

especially psychoanalysis: One of the philosophically intriguing questions here is whether we can explicate such psychoanalytic concepts as "repressed wishes", "unconscious anxiety", "Oedipus complex", etc. as dispositions, or whether unconscious events also need to be assumed. Even outside the sphere of Freudian preoccupations, there are for instance the often reported cases of "waking up with the solution of a mathematical problem." One wonders whether the brain did some "work" during sleep, and if so, whether "unconscious thoughts" might not be part of a first-level explanation of this sort of phenomenon. I am inclined to think that both dispositions and events are required, and that the future development of science may well produce more reliable neurophysiological explanations than the currently suggested (and suggestive) brain models (cf. Colby, 76).

10. Much more problematic than all the questions so far discussed in this section are the implications of the alleged findings of psychical research. Having been educated in the exercise of the scientific method, I would in the first place insist on further experimental scrutiny of those findings. But if we take seriously the impressive statistical evidence in favor of telepathy, clairvoyance, and precognition, then there arises the extremely difficult problem of how to account for these facts by means of a scientific theory. I know of no attempt that gives even a plausible suggestion for such a theory. All hypotheses that have been proposed so far are so utterly fantastic as to be scientifically fruitless for the present. But logical analyses (e.g., C. D. Broad, 52; M. Scriven, 304) which make explicit in which respects the facts (if they are facts!) of psychical research are incompatible with some of the guiding principles of ("Victorian"!) science are helpful and suggestive. It is difficult to know whether we stand before a scientific revolution more incisive than any other previous revampings of the frame of science, or whether the changes which may have to be made will only amount to minor emendations.

Concluding Remark. An essential part of the justification of the philosophical monism proposed in this essay depends upon empirical, scientific assumptions. Only the future development of psychophysiology will decide whether these assumptions are tenable. Since I am not a laboratory scientist (though I did some laboratory work in physics and chemistry in my early years), I cannot responsibly construct psychophysiological hypotheses. Nor did I intend to close the doors to

alternative philosophical views of the relations of the mental to the physical. What I did try to show, however, is that monism is

- (1) still very plausible on scientific grounds,
- (2) philosophically defensible in that it involves no insurmountable logical or epistemological difficulties and paradoxes.

I realize fully that I could deal only with some of the perplexities which have vexed philosophers or psychologists throughout the ages, and especially in recent decades. Just where the philosophical shoe pinches one, just which problems strike one as important—that depends, of course, on a great many more or less accidental personal, educational, or cultural factors. Despite my valiant efforts to deal with what strike me as important and baffling questions, I may of course not even have touched on other facets which some of my readers might consider as the essential problems of mind and body. May others come and deal with them!

NOTE AND REFERENCES

Since this essay has almost the dimensions of a monograph, I feel I should acknowledge my sincere indebtedness to the countless philosophers and scientists who have helped me by their publications as well as (in many instances) by personal discussion or correspondence to reach whatever clarity I may claim to have achieved. It is impossible to mention them all, but some stand out so distinctly and prominently that I should list them. Naturally, I have learned from many of these thinkers by way of disagreement and controversy. In any case none of them is to be held responsible for whatever may be wrong or confused in my views. My first acquaintance with philosophical monism goes back to reading the work of Alois Riehl (279); I found essentially the same position again in Moritz Schlick (298), some of whose work I had studied before I became his student in Vienna in 1922. I have profited enormously (although he may well think, not sufficiently) from discussions with my kind and patient friend R. Carnap intermittently throughout more than thirty years. During my Vienna years (1922–30) I was greatly stimulated by discussions also with Schlick, Wittgenstein, Victor Kraft, Otto Neurath, E. Kaila, Karl Popper, Edgar Zilsel, et al. I was greatly reinforced in my views by my early contact with the outstanding American critical realist C. A. Strong (in Fiesole, Italy, 1927 and 1928). Along similar lines I found corroboration in the work of Roy W. Sellars, Durant Drake, Richard Gätschenberger, and in some of the writings of Bertrand Russell. Discussions (and many controversies) during my American years, beginning in 1930, with E. G. Boring, S. S. Stevens, P. W. Bridgman, C. I. Lewis, A. N. Whitehead, H. M. Sheffer, V. C. Aldrich, S. C. Pepper, E. C. Tolman, C. L. Hull, B. F. Skinner, K. Lewin, E. Brunswik, W. Köhler, Albert Einstein, H. Reichenbach, F. C. S. Northrop, and Philipp Frank, proved most stimulating.

During the last three and a half years of the activities of the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science I had the tremendous advantage of intensive discussions not only with my colleagues Paul E. Meehl, Wilfrid Sellars, and Michael Scriven, each of whom disagrees with me on several different fundamental points, and each for different reasons, but I also profited from discussions with such visitors or collaborators as Gilbert Ryle, C. D. Broad, Anthony Flew, Peter Strawson, Ernest Nagel, C. G. Hempel, A. Kaplan, Arthur Pap, Herbert Bohnert, Henry Mehlberg, Hilary Putnam,

Gavin Alexander, William Rozeboom, and Adolf Grünbaum. Last, but not least, I owe a great debt of gratitude to my students at Minnesota who during many a year of seminar work in the philosophical problems of psychology have helped me through their criticisms to arrive at clearer formulations of my ideas and to eliminate various difficulties, mistakes, and confusions. It has been a veritable Odyssey of ideas for me, and I am by no means sure I have "arrived"!

In the following rather ample bibliography I have tried to assemble references not only to those materials actually discussed or quoted in my essay, but also a great deal of what seemed to me of systematic significance for future philosophical work in the area. With the appalling volume of philosophical writings in recent decades, many a valuable book or article becomes all too soon forgotten, and many go entirely unnoticed. Scholars or students who wish to tackle the "world knot" may find most of these books or articles stimulating, and many of them illuminating.

As regards my earlier publications on the mind-body problem, I now regard my presentation (103) of 1934 as partly confused. The later rather compact presentation (112) of 1950 presents on the whole an adequate preview and summary of my present outlook (though I am no longer satisfied with some of the illustrative analogies used there). A fuller discussion of my identity theory in relation to Carnap's present (largely unpublished) version of physicalism and to the issues of the empiricist criterion of factual meaningfulness is contained in my essay (116) in the forthcoming Carnap volume of P. A. Schilpp's *Library of Living Philosophers*.

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