find our feelings, accordingly, on the one side to be of the same nature as immediate experience, and on the other to present no radical difference from other objects. We do not call the furniture of our rooms 'feelings' (unless we mean the mere presence of appearances in our mind) and our ordinary speech declares that two people may share the same feeling as well as regard the same object. Yet we persist in believing that about feelings there is something private, that we cannot 'know' them from the outside; although we are compelled to admit that often an observer understands a feeling better than does the person who experiences it. So far as feelings are objects at all, they exist on the same footing as other objects: they are equally public, they are equally independent of consciousness, they are known and are themselves not knowing. And so far as feelings are merely felt, they are neither subjective nor objective. Let us assume, for the moment, that my experience may consist of one single feeling, and that there is one object before me which I either love or hate. Adhering to my own point of view, in which the feeling is *merely* felt (i.e., I am not conscious of it), the feeling cannot be subjective, for it cannot be said to exist at all. For whom will my feeling be subjective? For the dispassionate observer, who seeing the same object without the same feeling, subtracts my feeling from the object, to make of it a separate and independent entity existing in my mind. In other words, what is subjective is the whole world — the whole world as it is for me — which, because it is (for me) the whole world, cannot be contrasted with anything else 'objective'; and equally truly nothing is subjective. There is no reason, so long as the one feeling lasts and pervades consciousness, why I should cut off part of the total content and call it the object, reserving the rest to myself under the name of feeling. It is only in social behaviour, in the conflict and readjustment of finite centres,

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that feelings and things are torn apart. And after this separation they leave dim and drifting edges, and tend to coalesce.

We must maintain, then, that in any cognition there is never more than a practical separation between the object and that which apprehends it. The object stands out, if you will, against a background of experience; and although it has relations which fall outside of our experience, it is likewise an abstraction from experience, continually capable of subtraction or addition. 'The object before me is unstable and it moves so as to satisfy me . . . I insist that in addition to other influences (whose working I admit), the object is moved also by that which is merely felt. There are connections of content now actually present in feeling, and these are able to jar with the object before me. And they are able further to correct that object by supplementation from themselves.'²

With the status of the feeling become objective I shall be occupied in a later chapter; it is here only necessary to insist on the validity of the continuous transition by which feeling becomes object and object becomes feeling. One important case of this transition is sense-deception. The resolution of contradictions of sense may be found in a process of assimilation of feeling to a new object, or in assimilation of object to feeling. In the case of the stick in water, for example, the real object for the psychologist may include not only the 'real' stick but an instance of refraction. That the object in the illusion is quite as real as the 'real' object is a truth to which the new realism has well called attention. The new object and the false, we may add, are continuous, and the new object has been constructed by adding to the old object elements which were first experienced and not contemplated.

We are not here concerned with the absolute objective criterion for the permanence and independence of any special class of objects; it is enough if we can make clear that we have no immediate distinction between object and feeling. It may accordingly be said that the real situation is an experience which can never be wholly defined as an object nor wholly enjoyed as a feeling, but in which any of the observed constituents may take on the one or the other aspect. The further question is this: to what extent can we

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say that identity persists in such a change: to what extent may we say that the felt feeling and the observed feeling are the *same*? With the general question of identity we are not here concerned. But between the special case of identity of which I speak and identity in the usual sense there is a striking difference. The latter is identity of objects (points of attention). This case is not the identity of two feelings both objectified. It is the identity of something which is an object with something which is not. When the difference is noted the very statement of the question will I think provide the answer. There is, between the felt and the objectified feeling, a continuity which is not interrupted by any objective difference; and so far as there is no perceived difference we may assume the two to be the same.

This rather subtle question, which really belongs to a later part of the discussion, is worth some little detail here. In considering how far feeling may be an object (and may be known) we may ask whether our conclusions will have a bearing upon experimental psychology. We may say that if psychology sets up a sharp factual line of demarcation between processes and things, and yet proposes to investigate the former as objects of science, it is committed to a contradiction.* Introspection can give us only terms, and not processes. In the same way as the mathematical representation of motion is and is not the same as the motion represented, so the object in psychology is and is not the same as the process. And it is only when psychology pretends to deal with something more 'subjective' or more philosophic than the subject-matter of any other science that its pretensions lead it astray.

Yet to say that we have no knowledge of the process, of feeling and the transition from the merely felt to the objectified would be even more a vagary. The transition is not saltatory. It is neither wholly unconscious nor capricious, but is more or less a willed change. The attention to the feeling presupposes that there is such an object present, and that the attention has not manufactured the object (*Truth and Reality*, pp. 162 ff.). So that in

* See Joachim, *Mind* 69, January 1909, and G. E. Moore and Dawes Hicks in *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1909-10, on the subject-matter of psychology.

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attending to a sensation or feeling any change of which we are aware besides the change felt in attending may be attributed to the sensation or feeling and held to be independent of the attention; and if we are aware of no other change than the attention, we may consider that any other change is meaningless.

The more fundamental aspect of the question, however, is this (*Truth and Reality*, p. 169): 'In any emotion one part of that emotion consists already of objects, of perceptions and ideas before my mind. And, the whole emotion being one, the special group of feeling is united with these objects before my mind, united with them integrally and directly though not objectively. . . . For when the object-part of our emotion is enlarged by further perception or idea, the agreement or disagreement with what is felt is not merely general and suffused, but is located through the object in one special felt group. And this special connexion and continuity with the object explains, I think, how we are able further to transform what is observed by the addition of elements from what is felt. There are features in feeling (this is the point) which already in a sense belong to and are one with their object, since the emotion contains and unites both its aspects.'

The error, then, would consist in any sharp division between enjoyment and contemplation, either in general or at any particular moment, or in treating the distinction of feeling and object as a possible *scientific* distinction. Science may make the distinction between feeling of object and object of feeling, but it cannot make a distinction between feeling and object as such. And now we are in a better position to inquire into the situation (in order not to say relation) of feeling, thought and object in experience. It will be recognized, first, that experience is non-relational. Relations can hold only between terms, and these terms can exist only against the background of an experience which is not itself a term. The objectified feeling of psychology does not exist apart from the rest of feeling which is merely felt, no matter how negligible that rest of feeling may appear. But within experience we always find relations, and in this sense we may say that non-relational experience does not exist. These relations, however, are

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not experience, and while they are experienced and therefore real, they are not real as relations. Yet, just as relations, they seem to be essential to reality. In this way a contradiction has 'broken out'. 'Feeling has a content, and this content is not consistent within itself. . . .'³ This situation it is which prompts us to pass on by new construction to a larger felt whole in which the same puzzling terms and relations appear. No experience is self-consistent, because of the ideal aspects with which it is shot through. Yet these ideal aspects are likewise real, and themselves issue from a felt background.

We may now go on to consider the place of consciousness in experience. In order to understand Bradley's answer to this problem we must keep in mind two different and apparently contradictory aspects of the situation. Experience, we have been told, is not co-extensive with consciousness, but is wider. 'There is an immediate feeling, a knowing and being in one, with which knowledge begins' (*Truth and Reality*, p. 159). Feeling is more than either object or subject, since in a way it includes both. On the other hand, we must remember that the conscious subject, as a construction, falls partly outside of any whole of feeling. 'The finite content is necessarily determined from the outside.'⁴ We must therefore expect to find consciousness to be both something immediately given and something which would not be in the immediate experience unless it also extended beyond it. Consciousness is not an entity, but an aspect, and an inconsistent aspect, of reality. Experience, we may assert, both begins and ends in something which is not conscious. And that this 'not conscious' is not what we call 'unconscious' should be sufficiently obvious. For what we term unconscious is simply an element in experience which arises in *contrast* to other elements in experience. It refers either to certain supposed mental entities which guide or influence our conscious actions. And I need not point out that this use of the term is of very doubtful value. Undoubtedly our mental life is directed by many influences of which we are not conscious, and undoubtedly there is no clear line to be drawn between that of which we are conscious and that which as 'feeling'

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melts imperceptibly into a physiological background. But so far as this fringe is contrasted with that which is actually conscious, it is merely an object in our world like any other. And the 'unconscious' conceived merely as external objects is only the unfeeling; it is the other side of experience and not the whole. The unconscious, in short, denotes something within experience, as the conscious does, and neither of these terms will represent the whole.

At the beginning then consciousness and its object are one. So far we are in agreement with at least two schools of contemporary philosophy.* We can say with James (*Radical Empiricism*, p. 23) 'the instant field of the present is . . . only virtually or potentially either subject or object'. Confining ourselves to this instant field (which we must remember is only an abstraction) we grant that no division can be found between an awareness and that of which it is aware. We cannot allow Mr Russell's supposition of a 'consciousness' which might merely exist for a moment and experience a sensation of red. The 'red' would simply be a 'neutral entity' which might be taken as mental or physical according to context, but where there is no context there is neither mental nor physical. What James calls the context is that of which Bradley speaks when he says that the finite content is 'determined from the outside'. This determination from the outside is unending. In the first place, there is my present physical constitution, which determines the experience without being an element in it, and there is my whole past, conceived either as the history of my body or as the sequence of my conscious experiences, so far as I can detach them from the objects in the experience, and consider them only as adjectives of myself. And secondly, there are the nature and the connections of the object, which fall outside of the present moment of experience, and are discovered on closer scrutiny. As we develop subject and object side, they seem to approximate independence, for the object is certainly independent of this knower, and the knower independent of any particular object: on the one side we get souls or selves, on the other the physical universe. That

* And in opposition to Russell and Moore.

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objects are dependent upon consciousness, or consciousness upon objects, we most resolutely deny. Consciousness, we shall find, is reducible to relations between objects, and objects we shall find to be reducible to relations between different states of consciousness; and neither point of view is more nearly ultimate than the other. But if we attempt to put the world together again, after having divided it into consciousness and objects, we are condemned to failure. We cannot create experience out of entities which are independent of experience. Nor could we be conscious at all unless these ideal connections somehow entered into the experience, breaking up its immediate unity. Yet the original unity — the 'neutral entity' — though transcended, remains, and is never analysed away. In our perception of the red flower the original mere red, in which awareness and awared are one, persists.

We can assert much more than seems implied in the last sentence. It is not merely 'in my experience' that the moment of identity is essential. My existence is dependent upon my experience of red in the flower, and the existence of the flower is dependent upon its unity in feeling (as red) with me. Whatever relations the flower may afterwards be discovered to have, its nature must be such that its being under these conditions experienced as red will be essential to the whole account of it. The real flower, we can say, will be the sum of its effects — its actual effects upon other entities — and this sum must form a system, must somehow hang together. And if we attribute to the flower any other reality besides these effects, which are actual only in experiences, we are thrown back upon what it is for itself — i.e., upon its experience of itself. And here we only face the old difficulties of subject and object over again in the form of panpsychism. To carry the problem to this point may be possible. Neither attacking nor defending the pan-psychist view, I consider it negligible. For if the existence of subject or object is always relative, then the point to which we elaborate this relativity is a matter of indifference.

Thus we are led to the conclusion that the only independent reality is immediate experience or feeling. And we have seen that

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to think of feeling as subjective, as the mere adjective of a subject, is only a common prejudice. So far as it is feeling and nothing more, it is self-sufficient and demands no further supplementation. 'My' feeling is certainly in a sense mine. But this is because and in so far as I *am* the feeling. I do not in consequence know (in the sense of understand) my own feeling better than does an outsider. If it be objected that I must have a feeling in order to understand it, the same may be said of every other object in the world.

Immediate experience, we have seen, is a timeless unity which is not as such present either *anywhere* or to *anyone*. It is only in the world of objects that we have time and space and selves. By the failure of any experience to be merely immediate, by its lack of harmony and cohesion, we find ourselves as conscious souls in a world of objects. We are led to the conception of an all-inclusive experience outside of which nothing shall fall. If anyone object that mere experience at the beginning and complete experience at the end are hypothetical limits, I can say not a word in refutation for this would be just the reverse side of what opinions I hold. And if anyone assert that immediate experience, at either the beginning or end of our journey, is annihilation and utter night, I cordially agree. That Mr Bradley himself would accept this interpretation of his (*Truth and Reality*, p. 188) 'positive non-distinguished non-relational whole' is not to be presumed. But the ultimate nature of the Absolute does not come within the scope of the present paper. It is with some of the intermediate steps that the following chapters are concerned.

CHAPTER II

On the Distinction of 'Real' and 'Ideal'

The conclusion of the preceding chapter has been that reality as we may know it, the ultimate criterion which gives meaning to our judgments of existence, is so far as it appears at all, our experience, yet an experience which only to a certain extent — from a certain necessary but untenable point of view — is 'ours'. As a development and in support of this conclusion, we are driven to question the status of those elements within experience which exist only by virtue of their reference to other elements which are, in that reference, real, and we shall come to the conclusion that the apparently fundamental separation between the real and the ideal is but tentative and provisional, a moment in a process. This conclusion is nothing new; it is no novelty even in the essay which I shall chiefly quote, that on 'Floating Ideas and the Imaginary'* (*Mind*, October 1906); it is familiar to students of Hegel. I can only plead that I seem to find it constantly neglected or misinterpreted. Accordingly, after a general statement of the theory, I shall attempt to make the position clearer by criticism of such systems as would do without this theory, and shall try to show its full importance in the thought of Mr Bradley. Afterwards I shall attempt to point out some undeveloped consequences for the theory of objects, in regard to unreal and imaginary objects, 'intended' objects, and process (act) as object. The whole discussion, needless to say, is bound up very closely with that of perception and judgment, which will immediately follow.

* Reprinted in *Truth and Reality*.

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The theory, in its general terms, is stated in *Appearance*, Chapter XXIV. 'There is a view which takes, or attempts to take, sense-perception as the one known reality. And there is a view which endeavours, on the other side, to consider appearance in time as something indifferent. . . . We have seen that the separation of the real into idea and existence is a division admissible only within the world of appearance. . . . In order to be fact at all, each presentation must exhibit ideality. . . . But the union in all perception of thought with sense, the co-presence everywhere in all appearances of fact with ideality — this is the one foundation of truth.' And further, 'when an idea qualifies the universe, how can it be excluded from reality?' (*Appearance*, pp. 334-5.)

The ordinary view of the relation of real and ideal I take to be this. We are given in 'experience' something called fact which is real because independent, and independent because real. This fact is not necessarily fact of sense perception, or of physical reality, but the fact may be itself an idea from an external point of view, an idea placed in reality. And the objection that a fact is always an objective, and not simply a *that*, does not in the popular view militate against its independence. The fact may appear with its fullest development of definition, with innumerable stipulations of relationship, yet we 'apprehend' it as independent, and proceed to erect between it and its percipient an abstraction called thought, the existence of which is its reference to reality. And popular epistemology then asks us to accept the elaborated and sophisticated object as 'real', and yet to maintain the proviso that all the positive qualifications which make it just what it is are products of the 'activity of thought'. In other words, the popular theory of knowledge, from which our philosophies spring, is realistic and nominalistic at the same time. That this is a just description I think there will be little question; and whatever direction our solutions take, I doubt whether we ever wholly escape the crude antithesis.

Now there are several ways in which this difficulty is escaped or evaded. The simplest is that of sensation and thought, or, as in the Kantian philosophy, the distinction between an external reality

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from which we receive material, and the formative activity of consciousness. This distinction — ultimately that between activity and passivity — will serve to classify a vast number of systems, both idealistic and realistic; for I am not satisfied merely that the distinction should be finally transcended, but wish to enquire into its validity as a starting point. So that a conational psychology such as that of Mr Alexander, or of Lipps — any psychology which deals with 'processes' as its subject-matter — will fall into a class with such an idealism as was recently advocated by Professor Adams.* And the second attitude is that of psychologists such as Stout, who would make a sharp distinction between content and object, and between psychical and physical object.** This I believe is the more usual attitude in psychology. And again there is the view of those who would reduce everything to object and immediate apprehension, reducing the 'activity' of thought to a minimum, as Meinong, Russell, or Miss Wodehouse.

These views it will be necessary to criticize, but without some elaboration of the point of view from which these criticisms will be made, what I have to say may appear inconsequent and negative. The common complaint, accordingly, lodged against all these views, is that it does not matter from what point of view or with what data you start, you will, if you do not stop arbitrarily, come to one conclusion; and whether or no psychology has the right to stop, whether psychology is independent of metaphysics, will be one of the questions involved. And, according to this view, activity and passivity, immediacy and mediation, acquaintance and description, will be transcended in the process of completion of our knowledge. In the words of Mr Bosanquet:*** 'we shall . . . meet, with uncompromising resistance, the attempt to take any form of immediateness, understood as excluding mediation, for an absolute and reliable datum, whether in the form of an object of simple apprehension, called by the name of fact, or in the form of an indeterminate creative impulse called by the name of life, or in

* *Philos. Rev.*, 1913.

** See his controversy with Mr Joseph.

*** *Prin. of Indiv. and Value*, p. 13.

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the form of a subject of experience, impervious and isolated, called by the name of "self"'.

The first point to be made is that the difference between real and ideal is in a sense an ideal difference. It is created within a limited sphere of meaning and recognizable only within that sphere. If we would recognize a difference between reality and its attributes, we must have become aware of the fact of error, and of alterations of content in relation to the same intended object. We become aware that we have intended a reality, that we have, within our experience, delimited a field as real; that we have brought this field into relation with ourselves: and in error and in alterations of content we come to consider meaning as another reality beside that which it intends. This discovery must be qualified in two ways. First, the reality which we have intended is an ideal construction. It is not reality as a whole, but the radiation from a particular and indefinable point; a field of quite uncertain extent, assumed and selected. And second, the idea with which this reality is qualified is itself real, though of a reality which we cannot possibly define; for, though its existence as a fact is another thing from its meaning, yet its meaning is inextricably involved in its existence as a fact. The idea is something real, or it could not be even ideal; and on the other hand the reality to which it refers is an ideal reality, cut off, in a sense, and isolated; for the attribution of an idea to reality as such is not within our power. On the other hand, the reality intended tends to identify itself with the content of the idea; and on the other hand this content pretends to identify itself with reality. Without the ideal aspect of the real the distinction would be impossible. And unless the idea were itself real it would be unable to relate itself to reality.

But how, it will be said, will these statements be reconciled with the previous assertions that reality is experience? You have first defined reality as experience, and have then declared experience to be indefinable: you now pretend that we have always before us an ideal fragment which we call reality, and of which we predicate the ideal. Are not the two statements hopelessly at variance? If the

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first statement about reality is true, how can the second reality be real in any sense; and have we not rather a wholly imaginary world of imaginary predications completely cut off, as far as our knowledge and acquaintance goes, from the reality upon which you have insisted?

In order to reply to this objection, in which the whole realistic position is implied, it will be necessary to dispose of a difficult prejudice. The real and the ideal (including the unreal) are not two separate groups of objects. Nor, as we shall see, can they be distinguished as object and 'process' or 'act'. Neither the absolute real nor the absolute ideal can as such enter into discourse; it is only when two entities 'take of each other', so to speak, that either of them can be real or ideal. Reality is simply that which is intended and the ideal is that which intends; and ultimately — for we have no reason to stop — the intending is the totality of intending, and the intended is the whole of reality. This whole of reality, of course, will as discussed present both real and ideal aspects; but this differentiation in what should be simple will fall outside of our metaphysics (*Appearance*, p. 352). It is inclusive with reference to our system, and that is all that we require.*

The division of real and ideal into two groups of objects is an action of a natural and inevitable tendency. As we shall later urge, an object is simply that to which we attend, and we cannot attend to process or idea without making it to that extent an object. But, just as no object is wholly object, so we can, by constant correction and discretion, to some degree handle idea without reducing it wholly to object. In the first place, we must remember that the distinction of real and ideal is one that does not arise until the ideal is recognized as having a reality of its own, apart (in a sense) from its meaning; and yet as preserving its identity in this new aspect. Without the 'Mitmensch' (fellow man) and our introjection the question of ideality would never arise. It is easy to mistake the issue here, and to say that the idea is simply not recognized. We

* 'Wherever the idea can be merely *one aspect* [italics mine] of a single presentation, there we can say that the ideal content exists, and is an actual event.' *Appearance*, p. 352.

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can imagine a solitary autochthon, yet gifted with reason and, if you like, with some power of expression, making judgments, quite unaware of their ideal relation to the reality intended. And for this hermit, as a centre of experience, these judgments will simply not come into question — the question as to their existence will be one to which there is no answer, either affirmative or negative. And this is everywhere the case, that until the ideal is recognized as real, it is not even ideal. And I use the word 'recognize' with this in view: the idea as idea (as meaning) is neither existent nor non-existent, and could we consistently keep to this internal view it would not be real. It will be said, I know, that the externality of the idea is implied in its internality. But this implication exists only for a point of view which contains both points of view.

With these considerations in mind, let us return to the discussion of the relation of Reality as subject, to reality as the fragment to which predicates are assigned.* In any case of judgment or perception something is assumed to be real, and this something is a background of indefinite extent continuous with the content which is asserted of it. The background has ideal characteristics which are rather felt than predicated, and which are capable of indefinite transmutation in a more and more inclusive view. This provisional reality has, on the one hand, the character of an ideal construction, for it is a sphere in which our ideal activity has been exercising itself; and on the other hand it is apart from the particular idea at the moment and under the aspect of predication. It is, in contrast with that idea, *accepted*; and the ideal aspect of it is for the occasion negligible, in contrast with the particular idea with which we are engaged. Thus, of course, an idea may justly be predicated of an ideal world; and our interpretation of the character of Ivanhoe may qualify the assumed reality of the story just as truly as the story itself, as a story, qualifies reality. The ideal world of the story qualifies reality — in what way, we are ultimately in ignorance — and

* 'It would be impossible that any man should have a world, the various provinces of which were quiterationally connected, or appeared always in system.... He means, from time to time, by reality some one region of the Real, which habitually he fails to distinguish and define.' *Appearance*, p. 325.

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through this world our conception of the character of Ivanhoe is attached to reality. The question of imaginary and unreal objects belongs to a later part of the discussion. There is however one objection likely to be raised at this point, related to that question. The objection is this: the assertion that reality is always the subject is in apparent conflict with the fact of judgments in which reality is a predicate. In the judgment '*X* is real' is reality the subject? The answer is this: In this judgment the subject is not a presentation which we call real or leave in the void. It is already largely placed and determined. It is already predicated of a world which has two spheres, and the question is: through which of the two it shall be related to the whole. The titular subject is already real, and the adjectival reality is only the assertion of one sphere in which it belongs. Yet in the course of the assertion the nature of the subject has altered. If the reality which we assert is the reality of ghosts, then the ghost as potential subject, previous to the judgment, is not the same ghost as that with which we emerge. The latter is a real ghost; and how can we say that the content of a real ghost is not different from that of an imagined or merely presented ghost? The subject, then, cannot have been the ghost, and the predicate cannot have been reality; for, on the one hand, the subject of a judgment cannot be altered by the judgment, and on the other hand, the predicate must add something to our knowledge — and we knew already that the ghost was in some sense real.

With the connection between the predication inside the proposition and the predication referring to the subject outside the judgment I shall be concerned later. I must call attention here, however, to the fact that the idea which is predicated of reality is not the content of a single word. The statement that ghosts are real is not, as we have seen, the predicating ghosts of reality. An idea is never given in a single word ('only in the sentence does the word first acquire actual life and being'*) when that word is an element in a judgment and not in itself the expression of a judgment.

* See Jerusalem, *Urteilsfunction*, p. 28: 'Das Wort, . . . gewinne erst im Satze wirkliches Leben und Sein. . . .' and *passim*, for relation of word to idea.

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The fact that words are always used in the expression of ideas, and are remembered and placed by attachment to a more or less indefinite group of ideas in which they have been used, may lead us to regard ideas as the meaning of words. Now there is a decided difference. ('The isolated substantive name lacks the positing therein of a subject, and hence it cannot be presented here, at the locus of perception, as a living source of multifarious activity. . . . It will be seen that the meanings of isolated words must be so presented, as if nothing in perception corresponded to them; they are founded purely on the articulate sounds we make, and in this alone possess a basis for their existence.'*) A word, it is true, may mean or stand for, an idea. But there will never obtain an identity between the meaning of the word as concept, and the meaning of the word as idea. As an idea it is predicated of reality, assigned a place in a system — more or less complete — which is assumed as real. But the concept — greenness, or triangularity — does not as such qualify reality at all. It is, in itself, neither real nor unreal. The meaning of a concept always exceeds the idea, and is of virtually indefinite extension. When we predicate the reality of ghosts, for example, we qualify reality, an ideal reality abstracted from the whole, by the idea of *real* ghosts; and this idea includes, on one side, much more than the word or concept ghost. The ghost conceived as real is a special kind of content with characteristics continuous with those of the fragment of reality in which he is set; the idea, from one point of view apart from the world and attached to it, yet contains already the character of the world, a world, as I said before, which shows by the very fact that that idea can be attached to it that it is somehow prepared for the reception of that idea.

In this way I make the distinction between concept and idea.

* Gerber, *Sprache u. Erkennen*, pp. 102-3, is clear as to the unpresentability (*Unvorstellbarkeit*) of the word: 'Es fehlt dem isolierten nomen substantivum dies, dass in ihm ein Subjekt gesetzt ist, und so kann es nicht hier, an dem wahrgenommenen Orte vorgestellt werden als lebendige Quelle mehrfacher Thätigkeit, . . . Man sieht, dass die Bedeutungen der isolierten Wörter so vorgestellt werden müssen, wie ihnen in der Wahrnehmung nichts entspricht; sie gründen sich lediglich auf unsere Sprachlaute und haben nur an diesen den Boden für ihr Dasein.' — I fail to find, however, a clear distinction between concept and idea on the one hand, and idea and image on the other.

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The idea is the total content which we mean about reality in any particular presentation. It is not purely or even primarily psychological, for its meaning is essential (and meaning, as I shall have occasion to consider later, does not as such form an object for psychology); and furthermore, its meaning partially coincides with the reality which it intends. Nor is the idea purely a logical entity, since it always, in the end, comes to occupy a particular place in a real world. The concept, on the other hand, while it may in a sense — loosely, as I think — be called ideal, is not to be confounded with the ideality of the idea, and indeed in contrast with the idea had much better be called real.* The concept, in the first place, is extra-mental; it exceeds all actual and possible content, or definition. Nothing can secure you against the possibility that new experience may add to the meaning by extending the use. And properly speaking, a concept cannot be defined at all, for to define it is to restrict it to a definite circle of ideas. So far as it is thus identified with these ideas it ceases to be a concept; so far as it is present and practical, it is used to stand for a (not wholly definite) group of ideas. In this way we come mistakenly to identify the concept with one or several of its related ideas — to consider it as appearance as well as reality. And it is true that reality exists only through its appearances. It is only in some sense in ideas that concepts exist; and, in a sense, the pointing of the ideas at the concept constitutes the reality of the concept; its reality consists of the self-transcendence of ideas.

I am not confident that these definitions are valid ones, but they attempt to avoid Bradley's confusion of concepts with ideas, and Moore's confusion of ideas with concepts. Moore's criticisms of the passages in Bradley have however a certain force. 'Now to Mr

* Professor Hoernle ('Image, Idea, and Meaning,' p. 90) makes the following distinction between the real and the ideal: '1. In the first place, the contrast between idea and reality is taken to be a contrast between present reality and something which in some sense or another is "not present". Thus the past and the future are usually said to be "ideal" as against the reality of present experience; and again in volition we have the opposition between my present state and an idea of change, the "realization" of which would satisfy me. 2. Secondly, reality as contrasted with idea, is more particularly identified with sense perception.' — But I do not find this classification adequate; and it makes no place for the concept.

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Bradley's argument that "the idea in judgment is the universal meaning" I have nothing to add.' But he says further, 'I shall in future use the term "concept" for what Mr Bradley calls a "universal meaning"; since the term "idea" is plainly full of ambiguities, whereas "concept" and its German equivalent *Begriff* have been more nearly appropriated to the use in question.' This concept he substitutes for idea in such a use as the following: '... that the "idea used in judgment" is not a part of the content of our ideas, nor produced by any action of our minds, and that hence truth and falsehood are not dependent on the relation of *our* ideas to reality' where the idea used in judgment is properly an idea and not a concept.⁵ Both Bradley and Moore make but one distinction — that between a *psychical* idea and a *logical* idea. Russell (*Problems*, p. 99) makes a similar distinction: in 'the sense in which it denotes the *object* of an act of thought, whiteness is an "idea". Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an "Idea" in the other sense, *i.e.* an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental.'

Bosanquet (*Essentials*, p. 74) hardly differs: "'Idea" has two principal meanings. (a) A psychical presentation and (b) An identical reference.'

It should be immediately evident that the idea in Bradley's judgment is a very different thing from the concept in Moore's. We do not in judgment, certainly, simply predicate of reality the content, or part of the content, of a so-called 'mental state'. So far we are all in accord. In 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon' the idea is just as 'external' as the reality of which it is predicated. But the idea in question is not a concept, but something of indefinite complexity. Caesar's crossing the Rubicon (the objective) has, as we consider it, elements which attach it more and more in one way or another to the real. The movement is not simply the movement of an idea toward reality; but the real comes to join itself, by presenting ideal aspects which are also real, to the self-realizing idea. The idea was never at any moment of the process detached and 'floating'. In being an idea at all, it must mean to be real; it is

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no more mental than the reality to which it is attached; its ideality consists in its meaning, and cannot be considered as a quality or mark by which it may be distinguished from the real. Hence, in the judgment above instanced the idea is the whole reality meant — and I shall try to show later, the whole meaning is ultimately the whole of reality.

It is at once apparent that neither of the definitions used by Bosanquet is adequate for idea in this sense. This is rather what idealists are accustomed to call 'ideal content'. Content is as equivocal a word as any, but I cannot see that any distinction is introduced by using 'ideal content' instead of idea. The idea predicated of reality is not part of any 'content'* nor is it composed of simpler ideas. It is meaningless, I think, to speak of the 'content' of the idea: is the content anything but the idea itself? for so far as the content is discrepant with the idea, I cannot see that it is the content of *that* idea.

There are here several issues:

1. the relation of idea to mental content
2. the relation of idea to image
3. the relation of idea to concept and speech
4. the relation of idea to identical reference

Let us consider the last question first. I wish to distinguish idea from 3 and from 4, and 3 and 4 from each other. Fixed reference is thus manipulated by Bosanquet (*Logic*, I, p. 69): '... the idea, as used in judgment, is a general signification, or in other words, a fixed reference. And because fixed, it is limited; limited to portions of content which serve as indices of the reference, and are compatible with psychical accompaniments that vary with the series of images.'

The essence of an idea, for Bosanquet, seems to be that it should refer to something (*Essentials*, p. 75: the identity which two people mean to mean when they say 'Saint Paul's Cathedral' is the idea). What, in this case, is the idea? It is hardly the actual

* Bosanquet, *Logic*, I, p. 44: 'I ... shall follow Mr Bradley in using "idea" for a fixed content or logical meaning, not for the psychical images which pass through the mind and never recur....'

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object meant — the object is that to which the idea refers. It is not the word or sound 'Cathedral', nor is it the intention of the two people to refer to the same thing; it is the fact of their reference to the same thing. And '... the content of this reference is the object of our thought'.⁶ Now the idea, in this sense, can hardly be the idea which is predicated of reality. It is (*Essentials*, pp. 78-9) a 'concrete habit or tendency', a 'selective rule', and again it is a thing ('mental unit or image') which stands for something else.*

The idea predicated of reality cannot be either a 'mental presentation' or a conation, nor can it be simply a meaning — for a meaning always means to be something more than a meaning. It is not certainly a compound of simpler elements. Bradley is clear on this point (*Logic*, p. 12): 'We may say ... that all (judgments) have but one (idea). We take an ideal content, a complex totality of qualities and relations, and we then introduce divisions and distinctions, and we call these products separate ideas with relations between them. And this is quite unobjectionable. But what is objectionable, is our then proceeding to deny that the whole before our mind is a single idea. ... The relations between the ideas are themselves ideal. ... And the whole in which they subsist is ideal, and so one idea'. There is here a fixed reference in the sense that the idea aims to be (though any expression one can use will remain a metaphor) a reality, and the latter, as real, is independent of its relations. The fixity of the reference is not the character of fixity of meaning which the words have in language, nor is its fixity due to a composition of these fixities. It is not as if I took a number of sentence elements which have each an identity of reference and compounded them into a whole which has an identity by virtue of the ingredient identities. The idea, though largely dependent for its existence upon the forms of its expression, must yet not be confused with these forms. The idea is that reality which I intend, and the identity is only the

* Mr Bosanquet says (*Essentials*, p. 79) 'Mere mental facts, occurrences in my mental history, taken as such, cannot enter into judgment'. But I should ask whether the so-called mental facts are mental at all, and whether they do not enter into judgment just as do any other 'non-mental' facts.

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assumption of *one* world; it is not the characteristic of it as idea, but as world.

The idea, and its predication of reality, may exist previous to the articulation of language. It is not true that language is simply a development of our ideas; it is a development of reality as well. The idea is developed from within, as language shows a richness of content and intricacy of connections which it assumes to have been really there, but which are as well an enrichment of the reality grasped. Wherever there is an appreciation of a presentation and a relating of it to the subject's world there is an idea and a judgment: and this is practically universal. The sea-anemone which accepts or rejects a proffered morsel is thereby relating an idea to the sea-anemone's world. The fixity is simply this reference to a definite place in the world — a world which is built up from the subject's point of view. This, for the subject, is the only world, but it is not a solipsistic world, for it is not contrasted with any other possible world.

These remarks have been directed against such an interpretation of Bosanquet's definition as would infer that the idea, as idea, detached from its reality, need mean the same thing for various subjects. 'Saint Paul's' might retain its full fixity of meaning for me if everyone else meant by the same term, let us say 'Notre-Dame'. There would, of course, be contradiction in my world which I should have to rectify in one way or another; but the social consilience goes toward the construction of our world and not toward the definition of idea.

It is in this sense, then, that idea involves identical reference. The inquiry brings us consequently to the relation of idea to its articulated content and to the concept. The idea in predication is not necessarily of definite extent; it may be extended or narrowed or analysed. We are familiar with the objection 'but you imply much more than this' — or 'but you mean no more than —' and sometimes are immediately aware of an expansion or contraction of our idea. And again the idea may be analysed into component ideas. In the example which Bradley has given (*Logic*, pp. 12-13) we may first have an idea *wolf-eating-lamb*, and from this we separ-

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ate the ideas, let us say, of *wolf*, of *lamb*, and perhaps further, of *eating*. And this fact would at first seem to controvert what I have said, above (p. 38), for we seem to have an idea for each word. I should reiterate the distinction between word as concept and word as idea. There may be, in a sense, degrees of ideality and conceptuality. In all judgment, even of the simplest sort, there is involved recognition. The actual idea judged, it is true, is unique, or the judgment would not be made, but the judgment is made only through universal connections. In the cruder perception, *wolf-eating-lamb*, these connections are few and indistinct; in the developed knowledge we notice elements in this one idea which can be isolated through their relation to elements in other judgments, and which attain the status of ideas by bringing these relations with them to the particular case, so that the result is that a complex of connections is present in the particular perception or judgment, and besides being evoked by the idea, tends itself to become an idea and be judged about. And for this idea the one word (*wolf*, if you like) may stand. Yet it is a mutilation of connections to say that the one word stands for this 'idea'. For it does so only by virtue of its close connection with a number of more primary ideas. The *wolf* has become a reality perceived or judged, on a higher plane, as *wolf-eating-lamb* was in cruder knowledge; and this evolution of the idea can go on to the degree of abstraction upon which we find it practicable to live. This, then, is an idea 'of higher order', composed out of lower ideas and capable of entering as an ingredient in more particular ideas which are predicated of reality. The ideas of higher order are themselves less frequently predicated, for obvious reasons; their existence usually implies their assumption as ideal elements of reality (*Kraftcentra*). And these ideas of higher order, in their turn upon a higher plane, may be elements, rather felt than judged, in judgments of higher order, which in their own way are like the primitive judgments attributing a total situation to reality.*

* These levels of idea and judgment correspond, of course, to the levels of experience referred to in the essay of Bradley, used above ('On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience').

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We have marked briefly the steps in the development of general ideas. And we find that the generality of an idea is a matter of degree; every perception involves some degree of recognition and the operation of a universal. Accordingly we must now ask, what is the difference between such a general idea and a concept? I define concept (see pp. 39-40) as that which a word denotes, and idea (or general idea) as that to which a word refers in reality, this reference being contingent. And a concept, as I have said (p. 40) is a thing-in-itself; it can be suggested, rather than defined, through more and more general ideas, but is at no point to be identified with these ideas. The concept it is of which the word is properly the sign or symbol. I am in partial agreement with Sigwart (I, p. 42): 'Words are generally held to be signs of CONCEPTS. But a Concept in the logical sense is a work of art, produced by a conscious elaboration of our ideas in which its characteristics are analysed and its definition fixed, and it is the work of logic to help us to attain to the ideal state in which words represent such Concepts.' Of course I should be unwilling to admit that a concept is a 'work of art' or that it is in any way *created* by thought, or that greenness, triangularity, or to the right of, is '*produced by a conscious elaboration of our ideas*'. There is no meaning, so far as I can see, in saying either that the concept is created or that it is 'eternal'. In a sense, concepts are omnipresent, and in a sense, they are never known at all. We have, in the simplest case in which a concept appears, an intuitive knowledge of it (if one likes to talk of intuition), and on the other hand as I say, beyond intuitive 'knowledge' we know the concept only through ideas — through its appearances. And we must not confuse the development of the language with development in concepts; for it would, I think, be more apt to say that the development of language is the history of our exploration of the world of concepts. The goal of language is in this sense unattainable, for it is simply that of a complete vocabulary of concepts, each independent of the rest; and all of which, by their various combinations, would give complete and final knowledge — which would, of course, be knowledge without a knower.

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If this be true, how are we to estimate Mr Moore's assertion that 'a proposition is composed of concepts'? He accepts Bradley's statement that the idea in judgment is the universal meaning; but we have interpreted this universal meaning and Bosanquet's 'fixed' or 'identical' reference as an ideal reality in the form of universal connections; and not as the concept. Mr Moore postulates the ultimate vocabulary of which I have spoken. Once given this vocabulary of concepts, it would be quite true to say, as Moore does say (*Mind* 1899, p. 182), 'the world is formed of concepts. These are the only objects of knowledge. A thing becomes intelligible first when it is analysed into its constituent concepts.' For it is true that the concept is reality and the idea appearance, and I should almost agree that the concept is the only object of knowledge. But I defy Mr Moore to show a case of a concept which is actually known; and if he presents cases of such, I am certain that he has taken the shadow for the substance, the idea for the concept. It is true that existence (for which we substitute here *reality*) is itself a concept and true that we can define reality only by a reference to truth — for this only means that our only criterion for the degree of reality of a given appearance is the criterion of consistency and inclusiveness; it certainly does not mean that because reality is a concept it is known. What collateral can Mr Moore put up on behalf of such 'knowledge'?

We have thus seen in what way an idea is an identical reference and in what way it is related to the concept: the idea may precede the articulate thought, and likewise the concept may be said as an existent to precede thought, although its existence is not known of until late in the development of language. I turn accordingly to consider the relation of idea to image and mental presentation, and to the aspect of idea as a mental sign or symbol. And here I find serious difficulties with Mr Bradley's views, difficulties which may be due to my own obtuseness, but in which I seem to find my objection supported by the objections of Mr Moore and Mr Hoernle. 'For logical purposes ideas are symbols, and they are nothing but symbols (*Logic*, p. 3). . . . A symbol has 1. existence; 2. content. By a sign we understand any sort of fact which is

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used with a meaning. The meaning may be part of the original content, or it may have been discovered or even added by a further extension. . . . P. 4: A sign is any fact that has a meaning, and meaning consists of a part of the content, original or acquired, cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the sign.⁷

In what sense is an idea a sign? This seems a most treacherous statement. A sign has its existence beside its content, and it is just this separate existence — the fact that the sign might be misinterpreted or simply not recognized as a sign at all, which makes it a sign and not an identity. Take some of the examples of sign which Bradley mentions. A flower may become the sign or symbol of an emotion; the fox is the symbol of cunning. The meaning of these signs consists in a 'part of the content (original let us concede in the case of the fox, acquired in the case of the flower) cut off and considered apart'. Now does an idea refer to reality as fox refers to cunning? The quality to which the fox or the flower refers is something known or knowable otherwise than through the fox or the flower. And this is the case even when the sign is not fox in general, but as, let us say, when a withered flower is the sign of a particular moment in our history. The flower may be the only reminder we have of this moment, but it is in fact because of its essential heterogeneity with the event that it is able to replace itself and us with it, in the past. A flower may be the sign of an idea, but how can an idea be the *sign* of a reality? Such a view would surely lead us to a representational theory of knowledge.

The idea certainly has a sort of existence apart from the reality to which it refers, but the apartness is of a special sort and may easily be misunderstood. There may or may not be a mental content beside the meaning, but Mr Hoernle is certainly right in holding the meaning to be no part of this content (*op. cit.*, p. 74): 'We have nothing to qualify reality with except the contents of our minds, our imagery, which we "divorce" and "cut loose" from its existence in the mind so as to weave a garment for reality out of it.' The meaning is the idea, and the idea may be continuous with or in a sense dependent upon 'mental content',

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but so far as it is idea, is distinct therefrom. We must ask then (1) in what way idea is not that which it means, and (2) in what way it is not the 'mental' images and conditions.

The contrast between meaning and reality is not so apparent when the reality intended is a present sense perception as in some other cases. In memory, for example, or anticipation, there may be the consciousness of an intended reality and of a present meaning which are not co-existent in time. The reality is there, and the 'mental state' here. And inasmuch as this present state may omit the greater part of what was present to the reality which is remembered, and may likewise add or distort, we are accustomed to form in imagination the notion of a perfect idea of the past experience identical in content with the experience itself, and differing only in that it is present as a memory instead of past as an experience. The effort of memory, in this case, would be to identify itself with the past experience, and the completion of the process would be hallucination. This I suppose is the natural view — based upon comparison of cases of greater and less success in recollection — but it is simply a tissue of contradiction. It assumes, in the first place, that memory is always of images, whereas it is frequently of objectives, which may tend, it is true, to reinstate the imaginal conditions of the experience, but which may be independent of these conditions both for appearance and for certitude. And it may assume in the second place, a reinstatement of objects in a way which implies a point of view which was never actual. What we attend to in perception is one group of objects; what we attend to in memory is a different group: not, as in perception, the object as in itself it really is, but its image. Not that there are two distinct entities, the object and its image — the difference is not one of physical objects, but of intended objects. In perception we intend the object; in recollection we intend a complex which is composed of image and feeling. We do not intend to remember simply the object, but the object as we remember it. And this new object is much more *the experience* than *the past object*, for we try to remember how we felt toward the past object.

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It will be said: this feeling-object which we intend is simply a moment in the reinstatement of the total situation, the consummation of which operation would be the presence of the object as object and of the feeling as feeling. To recall feeling we are often told, is merely to live it over; it cannot be known or remembered, but only felt. And to this objection we can retort that hallucination is not the satisfaction and consummation of memory, but its disease. And so far as the feeling is merely felt, so far as the situation is merely lived over again, it is not a case of memory at all. We are attempting to recall, let us say, a public address which we have heard. If memory were simply a restoration of the past, we might expect to recall first the words or fragment of the sentences which the speaker uttered, rather than the sense which we extracted therefrom. For these sounds which he uttered take precedence in time of the meaning; the meaning, to use Meinong's phrase, is a *zeitverteilter Gegenstand*, and the fact that we recall the meaning, in most cases, before we recall the actual words, would imply that the past presents itself in a different time-order than that of the objective time in which the events are held to have taken place. Now in most cases the meaning is what we want; if we had to live through the whole speech again to re-extract the meaning, we should find it very inconvenient. And the meaning can hardly be said to exist in time as the spoken words exist. Furthermore, the meaning intended in attention to the speaker is not the same as the meaning intended in recollection. In hearing we aim at the meaning of the speaker — in memory we aim at the meaning which we drew from his words. And the same distinction holds good, though it is less apparent, even with the speaker's words: for we intend in the one case the words as spoken, in relation to the speaker, and we intend in the other the words as we heard them. And the words in this aspect, were never an actual object of perception; they have their existence only in memory. The past which we aim at is the experience of an ideal individual, who should have been both internal and external to ourselves, who should have both known and experienced the past to which in a very loose sense our memory may be said to 'refer'.

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In short, it appears that the past in the sense in which it is supposed to be recalled, in popular psychology, simply never existed; the past lived over is not memory, and the past remembered was never lived. But it will again be objected, if there is not a partial identity, and the possibility of degrees of identity, between the idea and an objective past reality, how is the idea to be distinguished from an idea of imagination? And it may be answered that there is an identity — not the sort of identity which we find between two objects, but that which can be found between two aspects. The past as lived and the past as remembered are in fact one and the same in intention, although in fact there is no reason to say either that they are the same or different. In order to make either statement, one would have to show a point of fact to which both refer, or one to which one refers and the other does not; and this identical viewpoint does not occur. You either live the past, and then it is present, or you remember it, and then it is not the same past as you once lived: the difference is not between two objects, but between two points of view. Two points of view may intend the same thing without there being any 'thing' which is the same. The sameness is a function of the two points of view. But there may, as we have seen, be a certain amount of discrepancy without any impeachment of memory, as when we 'remember' as the statement of a speaker what is actually a present inference from what we heard.*

* My remarks on the memory-image are I think thoroughly in accord with the conclusions of Titchener; but for me differences are essential which for Titchener appear to be only accidental (*Text-book of Psychology*, Part II, pp. 418-19). 'Is it not something of a paradox that the memory-image should be thus variable and instable? At first thought, yes: because we are ready to accept, from popular psychology, the notion that an image is a memory-image of itself, in its own right; and if that were the case, the image must of necessity copy or reproduce the perception. On reflection, no: because the image is, after all, made into a memory-image by the feeling of familiarity. So there is no reason in the world why it should copy the original experience. All it has to do — if we may ourselves talk a popular psychology — is to mean that experience (the meaning is given as the context of associated ideas and attitude) and to be recognized as meaning it. Suppose for a moment that memory-images were just weaker copies of the earlier perceptions, and nothing less or more: our mental life would, so far as we can imagine it, be an inextricable confusion of photographically accurate records. It is, in reality, because the image breaks up, because nervous impressions are telescoped, short-circuited, inter-changed, suppressed, that memory, as we have

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The identity in question is an ideal identity, a relation which exists only in relation with other (in fact, with all the other) identities in the series: it is an identity supported, if you like the phrase, by the will. You have a past experience and a present memory and, if these were all that existed, even they would not exist for they would constitute two utterly disparate worlds. But you have also an experience *b* and a memory *B*, and so on, and when you have the two alphabets given and only then you have some standard for comparison. The reference of each memory is not given separately, but you are, in a sense, given the whole series first. You cannot say simply 'A is identical with *a*', but you say 'A is identical with *a*, with regard to the identity of *B* with *b*' and vice versa.⁸

The idea, if the foregoing remarks have any cogency, is not a glass through which we descry a past reality, but the idea of a past reality is itself the object, an object which is not past in the sense of a past object of experience, and which is not present in the sense of a present object. It may appear a paradoxical statement, but it is not altogether untrue to say that the object of a memory is the memory itself: meaning only that we must distinguish between the object of the memory and the object of our attention when we remember. In memory, consequently, there is no more divorce between idea and reality than in any other kind of apprehension; the reality is our memory of a past experience, the idea is the reality in so far as we find the idea satisfactory; and when the idea fails to satisfy, we identify it with some other reality of memory or imagination. And the more or less figurative expression 'some other reality' must not mislead us: the operation consists simply in recognizing the idea for what it already is. How much this qualification explains is a question which introduces us to the dangerous problem of error, and this problem I shall memory, is at all possible. The remark has often been made that, if we did not forget, we could not remember. That is true. But we may go even farther and say that, if the mental image could not decay [cf. Hobbes] it could not either be the conscious vehicle of memory.'

My claim is that it is a bad metaphor to speak of the change from percept to memory-image as a decay. There is an alteration, not only in fullness and order, but in content. There are two essentially different points of view.

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have to postpone till I have gathered in several other floating embarrassments. I should like now to offer some remarks on the relation of idea and reality when the reality is an anticipated event and when it is an imaginary event or object.

It is obvious that an image located in the future cannot intend the real event, and the theory which possessed some plausibility in the case of memory cannot here apply. In remembering, we have seen, we have a memory which with respect to other memories refers to a particular reality. In the case of an idea located in the future, there is no such correspondence to be found, for the anticipated event may never realize itself. Ideas of anticipation, accordingly, occupy a place between ideas of memory and ideas of imagination. Such ideas may vary in two ways: in the degree of their realization, and in the degree of their connection with the present. This connection, again, may vary in two ways: the idea may be associated with the present, and spring therefrom, either in virtue of its probability or in virtue of its interest. And here is a line of demarcation between anticipation and imagination: a purely imaginary event can never really be set in the future, for such a disposition of ideas implies a continuity with the real existence of the subject, and a 'future' which has not such continuity is no future at all, but might as well be called past. An author can imagine, if you like, what 'might' happen to his characters in the sequel, but such events are either such as the author can imagine himself making to happen, or such as he imagines the characters themselves as anticipating or such as he accepts or rejects. And if I present to myself the figure of a centaur or dryad as existing 'in the future', I do one of two things. I either throw myself direct into a visionary world, which I proceed to qualify by the term 'future', or I qualify present reality and the idea of centaur so as to make the latter to me a real possibility. And the imaginary here mentioned is not as future imaginary; it is the real future of an imaginary present. An anticipated idea, then, cannot be wholly imaginary, and on the other hand it cannot essentially refer to an event which becomes actual. These observations seem so obvious that I must apologize for offering them.

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As to the degree of realization, it is not in principle involved. For we have seen that the degree of 'identity' between the memory and its intended real experience is not a question; and here, from the point of view of the idea, we are concerned only with possibility and interest. Though the difference of principle between ideas of the future and ideas of imagination is clear, yet the difference of fact is often hard to determine. We must of course consider an idea as possible, but we may so consider it with a greater or less degree of evidence, as we are moved by interest (including of course fear) or by knowledge: an idea which may appear to an outsider a pure imagination, possesses fatality for one crazed by fear or passion. It has frequently been said that we never desire what we think absolutely inapprehensible: it is however true that some of our sharpest agonies are those in which the object of desire is regarded as both possible and imaginary, in which in fact the *aspro martiro* is due to the irony of the contrast: the mistress exists as possessed in the real world of anticipation of the disappointed lover, while present reality is forcing itself in upon him with the conviction that this possession is imaginary. Images of future satisfaction to which we looked forward with confidence, we are constantly compelled to consign to the limbo of imagination; and we frequently forget that they were not imaginary in their genesis. The principle of the idea of anticipation, in short, I take to be this. The present as experience is as we have seen (Chapter I) indefinable and in this sense unknown, but its character, and ultimately its existence depend upon the internal qualification of real by ideal; and in this sense the present is ideal construction, and an ideal construction in which ideal constructions of the past and future are integral. These ideas do not qualify a real past and future, for there is no real past or future for them to qualify; past and future are as such themselves ideal constructions. Ideas of the past are true, not by correspondence with a real past, but by their coherence with each other and ultimately with the present moment; an idea of the past is true, we have found, by virtue of relations among ideas. Similarly, an idea of the future is not applied to the real complex which shall

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represent the realization or falsification of this idea. The present of ideal construction, the present of meaning and not simply of psychical or physical process, is really a span which includes my present ideas of past and future. The reality of the future is a present reality, and it is this present future-reality of which our ideas of anticipation are predicated, and with which they are identified. 'She must weep or she will die' is a statement *not* about the *real future* (which would be a contradiction) but about the *real future*.⁹ We are not to say that one of these ideas is realized and the other left floating 'like Mahomet's coffin'¹⁰; there is really but one idea, and that is predicated of a present future with which it is identical. The reality is immanent to the idea, or else the idea is not the idea of that reality.

If the last statement is true at all, it is true of the ideas of imagination as well as of any other. I shall state very briefly what I take to be the principle here involved, leaving the full discussion of the existence of unreal objects to a later chapter, in connection with the theories of Meinong. If I figure to myself the character of a personage of fiction, it is not true to say that there is no real object to which the idea means to 'correspond'. The distinction between real and unreal is practically useful but metaphysically baseless and indefensible. The character of fiction is imperfectly real because it is imperfectly ideal. And the round square, so far as it is idea (and I do not mean image) is also real. It is not unreal, for there is no reality to which it should correspond and does not. If there were to be such a reality, one would have to have an idea of it — and this idea which you call unreal is the only idea of it which you can present. The detailed discussion of this point I shall take up in connection with the problem of content, object, act, and presentation. The complete idea is the reality, and it is not until the idea realizes itself, and thus becomes really ideal, that we can really trace its ideal connections. When the poet says

I lived with shadows for my company

she is announcing at once the defect and the superiority of the world she lived in. The defect, in that it was vaguer, less of an

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idea, than the world of others; the superiority, in that the shadows pointed toward a reality, which, if it had been realized, would have been in some respects, higher type of reality than the ordinary world — compared to which the ordinary world would be less real, and which the ordinary world might be said to 'mean'.¹¹

The question in what sense an idea is 'meaning', may now be resolved. I accept Bradley's definition of a judgment as the predication of an idea of reality, and I agree that this idea is one whole. And in the article to which I have frequently referred ('Floating Ideas') he has laid down the general doctrine of the relation of real and ideal. But I maintain that for metaphysical purposes at least (*Logic*, p. 3) the notion of idea as symbol is quite inadequate. An idea is not a symbol as a fox is of cunning, or an anchor of hope. You cannot so isolate existence and meaning, in the case of ideas. And to say that an idea is an identical reference is only partially true. There is however a sense in which it may be said that idea is meaning. We may say, in one way, that every idea means itself; its ideality consists in its 'pointing toward' its realization, or (we have found it to be the same thing) toward its own idealization. Hence an idea as contrasted with reality, is something which cannot be grasped — for it can only be described in terms of that reality — in which case you have the reality and not the idea; or it must be described in terms of some other reality — in which case it has lost its meaning, and is no longer the same idea. The existence of idea, then, in contrast with the real, is only in the process, eluding our pains; for as soon as you touch it, you find that the whole world resolves itself into ideas — or into reals. The idea is, as idea, Act; and how far Act can be made an object, together with its relation to content, presentation, and object (*Inhalt, Vorstellung,* Gegenstand*) will form the subject of the ensuing chapter.

* Should I apologize for the fact that my use of 'idea' does not correspond with that of any author with whom I am acquainted? I have tried to show in the foregoing that *idea* should not be used indifferently with *concept* or with *image*, and *presentation* has a rather different use from either.

CHAPTER III

The Psychologist's Treatment of Knowledge

The conclusion derived from the two preceding sections has been that within the whole which is experience and is reality there is a distinction of real and ideal (within which is included the distinction of real and unreal): a distinction which turns out to be appearance and not real, inasmuch as the real is largely ideal, and the ideal is also real; a distinction, however, which in a sense supports reality.* For it is by this distinction that the word reality contains any meaning. We have found that reality is in a sense dependent upon thought, upon a relative point of view, for its existence; for ultimately the world is completely real or completely ideal, and ideality and reality turn out to be the same. And we found that the ideal can never be set over against the real absolutely, but tends to run, either forward or back, into the real which it intends, or the real out of which it may be said to be made: for both these reals are after all nothing but itself at another stage of development. It will be evident that the problem of error, in such a theory, becomes a very clamorous one. To approach this problem we must examine more narrowly the various moments of the process of apprehending an object: and inquire whether the distinction of real and ideal, as we have found its general principle, corresponds to the distinction of object and act, or of object and presentation. The nature of mental 'activity' and the operation of categories must be discussed. And the

* Mr Bradley does not commit himself to the assertion that non-relational experience is impossible, but it is implicit in his position. This, of course, is not in conflict with the other assertion that all experience is in the end non-relational.

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question, much agitated in recent years* of the subject-matter of psychology, must be agitated again.

The distinction between real and ideal in psychology takes several forms. On the one hand, it may be said, is external reality, and on the other mental content, which is ideal in so far as it intends that reality and has reality of its own as well; and which, under the aspect of that reality of its own, can be studied by the psychologist. Or we may deny the possibility of a valid distinction between content and external reality, and distinguish only between object and act or conation. Or we may deny activity to consciousness altogether, and assemble existents in one complex or another. Or we may say that reality consists of elements of sensation, the rest being ideal construction. Or there is the view of Mr Bradley, for whom everything is in a way psychical, and for whom therefore the distinction between object and act is not identical with that between an internal and an external reality but is reducible to the problem of knowing one's own mind.

The questions involved are these: in an act of apprehension is there a part which is strictly mental and a part which is strictly external? and even if the distinction can be made, can it be made sharply enough to give us a class of objects which can form a separate science, psychology? and the ultimate question is: is there a problem of the possibility of knowledge as well as that of the morphology and structure of knowledge?

There are two terms of psychology, which imply unexamined assumptions, and one of which at least has undergone the fire of recent realism: 'mental content', and 'psychical process'. The first is an assumption still of the majority of psychologists. The presentation of an external object may or may not 'agree' with that object, but in the cases where we assume a complete agreement or identity, the presentation is like a point at which the

* I refer to the articles in *Mind* by Bradley, Prichard, Joseph, Stout, and Joachim; to the articles in the *Proc. Arist. Soc.* and in the *British Journal of Psychology* by Alexander; and articles in the *Proc. Arist. Soc.* by Stout, Hicks and Dumville. I shall also refer to writings of Meinong, Messer and Lipps (especially the latter's *Inhalt und Gegenstand*).

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circumferences of two circles are in contact: the one point may be taken twice over in two diverging contexts. Thus Miss Wodehouse declares (p. 13) that content has one context, while object has another. The one is continuous with mental history, the other with external or physical. And Witasek states the theory in a more extreme way (which Miss Wodehouse would probably not accept) when he says (p. 3): 'a stone die is hard and cold, grey and heavy and angular: the presentation thereof, the thought or memory of the die, has none of these characteristics, and cannot have them — it merely itself contains, over again, the presentation of hard and cold and so on. . . . My *inner picture* . . . of the tree . . . is known only to myself.'* Hofler is saying the same thing when he makes the distinction: 'Physical phenomena are presented as spatial, and indeed in extended fashion, as located at a place; all mental phenomena are *unspatial*.'** Stout (*Manual*, p. 58) says: 'If I perceive a triangle, my perception is not triangular, — it is not made up of lines and angles.' And the same view is implied by Titchener, when he says (*Text-book*, p. 37): 'The psychologist seeks, first of all, to analyse *mental experience* [italics mine] into its simplest components.'

This assumption that references or meanings can be handled in the same way as the objects to which they refer, an assumption which so far as I can find, it is hardly thought necessary to defend, is an assumption which I believe to have very slight foundation.***

* 'Ein steinerner Würfel ist hart und kalt, grau und schwer und eckig; die Vorstellung von ihm, der Gedanke, die Erinnerung an ihn, hat nichts von diesen Eigenschaften, und kann nichts davon haben — sie enthält nur selber wiederum die Vorstellung von hart und kalt und anderem. . . . [M]ein *inneres Bild* [italics mine] vom Baume . . . das kenne ich allein. . . .'

** 'Physische Erscheinungen werden als räumlich und zwar, 1. als ausgedehnt, 2. als an einem Orte befindlich vorgestellt; alle psychische Erscheinungen sind *unräumlich*.'

*** As I am in this discussion particularly indebted to Mr Prichard I will ask permission to quote at some length from *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 125-6: '[T]he tendency to think that the only object or, at least, the only direct object of the mind is something mental still requires explanation. It seems due to a tendency to treat self-consciousness as similar to consciousness of the world. When in reflection we turn our attention away from the world to the activity by which we come to know it, we tend to think of our knowledge of the world as a reality to be

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I wish to consider several typical instances of the theory, and point out the untenable postulates upon which it rests. I would then discuss certain ambiguities in the position of Mr Bradley in this matter, and sketch a theory which appears to me more consistent with his metaphysical views. And first I should like to offer a tentative definition of Fact. A fact, I would submit, is a point of attention which has only one aspect, or which can be treated under one aspect. A fact, then, is an ideal construction, and has its existence within a more or less variable sphere of practical or scientific interest. It is not a judgment simply, but an objective asserted ('it is a fact that'); it contains an internal judging and an external recognizing of the validity of the judgment. Thus when I say 'Velasquez painted this portrait of Philip II' there is as yet no fact expressed; when I say 'it is a fact that V., etc.', or 'it is true that —' or 'I know that —' I am concerned with fact. There is a sphere of historical Reality which is taken for granted, a sphere existing in such a way that the judgment referred to must be either right or wrong, and this sphere we will call 'matter of fact'. And if this judgment is made upon the ground of internal evidence, there may be as well a sphere of aesthetic values taken for granted. Facts are not merely found in the world and laid together like bricks, but every fact has in a sense its place prepared for it before it arrives, and without the implication of a system in which it belongs the fact is not a fact at all. The ideality essential to fact means a particular point of view, and means the exclusion of other aspects of the same point

apprehended similar to the world which we apprehended prior to reflection. We thereby implicitly treat this knowledge as something which, like the world, merely *is* and is not the knowledge of any thing; in other words, we imply that, so far from being knowledge, i.e. the knowing of a reality, it is precisely that which we distinguish from knowledge, viz. a reality to be known, although — since knowledge must be mental — we imply that it is a reality of the special kind called mental. But if the knowledge upon which we reflect is thus treated as consisting in a mental reality which merely *is*, it is implied that in this knowledge the world is not, at any rate directly, object of the mind, for *ex hypothesi* a reality which merely *is* and is not the knowledge of anything has no object. . . . The root of the mistake lies in the initial supposition — which, it may be noted, *seems to underlie the whole treatment of knowledge by empirical psychology* [italics mine] — that knowledge can be treated as a reality to be apprehended, in the way in which any reality which is not knowledge is a reality to be apprehended.

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of attention. There is a sense, then, in which any science — natural or social — is *a priori*: in that it satisfies the needs of a particular point of view, a point of view which may be said to be more original than any of the facts that are referred to that science. The development of a science would thus be rather organic than mechanical; there is a fitness of the various facts for each other, with that instinctive selection and exclusion which is a characteristic of human personality at its highest. Thus the character of a science, like the character of a man, may be said both to be already present at the moment of conception, and on the other hand to develop at every moment into something new and unforeseen. But it will have, from its crudest beginnings, a character to which (though it may belie all our verbal definitions) it will always remain consistent.

Accordingly we may well look, without seeking to formulate narrowly, for the traits of psychology's maturity in the features of infancy. And I have been unable to discover, in the first place, that any scientific individuality is possible as 'reference or meaning', or that you can conjure up one by the magic word 'presentation'. The presentation, I shall argue, is identical with the object from the point of view of the experiencing subject, and from this point of view you have, in metaphysics, no appeal. If we come to find anything more real (as common sense tells us that we must) our criterion will not be an arbitrary division of experience and an arbitrary neglect of the individual, but a theory of degrees of reality. And it is only this arbitrary division which gives us the puzzles of immanent and transcendent object, of unreal and imaginary.

'Whatever constituents of our total experience at any moment', says Stout (*Manual*, p. 57), 'directly determine the nature of the object as it is perceived or thought of at that moment, belong to the cognitive side of our nature, and are called *presentations*.' I do not know in the first place exactly what limits Mr Stout feels justified in setting to the 'total experience at any moment'; for this definition would surely not exclude physiological process or logical category. Does he mean the 'content of consciousness'? But a so-called

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content of consciousness is not, any more than the world of knowledge, a mere collection of entities in which being and being known is identical; so far as they refer to their objects they are not themselves known, and so far as they are made objects of knowledge they no longer refer to objects.* The sensation of red, as cognitive, is not a presentation, but awareness of a red object, an object which is not in any case mental. What do we mean when we turn our attention from a red object to a sensation red? We are, I think, simply diverting attention from a variously determined object to a uniquely determined one. The so-called real object is in Mr Stout's words 'circumscribed and directed by a plexus of visual and other presentations'.¹² He should either say, I think, that the object *is* this plexus, or admit that even a single sensation circumscribes and directs an object. I cannot see why two or more sensations should give us the object when one does not. For Mr Stout admits that the object may really be presented. 'We may say, if we choose, that the object itself is *presented*, but we must not say that it is a presentation; and when we say that it is presented, it is better to say that it is presented *to* consciousness, than that it is presented *in* consciousness' (*An. Psych.*, I, p. 47). I fail to discern the difference; even if consciousness could have perceptions both outside and inside, I do not know how it would succeed in distinguishing one kind from the other. The difference is simply this: a 'red object' is an object which is otherwise known than by the quality red; it is an object which has been given a determined place in an order. The sensation is an object which has not yet thus been placed. It is incorrect, then, to say that we can have sensations of redness; redness is a concept; or to say that we have sensations of red. The sensation is of a red *something*, a red spot or area. And the discovery that the cause of the sensation is a pathological irritation does not affect the objectivity of the sensation in the least. The red 'that' was there, and the fact that the object cannot be further defined and verified does not make it any the less object.

* As has been ably pointed out by Mr Prichard and I believe by Professor Cook Wilson.

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The distinction between object and presentation can be made, as we have seen, in another way: the perception of a triangle, says Stout, is not triangular; the idea of a stone, says Witasek, is not hard and grey. This statement I believe to be in a sense false, and in a sense mere juggling with words. You argue that because idea and object are different, the idea cannot have the physical qualities of the object, and the fact that the idea cannot have these qualities goes to show that there is an 'idea' different from the object. The confusion of course is between reference and existence: the idea is conceived to have an existence apart from its object. This existence, as I have attempted to show in the preceding chapter, is simply the fact of its reference. This fact (which is an objective) cannot be said to be triangular or grey (though it may be hard) — but the fact thus isolated is not the idea; the fact of the reference of the idea must not lead us to speak of the idea as a fact; the idea is only matter of fact. And indeed we may say that the idea is an *abstraction from itself* — for the whole idea is (and yet cannot be) the reality, the idea, and the fact of reference of the idea.

When we say, then that the idea or the perception of a triangle is not triangular, we mean only the fatuity, that the fact of reference is not triangular. And as I have attempted to show in the preceding chapter, the idea (and the perception) is always in a sense identical with the reality which it intends. There can be for a perception, as we have seen, an indeterminate object; there can as well be a mistaken object, and in this way, when the same perception seems to be transferred from one object to another, we are tempted to say that the perception exists and is an object itself apart from any intended object. We have all had the experience of remarking a large bird in the distance, and discovering that it is a small insect a foot or two away. Here we say was a perception which has attached to two different objects. It is not so. There are two different perceptions, the second more consistent with a 'world', but no more closely attached to an object presented *to* consciousness than is the first. There cannot, that is, be a perception of an object if the object perceived is not really

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there. And when you attempt to consider this 'presentation' apart from any prejudice as to the nature of reality you are committed to a contradiction. You must treat the perception either as an illusion or as true. Apart from one or the other of these two points of view the perception simply does not exist. Any attempt to separate percept from object merely doubles the object. A perception cannot be an object for psychology in the sense in which Mr Stout would have it, because it involves two irresoluble points of view.

I confess that I am confused rather than enlightened by Mr Stout's rejoinder to Mr Prichard (*Mind*, April 1907). He says: 'For Psychology, the *esse* of the facts with which it deals is *percipi* in the sense that it considers things only in so far as they are at any moment known, or in so far as they come to be known . . . to an individual mind, and so enter into further relations both to the knowing mind, and to each other.' The fallacy of this statement, if I read it rightly, is as follows. The *esse* of no fact can be *percipi*. Now is psychology really considering 'things only in so far as they are at any moment known . . . to an individual mind'? For so far as they are known to an individual mind they *are* simply, and that's an end of it. And if as psychologists, we inquire into the nature of things as known to another individual mind, we are doing much more than we think: we are abstracting from them one kind of reality which they had for this mind, and substituting therefor another kind — namely, their reality as related to this mind. In Mr Stout's well-known instance, the man enjoying a cigar, there are, following out his definition, three cigars present:

1. The cigar known to the smoker.
2. The (cigar known to the smoker) as known to the psychologist.
3. The cigar known to the psychologist, in the role of private citizen.

Now if we content ourselves with being psychologists and not epistemologists, we have no warrant for identifying these three cigars. And Mr Stout not only insists upon the different points of

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view (the experiences of individual minds) but holds the inconsistent belief that psychology can exhibit the construction of the external world — that it can first abstract wholly from reality, and then piece reality together out of the abstractions.

Again, Mr Stout's beliefs in regard to the nature of sensations are far from clear. In the reply to Mr Prichard he says (*ibid.*, p. 241): 'What we [himself and Dr Ward] refer to when we speak of sensation is something apprehended as distinct from the act of apprehension. . . . Sensations . . . are . . . objects or, as Ward would say, "presentations".' This seems clear enough, though we may be disconcerted in referring back to the preceding page to find that a presentation, as the word is used by Dr Ward, is 'whatever is known *qua* known, whether directly or indirectly'. There is an ambiguity about the phrase 'known *qua* known'. It may mean: 1. from the point of view of the knower; 2. from the point of view of an observer regarding the knower in the act of knowing. Now on turning to Stout's article 'Are Presentations Mental or Physical? A Reply to Professor Alexander', (*Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1908-9, a year later than the reply to Prichard), we find stated on page 245: 'Sensations . . . cannot be merely objects if they are capable of entering into the constitution of properly subjective states.' And on page 246: 'Can Retentiveness be explained if presentations are Physical?' And referring to the *Manual*, we find that (p. 119) 'It is better to restrict the term *sensation* to the special form of consciousness which accompanies the actual operation of stimulus'. I do not know what a 'special form of consciousness' is; the phrase is at best hardly luminous. And when I find the author in one and the same article (*Mind*, p. 241, April 1907) stating that a sensation is an object, and later suggesting (*ibid.*, p. 242) that an (external) object may be made up of sensations, as a plant is of root, stem, leaves, etc., I conclude that I know neither what is sensation nor what is object.

The confusion results, I think, not so much from there not being several realities to correspond to the several terms, as from the use of terms in a plural marriage to mean several things indifferently: and to the fact that there are not distinct classes of *objects* to

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correspond to the several (real) distinctions. The former difficulty is peculiar to Mr Stout; the latter is a general difficulty of the subject-matter, and is apparent in a psychologist of a very different school, Professor Alexander. Mr Alexander is equally certain that a field of the psychical may be sharply distinguished from the non-psychical, though he draws the line elsewhere. In several remarkable articles, and notably that 'On Sensations and Images' (*Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1909-10) he has maintained a conational psychology. (*Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1908-9): '... mind consists of conations, affection being treated as a modality of conation.' And in the article just cited: 'The sentience is mental, but it is held not to vary in quality. The *sensum*, which I shall commonly call sensation, is non-mental.' Similarly (p. 13): 'the imaging is mental, the image physical.' In the attention to a green object, the object of our attention 'may be merely the sensation green' (p. 1).¹³

In contrast to the theory of Mr Stout, such a view has manifest conveniences. It enables us, in the first place, to do away with the equivocal 'presentation' which we have found such a source of embarrassment. Where Stout vacillates between feeling and object, the two are here sharply discriminated. The difficulties of unreal objects, of presentations which present nothing, are apparently avoided. Yet I think that the ultimate objections are much the same after all. In the first place, consider the status of sensation. Mr Alexander appears to assume, like almost everybody else, that we may have a consciousness which is in the strictest sense the consciousness of a sensation, and of nothing else. I have argued (*supra*, p. 62) that a 'sensation of colour' is a loose expression for a perception of a coloured something, and when we think of a colour, it is of a thing not otherwise conditioned than by that colour that we think. Similarly, in the case of a cutaneous pain-sensation, it is of an object conditioned only by that pain-sensation that we think. The sensation, I maintain, is always a way of being conscious of an object, and as we become conscious of this consciousness, it may result in an added determination either of the object or of the self. Hence, on my view, a conscious-

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ness of red is on the one hand a red consciousness and on the other hand the consciousness of a red object.

Otherwise, I think, Mr Alexander will find the same difficulty in constructing an object out of sensations as does Mr Stout. A sensation is certainly an object in the sense that it is the object to which it refers; but when we are aware of an object, the sensations through which we come into contact with it do not persist alongside it as independent objects, as on the ultra-objective theory I should expect them to. We seem to find a fallacy which can be attacked thus: *The object of attention and the qualities or conditions of this object cannot be equally objective from the point of view for which they exist as such.*

In a sensation, that is, there are two verbal moments, the -ing and the -ed, which can be discriminated when together but cannot be treated apart. The evidence that they can be discriminated for certain practical purposes is simply this, that when we speak of a sensation, in our quotidian vocabulary we can with perfect propriety have *emphasis* on either the active or the objective aspect, never meaning wholly one or the other in isolation. Sensation-in-itself is in the language of Bradley 'feeling' or experience as more original than consciousness; but sensation in itself is not as such capable of being an object of attention (Chapter I). Sensation and perception, on the theory I have just outlined, are different in concept but in existence different only in degree. Sensation as known is always some degree of crude perception:¹⁴ the moment we speak of 'having a sensation' we have stepped into the theory of knowledge, have posited a self and consequently an external world; it is still sensation, however, in that it is rather a feeling of a peculiar relation than a characterization of either subject or object.

The situation of the separate sensations, then, with regard to the developed object, is this: the sensations cannot be objects on the same plane as the developed object, since it is to this object, and not as before, to themselves (as by the vagueness of their reference they may loosely be said to do) that they refer. They are the ways of being conscious — the *content* — of this object,

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and in a sense the total experience may be said to be, on a higher plane, a fuller sensation of a remoter object (and so on). In other words, there is a constant transcendence of object into reference, and the absolutely objective is nowhere found. This, I think, furnishes a pertinent criticism of Mr Alexander. In a world so objective as that of Mr Alexander one cannot have a genuine object presented to one. ('On Sensation and Images', p. 15): 'Fully realise that perceiving a thing means that mind and the thing are together in the same sense as the table and the floor are together, and you understand that the imagination of the table means that the mind and the table are together; but the table in its imagined form, with imperfections and added elements.' I do not see how they can be together unless it is admitted that the object is only the compound of sensations — a position which may lead to Berkeley, and certainly leads to nominalism; (*Con. Psych.*, p. 253)¹⁵: '... a thing as perceived contains besides sensory elements other elements present to the mind only in ideal form. ... But the ideal elements are themselves objective and non-mental. They exhibit their true relation to the sensory elements in the course of the perceptual process itself.' I do not think that we ought to say that a thing is made up of sensory elements and ideas, as a pastry is made up of the right ingredients and good cooking. I do not think that it is true that we can or do attend to both sorts of elements at the same time in the same way. It is true, if you like, that the ideal elements are non-mental, but their relation with the real elements is one of mutual reference and implication; and in a world composed solely of objects I can find no room for implication. The picture which certain masses of colour 'imply' is just as 'objective' as the colour-sensations, but not objective in the same way; the cognition of the picture means a transition to a different plane of reality. The colour-masses have thus transcended themselves, and ceased to be simply objects.

This introduces us to Mr Alexander's theory of the subject-matter of psychology. Over against sensation the properly mental element is conation. (*Con. Psych.*, p. 243): 'the subject, as given in enjoyment and therefore in the only form in which it enters into

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psychology is nothing but the continuous tissue of its acts of conation or attention.' Psychology 'will describe how differently it *feels* or *is enjoyed* when we sense or perceive or will or the like.' Now my difficulty as I have already said, is in understanding what is left when you abstract from a mental state its reference; or what comes to the same thing, what reference is left when you have only the reference. 'In watching a ball which one is trying to catch, the perceptive conation whose object is the approaching ball is that complex of visual and anticipatory tactual conations which issue in movements of the eyes and more particularly of the hands' (*Con. Psych.*, p. 248). I cannot find anything here, once the non-mental or objective elements are abstracted, upon which I can lay my finger. I can see material for psycho-physics, but Mr Alexander insists that psycho-physics is a different field (*ibid.*, p. 248 ff.). I can only understand conation, so far as we may be said to be conscious of it at the moment, and Mr Alexander's conation goes far beyond this point, inasmuch as it is everywhere present — the subject in psychology is a 'continuous tissue' of its acts of conation.

There is no reason for regarding conation as ultimate even from a psychological point of view, unless we are ready to accept a psychology of faculty. And I can see no reason for making will more original than thought. (*Ibid.*, p. 263): '... [T]he act of judgment is maintained to be literally an act of will.' The proposition which is the *cognitum* of the judgment is the object willed. It is as possible to state will in intellectual terms, and to say (what I do not believe to be any truer) that will is the self-realization of an idea. The conation, I am ready to admit, exists, but only in a certain context: only with on one side a self to which the conation is attached (but which is never identified with that conation) and on the other side with a real world (real from the point of view of this self, which is all the reality required) which the conation intends. For in willing (and in desiring (Messer) which is another form of conation) some reality is already posited; and in desire the object desired is recognized as somehow real (Bradley). Thus it cannot be wholly true that (*ibid.*, p. 265) '... it is in willing that

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objects . . . become known as real. . . ' And in this relation the conation ceases to be merely a conation.

I cannot help thinking that Mr Alexander's conation tends to find its full reality in physiological process, much as its author may himself deprecate this conclusion. 'There is', he says (*ibid.*, p. 252), 'good reason for believing that these differences [in conation] are really of a spatial character, really are differences of the locality and direction of the physiological processes [italics mine] and that that locality and direction are actually enjoyed.' If what we 'enjoy' is the physiological process, then either this process is the object of the enjoyment — which is impossible, as the enjoyment refers to an entity of which we are conscious; or the process is the enjoyment — in which case nothing remains surely but to study the process itself. And the tendency toward physiology becomes still more natural if we mean to treat affections (*Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1908-9, p. 6) 'as a modality of conation'. The necessity for so considering them appears only when we have made conation so substantial as to isolate it from the intended reality, and the consequence is to make the tertiary qualities aesthetic, and entirely subjective. Now I am prepared to argue that affections are just as objective if objectivity is to be absolute and not in any sense a matter of degree — as are sensations. Why should anger be any less objective than pain-sensation? Can we not contemplate our affections as well as our sensations? And if it be said that affections are essentially *wahrnehmungsflechtig* (perceptually elusive), in contrast to sensation I reply that it appears to me everywhere a matter of degree. And finally I seem to discover that Mr Alexander, like Mr Stout, instead of recognizing everywhere differences of degree, has erected sharp bounds and everywhere transgressed them. One of the bounds is this: 'we contemplate objects, we enjoy our states.'¹⁶ We are then told that 'the fundamental fact of experience informs us that mind is but one thing together with external things . . . ' and on the next page that panpsychism overlooks 'the fundamental difference of mind and things which is expressed by saying that the one is enjoyed and the others contemplated' ('The method of metaphysics', pp. 4 and 5).

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An equally interesting and more satisfactory demarcation of the field of psychology is that of Lipps (*Inhalt und Gegenstand*). In this essay, in which I find very little to question, Lipps makes the claim that things, and not merely sensations, are given to us. (P. 512): 'A person who sees things . . . is not seeing sensations, or presentations, or perceptions, or experiences. . . ' (P. 513): '... sensation . . . is a determination of myself. . . At the same time the sensing is . . . also, in a manner, a determination of (for example) the blue or red.' There is a relative distinction into 1. Myself; 2. My sensing; 3. That which is sensed, or the content of sensation. What we are conscious of is *object* (p. 520: 'To think something, or think of something, is to have something as an object');* an object which is conditioned by our knowledge of it, because it is *our* object; but which is real, and not mere *Erscheinung* (appearance) — which is, *qua* our object, independent of us. The sensation is at once a *Bestimmung* (determination) of the object and of the *Ich* (the self), a relation between the two which conditions whichever you direct your attention toward.

The *Ich* and its objects then form metaphysically one whole, a whole from which we can abstract in either direction. Qualities in relation to external points of attention give us the realities of practice and natural science; in relation to (*in Beziehung auf*) the *Ich* they give the subject-matter of psychology. Mental states, Lipps insists, have no independent existence: there are simply relations which in our reference constitute the external or objective and in another reference constitute the psychical. *Eigenschaften* (characteristics) in themselves are not objects, not capable of being made a point of attention; they can only be experienced with respect to a point of attention. While normative science — logic, ethics, aesthetics — is 'lyrisch', psychology is 'episch' — gives not *Ausdruck* (expression), but *Bericht* (report). Normative

* (p. 512) 'Wer Dinge sieht . . . sieht nicht Empfindungen oder Vorstellungen oder Perzeptionen oder experiences. . . ' (p. 513): '... die Empfindung . . . eine Bestimmung meiner ist . . . Zugleich ist das Empfinden . . . in gewissem Sinne auch eine Bestimmung des Blau oder Rot. . . ' There is a relative distinction into: 1. Ich; 2. mein Empfinden; 3. das Empfundene oder der Empfindungsinhalt. What we are conscious of is *object* (p. 520: Etwas denken, an etwas denken, dies heisst etwas zum Gegenstande haben).

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science is the expression of the *ueberindividuelles Ich*, which is in a sense the realization of the limited *Ich*. (P. 663): (The 'supra-individual self') 'is in us, but we are not identical with it. Indeed, so far as we are not, we *ought* to be so. This ought is the call, which is an expression both of the *presence* of this self in us, and of our own *limitations*'. As for empirical psychology, (p. 654) 'it does not, indeed, replace the processes in consciousness, which experience declares to "belong" to the soul, by other conscious processes. But to the occurrence of such processes it adds a variety of determinations, which are of another nature, and so cannot figure in immediate experience: such as stimuli, associations, memory-traces, capacities, character-traits and dispositions. It thereby creates, upon causal principles, a world of the mentally or psychically real, which absolutely transcends, and is thus wholly beyond comparison with, what is given in the immediate experience of the self.'*

This theory has a certain resemblance to that of Ward for whom the subject-matter of psychology does not consist in any particular group of entities, but in the 'whole choir of heaven and earth' from a certain point of view. But there are aspects of Lipps' theory which leads us toward the conclusion that this point of view does not exist. Can *Empfinden* (sensing) be turned inside out and applied to the *Ich* in the same way as to the thing? I am inclined to think that there is a confusion here. I cannot see why, on the ground of the threefold division *Ich* — *Empfinden* — *Empfundene* (self — sensing — sensed) and the characterization, which seems to me admirable, of *Empfinden* as a *Bestimmung* (determina-

* (The 'ueberindividuelles ich') 'ist in uns, aber wir sind es doch nicht. Eben, soweit wir es nicht sind, sollen wir es sein. Dies Sollen ist die Forderung; und diese ist der Ausdruck zugleich für das Dasein jenes Ich in uns, und für unsere Schranke.' As for empirical psychology (p. 654): 'Sie ersetzt freilich nicht die Bewusstseinslebnisse, die nach Aussage jener Erfahrung an der Seele "haften", durch andere Bewusstseinslebnisse. Aber sie fügt zu dem Haben Bewusstseinslebnissen allerlei Bestimmungen, die nichts dergleichen sind, und darum in der unmittelbaren Erfahrung nicht vorkommen können. So die Reize, die Assoziationen, die Gedächtnisspueren, die Anlagen, Charaktereigenschaften, Dispositionen. Sie baut so dem Kausalgesetze gemäss eine Welt des seelischen oder des psychischen Realen auf, die dem in der unmittelbaren Icherfahrung Gegebenen absolut transzendent, ja damit völlig unvergleichlich ist.'

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tion) of both *Ich* and object, any further determination of the status of sensation should be necessary. This one situation is that which it always occupies. I am not, in experience of a colour, treating the sensation as a qualification of the blue or red any more than of myself. However I express myself, I mean only that the sensation is there as a relation between myself and the object, a relation which is internal and goes to make up both self and object. And if you propose to detach this sensation any further from the object and make it a determination solely of the self, then you put it in an entirely false situation. Lipps has already said that the object is really given to us, and the *Ich* really given to us, and that the sensations are not separate objects which stand between us and the object. Now the aim of natural science, I suppose, is simply to dispose of the various appearances which are found to be determinations of the *Ich* and of the real object so far as they are found to have the relation to the subject which they were supposed to have only to the thing — or rather, so far as they are found to have relations and to be distinguishable in thought from the thing. The goal of science, consequently, would be a system of terms in relation, of terms the nature of each of which would be constituted by its place in the system; which would be completely definable by their position, and which would have no characteristics which could be isolated from the system. Every empirical discipline, of course, uses terms the explanation of which would fall outside of that system in which they are explanatory; terms which we require a fresh point of view to analyse.

The attitude of science, then, involves the constitution of a larger and larger limbo of appearance — a larger field of reality which is referred to the subjective side of experience. Economics is appearance for the biologist, biology for the chemist. Similarly, social psychology is appearance to the individual psychologist. It is when we ask what the simple terms of individual psychology are that I am at a loss.

For the relation of appearances (the appearances which condition both self and object) to an ultimate external reality is not the province of any one science to decide, inasmuch as fields of

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discourse are objective or subjective in different contexts, and as things are non-mental in various ways, so they can be mental in various ways, and if the subject-matter of psychology is to be appearance in relation to the self, we have not one science, but a whole universe of sciences, corresponding to the self as found expressed in the structure of social civilization, in its works of science, in the laws of thought, in image or in sensation.

I think, then, that Lipps has been deceived into conclusions which are inconsistent with his own admirable division of mental and physical, by the tacit assumption that in the sciences other than psychology we abstract from the psychical aspect. The psychical aspect, he has shown himself, is always present: wherever there is the *Ich*, there is a continuity between the *Ich* and its object; not only in the case of perception, but in every case of knowledge. In science we have only abstracted from *one or several spheres of mental reality* — and from physical reality at the same time. We have then done in every science what Lipps asks us to do specially in the case of psychology — considered a field of reality as a condition and expression of the self.

What, if this be true, has Lipps in mind as the field of psychology? Simply, I think, the old chimera, 'states of consciousness', meanings torn from their reference. You have first a mind essentially related to a world. In order to study the mind, you abstract it from the world — but abstract the world with it, and double the world to get a *real* world. You then assert that the first world simply exists as presentation, and that reference is to *your* world, and not to the subject's. And all this comes from the fallacy of treating a difference of aspects as a difference of things.

We meet, however with definitions which make no distinction between mental and non-mental. Thus Miss Wodehouse's (p. 13) content is as objective as object; psychology does not expand the contents of the object but limits them 'because it is interested in their shape' (p. 20). This is an important, and radically different, definition, of the subject-matter of psychology; the external world and the mental world are of exactly the same stuff, and are *ultimately identical, but as experienced are both fragments.*

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The world examined by the psychologist is the world which is the content of consciousness in relation to the various elements in the constitution of the subject which condition it; and these elements, I should suppose, may be either that part of the external world which has previously been content of that consciousness, or the physiological and psycho-physical conditions. On the one hand the content is continuous with the whole external universe (p. 21) and on the other hand with the history of that subject. In the latter relation it is the subject-matter of psychology: psychology, accordingly, deals rather with the personal than with the 'psychical'.

This division would seem to give us two clear groups of objects. But I am not convinced that the connections of content may not be reduced to connections of the real world on the one hand and to physiological connections on the other. Memory content must be considered as connected according to the reality remembered and *in the same way as the reality remembered*: that is, the laws which hold of the reality hold of the memory connections in their reference; the laws of the physical world hold of ideas of that world so far as those ideas are real ideas. And so far as those ideas are not real, as from being a specification they are merely a tendency, and from a tendency merely an undifferentiated feeling, the idea is dissolved into physiological conditions. So far as the idea is real, we have seen above, it is not idea; and so far as it is not real it is not idea. This is equally true of ideas of imagination or of ideas of memory. It is not true that the ideas of a great poet are in any sense arbitrary: certainly in the sense in which imagination is capricious, the ideas of a lunatic or an imbecile are more 'imaginative' than those of a poet. In really great imaginative work the connections are felt to be bound by as logical necessity as any connections to be found anywhere; the apparent irrelevance is due to the fact that terms are used with more or other than their normal meaning, and to those who do not thoroughly penetrate their significance the relation between the aesthetic expansion and the objects expressed is not visible.

But it is no wise true that the connections of content are

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subjective and peculiarly subject-matter for psychology. They are personal if you like, but a work of imagination is never simply personal. So far as we consider it as *only* personal — i.e. significant only to the author — we explain it not as imagination but as the product of pathological conditions. Thus we are tempted to explain a poem of Mallarmé as we explain dreams, as due to morbid physiological activity. And if it is said that this radical separation would do away with all criticism, we may point out that criticism — involving the circumstances under which a work was produced — is other than psychology in that it includes at every point a reference to a real world with which the other is compared: a procedure which in psychology is inadmissible.

It is sufficient for the purpose of this chapter to have argued that a 'psychological event' can not be torn from its context and be set in a context of other purely psychological events: the problem of the relation of an idea to the real world from the point of view of epistemology must be taken up later. The theory of the idea which I have proposed, and which I believe to be substantially in harmony with Mr Bradley's metaphysics, implies to this point only that the idea, as you try to grasp it as an object, either identifies itself with the reality or melts back in the other direction into a different reality, the reality of its physiological basis. Ideas in relation with the nervous system on the one hand, and with the intended reality on the other, may have a certain existence in epistemology, but have no pretension to a purely 'psychological' existence. And here I find myself in conflict with much that Mr Bradley has had to say on the subject of psychology, especially in his articles on Active Attention, on the Definition of Will, and on a Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology.¹⁷ The first two articles are explanatory — they substitute for data of immediacy universal connections; we may therefore inquire what these data are. The last article defends a view very similar to those which I have been attacking.

'Psychology', says Bradley (p. 28),¹⁸ 'is to be concerned with psychical events, and such an event is whatever is immediately experienced, either as a whole or as an integral aspect of a whole,

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and is not for the purpose in hand taken otherwise than as an adjective happening to and qualifying a particular soul. These facts are events because they happen in time, each with a place in the order of the "real world" in general. . . . [T]he meaning of one soul or subject, . . . must be fixed arbitrarily.' (P. 35)¹⁹: 'You can only explain events . . . by the laws of their happening, and it does not matter for your purpose, so long as these laws work, whether they possess ultimate truth or are more or less fictitious and false.' The difficulty which I find with such a definition lies in the definition of event. Psychical event, it is said, is immediately experienced (distinct from experience). And the question I raise is whether in our conscious life anything is immediately experienced except experience itself. And in the second place the event taken as happening to that particular soul is not the same event from the point of view of that soul, for from the latter point of view the event does not 'qualify' the soul, but qualifies external reality. And if from another point of view, then what is the event? Till you have 'the laws of their happening' how can you be said to have the event? An event, I should suppose, is a *what* — a *that* somehow interpreted, for you must single out some one aspect, you must occupy some point of view not internal to the event, before there is anything of which there can be a law.

Mr Bradley's position involves a parallelism between knowledge as the reality which it intends and knowledge as event in the soul (p. 30).²⁰ 'To say that ideas and judgements do not happen at a certain time, and that in this sense they fail to be occurrences, seems clearly contrary to fact. . . .'²¹ '[T]he idea or the judgement, . . . is assuredly a psychical event. . . . A truth, we may say, is no truth at all unless it happens in a soul and is thus an event which appears in time.'²² This seems to me to involve a confusion of the psychological point of view with the metaphysical. From the latter standpoint this statement is correct; from the former it seems palpably false. A truth as truth must of course *appear* independent of the soul as experienced in the perception of that truth, and its oneness with the soul (as truth) is a matter of metaphysical unity and not relative to its happening 'in' a soul. A truth as such

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is quite independent of finite soul, and we may say that it is the finitude of truth which constitutes the finite soul. So far then, as it is an event it is not a truth or a judgment at all. And so far as we are conscious of it as an event it is not in the same sense the 'truth' that we are conscious of. In knowledge then the event of knowledge is not something that enters into consciousness.

It is certainly not from the point of view of the subject that the idea or judgment is an event, and from the subject's viewpoint the only laws of happening are the laws of the world of which he is conscious, while from the outsider's point of view, the only laws are laws which lie beyond the consciousness of the subject. But, it will be said, the subject is conscious of previous ideas and judgments as events in his own career: if he were conscious of them merely as realities apprehended, he would not be aware of his past at all, for it would not be *his* past, but the past of the world. We are constantly passing, that is to say, from the judgment as reality to the judgment as a qualification of ourself — a view which my own account of memory is obliged to support. I again offer, however, the theory of identity there presented, and emphasize the fact that memory is an elaborate and artificial product, which can be treated from the point of view of psychophysics as subject to laws — though only so far as it is not memory — which serves a practical need, and does not pretend to give anything which was ever as such actual. As in memory of an external reality we may have an image which refers to a reality, so in recollection of our own judgment we assert an objective (*that* we judged so and so), an assertion which refers to the judgment as an event but which constitutes it as an event in the act of assertion. For a reference, as I have suggested in several passages, does not everywhere imply the existence of that to which it refers, outside of the reference itself.

Let us say, then that in memory and in the observation of the actions of others we have reference to events which are never as such actual. Have we not here a consistent enough point of view to determine a subject-matter? I would offer two objections. In the first place, these events as psychic phenomena have no laws.

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For internally, their relations among themselves are determined only by the real world from the point of view of the subject, and externally by the real world from the point of view of the subject, and externally by the real world from somebody else's point of view²³; while their mid-way reality is at once greater and less than such as science can grasp. And in the second place the soul is not something definite to which phenomena can be attached all on the same plane, but varies with the meaning which each phenomenon has for it. In order to know what a particular event is, you must know the soul to which it occurs, and the soul exists only in the events which occur to it; so that the soul is, in fact, the whole world of its experience at any moment, while both soul and event transcend that moment. The soul is its whole past so far as that past enters into the present, and it is the past as implied in the present. (*Appearance*, p. 275): 'But at any one time . . . the soul is the present *datum* of psychical fact, plus its actual past and its conditional future.' But I cannot feel satisfied with the statement (*Mind*, 33, p. 29)²⁴ that 'The soul . . . is the dispositions which it has acquired'. 'In saying that the soul has a disposition of a certain kind, we take the present and past psychical facts as the subject, and we predicate of this subject other psychical facts, which we think it may become.' (*Appearance*, p. 276). Now I question whether it is ever a 'psychical' fact which we take as the subject in a disposition. Men are avaricious, generous, vicious, or self-sacrificing, and these qualities I suppose are dispositions. But avarice and generosity are not psychical events but social interpretations of behaviour, behaviour involving the whole organism. What is in the mind of the avaricious or generous man is not avarice or generosity, but a real world qualified in a certain way, and these qualifications are interpreted or introspected as subjective, conditioned by a disposition. But to be 'subjective' is not to be mental, and to be a disposition is ultimately to be a disposition of the whole organism — so that I can see no difference between psychical and physical disposition. For disposition must rest upon something which is actual and this must be a physical structure.

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What then as to the doctrine of Mr Bradley (*op. cit.*, *Mind*, p. 41),²⁵ that an emotion can be attended to? I believe this doctrine to be correct. For on the theory which I have outlined above, pleasure as pure feeling is an abstraction, and in reality is always partially objective: the emotion is really part of the object, and is ultimately just as objective. Hence when the object, or complex of objects, is recalled, the pleasure is recalled in the same way, and is naturally recalled on the object side rather than on the subject side: though it tends (*op. cit.*, *Mind*, p. 44)²⁶ to instate itself as an active pleasure.*

As to the theory of attention** and the theory of will** I think that they illustrate in detail the objections that I have raised in general. Will, we are told, is the self-realization of an idea; and this explanation I protest against as metaphysics and not psychology. I cannot feel, with regard to an explanation of a faculty which explains it by reference to something which falls outside of consciousness, that such is a psychological explanation. Mr Bradley is concerned with will only in operation: 'With will taken in its full sense I agree that psychology cannot concern itself' (i.e., will as 'standing tendency').²⁷ And with will as I am aware of will I cannot concede that this definition has anything to do. '[B]ecause I am aware of the idea as itself making the change . . . I am aware also that this change is the work of myself.'²⁸ But the idea has to be my idea. 'Provided . . . that the idea has remained qualified in my mind as the act of another, it cannot in its proper character, and as such, realize itself in my person.'²⁹ The fact that the idea has to be my idea seems to give away the whole case; for so far as it is *my* idea it is already willed.

So far as will is not felt, I cannot see any reason for using the concept at all; and so far as it is felt, it requires no explanation and can find none. Mr Bradley's account might be a true account of what goes on when we think that there is will; but in order to be a true account it would have to justify its point of view. Ideas,

* Cf. T. P. Nunn, *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1909-10, p. 192.

** 'Active Attention', *Mind*, 1902, No. 41. 'Definition of Will', *Mind*, Nos. 44, 46, 49.

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as I have claimed, are not objects, but occupy a half-way stage between existence and meaning. From a purely external point of view there is no will; and to find will in any phenomenon requires a certain empathy; we observe a man's actions and place ourselves partly but not wholly in his position; or we act, and place ourselves partly in the position of an outsider. And this doubleness of aspect is in fact the justification for the use of the term. Another person, and in its degree another *thing*, is not for us simply an object; there is always, I believe, a felt continuity between the object and oneself. The only error lies in regarding this community as due to the common possession of a character which belongs to both subject and object as such, and belongs to each independently. This character is then treated as a thing. But will is not a character of consciousness purely, and it is not at all a character of things as such; it arises only in a conflict, and is in the primitive mind cognized as a character of object as naturally as of subject; so that it is only by a certain degree of abstraction that we come to think of ourselves as willing and of objects as moved by 'forces' — an expression which simply indicates the degree of objectification which we have succeeded in establishing. For these reasons I am inclined to regard will as indefinable and as offering no problem. If we are to have a psychology we must postulate a faculty of will, though we hold will to be finally mere appearance. And such psychology, I think, will be not a scientific but a philosophical discipline. For science deals with objects or with the relations of objects; and will, we have said, belongs to a place half-way between object and subject.

Attention likewise belongs in the class of half-objects. 'Popular psychology', says Titchener (*Psychology of Feeling and Attention*, p. 181), 'regards attention, indifferently, as faculty and as manifestation of faculty.' Here, I suggest, popular psychology is right, for popular psychology (in this sense) is the only psychology that there is. And I believe that Bradley's theory of attention, like Titchener's, is merely an attempt to reduce attention to something else without knowing what that something is. What can we have, in an account of attention, but a description of physio-

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logical conditions and a description of the realities apprehended? And there is only attention, I submit, when the conditions and the reality apprehended are confused. That this interfusion is everywhere found does not alter the case. For it is only as felt that the two are confused, and when we turn this feeling into an object the two elements fall apart: 'We cannot attend to several disconnected objects at once; we organize them into a single object' ('Active Attention', p. 21).³⁰ This I believe to be true, but what does it mean? That the world, so far as it is a world at all, tends to organize itself into an articulate whole. The real is the organized. And this statement is metaphysics, so if it comes to us as a novelty it is not psychology. From a psychological point of view, things perceived are connected so far as they are perceived to be connected. If we contemplate several objects, and recognize them as disconnected, they *are* disconnected except for metaphysics, and that is the complete statement of the case. 'But is there then', says Mr Joseph (*Mind*, 1911), 'no such thing as psychology . . . [I]f I were asked what it really is, I should say, not a science, but a collection of more or less detached inquiries, of the result of which philosophy must take account. There are for example inquiries into "double personality" and kindred puzzles, which must affect any theory of the real nature of the individual soul or self; there are experiments about association-time, reaction-time, etc., which help to explain why one man's mind works quicker than another's, but no more throw light on the nature of thinking than the determination of the duration of the crotchet explains the beauty of music. [T]here are more definitely psycho-physical investigations, e.g., into brain-localisation which may have therapeutic value, and of course any facts about the relation of what is mental to what is cerebral are important to a theory of the soul, as of a knower belonging somehow to the same whole with the known.'

I can subscribe to most of this statement. There is certainly an important field for psycho-physics and the study of behaviour, and there are even certain processes where introspection is not without value. But this knowledge, I insist, is knowledge either of physiology, biology, or of the external world, and implies both a

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real known external world and a real nervous system: for we are not to say that there is a mental content which is mental. There is, in this sense, nothing mental, and there is certainly no such thing as consciousness if consciousness is to be an object or something independent of the objects which it has. There are simply 'points of view', objects, and half-objects. Science deals only with objects; psychology, in the sense of rational or faculty psychology, may deal with half-objects, and metaphysics alone with the subject, or point of view.