

MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

I.—TYPES OF WILL.¹

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I.—SIMPLE VOLITION.

THERE are tendencies in us of which we do not foresee the consequences, there are others of which we do. There are conations that are blind, and also foreseeing conations. Our instinctive impulses, at first unconscious of their end, as we grow up attach to themselves ideas and foresight. Yet they at times surprise us by their suddenness and unfamiliar character. They impel us to actions that we on reflexion disown because we do not recognise ourselves in them.² For we did not foresee their tendencies, therefore we could not subordinate them to any conscious end. We had neither the opportunity of accepting or of rejecting them. Hence we disown them as not part of our conscious self, as independent of the ends which it sets before itself. But do we disown them because they are relatively unorganised? Our primitive impulses are at least organised in this sense: they are subordinated to the end of preserving the life of the species and the individual. None the less we disown any impulse that is not also organised in one of the systems of thought which are our conscious interests and sentiments. If it has sprung up independently of them, and thwarts

¹ Read before the Aristotelian Society.

² See Fouillée's *Tempérament et Caractère*, p. xiv.

their volitions, we say that it thwarts *us*, and we call its action involuntary. And, irrespective of its degree of organisation, we will not be held responsible for it, except and so far as it rises into consciousness and comes within the control of our voluntary self.

As far as consciousness is concerned the lowest level of the conative development is the blind conation that carries no idea of the end to which it is directed ; and we are generally agreed not to call this type volition. All other conations carry an idea of their end or object. Desire and aversion are such conations, but mere desire or aversion is not called will. Yet we are not consistent in this point of view. An unopposed desire is often impulsively realised, and we call that impulsive will. If we are angry with some one, ideas of hurting or paining him occur, and we sometimes find the pain or injury has been inflicted without any prior consciousness on our part that we were going to inflict it. If we are reproached for the action, we say we did not "mean" to do it. For the idea absorbing attention, and strengthened by the emotional impulse, has straightway realised itself without, as far as we can detect, requiring any other subjective condition for its accomplishment. Are we to call this type volition? According to the general opinion of psychologists, we should have to include it. An action that results from desire we call voluntary ; for it is preceded and partly determined by a conscious idea, by desire and attention. We can hardly call it non-voluntary, because of the presence of these constituents ; and involuntary or against will it certainly is not. Yet if the action be voluntary, the state which precedes it is volition. But this state is mere desire with attention, and, did it not determine action, we certainly should not call it will. Does, then, desire only become volition so far as the idea of its end becomes realised in whole or part, and is that sequence what we mean by volition? Prof. Ribot maintains that we reduce volition to an abstraction if we exclude its motor effects and accompaniments, that as an internal state it cannot be distinguished from a logical operation of the intellect.¹ And, in Mr. Bradley's opinion, the idea producing its existence is volition.² Yet this view, according to Mr. Stout, is a mistake. "The question," he remarks, "as to the nature of a certain mode of consciousness is quite independent of the question whether or not this mode of conscious-

¹ *Les maladies de la volonté*, p. 29.

² *MIND*, vol. xiii., p. 25.

ness will be followed by a certain train of occurrences in the organism and in the environment."¹ And it will be difficult for any one who has reflected on the type of abortive volition in involuntary actions to any longer maintain that the realisation of the idea is essential to volition.² As, then, mere desire with attention is not will, nor becomes will in the realisation of its end, it follows that impulses realised without attention certainly are not. Cases of this kind occur in all habitual actions. Their conation is not altogether blind, but the vague idea of an action arises outside the area of attention, and is apparently realised without coming within that area. As Prof. Sully remarks: "It is only when I have to do something new and unfamiliar that I need to realise with the maximum distinctness, by a special concentration of attention, the idea of the object or end and the idea of the required action".³

There are, then, three types that progressively approximate to will without quite revealing its specific character: (1) Conations that are blind; (2) Conations that vaguely foresee and accomplish their ends; (3) Conations that clearly foresee, or, through attention, accomplish their ends.

We come next to the more deliberate and developed types where, between desire and its satisfaction, the judgment intervenes that we are going to satisfy it. This judgment must be carefully distinguished from the idea of the action on which it is based. The judgment is a further development of it. We have the idea of an action before we decide; we may doubt, we may question, we may judge that we perhaps will realise it before the definite judgment occurs that we are going to realise it. Here for the first time we seem to come within the radius of will; for, if the action or end be not realised, we still should not hesitate to call that desire a volition which we had admitted to ourselves we were going to satisfy. Accordingly we find this definition given by Mr. Stout: "Volition is a desire qualified and defined by the judgment that, so far as in us lies, we shall bring about the attainment of the desired end".⁴ Now this judgment has not time to develop in ordinary impulsive action. It is where desire cannot at once find an outlet for its impulse that the pause occurs

¹ "Voluntary Action," *MIND*, N.S., vol. v., p. 355.

² See "Attention and Will," *ibid.*, vol. iv., pp. 461, 463.

³ *The Human Mind*, vol. ii., p. 225.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 356.

before action in which the reflective judgment, I shall do this thing, finds its opportunity. If we are indignant at an insult and cannot at once avenge ourselves, if we pity some one's distress and cannot immediately relieve it, we are then so often aware in the persistence of our feeling that we are going to relieve this distress or going to avenge ourselves.

And this judgment may occur in a mental state that amounts to only a simple volition. It may be preceded by no doubt and conflict of motives. The obstruction in the way of desire may be due to outward circumstances and not to an opposite desire. For my pity or my anger may possess me for the time being, so that other desires are excluded. In this case there is no choice, no selection of one end and rejection of an opposite end. Simple volition may then be defined as that mental state in which a single desire culminates in the judgment of attentive thought that we are going to realise its end. And complex volition in distinction from it will be preceded by doubt and a conflict of motives, and the decisive judgment in which it culminates will select the end of one of the conflicting motives. In both the judgment appears as the distinguishing character of will, as that which distinguishes the prior state of desire from volition; and the character of the judgment in both is positive and categorical.

II.—WILL AS NEGATION.

We often experience that mental state in which the idea of some action arises, and the responsive attitude of the self is at once defined in the judgment: "No, I shall not do that". In healthy minds, where virtue is a habit, such a negative volition is the normal attitude when they feel tempted by some vicious propensity. In pathological cases of fixed ideas where we are struggling not to realise the action which an idea represents, or not to attend to the idea itself, we may also have no positive and complementary end in view; our volition may be confined to the idea of not doing or not attending. How are we to interpret this negative character if volition always contains the positive idea of doing something developed into the positive judgment that we are going to do it? Is negation a positive judgment in disguise? That we are not going to realise an idea where we are conscious that it has a strong tendency to pass into action, means that we are going to restrain it, and that is surely something positive. Seeing that the absorption of attention by the idea

indirectly aids its realisation, we may will not to attend to it. And not to attend to it means that we shall attend elsewhere, to objects among which it is not found, from which it is absent. But can we give any positive interpretation of absence? If you are trying to restrain a reflex tendency, as the impulse to yawn or cough, the object of your volition is that the yawn or cough shall not become fact. Being an idea, it shall at most remain an idea, and shall be absent from the circle of what we call fact. But 'absence' means that it is *not* within the circle. What then is there positive about your volition? Are you willing to maintain the *status quo*, to permit the idea of the event, but not the event itself? Even in this case the negative element reappears as complement of the positive; for you cannot think of maintaining the *status quo* without thinking that certain changes which would destroy it shall not take place. (Thus we cannot resolve negative volition into positive, even where we can show that the one logically implies the other.) The positive is only a complement of it, and is incapable of supplying its place. Negative thought is unique, and this fact accounts for that type of volition in which the uniqueness of negative thought is employed in the characterisation of the end.

This uniqueness of negative thought penetrates also conations which are not will. What we call aversion seems to be a combination of desire and negative thought. If I have aversion for anything, I desire to escape from it; not to be near it, not to see it. If I have aversion for an end, I desire not to accomplish it. There are then negative desires as well as negative volitions.

In the treatment of negative thought, which has been so closely associated with logic, we must guard against confusing the distinct characters of logical and psychological analysis. In logic, negative thought necessarily involves a positive and positive thought a negative. If we have asserted that a man is honest, we are logically bound to deny that he forges other people's signatures or cheats at cards. The validity of the positive assertions involves the validity of the negative assertions, and conversely every negative involves some positive assertion. Logical analysis endeavours to discover what a content of thought involves or presupposes. It does not regard this content as an existing psychical fact, nor the judgments it presupposes as existing co-presented psychical facts. Psychology, on the other hand, deals with thought only as a psychical fact occurring in an individual mind, and having that specific character which justifies our designating

it by the general term, thought. And psychological analysis endeavours to discover what this fact actually contains, as negative or positive thought, in its particular context ; not what it logically involves. Hence the two sciences from their different standpoints, from the different character of their analyses, will reach different conclusions, which rightly understood are in no way inconsistent with one another. We can illustrate the different character of the analyses and the different conclusions to which they lead in the present instance. In the psychological analysis of negative volition, we have to consider whether the negative actually present in its psychosis is co-presented with a positive thought which is its logical complement. In resolving not to attend to one object I must logically judge that I shall attend to another, or relapse into that sentient state in which all selective attention seems to be extinguished. In resolving not to do *this* I must logically judge that I shall do *that*, or at least maintain the present state : for the negative involves the positive. But in the resolution not to accomplish one end, there is not always as a psychical fact the positive resolution to accomplish some other end in place of it. In the negative volition, "No, I shall not do that," the idea of doing something else or maintaining the present state may not occur : the volition may be confined to the idea of not doing or not attending. But without the occurrence of the idea a supplemental positive volition is impossible. So also a positive volition may resolve to accomplish what it anticipates in idea without rejecting other alternatives which are inconsistent with its purpose, without even the idea of them occurring. Still, in the negative volition, "I shall not do that," we must in the sequel do something else or maintain our present state, although we may have had no prevision of this positive result. But its occurrence is obviously conditioned by the fact of the negative volition. In escaping from one object, we, as a matter of fact, pursue after another, and the direction we take is conditioned by the direction we avoid. In resisting temptation, we attend to objects from which it is excluded, and the negative volition conditions the positive movement of attention. In fact as "negative conditions positive apperception,"¹ so negative volition conditions and has as its psychical complement some positive conation. We may then lay down this general theory. All negative volition is as a psychical fact accompanied by some positive conation : all positive volition by

¹ *Analytic Psychology*, G. F. Stout, vol. ii., p. 144.

some negative and inhibitory conation. But this conation has often no foresight of its end, still less does it develop into volition. In pure negative volition, the positive conation is blind. In pure positive volition, the negative conation is blind. In the mixed type, both the positive and negative conations supplementing one another have developed the volitional character.

The logical doctrine that all negative involves positive thought cannot then be interpreted in psychology to mean that all negative thought is actually accompanied by a positive, nor consequently that all negative volition is actually accompanied by positive. And were this not the fact, all simple volition would be resolved into complex volition or choice. Before every voluntary action we should have the idea of some alternative action, and volition would be the choice which, accepting the one alternative, consciously rejected the other. That our deliberate and purposive actions correspond to this type is perhaps obvious; and we might define choice as the mixed type of positive and negative volition. That our more sudden and habitual actions—not so sudden nor so habitual but that we, in some measure, anticipate them in idea and foresee their accomplishment—that these also correspond to this type is a supposition which an impartial study of the facts does not favour. From blind conation to deliberate purpose there is an unbroken chain of development and complication. At the first stage we have actions vaguely foreseen, at the next, attended to, then developed into the assurance or judgment that we are going to accomplish them, at which stage, in agreement with the common usage of the word, we have named them simple volitions, lastly still further complicated by the representation of alternative actions. Shall we say that as soon as the third stage is reached and the knowledge of what we are going to do arises, the knowledge of what our intended action also excludes must arise with it? We had better surely take in the first place, as a more reasonable hypothesis, the theory which represents the conative development as steady and uniform, and not heap upon any one stage of it the growth and complications which are more likely to have been arrived at in the course of several.

We must then modify our preliminary definition of will if we are to interpret the present type. It is not the positive judgment, "I am going to do this," which is the distinguishing character of volitional conations. In pure or unmixed negative volition, we have no idea of any end that we are going to accomplish, we have only an idea of a result

or end that we are not going to accomplish. (The distinguishing character of will is either a judgment that we are going, or not going, to accomplish an end, or some mixture of both judgments.) What is common to all we have not discerned, unless it be that their character is categorical.

III.—HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE WILL.

Those constituents of our thought-attitude to objects that we name the categorical, problematic, disjunctive, and hypothetical, are not tied to judgments. The logical text-books regard them as forms of judgment, and recognise no significance in the fact that they penetrate also other attitudes of thought. Indeed their common character is their mobility united to a strictly dependent nature. They pass from thought to thought, but can never subsist by themselves. Thus our questions, as well as our judgments, may assume a hypothetical, disjunctive, or problematic form; and even our supposals. I may say, "Let us argue no more, but assume that this is probably the case, and see what follows from this assumption;" or, "If one or other of these alternatives is true, what inference can be drawn from that supposal?" And these mobile elements that attach themselves to the fundamental types of thought are not even confined by the circle of them; but some, though not all, project themselves into our volitions. "If he persist in his present behaviour, I shall leave," is a genuine hypothetical volition, as "I shall travel *via* Calais or Boulogne" is one of a disjunctive type. And although both judgments are problematic in a sense, as both, at a point, infected with doubt, yet if we introduce doubt at another we destroy their volitional character. "I may travel," "I probably shall leave," are not volitions. The problematic element introduced at this point in whatever degree, from mere possibility up to almost complete certitude, is incompatible with the fact of volition; and if I am not quite convinced that if something happen I shall act, or that I shall definitely go to the one place or the other, there can be no will. While in the state antecedent to choice we are not sure what we are going to do, while in the state subsequent to weak volitions we again relapse into doubt, the moment of volition is a moment of belief. Full undoubting belief embraces it at a point, though over all the rest doubt may range in all its degrees. Thus I may be doubtful as to my success, but I am certain that I shall try. Our volitions are categorical, disjunctive, hypothetical, posi-

tive and negative, but problematic in this sense they cannot be.

Yet these hypothetical and disjunctive volitions are peculiar in their structure, and disturb all our accounts and definitions of will. In the one we do not judge that we are going to do anything. We resolve, yet without resolving to do that which we have in mind, and without resolving not to do it. What is certain and above doubt, where everything depends on a supposal? Yet the volition is certain, of something I am quite sure. I am quite sure that I shall act provided something else happen. But I am not sure I shall act, because I am not sure "something else" will happen. I am only sure of the relation of dependence between two events, the condition and my consequent action, but not of the happening of either. I am sure that this relation is the result of my will: I will this relation of dependence: that is the object and end of my volition.

Now we have always supposed that in volition we think of the idea as about to become fact. But in hypothetical volition, what is this idea? "If he continue in his present behaviour, I shall leave." It is not the continuance of his present behaviour that I will shall become fact, nor yet the idea of my leaving. What I will is that the one event shall produce the other. Yet we cannot eliminate the unique hypothetical character of the volition; for it is only on the supposition that the first event occurs that I will it to produce the second event. And this causal relation cannot occur without the happening of the first event; but, as I do not will the happening of the first event, I cannot even will the occurrence of this causal relation. I will that nothing shall, in point of fact, take place; but as before my volition occurred the continuance of his present behaviour might have produced any one of several consequences, the end of my volition is that it shall produce definitely one of them, namely, the fact of my leaving, and yet shall produce this one result only on the supposition that his conduct be not changed. This hypothetical form of the volition is irresolvable; we can neither analyse it into a categorical volition, nor interpret it by this type of will. Categorical volitions affirm that I am going or not going to do something: hypothetical volitions do not affirm that I am going to do anything.

It has been maintained by some logicians that the hypothetical may be reduced to a categorical judgment; and here, as in the treatment of negative volition, we must be careful

not to confuse what a content of thought logically involves with what an occurring thought actually contains. It is true that the hypothetical judgment involves a categorical. "If he persist in his present behaviour, I shall leave" involves a categorical judgment as to his objectionable conduct. Nay more, this judgment has actually occurred, and its occurrence has been a psychical condition of the volitional attitude which succeeds to it. But, as categorical, it does not make a definite action in the future conditional on the persistence of his objectionable conduct. The categorical judgment contains no supposal; and the hypothetical cannot therefore be resolved into it. The hypothetical psychologically contains a supposal, but contains no judgment. If the categorical judgment persist, it is co-presented with the hypothetical, but not contained in it, as, "His conduct is objectionable; I shall leave if it continue". We must therefore conclude that although the hypothetical logically involves, it neither contains nor can be analysed into a categorical judgment, but is, in respect of its supposal, a distinctive attitude of thought.

If we take next the disjunctive type of will, "I shall go either to Calais or Boulogne," it may be said that this does contain a categorical volition. It is certain that we are going to travel, but we are in doubt whether our temporary destination shall be Calais or Boulogne. We may say that the only volition is this categorical judgment that we are going to travel, and that in the undecided thought that we shall go either to Calais or Boulogne there is no will. But suppose that we have excluded other alternatives, that we have settled not to go to Havre or Dieppe, and have definitely confined ourselves to the alternative of Calais or Boulogne, then over and above a vague resolution to travel, there is the more definite resolution that we shall travel either to Calais or Boulogne. Instead of containing more doubt, this disjunctive volition contains less; and you cannot reduce it to the vaguer categorical volition which may have preceded it. But we may ask: Is it our previous type of hypothetical will differently expressed? for, if I do not go to Calais, I shall go to Boulogne, and if not to Boulogne, to Calais. But neither of these hypotheticals taken separately commits me to the alternative of one or the other. "If I do not go to Calais I shall go to Boulogne," does not tell me what must happen if I do go to Calais. Neither of these hypotheticals taken separately is then a disjunctive volition. Each tells me what will follow from a given supposal. Neither tells me that this supposal must become fact, nor

what will follow from the alternative supposal. But is the disjunctive volition the combination of both hypotheticals? If we think of both together—"Suppose I do not go to Calais, I shall go to Boulogne," and "Suppose I do not go to Boulogne, I shall go to Calais"—and become conscious of their mutual relations, we reach the conclusion, whether logically valid or not, that I shall go to Boulogne *or* Calais. Our two judgments have been succeeded by a single judgment; and do we suppose that its psychosis gathers up and contains them as psychical facts? Their "Suppose I go to Calais" and "Suppose I go to Boulogne" have given place to a definite "I shall go to the one town or the other". They are only the psychical conditions on which this new disjunctive judgment is dependent. And assuming what is certainly not the psychical fact, that we always reach a disjunctive volition through first reflecting on two or more such hypothetical volitions, none the less it is not a combination, nor a putting of them side by side. Before it can occur their attitude of supposal must give place to a single assertorial attitude. Hypothetical volition does not assure me that anything will become fact: disjunctive volition assures me that, so far at least as I am concerned in its production, something will become fact. The judgment of hypothetical volition does not affirm that I am going to do anything; the judgment of disjunctive volition affirms that I am going to do one thing or another.

Our bias for analysing one form of thought into another will receive a good many checks of this sort before we recognise that the forms of thought and conation are unique differentiations.

In distinguishing will from mere conations, we have been led to emphasise the judgment into which some conations develop as that which is distinctive of will. But the form of this judgment is not exclusively categorical, disjunctive or hypothetical, affirmative or negative; and if we rely on the form alone and expect to find the qualitative difference of will within this form, we shall be disappointed. For we can easily construct hypothetical and disjunctive judgments similar to those we have just considered, which we can see at a glance are not volitions. "If he is there I shall see him," has the same form as the judgment "If he is there I will see him," yet the one is a mere judgment, the other also a volition. Nor is it that in the one the conation of desire is absent, in the other, present. For I may desire to see him in both cases; but in the one this leads to a state of expectancy, in the other, to a state of will.

Propositions of the same form and in the same person express both. They differ in only a single word, and the use of the word "shall" in the context of the one indicates that the meaning is a mere judgment, and the word "will" in the other, that the judgment contains also a volition. So also the disjunctive judgment, "I shall go either to Calais or Boulogne," contains a volition, while the similar judgment, "I shall go or I shall not," is so pervaded by doubt as to exclude the possibility of will.

We cannot then rely on the form of these judgments; all depends on what they actually contain. And we can vaguely recognise two essential characters of this content. "If you are there I shall see you" is not will; "If you are there I shall make a point of seeing you" is. In the one judgment there is an emphasis laid on the agency of the self which is wholly absent from the other. Yet, in other cases which also in a sense concern the self's agency, the hypothetical judgment expresses no more than expectation. "If I am tempted in that way I shall succumb" does not imply a present volition on my part to yield to temptation, but a mere expectation based on an experience of my own weakness. Yet in both judgments I affirm that I shall act in a certain way on the supposition of some event occurring.

The other essential character of will has been brought out by our study of the disjunctive judgment. That judgment is always affected by doubt at a point, and is, in this sense, problematic: but where it contains volition there is always a core of belief. It is difficult to point out this core of belief, for it is to the fact of volition that it essentially refers; and if we cannot point out the volition in the complex psychosis which contains it, we cannot specify the belief. This belief is not always that I shall accomplish what I intend; for I may be doubtful of success. It is not essentially a belief that I shall do anything; for my volition may rest on a supposal; nor even that I shall try to do something, for this also may rest on a supposal. But unless I believe, unless I am aware—for the belief is a judgment—that, conditionally or unconditionally, I shall try to do something, there can be no will.

IV.—FICTITIOUS CHOICE.

We may draw the line between conation and will where the former divides into two contrary tendencies, each carrying an idea of its end. We may maintain that we cannot be said to will, and can have no sense of freedom where there is not

present before action a second and alternative idea, even if it be only the negative idea of not doing that to which the first idea impels us. Volition or "selective action," says Prof. Titchener, "arises where we have in consciousness the materials of two different impulses, where two compound ideas of object and result are both alike supplemented by the idea of one's own movement, and the attention oscillates from the one to the other," accompanied by doubt and the "mood of indecision".¹ In this narrower use of the term, volition is synonymous with choice; and what we have taken to be simple volitions, where only one end is represented before action, can be no more than conations. As we have already the term 'choice,' which clearly designates this complex type, it would seem better and more in consonance with the common usage to allow the wider term 'will' to include our simple varieties.

Complex volition or choice is preceded by doubt and conflict. It is "the mental state which emerges when the process of conflict ceases because it has worked itself out to a definite conclusion".² The conflicting desires which in the state of indecision appeared as motives, now "disappear or appear only as obstacles"³ on the same plane with any other difficulty in the way of achievement. But the presence of conflicting desires is not the choice between them. One or both may disappear before any decision is arrived at. Where there is choice they must culminate in the definite judgment that, conditionally or unconditionally, we are going to realise the end of one of them. The process of attention which persists throughout must undergo this modification. Choice, like simple volition, will appear to consist "in a certain kind of judgment or belief".⁴

If you ask a child which of two playthings he would like to have, he hesitates before he chooses. His doubt may last an appreciable time or pass in a moment, but in either case it is abolished by a process of thought. By a comparison of the two objects, he decides between them. He has to find an answer to the question suggested to him, "Which do I like more?" and his judgment that he prefers *this* and not the other object is completed in the volition, "I will have *this*". Note that the mind is probably determined at the outset by

¹ *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 254-255.

² *Analytic Psychology*, by G. F. Stout, vol. i., p. 131.

³ G. F. Stout, *MIND*, N.S., vol. v., p. 337.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 356.

the idea of the stronger liking, it is only in doubt which this is. This determination is partly due to the question proposed to it. If that question had been, "Which plaything will teach you more?" the idea of utility, in spite of its unattractiveness to the mind of the child, might have aroused a momentary conflict with his inborn tendency to be guided by the stronger liking. But here the issue is simple and restricted from the outset. The child's mind is made up before it chooses, all that is left undecided is on which side its liking is stronger. When again we are on a journey, and in doubt which of two routes to choose, yet decided to take the shorter, a similar process of thought, where evidence is at hand, develops the selective judgment that abolishes the conflict, the doubt and the question. And even when in youth we deliberate what shall be our profession, if we happen to be either prudently decided to adopt that which would be most for our interest, or, on the other hand, to follow our strongest inclination, a process of thought essentially the same, though more complex and prolonged, develops the decisive judgment which displaces it. In all similar cases, whether, as in the first, the question is, "Which of two objects is the better in some respect?" or, as in the second, "Which is the shorter way to our destination?" or, as in the third, "Which end is better in this or that respect?" and where we are decided at the outset, whether knowingly or not, to choose the better in the way we have conceived it, then our choice is the judgment in which the state of doubt and conflict culminates. Note, however, that this judgment is not merely an answer to a question asked by the intellect, but also somewhere implies will—"Which shall I take?" "What shall I do?" "What shall I be?" And the answer, "This," does not only contain the judgment, "This is better," but, fused into one with it, the further judgment, "I will take This," "I will do This," "I will be This".

What this double aspect implies will become clearer to us if we modify the kind of question to which our choice is the answer. If instead of asking, "Which shall I take?" "What shall I do?" "What shall I be?" we ask, "What will be given to me?" "What will be done to me?" "What shall I become?" we feel that the answer to these three questions cannot reveal will, while the answer to the former, in the common meaning of the word, must reveal it. There is a difference between them. The questions that provoke will have a specific character distinguishing them from other questions. It is obvious that the first three concern the agency of the self,

while the second ask what will be given, done, or happen to the self. And their answers correspond. The first three affirm that the self is to be an agent in taking, doing or becoming something: the second that the self is to be a patient, as the recipient of a gift, as suffering some action, as undergoing some transformation of character. Complex volition or choice is then a judgment of the self's agency. It is the outcome of such a doubt and question as must, if it be answered, result in choice. And it emerges when that antecedent process "has worked itself out to a definite conclusion".¹

But the three examples we have taken represent different types: (1) The mind of the traveller is made up at the outset. He confines himself to the one question, "Which route is shortest?" He is determined to take the shortest. Now this set of his will may have been the outcome on a former occasion of doubt, question and conflict, in which case it is choice, according to our provisional definition. On the other hand, it may not have been. The man may never have asked, "Shall I take the shorter route or the more beautiful?" But his strong practical habits and commercial interests may have determined his will without doubt or conflict, in the only way that would seem reasonable to him. He knows he is going to take the shorter route, and he has never thought of taking any other. His initial determination is not choice, it is a simple not a complex volition. But its subsequent progress is marked by doubt, question and conflict. The man now asks, "Which route is shorter?" He is uncertain which. Still this conflict is merely a conflict of ideas. The question is addressed only to the intellect. It does not unsettle the will. It does not mean, "What am I going to *will*?" for that is already determined, but, "What am I going to *know*?" viz., whether this or the other route will accomplish my preformed volition. Where then is there a real choice? A simple volition controls the subsequent sequence and works out the means to its own accomplishment. Doubt, question and conflict follow, instead of as in real choice preceding, volition. The complexity is a complexity of thought merely, and as far as the will is concerned its choice is fictitious.

Still we may argue, The traveller has reached the conclusion that he is going to take *this* and not the alternative route. His judgment is will according to our definition; and it follows a process of doubt and conflict and is, therefore,

¹ MIND, N.S., vol. v., p. 181.

choice. Our answer must be that his volition does not appear for the first time in the conclusion. It has been present to his mind from the beginning and persists throughout. And the process of doubt, question and conflict is a means to its end, because it provokes the knowledge of which it stands in need. The will is not the outcome of this conflict, and is therefore not choice, but subordinates the conflict to the idea of its end.

(2) We have assumed that the traveller knew at the outset that he would take the shortest route. A single dominant conation is implied in the question he asked, in the fact that he confined himself to this question. But he may not have been conscious of this conation: he may not have known that he would take the shortest route instead of the most beautiful. In that case the initial set of his mind is blind conation; a set of the character, not a set of the will. Where then does the will appear, where is there a real choice? As in the last case, the doubt and question refer to the intellect. There is a conflict of thoughts, not a conflict of desires. And this intellectual process controlled by a blind conation culminates in the judgment that *this* route is shortest. But as soon as he reaches this conclusion, his blind conation is illumined by a consciousness of his end, and the man knows that he will take this route. Through knowledge, conation has developed into will, and we realise the truth of Mr. Stout's maxim that it is "the cognitive side of our character which gives determinate character to the conative".¹

Still there is no choice, if choice means the selection between conflicting conations or motives. It is a simple volition which coincides with a selection between ideas controlled by a single motive. It is the fictitious choice of judgment confused with the real choice of will because it is fused into one psychosis with a simple volition: "This route is shortest; I will take it". Here the first phrase expresses the selective judgment, the second the simple and driven will.

There is this difference between our two types. In the first, a simple volition precedes and controls the process of doubt which culminates in fictitious choice. In the second it succeeds the process of doubt and conflict and coincides with the moment of fictitious choice. And there is this in common between them: in neither is there any conflict of desires or motives.

¹ MIND, N.S., vol. v., p. 356.

(3) The case of the youth in easy circumstances and free to do as he likes who is resolved to choose that profession for which his inclination is strongest, yet in doubt as to which is his strongest inclination, differs in a material respect from both the preceding types. Here there is a genuine conflict of desires. Different manners of life alternately appeal to him. Each awakens a strong desire. He hesitates for long between them; for the most intense may not be the most persistent. At length, after many contrary opinions, he reaches the momentous choice which decides his career. There is surely nothing fictitious about this choice! Where could we find one more real to oppose to it? Yet, as in the first type, he starts from a volition, and the conflict of opinion which follows is instrumental to it. The rival desires are not motives to his will which is already decided, but motives to his thought which has to decide which of them is the stronger. And this decision or choice is obviously a judgment, and the volition to which it is subordinate remains essentially what it was at the beginning. Its end has indeed changed, and through the process of thought has become more definite. At first it was, "I will adopt that profession which . . ."; now it is, "I will adopt *this* profession". But if at the beginning it were simple as a volition, it is simple now; if it were a choice, it remains a choice. And the decision between the conflicting desires is the fictitious choice of judgment.

Conflicting desires are in a right sense only motives to the will, where the will is the outcome of their conflict. Where it precedes and subordinates them, they are not its motives. Our resolutions are sometimes followed by the desire that we had not made them. But if we remain steadfast the desire is not a motive, and no more than an "obstacle" or hindrance. Where it unsettles the will and throws us anew into the state of doubt from which we had escaped, it is still not a motive to that volition, but to the new volition which tends to replace it. If the youth had asked, "After all, is it not wiser to set aside my inclinations and adopt that profession which offers me solid advantages?" in that case, if his resolution had given way, there would have ensued a genuine conflict of motives. Torn between his preference for one mode of life and the love of wealth or position directing him to another, he would have been forced to choose between these conflicting motives or to remain undecided.

(4) We come next to the fourth type: the case of the child who is called upon to choose between two playthings. If the child ask itself which plaything is nicer, and ask itself no

further question, then this question is witness to the presence of a conation which will be embodied in the judgment which answers it, and will determine the action. This conation is probably blind at the outset—a blind set of the will ; and it is never called in question or doubted. Only a speculative difficulty remains ; and fixing attention alternately on these two objects, it must let them play upon its feelings until some difference between their intensities is produced ; and then, on the first recognition of a superiority on one side or the other, its impulsive conation rushes into will and self-consciousness in the judgment which signalises its discovery, "This is nicer : I will have this". Now here we may suppose that both playthings appeal to the child's feelings, that alternately he feels desire for both. There is then, as in the last case, a conflict of desires ; and the will—the conscious will—is the outcome of this conflict, and does not as in the last case precede it. And these desires are motives since the will chooses between them. Does it not follow that this is a genuine and not a fictitious choice—that the choice is a volition and not the mere selective judgment which follows a disjunctive question? We must answer this question in the affirmative if we hold by our definition of will—that it is not a blind but a foreseeing conation culminating in the judgment that the self is going to accomplish the event foreseen. And yet this result is not satisfactory. We shall be inclined to reverse it, to apply to all our four types the same treatment, and say : So far as there is any will in the process, it is at the commencement, not at the conclusion. All are types of fictitious choice ; no one is real. For the mind is made up at the commencement, and nothing occurs afterwards to alter the blind or conscious set of its will ; all that follows is the light thrown by the intellect upon the conflicting thoughts or desires, so that one of them is seen to represent the object of this pre-existent will. And we are often disposed to take this broad view of the will. Those deep forces within us which work for the most part unseen, their tendencies unforeseen, whose objects only rise into clear thought at times, and at the moment of action are embodied in the judgment that we are going to fulfil them, seem to us the real and abiding will, and their conscious expression an accident or momentary phase, the mere play of thought upon their upmost surfaces.

We have come to distinguish two kinds of choice, fictitious and real ; but the former is real as far as judgment is concerned, fictitious only as far as will is concerned. The weak introspection and analysis of ordinary thought confuses

them, it applies the same term, 'choice,' to both; and it means by the term a complex type of will. But one of them is fictitious choice embodying only a simple volition. Fictitious choice is not a selection between conflicting motives: it may deal with desires and decide between them; but its decision is a judgment. It has like all judgment the character of truth or falsity: and like all judgment which resolves a doubt and disjunctive question, it selects one of the conflicting ideas of the state of doubt: but it does not select one of the conflicting motives. It may affirm that one desire is better, the other worse; that one is stronger, the other weaker; that one road is longer, the other shorter; and if the question has been which of them is better or stronger, or shorter, it decides, selects, banishes doubt and assumes the externals of a volition; but its fictitious character is most clearly exposed where it is followed by a genuine choice which makes an opposite selection. It may select the shorter, and the will may select the longer: it may select the better, and the will may follow the worse: it may select the stronger, and the will may reinforce the weaker. The choosing will does not affirm the qualities of its motives nor their relative strength, nor the best means to their fulfilment: it simply decides between their rival conations. The will cannot judge in the sense of affirming what is true or false. Its "I will do this" is neither true nor false in the same sense in which a judgment is true or false: it does not become true when its end is realised, nor false when it fails. Though we may lie and say, "I will do this," meaning it not, the lie attaches only to the judgment; and our inward and hidden intent, though it only becomes self-conscious in a judgment, is no more a judgment than desire is, and is neither true nor false. We have seen in former types how a judgment may assume the character of a simple volition; we see in the present type how it may assume the character of complex volition or choice.

V.—INVOLUNTARY ACTION.

An involuntary action is well defined by Mr. Stout to be "one which takes place in opposition to a voluntary resolution which exists simultaneously with it and is not displaced by it".¹ We often do what is contrary to our intention without anticipating the result; as where a child in trying to help hinders some one. But the involuntary actions we are to

¹ MIND, N.S., vol. v., p. 356.

consider are partly produced by the strength of the idea which represents them. Now when an idea produces the action by its own strength and without any concurrent resolution on our part, that is called *ideo-motor action*: when an idea produces the action it represents not merely without our concurrence, but in spite of a contrary resolution, that we shall name *involuntary ideo-motor action*.

Conflict is of the essence of this type; we strive to restrain an idea of abnormal strength: we fail and our volition is abortive. But as complex volition is also characterised by conflict, we may perhaps find this type representative of real choice.

The first sub-types we shall consider are those produced through fear. A man struggles not to become confused or dumfounded through fear, and the idea of this result is that which produces it; or he resolves that an anxious idea shall not interfere with some delicate operation he is conducting which requires calmness and self-control; or that he will not attend to a horrible idea that is coming to fascinate him. And this impulse of fear, which, when not too intense, aids our escape from its object, here, through some morbid development or excessive intensity, defeats its instinctive end, and draws us to the very object we are striving to avoid. Ordinarily when we recognise within us the presence of such an overmastering fear, we at once concentrate all the energies of our will in resisting it. We pass through no intervening state of doubt. We do not first ask ourselves, "Shall I oppose it or shall I yield?" and decide after deliberation. Our action is immediate; there is no "struggle so far as regards our own part in the matter".¹ If then the precedence of such a struggle as this with doubt and question is essential to complex volition or choice, if choice is the mental state which arises when such a conflict ceases, then there is no choice. And there can be no real choice without a conflict of motives. But here there is only one motive present, the desire to restrain the action the idea of which persists. There is indeed another and contrary motive in a different sense. There is something present which is *moving* us to action, but it moves us to an involuntary not to a voluntary action. It is not a motive *to* the will but *against* it. The conflict is then between a motive which the will immediately supports and an obstacle to that volition. And the doubt which so penetrates us at such times is not any doubt as to what we are going to will, but whether we can

¹ *Op. cit.*

accomplish our volition. The mental state or psychosis can then at most be a simple volition. But has it even reached this stage of development?

In considering the type of simple volition, we found that an essential element of it was a judgment, in the common type, a categorical judgment that we were going to accomplish a desired end. But it appeared that this judgment only occurred where a sufficient pause intervened between the desire and its execution. Some obstacle delays the outrush of desire, and in the interval we become conscious that we are doing to satisfy our desire. Here also there is an obstacle, and our desire finds itself constrained. But we are already struggling against this obstacle before we recognise that we are doing so. Our impulse to escape from any object we fear is instinctive. A conscious volition may support this impulse, but the impulse precedes it. Now, what we have to inquire is whether an involuntary action does not sometimes occur so suddenly through the fear that we have of doing it, that the only conation that has time to develop for its restraint is just such an instinctive impulse as fear always involves. In learning to bicycle, people sometimes find that the mere terror which seizes them at the thought of running into a passing vehicle is sufficient to bring about the accident. On such occasions, the thought which occurs to their minds, often betrayed by their exclamation, is, "I know I shall run into it!" If fear left them time for reflexion before the accident, the second judgment, "I shall try not to," might also occur as the revelation of a conscious will antagonistic to the involuntary impulse. But there is no sufficient interval. As soon as the first judgment occurs, the collision takes place. In this strange type—common to our experience, but strange to our preconceptions of will—we find an involuntary tendency that apes the character of volition in the judgment that we are going to accomplish the object of that tendency, while the voluntary impulse opposed to it never attains to this degree of development, but reaches at most to the idea of not doing the action without culminating in the definite judgment that we are not going to do it. Yet we should describe the collision as involuntary, and we should say that it occurred in spite of our voluntary effort. For, however unsuccessfully, we tried to avoid it; though our momentary effort was confused and overpowered through fear of the accident. But according to our definition of will, this effort is not volition, because it is instinctive and precedes the idea of escape, and because this idea of escape does not develop into the judgment that we shall try to

escape. Were this judgment to occur, it would still succeed and not precede our effort. It would not determine our abortive effort: our abortive effort would determine it. It would, in fact, be a mere recognition of what was actually taking place, namely, our effort to escape. If, then, our effort be not a volition, the triumph of the contrary idea and judgment cannot produce an action involuntary or against will. Here, again, we feel tempted to broaden our definition of will. The effort which comes to our succour when some morbid idea or sudden emotion threatens us with destruction, however obscure it be, seems to us a genuine propulsion of the will, and, as we should say, an effort of self-control. Though it proceed not from the self as conscious thought, it proceeds from the primitive self as a system of tendencies instinctively organised for our preservation. And any impulse that proceeds from this self and is subordinated to its end seems will to us, so far at least as it gathers some idea of its end, although the idea be subsequent to the impulse, not the impulse to the idea. Where, on the other hand, an impulse is provoked which is not subordinated to the instinctive end of the organism or the conscious ends of the mind, though it proceed from this primitive self, yet it is not will, because it has escaped from the control of this self. The present case is an example. An emotion of fear, through a too great intensity, has defeated its instinctive end, and driven us to the very object we should avoid. It has broken apart from that instinctive organisation of the self, and therefore can be no longer the will of that self. The fullest consciousness will no longer make it will. And this we see clearly in the present example. We have an idea of the accident before it takes place, and, through the fear that possesses us, a consciousness that we are about to fulfil this idea; and yet this express judgment that we regarded as distinctive of will does not bring the impulse one degree nearer to volition than it would have been had it remained a blind tendency.

On the other hand, successfully as this conception of will interprets the present type, we should meet with many difficulties if we put it forward as the essential character of volition. Its definition is this: What the self does consciously is will. And "does" means not merely what it outwardly accomplishes, but what it is striving to do, as in the present thwarted impulse. Will then in this sense is the conation of the self. From which it follows that the striving of desire is will, whether or not we decide that we shall satisfy our desire. But at least, in any right sense of the term, there can only be one volition present at a given moment. Where

we have contrary desires which then is will? That which proceeds from the self? But both proceed from the self, belong to different sides or interests of that one self. One, say, is the interest in our profession, the other, interest in our country; or, one is the sentiment of pleasure, the other, the sentiment of duty. In all complex volition the self is ambiguous, and it is only at the decisive moment when we reject one desire and welcome its opponent that we know in which line of tendency the self is henceforth manifest. Then the self contracts. That which a moment before was one of its motives has now become an "obstacle" and a not-self. The volition has negatived it. It is excluded from the new limits of the self. And, instead of the conation of the self being *ipso facto* will, it is the conation which has become will that constitutes the sentiment from which it precedes the self. That mental system which has power to develop will becomes the new self. And the mental system, say of a fixed idea, though it culminate in the judgment of its prospective triumph and realisation, where it cannot develop a will, cannot become the self of the moment; where it is opposed by the will of another system it becomes a not-self; and all that proceeds from it is involuntary action. If we are then compelled to maintain our former definition as against this alternative conception of will, we cannot class the present type with involuntary actions. We must call it non-voluntary ideo-motor action.

In other cases fear produces genuine involuntary action. The game of golf furnishes an excellent illustration of this. It is one of the most deliberate games ever invented. We are not called upon to face, as in cricket, a sudden situation to which we must promptly adapt ourselves; but before each stroke we may exercise as much thought and deliberation as we judge necessary. It is therefore peculiarly influenced by the character and play of our ideas. In all difficult undertakings confidence aids success; but in varying degrees. Here it is of so much importance that if we have an idea that we shall fail in any particular stroke we commonly do fail. Unreasonable fears disturb at times even good players. The sight of a long distance of sand or water will suggest to one that he will not succeed in driving his ball across it, though he knows himself capable of the achievement. And if he fail he will often tell you that he knew that he was going to fail. This judgment has irresistibly formulated itself in his mind through fear, though he is conscious of a voluntary resolution opposed to it. His voluntary resolution cannot acquire the same degree of confidence.

He cannot persuade himself that he knows he is going to succeed, or he probably would succeed. He knows only that he is trying his best, depressed by the influence of an idea that he cannot exclude. Here in this type we have an undoubted volition rendered abortive by a contrary idea and judgment, and the result is an involuntary ideo-motor action.

But how do we know that this action is involuntary? Like the last type, it has aped the character of categorical volition in the judgment that we are going to realise the action. But if desire be essential to volition, the action cannot be voluntary because we had no desire to accomplish it, but, on the contrary, a strong aversion.

Again in this type, as in the preceding, there is no choice, if choice means the decision between rival motives. There is only one motive present, the desire to succeed; and the fear of failure constitutes a mere obstacle to the volition in which this desire results. Yet there is doubt and conflict present; but this concerns, not what we are going to decide, but whether our resolution will be effective. It is a doubt which is not a condition precedent of will, but complicates its progress. Now the only distinction between this and the preceding type of non-voluntary ideo-motor action is that here the instinctive tendency to escape from the object we fear has a sufficient interval to develop into a conscious volition in the judgment that I shall try to do that which fear suggests to me I shall fail in doing.

In other cases of involuntary action, there may be a conflict of desires present. Thus in struggling to restrain a reflex tendency, as Mr. Stout has well recognised, the impulse of that tendency becomes defined as a desire. To restrain a yawn or cough is so disagreeable that we long to let it escape and have done with it. On the other hand there is often an opposite desire present, and to permit a reflex tendency to escape may be ill-bred or even disgraceful; while in other cases, as where an army is on a march and complete silence has to be maintained, a fit of coughing may endanger its safety. And here the difficulty of distinguishing by the presence of a judgment between will and the involuntary tendency is at its climax.¹

But we are now prepared for this result. The judgment that we were going to accomplish some end which, in our first type, we assumed to be not merely an essential constituent of will, but its distinctive constituent, that assump-

¹ See Mr. Stout's article already referred to, p. 360.

tion we have had to surrender. We have seen hypothetical and disjunctive judgments which by their form are not to be distinguished from hypothetical and disjunctive volitions ; and in our present type we have merely discovered examples of categorical judgments which ape the character of categorical volitions. There is indeed no reason why an involuntary tendency, any less than will, when it is at the point of accomplishing its end, should not become embodied in the same kind of judgment, making known to us the results which it is to bring about. We have to pass from the judgment to what it actually contains, before we can tell whether it embody an involuntary impulse or a volition.

If we ask, in the next place, whether, in restraining a reflex tendency which has become a pressing desire, we are exhibiting choice, it does not follow because there are opposite desires present that there is any choice between them. As in the third type of fictitious choice, the decision between opposite desires was determined by a pre-existing volition, and the decision itself was no other than a judgment that decided which desire were stronger ; so here for another reason there may be no choice, if choice is a volition preceded by a genuine doubt as to the desire we are going to select. As in the types of involuntary action due to fear, we decide without hesitation, so here the escape of the reflex tendency may be so disgraceful, or fraught with such serious consequences, that we never doubt or ask ourselves whether we should permit it to escape ; we decide at once to restrain it. It may be objected that a moment before we decide to restrain the reflex tendency, there must be some doubt as to what we are going to decide ; but this objection would exemplify that frequent source of error in our science named by Prof. James "the psychologist's fallacy". We, taking up the standpoint of an external observer, may judge that there is some uncertainty how the individual in question may act : he may experience no such uncertainty, but as soon as he recognises the conflicting tendencies, decide at once between them. When the order has been given by a military commander that, to surprise an enemy, the march must be noiseless, it may be difficult and painful for some individual to repress the tendency to cough, but the habit of military obedience does not admit of any doubt rising in his mind as to whether he should obey or satisfy a desire which is becoming imperious. He at once resists it, and if it escape, it escapes in spite of him. The volition is after all a simple volition ; and the disciplined soldier cannot be said to choose to obey his superior.

And, lastly, in involuntary action there may be a genuine choice rendered abortive by the triumph of the involuntary impulse. It is, however, difficult to find any unambiguous example of such a type. There are no doubt cases of morbid ideas that possess and fascinate attention, which we resist at times and at other times question whether we should any longer continue our futile resistance; yet supposing we resolved to continue it after such question and doubt, our resistance is choice, but it does not follow it was persisted in until the involuntary action escaped. What commonly happens is that the involuntary impulse gathers fresh strength and is suddenly realised without our thinking of resisting it until too late. It is then only involuntary in the sense of being opposed to a prior volition that we have never consciously revoked, but forgotten at the crucial moment. Many of our actions that in strictness are non-voluntary, as containing at that moment neither the volition to do or not to do them, would in this sense fall within the category of involuntary actions. Our good resolutions are forgotten, but seldom revoked.

VI.—WILL AS IMPERATIVE.

At the end of his long and brilliant chapter on the will, after having shown in vivid illustration that its essential character is effort of attending, Prof. James comes to recognise that some complex types contain an additional constituent. This he frankly confesses he cannot analyse. We may name it a consent, a *fiat* or imperative, but we can go no farther: "the indicative and imperative moods are as much ultimate categories of thinking as they are of grammar!"¹

It is a curious fact that while we frequently use the imperative mood where our object is to control the conduct of another, we seldom if ever use it at the moment of volition, in the control of our own conduct. But if we listen to the inward voices at times of stress and doubt, in the conflict preceding choice, we find that *they* often address us in the imperative mood. The moral sentiment so frequently adopts this attitude that we name it the moral imperative; and our mutinous desires also call to us through the fight: "Do it, take it, away with your scruples!" But the response of our will is different. It is like the action of a man that seizes a fellow-creature who is falling and cannot save him-

¹ *Prin. of Psy.*, vol. ii. p. 569.

self, but does not impotently command him to rise; or, that holding an animal which struggles to escape, does not bid it begone, but, what is more to the purpose, sets it free.

The indicative and imperative moods may be ultimate categories of thought; but if we have been tempted to identify the imperative mood with volition, we must reluctantly conclude that it is often present in the state of conflict preceding voluntary choice, and often absent in the decisive moment which abolishes our doubt and conflict.

Yet where our object is to control the conduct of children, servants and our subordinates generally, volition assumes the attitude of an imperative, sometimes politely disguised as a request, sometimes assuming the peremptory tone of a command.

Will is not then essentially an imperative, any more than it is essentially defined in a categorical, a disjunctive or a hypothetical judgment. It is indicative as well as imperative. And the imperative, like the disjunctive and hypothetical judgments, is ambiguous, and may or may not contain will. Where it appears in the state of indecision preceding choice, it is the specific attitude which our rival conations assume in face of the inward obstacle to their satisfaction; where it appears in our external volitions, it is the specific attitude which these assume in the face of an external obstacle to their realisation. In the one case, the obstacle is a rival motive; in the other, it lies in the inertia and conflicting desires and will of our fellow-men. If we see a servant bringing us what we want, we do not order him to bring it; if a child is doing what he is permitted to do, we do not order him to desist. Our order is given where without it our wants would not be attended to or our will would not be obeyed. But where people are angry, they often give meaningless or inconsistent directions; they command that to be brought to them which they see is on the way, or children to cease doing what they have permitted them to do. The emotion of anger finds a vent in overcoming the obstacle of a proper self-respect and dignity in subordinates.

We can now understand why it is that the imperative does not appear in the volitions that control our own conduct. Where our end can be obtained independently of the aid or concurrence of our fellow-men, the imperative is absent, because its presence would be meaningless. If our volition has been preceded by a conflict of motives, that conflict has now ceased, our course is decided, and there is nothing for an imperative to accomplish. But it appears in this state of indecision preceding choice, because volition is absent, and

* may be provoked by an imperative like the will of another man. And how often these imperatives seem to us to have an extrinsic source, and to be the echoes within of the will of the gods or our fellow-men without. We do not at first identify such inward voices with ourself. As when we think, the opinions of other men occur to us as not our own opinions, as not yet affirmed or denied by our judgment, so before we will the commands of our parents and those whom we venerate, and the codes of society or religion, often occur to us, as not commands proceeding from ourself, and not yet consented to or rejected by our will.

And so the imperative is always a stimulus to our will or conation, or to the will or conation of other men. But is itself ever a volition? Or, in other words, as there are categorical, disjunctive and hypothetical types of will, are there also imperative volitions? If there be, they seem only to occur where the object of the imperative is to control the conduct of another person and not our own:

But sometimes the imperative mood is only a short and abrupt expression of desire. "Come and see me," may mean, "I desire," not, "I command it". Only the form is imperative; the meaning is different. At other times the meaning is imperative. An undoubted command is given, and understood as such both by the person addressing it and the person to whom it is addressed. And we recognise this as volition. But often where we give an order, as in our simple categorical volitions, we are not conscious of any other desire, except the one which we direct shall be satisfied. We are not thinking of the desires of the person we address, and whether these are antagonistic to our own. From the habit of giving orders to our subordinates, we give them without thinking of their feelings, so long as the order belongs to the class which we are accustomed to give and they to obey. In this case the imperative is a simple volition. But at other times we become clearly conscious of a conation in them which our imperative is meant to restrain. If a child is doing what he is not permitted to do, he is told to desist. Or if we anticipate that he is going to do it, we remind him that the action is forbidden. In such cases there seem to be two ideas present—the idea which we foresee the child is going to do and the contrary idea of the conduct which we prescribe. The one idea is expressive of a conation in ourselves; the other of a conation in the child. Can we ever choose between two conations, one of which is in ourselves, the other in the mind of another person? We should answer this question in the negative. Only so far as the conation

of another person becomes ours through sympathy, or through its harmony with our sentiments, does it become a motive to the will and an alternative to the desire we feel. But since the desire of another person often becomes such a motive in one way or the other, the imperative may be the result of a complex volition or choice. Thus you both desire to do what is best for your child, and you desire also through sympathy to yield to his desire. And where we choose between these motives, there seems first to be present to our minds the judgment that we are going to follow one of these two desires, and only afterwards, as it were a means to carrying this judgment into effect, does there issue from us an imperative or order to the child. Thus we are compelled to ask whether after all the imperative can be a volition, or only the means by which a preformed volition accomplishes its end.

If we assume it to be only a means, we shall find it troublesome to point out in all cases the volition that precedes it. In the case we have just considered, we deliberate between the child's desire and what, as responsible for him, we think he should be allowed to do. There is then that pause before the issue of our imperative in which we decide and are conscious of deciding between these alternatives. But the imperative often issues from us so suddenly that there is no sufficient interval in which the conscious judgment of how we are going to act can be formulated. A sudden want or desire rises in the mind, and we call upon a servant to fulfil it. The pull of the bell is an imperative, as much as our express order; and, as so frequently in involuntary action, no doubt or question intervenes, still less a judgment which answers the question. There is a single desire culminating at once in an imperative; as in our simple categorical volitions, a single desire culminates in a categorical judgment.

But in the complex type of the imperative, where a voluntary choice ordinarily precedes its command and is defined in a judgment, does the imperative lapse from a volition and become something else? The volition may precede the imperative, but is not annulled. It is changed, but persists. It is first embodied in a judgment, afterwards in an imperative. In the same way a hypothetical volition often passes into a categorical. "If you are there I shall make a point of seeing you." "But I shall be there." "Then I certainly will see you." In this *volitional syllogism*, as it might be called, the hypothetical volition of the major premiss is transformed into the categorical

volition of the conclusion through the judgment of the minor premiss.

We have seen will disengage itself from one form of judgment after another, and in our present type, it seems to throw aside every form of judgment and the definitions by which we have bound it to the judgment and to assume the distinctive form of an imperative.

But is the imperative a distinctive form, an "ultimate category"? Is its attitude as unique as negative thought, as the categorical, disjunctive and hypothetical judgments? Is its uniqueness, like theirs, not due to the combination of any constituents which we can specify? Does it belong to those products of mental life which consist in new groupings and complications of constituents present in other and previously subsisting groups, or to those products which consist in a new differentiation of such constituents? In the one case it is analysable in respect of that which is distinctive of it; in the other it is not.

There is one explanation of the imperative which readily suggests itself. When we say, "Do this," we may mean, "If you refuse, you will be punished". Is the imperative in reality a hypothetical judgment disguised in a unique grammatical form? We often supplement it by such a judgment where we anticipate that it will not act as an adequate motive without. And we can explain the influence which it exercises over us by the many painful consequences which, in childhood and youth, have followed disobedience to our superiors. But our question is one of analysis, not of genesis. We have to ask what the imperative means to the person who uses it, not how it has become a motive for the person to whom it is addressed; and where we anticipate no disobedience we neither say nor think, "If you do not do this, I will punish you," or "I shall be offended". This hypothetical judgment is something additional to the command, and which may or may not be added to it. And further, such hypothetical propositions essentially express a condition and its consequence, not a command that the person spoken to shall so act that the consequence shall not become due. The command is indirectly conveyed to him by the tone of your voice, the expression of your features, and perhaps by his knowledge that you will be pained by his disobedience and the necessity of punishing him. But a vicious schoolmaster might enjoy the prospect of a boy's disobedience that he might have the pleasure of flogging him; and his hypothetical proposition, though interpreted by the boy as an imperative, might contain no real

imperative volition, but its essential meaning of a condition and its consequence, and an ardent hope that the condition might become fact. In this case we can hardly suppose there were any real imperative in the schoolmaster's thought. And so a despot may say, addressing a rebellious subject, "If you do not submit, I shall forfeit your estates". And being confident of success, he may neither will nor desire his submission, because he covets his property.

Now the interesting point in these examples is that while they are not mere judgments, but genuine hypothetical volitions, they are not imperative volitions; they therefore demonstrate the distinctiveness of these two types of will. In the schoolmaster's mind there is a resolution to punish the boy in the event of his misconduct, and in the despot's, in a similar event, to seize his subject's estates. Both hope the event may occur in order to enforce its consequence. Both simulate an imperative attitude; but, through their hope of the event, in neither is there an imperative volition forbidding it.

We may next attempt to resolve the imperative into the disjunctive judgment, "You will do this or take the consequences". Here, as in the previous case, we must make the answer that this disjunctive judgment, though it sometimes supplement an imperative, is not its essential meaning; and is often neither spoken nor thought of. And again, the intention may be to inflict the punishment, and the alternative to it which is put forward may be chosen because we are sure it will be rejected, and will therefore of a certainty promote the end of our real volition.

We may make a more successful attempt than either of the foregoing to resolve the imperative into the categorical judgment, "You will do this". And here, as in the case of the imperative itself, the proposition is full of ambiguity. Like the imperative mood it may mean no more than a desire or entreaty, as where we emphasise the word "will"; or again, it may express a question. But where it means Will, it seems to be the same volition as the imperative. Thus, I may say to a man, "You will go to this place, and on arriving there you will leave this letter, and you will bring back the answer to it"; and the same volition, with no substantial alteration of its meaning, may be expressed in the imperative, "Go to this place, leave this letter, and bring back the answer to it". There is more emphasis in the imperative, and the emphasis is laid on the volition, while in the proposition there is rather a clear and certain anticipation of the future event, and the volition sinks into the background.

There is sometimes an overpowering assurance about "You will do this;" a cool, deliberate determination, so different from the abrupt "Do this," where it springs impulsively, suggests a threat and hides a suspicion of failure. But a more striking difference remains to be pointed out. In "You will do this"—leave this letter and bring back the answer—there is always a clear anticipation of a future event, but this anticipation like others may be mistaken. The man may do something else or refuse. In other words, "You will do this," is a judgment referring to a future event: "Do this," is a command referring to a future event. The judgment is either true or false: the command is neither true nor false. It is not shown to be false or mistaken, like the judgment, when the event referred to is not accomplished; nor does it become true, like the judgment, when it is. The failure of the judgment is error, a mistake in its conjecture; the failure of the imperative is a thwarted purpose.

But we are not yet at the bottom of the difficulty. The judgment, "You will do this," may, as we have seen, be more than a judgment; it may also contain a volition: in the same way as the imperative may also imply an anticipation or judgment. In that case the judgment, "You will do this," means, "I command you to do it, therefore you will do it". The anticipation or judgment of the future event is the consequence of the implied command or imperative. And similarly, when we give a command and are also conscious of anticipating its accomplishment, this judgment only arises because we are conscious that the command has been given.

This implication of a command in the judgment, "You will do this," comes out more clearly if we substitute the word 'shall' for 'will'. There can then be no mistake about the presence of volition. But it carries also the meaning that this imperative has been already partially thwarted or that at least there are clear signs of disobedience, as when a nurse having repeatedly used the imperative, "Sit still," to a restless child without the required result, clenches it in the judgment, "You shall sit still," and thumps it down on the seat. "You shall do it," means, "I will make you do it, and having ordered you to, will use physical force to compel obedience".

We have seen that in these alternative phrases which we may use instead of the imperative mood, though not without a certain alteration of our meaning, the categorical judgment, which they prominently express, still carries with it more or less clearly the imperative as its basis; and that by

the discovery of these alternative phrases, so far from having resolved the imperative into a categorical judgment, it persists as the indispensable basis of that judgment.

From our failure to analyse the imperative as will, we infer that, like negation and the types of judgment, like the distinction between pleasure and pain, and the distinctive varieties of sensation, it is a differentiation of thought, or more correctly of thought and will, of which we may perhaps furnish a genetic, but never an analytic explanation.

VII.—DESIRE AND WILL.

In all volitions, according to the common opinion of psychologists, we either desire their immediate result or some remoter consequence. But our situation may be so desperate that, instead of a choice between desires, we have only a choice between aversions. A woman may have to choose between death and dishonour. A man suffering from an incurable disease may prefer the alternative of suicide; and a condemned man has sometimes been permitted to select the manner of his death. He may have an aversion to death in every form; and if we take aversion to mean desire to escape from an object, he has several such desires. He desires to escape from death altogether, and each death, as he imagines it, he shrinks from. But a power that heeds not his desires holds him fast. Powerless and despairing, he cannot will to escape from it. There is no good that he can choose; he can only avoid the greater evil. Some death appears to him less horrible than others. His aversion to it is less strong, and he perforce selects it.

In this type, there is a volition present and even a rational choice; but can we find any desire for the death selected? We may say that the motive which determines the man's choice is desire to escape the greater evil. He sees a course that offers him escape. He therefore desires to follow that course. But this argument is based on a false simplification of his state of mind. Desire may indeed be present in the state anteceding his volition; but at the moment of will it is transformed into aversion. He desires to escape the greater evil: he desires also to escape the less; and the course which he represents as an escape from the greater is that which leads directly to the less. Were it not for the less, he would desire to follow this course; but the presence of this evil at the end of it transforms desire into aversion. Were it not for the greater evil at the opposite end, he would desire to retrace his steps; but the presence of this greater

evil again transforms desire into aversion. There he stands between these opposite goals, hemmed in in a course that inevitably leads from one to the other, with a simultaneous aversion for both ; and shrinking to the last he is pushed forward to the one goal by the greater horror behind him.

While in the common types of volition there is desire to do what we will to do, either for itself or some ulterior consequence, here there is desire not to do what we will to do, and desire that death, the ultimate consequence of our action, may not be realised. It is the extreme opposite of the type which psychologists¹ have described as universal, and admitting of no exceptions. And we can conceive of a third that occupies an intermediate position between these extremes. Volition may stand in three typical relations to desire : (1) we may will to do what we desire to do ; (2) we may will to do what we desire to escape from doing ; (3) we may will to do what we have no desire of doing. In other words, we may feel either desire or aversion for what we are going to do, or, conceivably, neither one nor the other.

There is another type familiar to those who have an experience of self-sacrifice, in which the sacrifice of one of ourselves is undertaken, not in a mood of warm and exalted emotion, but in the calm, austere spirit of the northern Teutonic races, where duty, for duty's sake, ordains the sacrifice. It is "a dreary resignation," "a desolate and acrid sort of act, an excursion into a lonesome moral wilderness".² Do you think that at the moment at which you were to resolve to go out into this "wilderness," you would feel any desire to be there? Do you think that in the heart-rending struggle which precedes, you would be led to such a self-sacrifice by the pleasant impulse of desire? Of course, we know that a soul so high-strung loves duty, and desires to follow it. But where is the love, and where the desire, at the moment of a great surrender? The end is still desirable, but does desire occur as a psychical fact? The end is desirable ; it is an end we ought to desire ; it has moral value ; we do desire it at other times ; nay, more, were only the burden of this sacrifice lifted, we should desire it anew. But as when a youth is in love, his favourite occupations and the books in which he took delight, delight him no more, and his intellectual ambition is under an eclipse, because all the desire of his being is absorbed into the system of this over-

¹ Mr. Bradley is an exception : see his "Pleasure, Pain, Desire and Volition," *MIND*, xiii.

² William James, *Prin. of Psy.*, vol. ii., p. 684.

mastering passion ; so when, at the call of duty, we sacrifice what we most love, the passionate desire of love effaces the pale intellectual desire of duty.

In this type, desire is no longer present as a motive to the will. There is desire for the end that we sacrifice, not for the end we accept. And we can quite well explain the motive which influences this choice without supposing it to be formed of an actual present desire. The austere love of duty, the calm but often steady desires that subserve it, explain the formation of a habit of acting in harmony with its dictates ; and this habit, where a sufficient interval occurs before action, is ordinarily reinforced by desire. Only when an intense desire competes with it, is it effaced for the time. Then the "feeling-tone" of the sentiment of duty is effaced, and the mental system which it qualifies becomes a dry mental fact. But it does not cease to be a motive ; its conation is diminished, but not destroyed. It still strives to exclude those ideas of action that are incompatible with it ; it thwarts the contrary desire. The habit of our past lives stands by us. It maintains these ideas within the focus of attention, so that passion cannot exclude them, or blind us to their true character. And they persist as an alternative motive to the will, unloved, undesired at the moment though they be. And the loss of their affective side, that side which affects us with pleasure and desire, is not anything exceptional. It seems to be a general psychological truth that only opposite desires nearly balanced in point of intensity can both be felt together. When one is calm and intellectual, and the other has reached the intensity of passion, the first disappears. But when the state of indecision is prolonged, amid the fluctuations of intensity of the contrary desire, the first may find an opportunity, and be reinstated. But at the moment we make those calm but steadfast resolves, when at the same moment that we see all the allurements of passion we reject them, then we feel only the desire that we will not to follow and not the desire to follow that we will. And were this not the case, did we in a moment see the beauty of self-sacrifice, and on the impulse achieve it, then we should not feel that terrible effort in our resolution. It would form easily, and, with the subsidence of emotion, as easily, perhaps, be forgotten or repented of.

This effort that we feel in forming a resolution must be carefully distinguished from the effort felt in carrying it into effect. Great undertakings are hard to achieve ; but we will to achieve them in youth with facility. There may be little effort felt in going out into the cold, but the resolve may

cost us much. It is the first and antecedent, not the subsequent effort, that is often witness to the fact that our resolution is contrary to our desire. And yet not always; for where two contrary desires persist, and prolong indecision, we feel often a considerable effort in making any choice between them.

There are, then, three types due to the relation of will to desire: the common type in which desire is the motive selected; the type in which desire is effaced from the motive; the type in which desire is replaced by aversion. The second type is exemplified more frequently than we think. The little words "ought" and "must," with their impalpable meanings, have come to acquire considerable force with civilised men. When the desire opposed to them is not too strong, they are often sufficient of themselves to overcome it. We do little disagreeable things because, as we say, we must. We go to see people that we dislike, we write letters that we hate, because we have to. It is an artificial explanation, sought after in the interests of a theory, to suppose that we always think of the consequences of these disagreeable actions, and that these awaken an actual desire to do them. The idea that we have to do them moves us. We are going to delay no longer, and this idea culminating in the prospective judgment of our action suffices. When we hesitate we are apt to feel aversion, and the third type is exemplified. When we act quickly, through a settled habit, there is no interval sufficient for desire or aversion; we have simply the idea that we *must*, followed sometimes by the judgment that we *will*.

There are two arguments that may still be advanced in support of the usual theory. We may urge that desire is not altogether absent from these cases, only that it is so faint as to pass undetected. But if we cannot sometimes detect it, we cannot verify the theory that it is essential. The theory or hypothesis, while it interprets the common types, finds others which are, to say the least, ambiguous, and rather lend support to an opposite hypothesis. But what shall we say where it is not merely a question of desire being extinguished, concerning which we can always allege that it still flickers, but where it is a question of desire being replaced by the contrary fact of aversion—instead of desire to do the action, desire to escape doing it? And this is sometimes sufficiently intense to be unmistakable. Shall we urge that in the very core of this aversion there is a hidden and contrary desire—that the man who has chosen the death for which he feels the least aversion, also secretly

and unknown to himself in some degree desires this death? Who with an open mind would be convinced by that argument? And we may ask further: Is a desire that is unfelt and unrecognised any longer a desire? For when we desire, we know that we desire; as when we will, we know that we will. Sometimes, indeed, we try to blind ourselves to the fact of desire; but the effort shows that we have first recognised it. An unfelt desire is a blind conation—a tendency only interpretable by its result. But the cases we have considered are not blind conations; we foresee their results, only we feel no desire for them. In our first example, choice lay between two actions which were neither desired nor for most men desirable, their common end, death, being likewise neither desired nor in most men's opinion desirable. In our second example, choice lay between two actions one of which was desired and the other recognised as desirable, but for which there was no actual desire. In the one case we cannot choose anything that we desire: in the other what is desirable but not desired.

The study of the types of will is the indispensable basis of a scientific theory of its essential character. Because such a preliminary study has never been made, or because we have contented ourselves with the portrayal of a few subordinate types, our theories of volition have one after another appeared one-sided and inadequate. A theory formed in unconsciousness of any distinctive type of will, or without a clear insight into its peculiarities, is liable to be overthrown by any one to whom this type is familiar in his own experience. And the more closely the typical forms of will are studied, the more we shall appreciate the difficulty of embracing them in any one supreme type. We have already felt something of this difficulty, as well in pursuing the character of simple as of complex volitions. The general theory of will we can only put forward as a scientific hypothesis for interpreting its distinctive types: and when a new type is brought forward that we have not anticipated we may have to modify our hypothesis. Better evidence than this we cannot pretend to, and the profoundest introspection will not show us the *universal* character of will.

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