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I.—MR. BRADLEY'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT.

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*Introductory.*—It would, I presume, be generally admitted, that all predication has for ultimate subject something concrete. But it seems a gigantic paradox to maintain that there is only one thing which is concrete in the sense required. Now it is just this paradox which forms the most essential feature of Mr. Bradley's theory of judgment, and it is just this paradox which constitutes the indispensable basis and presupposition of his whole philosophy.

In examining his views I shall refer especially to the first, and in a less degree to the second, chapter of the *Logic*. Both these chapters contain assertions which he would not now defend. But I shall endeavour to confine my criticism chiefly to those essential points which he does and must abide by.

*Definition of Concreteness.*—With a view to clearness, I must here attempt to say what I mean, and what, I take it, is ordinarily meant by the term *concrete*. What is concrete is particular. But we cannot affirm that whatever is particular is concrete. The roundness of this or that orange, as it exists in the orange, is particular. But it is not concrete. It is not concrete, for the reason that its particularity is derivative. It is particularised not only for our knowledge, but in fact by its being a partial feature of the particular

orange. If we disregard what is involved in its existence in the particular orange, we immediately think of it an abstract universal which cannot exist without being particularised. On the contrary, the orange is ordinarily regarded as particular in its own right. Doubtless it stands in manifold relations to other particulars, and such relatedness essentially determines its special nature. But such relatedness is not generally supposed to give it particular existence. Both the orange and the table on which it lies are for the plain man particulars in their own right—in other words, they are both concretes. And it is only because they are both concretes that they can stand in that particular relation which we express or imply by saying “that the orange is lying on the table.” The mutual relatedness distinctive of concrete existence presupposes their particularity, and therefore cannot logically constitute it. Concreteness, then, is underived particularity. In order to show that anything is not concrete, it is not sufficient to show that its special nature is determined by relations to other things. It must be shown that it owes its *particularity* to such relations, and that they do not, on the contrary, presuppose its particularity. It must be shown that it is only particularised as an adjective of something else. What Bradley, Spinoza, and Hegel try to show is that everything is ultimately particularised only as an adjective of the absolute. There is for them only one concrete. On the other hand, Aristotle, Leibnitz, and Herbart agree with common sense in holding that there are a plurality of concretes. In this I follow them.

*Ideas and Signs.*—Mr. Bradley begins with the thesis that there cannot be “judgment proper without ideas,”\* and he proceeds to affirm that all ideas are symbols or signs, and must be recognised as such by the person judging. If we enquire what is a symbol or sign, he provides us with a precise answer. A sign or symbol is “any fact that has a meaning, and meaning

consists of a part of the content (original or acquired),\* cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the sign.” As Mr. Bradley now no longer admits the possibility of “floating ideas,” we must, in spite of the note to page 4, add that the content of the sign is not only cut loose from its existence, but also “referred away to another real subject.” The term “content” stands for the nature of anything as distinguished from its existence.

If we examine this definition closely, we soon see that however well it may apply to the special case of ideas, it is not applicable to other signs. It is not true that whenever we use a sign, the content of the sign is thought of as qualifying the thing signified. When a forget-me-not is regarded by me as a sign of faithfulness in love, I do not mentally qualify faithfulness in love as being blue, or having stamens and a corolla. Yet Mr. Bradley, when he wrote the *Logic*, regarded such cases as coming within the scope of his definition. I submit that they evidently fall outside it. It is clear that so far as the definition holds good at all, it holds good only of signs which owe their significance to their likeness to the thing signified. But even here there is a difficulty. In regarding a handful of wheat as a sample of a sackful, I undoubtedly regard the qualities of the wheat in my hand as also belonging to the wheat in the sack. But I do not, in any intelligible sense, mentally cut loose these qualities from their existence in the sample before me. If I did not recognise the qualities as existing in the sample, it could not represent for me the rest of the wheat. Finally, it is very hard to accept the statement that only the content of signs can be significant, and not also their existence. When an engine-driver sees a danger-signal on the line, the actual existence of the signal at the time has surely a meaning

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\* I cannot discover what this reservation means. I have consulted Mr. Bradley himself without result. He assures me, however, that it is of no importance.

for him. It indicates a correspondingly existent danger which a merely imagined or supposed signal would not indicate.

If ideas satisfy Mr. Bradley's definition of a sign, it is plain that they form an altogether peculiar species of signs. Indeed, they must differ so much from other signs that it may well be doubted whether we ought to apply the term *sign* to them at all.

*Logical and Psychical Idea.*—There is, however, no doubt that the definition of a sign does agree most rigorously with Mr. Bradley's own account of ideas. Indeed, we have only to take one more point into account in order to transform it into a complete definition of what constitutes an idea according to Mr. Bradley. We have only to consider the kind of existence which, according to him, belongs to the signs used when we have ideas, or, in other words, make judgments. The sign exists as psychic fact. It exists as an immediate experience of the person judging at the time when he judges. It must be an immediate experience, in the same sense as a toothache or hunger, if and so far as they are actually being felt. The content of the idea is merely a partial content of this psychical fact divorced from its psychical existence. The psychical fact Mr. Bradley calls a psychical idea, in distinction from the logical idea with which he is alone concerned. This terminology seems to me unfortunate and misleading. It implies that meaning can be in no sense a psychical fact. Now, if the term *meaning* stands for what is meant, this may be admitted; but the act or process of meaning this or that is psychical fact, and can be nothing else. Further, this act or process is essential to ideas even from a psychological point of view. A psychical idea, in Mr. Bradley's sense, is, as he himself points out, not an idea of anything. This being so, it cannot be regarded, even by the psychologist, as being an idea at all. To have an idea is to think of something as so and so qualified. Both for logic and psychology the idea is the qualification by which the thing thought of is determined for the thinker. The

difference between the points of view from which the logician and the psychologist respectively regard ideas need not be discussed here.

*Essential Points of the Theory.*—We are now in a position to state the leading points in Mr. Bradley's theory of judgment:—

(1) According to this theory the entire content of every idea is also a content of immediate experience\* at the time of

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\* Strictly speaking, the qualification, "immediate," is unnecessary, and may very well mislead. There is no difference between my experience, in the strict sense, and my "immediate" experience. When I now think of the felt pain of yesterday's toothache, this pain, though it is now thought of, is not now an experience of mine at all. It was so yesterday. If we choose to say that yesterday's toothache is now a mediate experience of mine, we ought clearly to recognise that we are using the term "experience" in a generically different sense from that which attaches to it in speaking of "immediate" experience. We mean merely that it is something we are thinking of, not something we are feeling. The distinction is as great as that between a "wire," in the sense of a telegraphic despatch, and a wire as it stretches from one telegraph post to another.

If there is necessarily some quasi-cognitive awareness attaching to the mere existence of a feeling, yet this awareness must be distinguished from the content of which we are aware; for the awareness is present both in pleasure and pain, and both in anger and fear, whereas the content varies. We may affirm that the awareness and the content are inseparable abstract aspects of the relatively concrete feeling. But we must none the less distinguish them. And the content, as well as the awareness, is an experience of the person who feels,—his *immediate* experience, if we choose to call it so. In any case, we ought not to call the content an object. For the mode of our awareness of it is radically different from that of our present awareness of yesterday's pain. Yesterday's pain is distinct in existence from our present cognition of it. The present cognition is our experience, not that which we cognise. But that awareness of present pain which is supposed to be involved in the bare fact that it is felt, is not distinct in existence from the feeling. It is merely an abstract aspect of it, like its intensity.

Further, I would point out that what is my experience does not cease to be so because I cognise it, and it does not cease to be *immediate* because I cognise it. I may be actually feeling angry, and at the same time judging that I feel angry. Similarly, I may judge, and at the same time judge that I am judging—*e.g.*, when I purposely give an example of the process of judgment. Feeling and judging no more cease to be immediately experienced merely because they are also cognised, than the moon ceases to be the moon simply because someone thinks of it.

judging. If it were not so, it could not be used to determine for thought the subject concerning which we judge. Thus, whenever we think of or apprehend anything as having a certain qualification, the characters which we ascribe to it are wholly contained within our own psychical state at the moment. From this point of view "no idea," as Mr. Bradley himself says, "can be anything but just what it means." The partial content of psychical existence which is used as an ideal symbol must be simply identical with what it signifies. Regarded in this light, the actual existent psychical state which is supposed to serve as a sign may appropriately be called an "image." For it contains a duplicate of its own meaning, as an image in a mirror is a duplicate of the object it reflects. Hence we find Mr. Bradley freely using the terms image and imagery without special explanation. "The imagery," he says, "is a sign, and the meaning is but one part of the whole which is divorced from the rest and from its existence."

(2) A second point of Mr. Bradley's theory is that the partial content of our immediate experience which is used as an idea, is *co ipso* "cut loose," "alienated," "divorced," or "prescinded" from its existence as a feature of our psychical state. In judgment it is indeed treated as the qualification of a concrete existence. But this concrete existence is always and necessarily something other than the immediate experience from which it is extracted. In becoming a logical idea, it becomes a "wandering adjective." Setting aside the cloud of metaphor which is apt to envelop Mr. Bradley's meaning in brilliant obscurity, what does this really involve? In plain language, it affirms that the partial features of immediate experience which are used as ideas on judgment, are never themselves apprehended as being features of the psychical fact in its immediacy. Here there is a marked contrast between Mr. Bradley's "ideas" and other signs. When in other cases I use one thing as the sign of another, I have already an idea of the thing which fulfils for me the function of a sign.

It is already the subject of judgments with determinate predicates. Otherwise I could not possibly use it as a symbol of anything else. But of necessity this cannot hold good of the psychical fact which constitutes the existence of the sign used in judgment. We cannot suppose that we have already an idea of this without a vicious circle. We should have to say that an idea is the qualification of something else by an idea of psychical fact. Mr. Bradley certainly cannot be charged with any such absurdity. For him the very essence of predication is the divorce of a partial content of psychical fact from its psychical existence, and its reference to some other existence. There is no place anywhere in the process for an idea of the psychical fact in its immediacy.

A third and most vital point of Mr. Bradley's doctrine emerges when we press the question: What are the ultimate subjects to which predicates are attached in judgment—wherein do the wandering adjectives find a home? The answer is already logically implied in the very conception of an ultimate subject taken in conjunction with Mr. Bradley's doctrine of ideas. An ultimate subject must be a concrete existence, containing as part of its concrete nature those features which are ascribed to it in judgment, so far as the judgment is true. From this definition, taken in connexion with the general theory of judgment, there follows of necessity a most important and startling consequence. There can be for us only one ultimate subject of predication—the absolute whole of being. For an ultimate subject is only determinable in thought through its ideal predicates: and these by their definition are all abstract universals—contents cut loose from their existence. However complex they may become, they must still remain complex generalities. But if an ultimate subject is to be determined for our thought as one concrete individual among others, it can only be so by these abstractly universal qualifications, and this is for ever impossible. Thus the only concrete being which can exist for us is the one concrete which is presupposed in

all predication—which is needed to individualise the abstract generality of all possible predicates. Apart from the process of judgment this ultimate subject is absolutely indeterminate. It is a mere *that* without a *what*. It is just Hegel's category of pure being indistinguishable from pure non-being. And this distinctionless unity can never become pluralised for us. We can never say: "Lo, here is an ultimate subject," or, "Lo, it is there." It is everywhere or nowhere.

Hence follows Mr. Bradley's ultimate test of truth. If a predicate is not fitted to be a predicate of the absolute as such, it is so far false. For it must be a predicate of some concrete being. But the only concrete being is the absolute.

*Criticism.*—Turning, now, to criticism. I propose to join issue on each of the three points which I have indicated as vital in Mr. Bradley's theory:—

(1) First, Mr. Bradley affirms that whenever we apprehend or think of anything as having a certain qualification, that qualification is always in its entirety present as a content of his own psychical existence at the time. Now, under a reservation to be discussed later, I am prepared to maintain not merely the contradictory but the contrary of this proposition. I am prepared to maintain that, so far as the subject of judgment is other than our own immediate experience, it is always determined for thought by a qualification which is not a content of our own immediate experience. For present purposes, however, it is enough to show that this is sometimes the case.

The instances which appear, at first sight, most aptly to illustrate Mr. Bradley's doctrines are those in which the vehicle of thought is mental imagery in the strict sense—*i.e.*, revivals of sensible qualities and relations. Let us consider especially visual imagery. So far as our thought merely refers to the visible appearance of a thing not actually seen, the only content of immediate experience which can be detached from its existence and used as a predicate is the content of a mental

picture. On the other hand, what we normally think of is the thing as it actually has been seen, or will be seen, or may be seen with the bodily eye. The subject of judgment is, therefore, ideally determined by characters which do not belong to the psychical image. Our meaning somehow includes those distinctive characters of actual sensation which are absent from our immediate experience at the time. If we were thinking of the thing, not as actually seen, but as we had mentally pictured it on some previous occasion, the visual image might be virtually the same. But our specific meaning would be essentially different.

I admit, of course, that when we use a visual image in judgment, part of our meaning is also a content of the image. But where the reference is to actual sensation, we could not mean this, unless we meant more than this. I could not ascribe to a horse as actually seen features belonging to a mere mental picture unless I thought of the horse as actually seen and not merely imaged.

Coming to details, we find this view corroborated at every point. I mentally picture the face of a friend. Not being a very good visualiser I get no distinct view of the face as a whole, but only a series of fluctuating and fragmentary glimpses, now of this part and now of that. Yet what I mean throughout—what I have an idea of—is the visible appearance of the face as a whole, as I might see it with the bodily eye. The partial glimpses are apprehended by me as being partial,—as being fragments of a certain specific visual whole. The fragmentary contents of the fluctuating image do indeed qualify the whole face. But they can only do so on condition that I think of the whole as such—and the whole as such is not imaged.

We reach the same result if we consider the inaccuracy rather than the fragmentariness of images. I am thinking, let us say, of a perfectly straight line. I may use, for the purpose, either an image or a percept of a line which as

imaged or perceived deviates sensibly from straightness. I succeed in meaning what I do mean by regarding the line thought of as being without all such deviations from straightness as belong to the merely imaged line. It may be said that this relation of otherness falls within the content of immediate experience. But even if I admit this, I must still insist that what is ideally represented is not merely the specific relation of otherness, but that which is required to satisfy this relation. As so qualified it necessarily falls outside the content of immediate experience. It is essentially determined for thought as *not* being qualified by the immediately experienced content.

There are some few persons who have virtually no visual imagery at all. But they are not for that reason incapable of ideally representing things as seen when they do not actually see them. Undoubtedly in doing so they use certain contents of immediate experience, and in particular revivals of kinæsthetic sensations connected with the movements of the eyes. But what they have an idea of is visual experience as such. It is not something which is merely invested with qualifications drawn from the content of motor and tactual imagery. It is determined for thought as other than the contents of such immediate experiences, and as standing in certain specific relations to them.

Turning from the thought which uses mental imagery to judgments directly connected with actual perception, we find that here also meaning is not always, and perhaps is never, merely coincident with any content of existent psychical fact. I apprehend a billiard ball lying before my eyes as being blue. In doing so I qualify it by a partial content of a visual sensation which I am experiencing at the moment. But the predicate *blue*, as a quality of the billiard ball, is very far from being merely this or any other content of my immediate experience. It includes a special relatedness to other characters of the object which is no mere content of my psychical state at the time. To develop this point at length would carry us too far.

But it seems sufficient to point out that the sensible quality, as I affirm it, involves what Mill would call a permanent possibility of sensation. How can a possibility, as such, be part of the content of immediate experience? The immediate experience is actual or nothing. Again, let us take the case of extension as a predicate of bodies. Mr. Bradley has written an article to show that psychical states are extended. From his point of view it is absolutely necessary that they should be so. He himself recognises the necessity as an immediate consequence of the proposition that, so far as regards their content, ideas must be what they mean. The position of those persons who accept the general doctrine, and get boggled at the application of it, seems to me ridiculously inconsistent. Further, as regards the question of fact, I am in a great measure in agreement with Mr. Bradley. Visual and tactual sensations are psychical facts—immediate experiences. And certainly visual and tactual sensations have an extensive character. I also agree that, apart from this, we could never become aware of external objects as extended. But I am compelled to deny that the extension of physical things, as we apprehend it, is ever quite the same in nature as this, or any other, content of immediate experience. When I apprehend the extension of a physical thing I usually apprehend it as having a determinate size and figure. Now it is also true that my visual or tactual sensations and images have magnitude and figure. But their magnitude and figure is different not only in existence but in content from those of the physical thing as apprehended by me. I see a pen close to me, and a lamp-post in the distance. I judge the lamp-post to be bigger than the pen. But the visual sensations which I use in apprehending the size of the pen are far more extensive than those which I use in apprehending the size of the lamp-post. In general our judgment of physical magnitude remains fixed within wide limits independently of very great fluctuation in the extent of the corresponding visual sensations. Nor is the case

essentially altered if we turn to tactual experience. The extensiveness of tactual sensation varies in amount with the locality of the skin stimulated. The same holds good of kinæsthetic sensation. The quantity of joint, tendon, and muscle sensation will differ according as we explore an object merely by a movement of the fingers, or by a movement of the whole hand on the wrist-joint, or, again, of the arm up to the elbow, or by varying combinations of such movements.

Berkeley has pointed out that visual extension and tactual extension are so far disparate in character that we cannot judge a given quantum of the one to be equal to, or greater, or less than a given quantum of the other. But there are not for us two correspondingly distinct magnitudes of the same physical thing. The spatial extension of a material body is thought as single, and it is not thought of as being either distinctively visible or distinctively tangible. It is determined for us as that which is required to satisfy certain relations. But there is no adjective merely drawn from the content of our immediate experience which can fulfil this condition.

I have yet to refer to another group of cases, which seem even harder to reconcile with Mr. Bradley's theory. There are instances in which the specific nature of an object of thought as such does not seem to correspond even partially to any assignable content of our psychical state at the moment. The leading example is the use of words in silent thought or in actual speech. Many of us habitually think without using any sensory images or percepts except the verbal. For instance, in composing this address I myself have scarcely used any other. Now it is, of course, sheer nonsense to say that the specific nature of what we think of when we thus think in words is constituted by partial features of the content of the words themselves considered as auditory-motor or visual-motor complexes. I have elsewhere maintained that, besides the verbal images or percepts, there are connected with these other peculiar modifications of our psychical state which cannot properly be called

images. Each word has a distinctive meaning, because, owing to its preformed associations and its context, it modifies immediate experience in a distinctive way which does not seem capable of further analysis. But I do not see how it can possibly be maintained that what we think of is even partially determined for our thought as being in nature identical with these peculiar contents of immediate experience. On the contrary, we must regard the word and its psychic "fringe" or "halo" as constituting together the sign of something specifically distinct from them, not only in existence, but in nature. What we think of is determined for thought as that which is related in a certain way to such signs. And the relation just is that of sign to something signified. What we think of is thought of as that for which the word with its psychic fringe or halo stands. The subject is one which I have often discussed before, but always with a tormenting sense of confusion and inadequacy. I feel that my present statement rids my own mind of an intolerable burden. It would be easy to go on from now till doomsday multiplying illustrations of my general position. Probably my overwhelming sense of the importance of the point has already led me to try your patience unduly. I shall therefore conclude with a general challenge to my opponents to produce a negative instance. I challenge them to produce a judgment in which there is reference to existence beyond immediate experience, where the whole content of thought is merely coincident with some content of immediate experience.

I would also urge that the opposite view leads to consequences which cannot be reconciled with admitted facts. Reference to existence beyond immediate experience could not occur in the form in which it actually does occur if the entire content of judgment were always merely coincident with some content of immediate experience. Human beings who have not learned or do not accept the philosophy of Hegel or Mr. Bradley suppose that there are an indefinite number of



distinct things concrete and individual in the sense required to constitute them ultimate subjects of predication. When the man in the street affirms that a certain cow has a crumpled horn, he would not admit that he is affirming, however indirectly, that the absolute has a crumpled horn, or that his statement must be partially false because as it stands it cannot hold good of the absolute. On the other hand, when he affirms that it belongs to the general nature of cows to chew the cud, he would most readily admit that he is *eo ipso* affirming that this or that individual cow chews the cud. Now, I am not here concerned with the question whether the plain man is right or wrong in supposing that there are an indefinite plurality of ultimate subjects of predication. What I now desire to point out is, that even if he be under an illusion, the illusion itself is inexplicable on the lines of Mr. Bradley's theory. For Mr. Bradley the subject of judgment is initially an absolutely indeterminate *that* without any *what*,—pure entity without quiddity. It becomes qualified only through the predicates which are attached to it. But these predicates are all of them partial contents of immediate experience alienated from their existence. As such they are all abstract. Indeed, this is the compelling motive of their application as predicates of something else. If they were not apprehended as being, through their abstractness incapable of standing alone, they would not be regarded as adjectives of another substantive. As the process of predication advances, the predicates used become more and more complex. But from the nature of the case they still remain complex abstractions. They are still merely contents of immediate experience cut loose from their existence. And it still remains true, according to the theory that the reason of their being referred to something else as adjectives is that, owing to their recognised abstractness, they cannot stand by themselves. Now, how can this progressive determination of the initially indeterminate subject by characters that are always abstract, ever come to produce even the appearance of

a plurality of concretes as ultimate subjects of predication? Mr. Bradley seems to me to have proved too much. If his theory of predication were true, it would need only to be stated in order to be universally accepted. Nobody would suppose that any proposition could be ultimately true or false of anything but the absolute.

(2) We now turn to the second point of Mr. Bradley's theory of judgment. We find him constantly and strenuously asserting and re-asserting that in all judgment the content of our immediate experience which is used as a predicate is cut loose from its existence as a feature of our psychical life. It is not at all apprehended as being a feature of our psychical state, but only as a qualification of something else. I find this doctrine extremely hard to understand. If we follow it out rigorously, it seems to commit logical suicide. The whole doctrine of ideas is founded on a recognised contrast between the content of an idea as predicate of an object and the same content as a feature of immediate experience. Now I fail to see, if the doctrine itself be accepted, how Mr. Bradley or anybody else could ever become aware of this contrast. I fail to see how there could be any sort of cognition of immediate experience at all, or of anything as a feature of it, or of the fact that it has features. Immediate experience, it must be noted, is in no sense a knowledge of itself. It does not characterise itself either as being mere feeling or as being this or that sort of feeling. Judgment is the essential form of knowledge. Without it there is nothing that can be called discernment, distinction, recognition, or awareness of connexion and relation. If, then, it is essential to judgment that the contents of immediate experience are cut loose, divorced, alienated, from their existence as contents of immediate experience,—if judgment merely consists in ascribing these "wandering adjectives" to something else,—it does not seem possible that we should ever become able to predicate anything concerning immediate experience, either truly or falsely.

It does not seem possible that we could ever even have an idea of it as being immediate. Yet we find Mr. Bradley constantly making judgments about immediate experience as unhesitatingly as if it were a coal scuttle or an equilateral triangle. In the *Logic* he says of the idea, considered as psychical fact, that it exists "with particular qualities and relations. It has its speciality as an event in my mind. It is a hard individual, so unique that it not merely differs from all others but from itself at subsequent moments." Again, in chapter IX of *Appearance and Reality*, we find the following statements:—"At any time all that we suffer, do, and are, forms one psychical totality. It is experienced all together as a co-existing mass, not perceived as parted and joined by relations even of co-existence. It contains all relations and distinctions, and every ideal object that at the moment exists in the soul. It contains them, not specially as such, and with exclusive stress on their content as predicated, but directly as they are, and as they qualify the psychical 'that.' And, again, any part of this co-existence to which we attend can be viewed integrally as one feeling." Any part of this co-existence to which we attend! What does this mean? Does it imply that we can distinguish the part within the psychical whole, so as to apprehend it as being within this whole? If so, then there is certainly a judgment having for its subject existent psychical fact. But how is it possible to reconcile this with Mr. Bradley's own definition of judgment as excluding all reference to psychical fact as its subject,—as consisting merely in using some partial content of psychical fact as a qualification of an existence which is not psychical. If we abide by this definition there is no possibility of having a cognisance of psychical fact at all. What Mr. Bradley says about psychical immediacy may be all true and instructive. But on his own theory he could not possibly know anything about it, or even suppose that he knew anything about it.

I can see no way out of this *impasse*, unless we discard the assumption that judgment cannot qualify psychical fact in its immediacy. And this leads us to inquire on what ground the assumption is made. Mr. Bradley supplies two answers to this question. For the first I may refer to the following passage in *Appearance and Reality*:—"The idea is not the same as fact, for in it existence and meaning are necessarily divorced. And the subject, again, is neither the mere 'what' of the predicate, nor is it any other mere 'what.' Nor even if it is proposed to take up a whole with both its aspects, and to predicate the ideal character of its own proper subject, will that proposal assist us. For, if the subject is the same as the predicate, why trouble oneself to judge? But if it is not the same, then what is it, and how is it different?"\* To this I reply that, so far as judgment refers to psychical fact in its immediacy, the predicate is distinguished from the subject as part from whole. The subject is the inclusive unity of immediate experience which contains the partial feature predicated of it. Mr. Bradley's other answer simply consists in strenuous reiteration of the thesis that in all judgment something is qualified which is not psychical fact in its immediacy. With this thesis I myself am in emphatic agreement. But I fail to find any cogency in the inference which Mr. Bradley draws from it. It is one thing to say that my judgment always qualifies something other than my own immediate experience. It is quite another to say that it does not qualify my immediate experience at all. The position for which I contend is that any complete judgment does both coincidently. When Mr. Bradley says, that in judging we "cut loose," "alienate," "divorce," "prescind," or "separate" psychical content from psychical existence, I would point out that these words are the merest metaphors. They are merely metaphorical expressions for what we more appropriately call "discerning," or

\* Ch. xv, p. 168, of *Appearance and Reality*.

"distinguishing." But what we discern or distinguish never does or can lose connexion for our thought with that from which or within which it is discerned or distinguished. Would not Mr. Bradley himself tell us that to distinguish is to unite? He must therefore be driven to maintain that his metaphors are more than mere metaphors. He must maintain that "divorce" is more than discernment, and that it excludes the possibility of discernment. But such a contention seems irreconcilable with omnipresent fact. Doubtless in all judgment I somehow use partial contents of my immediate psychical existence in determining the nature of some other existence. But, in being so used, are they ever so isolated from their context or complement in immediate experience that in place of this context or complement there is for our thought mere blankness or nothingness? The question, I take it, answers itself.

In judging a piece of paper to be white, the visual sensations which I use are only a fragment of a mass of visual experience not so used. But the continuity of this fragment with the whole does not fall utterly outside the range of my thought at the time. The fragment is not "cut loose" from its context as it might be if I became afflicted with partial cortical blindness. The point is to me so plain that I shall not argue it further until I know what opponents may find to urge against it.

I must, however, add some words by way of explanation. In the first place, the total psychical fact is not apprehended in the same way as its partial feature. It is only so far apprehended as is necessarily implied in the discernment of parts within it. It is not itself discerned as a partial feature of a more comprehensive whole. We are not aware of it as circumscribed or bounded off. If we choose to confine the term object to what is demarcated in this way, then it cannot be said to be presented as an object. In the second place, the psychical reference in judgment, though it is invariably present, may be very subordinate and inconspicuous. It may

be implicit, not explicit. In other words, though the psychical reference is necessarily included in the total judgment, yet our interest and attention in judging may be primarily and predominantly centred in something which falls outside the range of our immediate experience. Not only may this be so, but in fact it most frequently is so. Probably in the earlier stages of mental development it is always so. In the third place, we must avoid identifying psychical reference with what we call self-consciousness. The consciousness of self is a complex product of mental development, and even in its simplest phases it always includes a reference beyond immediate experience. All that we are justified in affirming is that the primary psychical reference implicit in all judgment is the ultimate point of departure of the growth of self-consciousness, and that it always continues to be its essential basis and pre-supposition.

(3) We now come to the third, and perhaps the most interesting, point in Bradley's theory of judgment. If this theory is accepted, it is for ever impossible for us to determine in thought any individual, as such, except one—the absolute whole of being. This alone is concrete in the sense required to constitute it an ultimate subject of predication. This alone is a substantive; whatever else we may distinguish in thought is merely its adjective.

So far as this contention is based upon the general doctrine of judgment we have already virtually disposed of it. In the first place, we have pointed out that in all judgment we are aware of psychical fact in its immediacy. Hence in all judgment we are aware of an individual existence which is not the universe. Mr. Bradley himself calls it a "hard individual." The only question that remains is whether we can determine in thought other individual existences as such. This would be, of course, impossible if our only means of determining what we think of consisted in qualifying it by contents of immediate experience cut loose from their existence. But we have tried

to show that the object of thought is also determined by its *relatedness* to the content of immediate experience. It is apprehended as that which is required to satisfy a certain relation. Now, since we are aware of psychic fact in its immediacy, there can be no reason why an object should not be determined for thought by its relatedness to psychic fact in its immediacy. When this is so the object must be apprehended as individual, in the same sense as immediate experience is individual.

This is my general position abstractly formulated. The actual situations in which the individual is apprehended as such are just those described by Mr. Bradley himself as involving, in a peculiar sense, direct contact with reality. When a man grasps a solid object in his hands, when he stamps on the ground, when he is wrestling for his life with an adversary, or when he is awaiting the fateful yes or no from the lips of his beloved, he is determining in thoughts individuals distinct from others and from the all inclusive universe. In this respect those experiences are of primary importance in which motor activity finds itself variously conditioned in the attainment of its ends. And in spite of the scorn with which it is treated by Mr. Bradley and others, I must maintain that what is known as the experience of resisted effort has, from this point of view, an especial significance.

Having once attained the thought of individual existences in this direct way, it becomes possible to determine others in thought by their connexion with these. Other individuals are determined for thought as being in individualised relations to individuals already recognised as such. In general, if we set aside the primary awareness of psychic fact in its immediacy all individual existence is determined as such by its connexion with other individual existence.

*Objections Considered.*—And, now that I have reached this point, I see advancing against me an overwhelming flood of

hostile arguments. There are many which I can anticipate, and doubtless there are also many which I do not anticipate. I proceed to deal very briefly with some which I foresee as likely.

In the first place it may be urged that what I call an individual has no real claim to this title. Being admittedly only part of the universe, it must be related to other parts, and without such relatedness it would not be what it is. This objection would, indeed, be fatal if I began by admitting that the individual, as such, must be self-existent in the same sense as the absolute whole of being is self-existent. But to presuppose this is merely to beg the question at issue. An individual has all the self-existence I require if it is capable of being an ultimate subject of predication. It must be self-existent as compared with the partial features and aspects of its own nature, and it must not be a partial feature or aspect of the nature of anything else. Its independence is merely that of a substantive in relation to its adjectives. It by no means follows that it cannot be related to other individuals, and have its nature determined by them and the relations in which they stand to it. Nor does it follow that it cannot have individual parts which, as Hobbes would say, are parts of *it*, and not parts of its nature, and are therefore not capable of being predicated of it. A pillar supports a roof. If there were no roof the pillar could not support it; if there were no pillar the roof could not be supported by it. But the roof is not therefore an adjective or partial feature of the nature of the pillar, or *vice versa*. You cannot in virtue of their relation say that the pillar is a roof, or that the roof is a pillar. Neither is the relatedness of either an adjective of the other. The pillar supports in relation to the roof, and the roof is supported in relation to the pillar. But the roof does not support, and the pillar is not supported—if we regard them only in their connexion with each other. Finally, the relation into which pillar and roof both enter is not an adjective of either of them. It falls outside the

nature and existence of both. It falls within the whole of which both are parts. It is a predicate of this whole that it contains the relation as one of its partial features. Just as an individual may be related to others without compromising its distinctive independence, so it may comprehend within its unity parts which are themselves individual. Of course these parts cannot be its adjectives. They are parts of its existence, not of its nature. But, in fact, no one supposes otherwise. No one says that a tree is a leaf, or that a dog is its tail. What we can predicate is the relatedness of the whole to the individual part, in accordance with the special form of unity characteristic of the whole. We can say that the tree has a leaf growing on the extremity of its topmost branch, or that the dog is wagging its tail. Nor do I find any relevant difficulty in being compelled to assume that some individuals contain individual parts which no assignable number can finally exhaust. If, whatever number of parts is taken, the subdivision can still be made exhaustive, and does not make any difference to the unity and continuity of the whole quantum, and if all the exhaustive subdivisions are quantitatively equivalent to each other, there seems to me no possibility of exhibiting at any point anything which can be properly called a contradiction or absurdity.

Another group of objections may be based on the principle that what is transient cannot be concrete. And this seems to destroy at once the individuality of present psychical fact in its immediacy. Now I admit that if the term transient be taken in a certain sense, what is transient is abstract. The complete fact of change has two aspects: (1) an enduring sameness of content, which taken by itself is abstract; (2) a continuous alternation of differences in the way of particular determinations of this abiding content. These differences considered by themselves as what passes or is transient in the process, are also undoubtedly abstract. But in any actual change these two aspects of duration and transition are unified in a peculiar way. I do not mean that we can conceptually construct an

idea of change merely by putting together in thought these abstract features. On the contrary, the experience of change is required to show us how they can be united. It is only within the completed whole of change that we distinguish them. And this whole it is that I take to be concrete. Further, every temporal subdivision of concrete change is itself concrete.

This suggests another difficulty. A real individual cannot, as such, be in continuous connection with what is unreal. But present psychic fact is essentially a transition from the past which is no longer real to the future which is not yet real. I reply that in affirming anything to be no longer or not yet real, we do not deny that it is real at all. What we refer to is simply the time of its occurrence, not to its reality or unreality, its concreteness or abstractness, when it does occur. When we say that a future or past event is not real now, we simply mean that it is not taking place at the time when we are making the judgment. But so far as the judgment is true, it takes place at some other time related in a certain manner to the present.

Again, it will perhaps be said that psychic fact in its immediacy is so fleeting that we cannot have time to apprehend it before it is gone. My answer consists in a reference to the mode in which I suppose the psychic fact to be apprehended. We become aware of it only so far as we discern a partial feature within it. But this partial feature waits long enough to be discerned.

I must next defend myself against the sort of criticism which Mr. Bradley brings to bear on the analytic judgment of sense. For evidently what I call "psychic reference" is a pure case of this kind of judgment. "It is," says Mr. Bradley, "a very common and most ruinous superstition to suppose that analysis 'is no alteration.'" Now, if "analysis" is taken to mean an actual or ideal separation or taking to pieces, I have no quarrel with this statement. But if what is meant is the discernment of a partial feature within a whole as being within this whole, then I must confess that I

am very superstitious indeed. Still I admit that Mr. Bradley's contention would have some force as against me, if I maintained that the discernment of a feature of immediate experience makes no difference to the experience as it existed before the distinction was made. But this I do not hold, and I do not think that any defender of the analytic judgment of perception need hold it. The immediate experience referred to is the immediate experience when discernment of the partial feature is already present. Having disposed of this point, we come to the central principle of Mr. Bradley's argument, which is most clearly stated on page 97 of the *Logic*. "The sensible phenomenon," he says, "is what it is, and is all that it is; and anything less than itself must surely be something else." The question is, "When I take in my judgment one fragment of the whole, have I got a right to predicate this of the real, and to assert 'It, *as it is*, is a fact of sense'?"\* Of course, if Mr. Bradley means predication of the absolute when he speaks of predication of the real, it is useless to argue the point further at this stage. But if he means predication of the sensible phenomenon a partial feature of it, it is difficult to see how he can find any cogency to his own argument.

If I say "this sound is shrill," I do not take a partial feature of the sound, and then merely identify the sound as a whole with this partial feature. If I say "this animal is a quadruped," I do not assert that its whole being consists in having four legs. If I wanted to say such things I should express myself differently. I should say "this sound is shrillness," or "this animal is quadrupedality." Whenever we judge at all, we not only predicate a partial feature, but we predicate it as partial. What we assert is its connectedness within the whole nature of the subject, in accordance with the characteristic form of unity distinctive of that subject. Mr. Bradley's criticism, it seems to me, is justified only in the

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\* Cf. *Logic*, pp. 93-102.

case of a class of judgments which nobody makes, because everybody sees at once that they are false. Everybody sees that it must be false to say that an orange is rotundity, or that a fox is sagacity. If all analytic judgments of sense involved a like absurdity, there would be no need for Mr. Bradley, or anybody else, to exhibit this fact by an intricate argument.\*

Finally, I ought, perhaps, to say something of the direct argument by which Mr. Bradley apparently seeks to show that all ideas are merely abstract universals. This argument consists in a challenge to examine the content of any idea whatever. It is maintained that on examination we shall always find that

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\* Yet we have not altogether disposed of Mr. Bradley's case. He has yet another string to his bow. In the analytic judgment, besides the special feature discerned, there is always an unexplored remainder. According to Bradley, the unexplored remainder must so condition the nature of the special feature that this cannot be what it is apprehended as being. The principle of this argument, so far as I can understand it, is by no means self-evident. The principle seems to be that there cannot be in any sense or in any degree what we call a datum or a premise. The nature of the relatively unknown cannot be determined for us by the nature of what is already known. On the contrary, what we regard ourselves as knowing is wholly and utterly at the mercy of the relatively unknown. And the relatively unknown is entirely merciless. So long as we are at all ignorant, all our judgments must be false. I submit that this principle involves absolute scepticism and absolute empiricism,—in the worst sense of the word *empiricism*. It is equivalent to denying the logical possibility of anything which can in any sense be called inference, or transition from the known to the unknown. I submit, also, that it has no real justification. All that we are justified in asserting is that, so far as a judgment involves presumptions as to the nature of what is relatively unknown which are not merely elicited from the data on which we proceed, the judgment may be falsified by acquisition of new data. But so far as a judgment is merely analytic, so far as it consists in discerning partial feature within the whole of reality, it involves no such assumption. The real basis of Mr. Bradley's argument is his view of the nature of the one ultimate subject of all judgment. This must exclude all plurality, all relative independence, all relatedness of its partial features. Indeed, it cannot, in any ordinary sense, have partial features. Virtually it is not only a unity, but a perfectly simple unity. Hence all appearance of partial features within it must be mere appearance, and not truth. All discrimination is falsification.

the idea turns out to be in its intrinsic nature applicable to a possible plurality of instances. There is nothing in its intrinsic nature which confines it to a singular and unique subject. "‘That bough is broken,’ but so are many others, and we do not say which. ‘This road leads to London’ may be said just as well of a hundred other roads." From such considerations Mr. Bradley seems to infer that the only unique and singular subject which we can determine in thought is the absolute whole of being. Now I insist, as strongly as Mr. Bradley, that whenever we have an idea we think of a general qualification,—of a qualification capable of existing in a plurality of instances. But I would point out that this mere generality never is, or can be, the entire content of our meaning. We cannot think of general characters without *co ipso* thinking of them as exemplified in instances which are ultimately particular. In recognising that "this is a road" may be truly affirmed of a hundred roads, I must also think of the hundred roads, and recognise that in the long run these are, and must be, particular roads, and not mere generalities. To think of the abstract universal is of necessity to think of the particular also. Generality would not be generality at all if it were mere generality.

The only question which remains concerns the possibility of singling out any one particular instance as such. The typical ways in which we attempt to do so are by using such words as "this" or "that," or by pointing. Mr. Bradley insists that such signs cannot fulfil the function assigned them, because they have a generalised meaning. We can *point* to many things, and "this" or "that" are the most generally applicable of all words. This is, of course, true. But it by no means follows, because such signs have a general significance, or more accurately a general element of significance, that they do not also have a particularised significance. We must distinguish general meaning and occasional meaning. The general meaning is that which is common to more than one possible application

of a sign. The occasional meaning is determined by the context and circumstances under which it is actually being used on this or that occasion. So far as the determining circumstances are themselves particular, they are capable of particularising the meaning of the signs. Mr. Bradley's argument reminds me of a boyish joke. A boy calls out to another, "Where are you?" The answer is, "Here!" Which is met by "No, you are not here; you are there!" The meaning of the words "here" and "there" of course varies with the actual position of the speaker when he uses them. Hence the school-boy dialectic. Of course, if the question be pressed how the circumstances under which a sign is used are themselves particularised, I must fall back on the psychical reference to judgment,—on the concrete individuality of the psychical life of each of us.

*Appearance and Reality.*—In conclusion, I would invite your attention to an aspect of Mr. Bradley's philosophy which does not perhaps come strictly within the scope of this paper. Whatever is not fitted to be a predicate of the absolute he condemns as being *pro tanto* mere appearance. Now, this whole position seems inevitably to presuppose that the absolute does really appear. It seems futile and meaningless to explain this and that as being mere appearances if you regard the fact of appearance itself as being a mere appearance. Appearance must, therefore, be a predicate true of the absolute. But what does appearance in this sense ultimately mean? It can, I think, only consist in the fact that there are a plurality of finite centres of experience. Unless we presuppose this fundamental fact the whole conception of "mere appearance" loses all significance. There would be no one to whom anything could "merely appear." The fact itself is admitted by Mr. Bradley to be beyond the reach of explanation. "That experience should take place in finite centres, and should wear the form of finite 'thisness,' is in the end inexplicable." But he sees in this no serious objection to his

general theory. For "to be inexplicable and to be incompatible are not the same thing." The plurality "exists in, and therefore must qualify, the whole. . . . Certainly in detail we do not know how the separation is overcome, and we cannot point to the product which is gained, in each case, by that resolution. But our ignorance here is no ground for rational opposition. Our principle assures us that the absolute is superior to partition, and in some way is perfected by it."\*

Now, this seems to me very like an unconscious evasion of the real difficulty. It is proposed to treat the existence of finite centres of experience as mere appearance. But mere appearance, I presume, is always due to our partial apprehension of the one reality, and this again to our finitude. Thus it is a vicious circle to explain partial apprehension or finitude of experience as being itself mere appearance. There can be mere appearance only on condition that something appears, and this ultimately can only be the absolute. Unless the absolute really has appearances Mr. Bradley's whole position becomes untenable. But the fact that it appears at all is the same thing as the occurrence of experience in finite centres. When, therefore, we say that experience takes place in finite centres we state what is absolutely true.

It is further to be noted that if appearance, as such, is a true predicate of the absolute, what is true of appearance, as such, must also be true of the absolute. Thus, if there are degrees of appearance, there are degrees in which the absolute really does appear. In fact, Mr. Bradley calls them "degrees of reality." It would seem to follow that the conception of "degree" is fitted to be a predicate of the absolute. But would it not be just as easy to dispose of its claims as of those of other concepts examined by Mr. Bradley? The doctrine of degrees of reality involves the reality of Degrees. But the assumption of the reality of Degrees, honorary or otherwise, looks like an Academical prejudice.

\* *Appearance and Reality*, p. 226.

## II.—"APPEARANCE AND REALITY": A REPLY TO MR. CARR.

By A. J. FINBERG.

THIS paper is in no sense an attempt to defend Mr. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. There must be some show of an attack before a defence is required, and I cannot bring myself to see that Mr. Carr's paper was an attack. But others so regarded it, and apparently Mr. Carr. So it is clear that some of us have misunderstood Mr. Bradley. And if I have misunderstood, I am anxious to learn where.

I have observed that, in discussing Mr. Bradley's books, there is only one thing which is regarded as irrelevant—that is, Mr. Bradley's own published account of what he means. I desire to-night to limit the area of discussion to Mr. Bradley's arguments only so far as they are concerned with Mr. Carr's criticisms. Of course, I alone am responsible for the construction I put upon Mr. Bradley's words. And I may as well confess that I am dependent for that meaning upon what is printed in Mr. Bradley's books. I mention this apparently superfluous point, because we have been assured that Mr. Bradley is given to eating in private the words he uses in public. So if Mr. Carr assures me that Mr. Bradley has informed him in private that he attaches "no importance" to some of the arguments employed in *Appearance and Reality*, I must ask to be allowed to regard such confidences as irrelevant. But I do not think Mr. Carr is at all likely to adopt such methods.

The main question Mr. Bradley sets himself to answer in his book is, as I understand it: How, without contradicting ourselves, can we think of Reality? We cannot, with Locke, regard the unknown qualities of the "real essence" as the only