

CHAPTER II

THE DIALECTIC OF CONTRARIES AND EXACT RESEMBLANCES

IT would appear that no one has denied the existence of resemblances in the sense in which it is common usage to say that light crimson resembles dark crimson. Such is not the case in the matter of exact resemblance. The existence, even so much as the possibility, of an exact resemblance has been denied systematically as a matter of principle by Hegelian Idealism. This denial is based on no attempt to muster an empirical demonstration of a Leibnitzian identity of indiscernibles. Rather, the denial is part and parcel of a conception of identity as identity in difference that is of the very essence of the Hegelian dialectic of contraries.

The phrase "identity in difference" has been regarded by some thinkers as a matter of mere mystery-mongering. How can differences nevertheless be identical? The phrase is transparently absurd.

Such is, of course, the case in the light of the Law of Non-Contradiction. But in the philosophy of Hegel, as in that of Bradley, the Law of Identity is denounced and repudiated. Those imbued with unquestioning confidence in the Laws of Thought turn away from the suggestion that this could be done as from something wanton. Yet there was nothing unconsidered about it.

Hegelian philosophy takes becoming seriously. In this regard, as in others, it breaks sharply with the thinkers of the seventeenth century and the pre-critical thinkers of the eighteenth. For them, changes are matters of succession, not of growth and development. One state succeeds another; there is no question of the growth of one phase into another development.

Now, it is an old story that change is unintelligible. How can A, which is A, change into Y, which is Y. Let the process of change be a matter of stages as minute as you wish. Still, in the course of the process, however conceived of, there finally would be a moment at which A would no longer be A, and would not yet be Y. Yet to say, in any case whatever, that A may be both A and not A is to utter a self-contradiction. That contradiction would be implicated in any view on which it were held that one self-identical being may become another self-identical being. What is self-identical may not become: it may only be itself. Any view of change on which what changes is self-identical must, then, be abandoned. The truth to be elucidated by the dialectic that supersedes abstract and static logic is that changing reality is becoming. In Hegel's *Logic* becoming is the primary category in and through which the initial synthesis of the dialectic is made; namely, that of being and nothing.

Bradley's philosophy affords the classic English variant on the dialectic of contraries. In the interests of a method by which Appearance (or experience in becoming) could be elucidated, Bradley denounces the Law of Identity on the authority of Hegel. Thus Bradley writes in his *Logic*: "The principle of identity is often stated in the form of a tautology. 'A is A'. If this really means that no difference exists on the two sides of the judgment, we may dismiss it at once. It is no judgment at all. As Hegel tells us, it sins against the very form of judgment: for while professing to say something it really says nothing. It does not even assert identity. For identity without difference is nothing at all. It takes two to make the same, and the least we can have is some change of event in a selfsame thing, or the return to that thing from a suggested difference. For, otherwise, to say 'It is the same as itself' would be quite unmeaning. We could not even have the appearance of judgment in A is A, if we had not at least the difference of position in the different A's; and we cannot have the reality of judgment, unless

some difference actually enters into the content of what we assert."⁽¹⁾

Hegel "tells us" that a tautology "sins against the very form of judgment". There is "the appearance of judgment in A is A" merely because each A is in a different position. This will not do. One A is enumerably different from another A, to be sure; but "unless some difference actually enters into the content of what we assert", there is only the appearance of judgment. "For identity without difference is nothing at all."

Those who are accustomed to regard numerical differences as genuine differences, may be perplexed by the above-quoted statements. In A is A, they might urge, there is a difference; that of the one A from the other. Thus the one A is existentially different from the other. Now, as may become plain in the course of this paper, the doctrine of identity in difference denies that mere numerical difference makes sense. "Numerical distinction is not distinction without difference, that once more is senseless . . ."⁽²⁾ The difference which Bradley demands is difference in quality or character. "Without difference in character there can be no distinction, and the opposite would seem to be nonsense."⁽³⁾ In a tautology the two terms are not different in character. Therefore, in Bradley's view, they are not really distinct, "and the opposite would seem to be nonsense".

In a tautology there is no movement in thought at all, but at best the assertion of the barren identity of two symbols. Since all that exists is in becoming, thought devoid of development would be at best a mere association of images recollected. An association of ideas could be no judgment, for associations are recollections of, not developments in and of ideas.⁽⁴⁾

A genuine judgment, as distinguished from an association of ideas, will (it is held) assert unity in diversity, not the

⁽¹⁾ *Logic*, Vol. 1, p. 141. Italics mine.

⁽²⁾ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 531.

⁽³⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 532.

⁽⁴⁾ See the *Logic*, Bk. II, Part I, Ch. 1.

empty identity of the tautology A is A. In the absence either of differences united in judgment, or of the unity differentiated by the differences, judgment is absent. For unless the different constituents of a judgment are in some sense united in it, there is then no judgment but, at best, an association of ideas. On the other hand, unless it be differences that are in union, there is no judgment, but rather the mere utterance of strict tautology, and so no movement in thought.

Thus we may see that the formula of judgment may not be A is A. On this view, we are required to realize also that the formula of judgment may not be A is B. For in this latter form we assert (it is assumed) that A is identical with, or strictly the same as, B. This being so, we are confronted by an alleged dilemma: on the one alternative, A is A, we assert nothing about A; on the other, we say that A is what it is not, namely B. "And we seem unable to clear ourselves from the old dilemma. If you predicate what is different, you ascribe to the subject what it is not; and if you predicate what is not different you say nothing at all."⁽¹⁾

In Bradley's view, the source of this error may be brought to light by considering the nature of the contradictory, on his dialectic of contraries. "We have to avoid in dealing with Contradiction, the same mistake we found had obscured the nature of Identity. We there were told to produce tautologies, and here we are by certain persons forbidden to produce anything else. 'A is not A' may be taken to mean that A can be nothing but what is simply A. That is, once again, the erroneous assertion of mere abstract identity without any difference."⁽¹⁾ That assertion is erroneous because it rests upon the assumption of pure negation. Indeed, that assumption is at the basis of the traditional yet wholly erroneous understanding of the Law of Non-Contradiction. For the assumption that A is simply not B carries us ineluctably to the conclusion that A is A irrespective of its relations. And that

⁽¹⁾ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 17.

conclusion, it is alleged, entails the above-mentioned dilemma.

For this reason, among several others, there can be no place in logic for the notion of mere negation. "The contradictory idea, if we take it in a merely negative form, must be banished from logic. If not-A were solely the negation of A, it would be an assertion without a quality, and would be a denial without anything positive to serve as its ground. A something that is only not something else, is a relation that terminates in an impalpable void, a reflection thrown upon empty space. It is a mere non-entity which cannot be real."⁽¹⁾ In a word, mere negation is groundless verbiage. Every significant negation presupposes a positive ground. We cannot and do not deny a predicate of a nothing; rather we deny it of a subject on the ground that this subject possesses a quality which is incompatible with the predicate of our negative judgment.

Thus, in Bradley's view, the negative judgment does not express bare otherness or mere negation, between terms for which there would be no middle ground. Hence Bradley denies that the logical form of the contradictory, within which no middle term is possible, and the logical form of the contrary, within which a middle term is possible at least, are distinct forms of judgment. Consequently, he holds that the contradictory is one with the contrary. "But then this positive ground, which is the basis of negation, is not contradictory. It is merely discrepant, opposite, incompatible. It is only contrary."⁽²⁾

Thus Bradley holds that the notion of the contradictory, as it is formulated by formal logic, must be "banished" from logical theory. This must be so, he argues, because pure negation is absurd, and without mere negation, there may be no contradictory as distinct from the contrary. Pure negation is absurd because, "It is impossible for anything to be only Not-A. It is impossible to realize Not-A

in thought".⁽¹⁾ Thus the contradictory can only mean what is meant by the contrary.

No rule that would comprehend the scope of the contrary could be formulated. For "contrary opposition is indefinitely plural. The number of qualities that are discrepant or incompatible with A, can not be determined by a general rule. It is possible, of course, to define contrary in some sense which will limit the use of the term; but for logical purposes this customary restriction is nothing but lumber. In logic the contrary should be simply the discrepant".⁽²⁾ The contradictory is one with the contrary, and the contrary is simply the self-discrepant. Thus, wherever Bradley writes of a relational situation as being self-contradictory, he means not what a reader steeped in the Aristotelian tradition naturally would take him to mean; rather, he means that the terms and relations in question are respectively contraries, and that by virtue of these very contraries that relational situation is self-discrepant.

Thus we may come to see something of what it means to say that identity is identity in difference; not the inane abstraction expressed by A is A. "The axiom of Identity, if we take it in the sense of a principle of tautology, is no more than the explicit statement of an error."⁽³⁾ For all thinking is becoming, and in the reaffirmation of the affirmed judgement is born. In a tautology, there is no development at all. The traditional notion that an affirmation of identity is and must be tautological derives from an unmitigated error, of which the axiom of identity is "the explicit statement".

This error is the fantasy that there could be and is pure negation, or mere otherness. It is absurd to hold that A might be merely A, and so merely not B. This is absurd on two counts. In the first place, to say that A is not B is to say that A is what it is not, namely, B. (This line of argument in particular may well be deemed almost certainly fallacious; in any case, our purpose here is not that of a

⁽¹⁾ *Logic*, Vol. I, p. 123.

⁽²⁾ *Logic*, p. 123.

⁽¹⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁽²⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁽³⁾ *Ibid.*

critic.) In the second place, it is absurd to hold that "A is not B" means that A *per se* is not B *per se*. For in that case there could be no ground for the not. It might as well be said that wisdom is not blue, or that a mind is not a coal scuttle.

It is well understood that pure negation (as unclarified by relevant advances in logic) permits the so-called infinite judgment. Bradley takes it that no case of pure negation may yield anything else. For this reason, he holds that a characteristic A may not be B, and that the characteristic B may not be A, each one merely and simply in its own right. Rather, a middle term between A and B is requisite that there may be a positive ground, or justification, for the difference between A and B.

Any theory which requires that there be a middle term between any two terms can only repudiate the Law of Non-Contradiction. For, as is well known, that Law entails the Law of Excluded Middle on which there may be no middle term between the terms of a contradictory. The contradictory must be "banished from logic". This is done by identifying it with the contrary. Since there is a middle term between the terms of any contrary, a basic requirement of a dialectic of becoming (as distinguished from succession) is thus fulfilled.

But "It is necessary before all things to bear in mind that the axiom does not in any way explain, that it can not and must not attempt to account for the existence of opposites. That discrepant or incompatibles or contraries exist, is the fact it is based on. . . ." (1)

"If the principle of Contradiction states a fact, it says no more than that the discrepant is discrepant, that the exclusive, despite all attempts to persuade it, remains incompatible. Again, if we take it as laying down a rule, all it says is, 'Do not try to combine in thought what is really contrary. When you add any quality to any subject, the subject is as if it were not altered. When you add a quality, which not only removes the subject as it was, but

(1) *Ibid.*, pp. 145, 146.

removes it altogether, then do not treat it as if it remained'." (1)

Now Bradley sees full well that in thus regarding the contradictory as "the general idea of the contrary" he offers his readers a forced choice between the square of opposition and his dialectic of contraries. Thus at the bottom of the next page, after having discussed further his identification of the contradictory with the contrary, he writes as follows: "My one idea here is to disarm opposition to the axiom of contradiction, as it stands above. *But I clearly recognize that, if not-A were taken as a pure negation, no compromise would be possible. You would then have to choose between the axiom of contradiction and the dialectical method.*" (2) This statement of the matter in question would seem to be fairly explicit.

The bearing of the dialectic of contraries on exact resemblance is perhaps best brought to light through a brief consideration of the theory of relations which it entails and elucidates. Yet, the foregoing brief exposition of Bradley's reasons for holding that "identity without difference is nothing at all", may make something of that bearing fairly plain. If there may not be two beings that are identical, if "identity without difference is nothing at all", then there may be no exact resemblances. And true-blue Systemic Idealists echo the words of the master, "identity implies difference", and deny the possibility of an exact resemblance. Truly, no compromise is possible. If "A is A" is non-sense, then "this shade of yellow is strictly identical with that shade of yellow" is senseless. And any painter, no matter how great a master in the art of handling hues, who thinks he can avail himself of two cases of the same hue, is fooling himself. Identity without difference is nothing at all, and mere numerical distinction is senseless.

Something of the categorical sweep of this doctrine is apparent in the theory of relations which it entails. An extensive misunderstanding of that theory may be averted

(1) *Ibid.*

(2) *Ibid.*, pp. 147, 148. Italics mine.

if, at the outset of a very brief statement of it, we bear in mind that Bradley does not use "appearance" as it is used, for example, by a proponent of the casual theory of perception. For Bradley's "appearance" is not the name of a veil hanging between the percipient and the really real. It will be recalled that there is a classic tradition on which what is in becoming is appearance and appearance is what is in becoming. Those who read Bradley will recall that he writes of an "infinite process"; of a "principle of fission which conducts us to no end"; of relations that "break out", and "fall between" qualities in appearance; and of a "what" being "in collision" with another "what". And so on over and over again.

If one were to take it that, for Bradley, "appearance" is the name of something not in becoming or development, such as a *sensum*, one would have to take this idiom as mere metaphor. In the absence of becoming there could be neither "process", infinite nor otherwise; nor "fission", whether endless or not. And to take the idiom of a master of dialectical prose as the writing of bemused irrelevances would be more than arrogant; it would be silly.

As is well known, Bradley rejects Hegel's "ballet of bloodless categories". He also finds the dialectic of contraries unable to arrive at a self-consistent elucidation of the two contraries that are for him the characteristics of appearance everywhere and always; namely, quality and relation. By the term "quality", Bradley does not mean anything like a sense-quality, thought of as self-identical. No more does the term "relation" in his usage designate anything like an external universal that requires at least two particulars for its illustration. For the self-identical and external may not be in becoming.

In Bradley's view, "quality" designates any moment of experience wherein immediacy is dominant and differentiation is recessive. And "relation" designates any moment wherein differentiation is dominant and immediacy is recessive. In any experience, the aspect of immediacy is quality, and the aspect of differentiation is relation.

In this sense of the term, "Qualities are nothing without relations. In trying to exhibit the truth of this statement, I will lay no weight on a considerable mass of evidence";⁽¹⁾ namely, all of the evidence that goes to show how qualities are in fact varied by changes in their relations. Bradley rules out this evidence not because he considers it unsound as far as it goes, but because it does not go far enough. He believes the conclusion in question to be demonstrable *a priori*, and proceeds accordingly.

Wherever there are different qualities, there are qualities related by their differences. "For consider, the qualities A and B are to be different from each other; and, if so, that difference must fall somewhere. If it falls, in any degree or to any extent outside A or B, we have relation at once. But, on the other hand, how can difference and otherness fall inside? If we have in A any such otherness then inside A we must distinguish its own quality and its otherness. And, if so, then the unsolved problem breaks out inside each quality, and separates each into two qualities in relation. In brief, diversity without relation seems a word without meaning."⁽²⁾ The difference between A and B, in virtue of which they are distinct, either "falls outside" or "between" A and B, thus to relate them, or that difference "falls within" A and within B, thus to differentiate each one of them within itself. On the latter alternative, the moment of relation would break out within A and within B. Therefore the difference that differentiates A and B must fall "outside", or "between", and thus "we have relation at once".

This basic point in Bradley's elucidation of his conception of relation may be illustrated by a process of cell-fission. In the very incipience of that process the incipient differentiation must fall somewhere. In point of fact, it falls "between" the incipient cells in the observable sense that it is their differentiation. As soon as we notice this much, then (on the assumption that differentiation is relation), we are aware of a relation. For we are then aware of a

⁽¹⁾ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 21.

⁽²⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

differentiation by virtue of which incipient qualities are differentiated, or, in Bradley's idiom, related. Thus, in this sense of the term, a relation is a *liaison au pied de la lettre*, rather than a nexus taken as a connecting link. Were a quality devoid of relations in this sense of relation as differentiation, it would be in no respect different from anything at all, and so would not be a quality or anything else.

Presumably it is even obvious that no static line between a differentiation and what is differentiated by it can be drawn and sustained in and by sentience, as distinguished from dialectic. For any relation, and any quality, will be in process. As incipient qualities become more and more immediate, their differentiations alter from stage to stage. And, as their differentiations become the more marked, the qualities are perforce altered. "Hence the qualities must be, and must also be related. But there is hence a diversity which falls inside each quality. Each has a double character, as both supporting and being made by the Relation."⁽¹⁾ That a quality may be itself at all, it must be distinct from something else. In order that a quality may be distinct, it must be differentiated from other qualities.

This differentiation is no third entity; rather, it is a *liaison* that contributes to constitute the qualities it differentiates. In so far as A is immediacy or quality, A is not relation. Yet, that A may be distinct, it must be at once itself, in so far as it is A, *and* the differentiation by which it is differentiated. "A is both made, and is not made, what it is by relation; and these divergent aspects are not each the other, nor again is either A. If we call its diverse aspects 'a' and 'a', then A is partly each of these. As 'a', it is the difference on which distinction is based, while as 'a', it is the distinction that results from connection. A is really both somehow together as A (a—a). But (as we saw in Chapter II) *without* the use of a relation it is impossible to predicate this variety of A. And, on the other hand, *with* an internal relation A's unity disappears,

⁽¹⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

and its contents are dissipated in an endless process of distinction".⁽¹⁾ Devoid of relation, A would be undifferentiated from anything else, and so would be nothing at all. As differentiated, A is at once the 'a' that is differentiated, and the 'a' that is the differentiation or relation. Thus "A is partly each of these". Neither 'a' nor 'a' is the other, "nor again is either A"; for 'a' is what is differentiated, while 'a' is the differentiation. This differentiation 'a' is essential to the 'a' that it differentiates.

That is the reason why "A is both made, and is not made, what it is by relation. . . . It may be taken as at once condition and result, and the question is as to how it can combine this variety. For it must combine the diversity, and yet it fails to do so". A is at once 'a', the aspect of immediacy and 'a', the aspect of mediation, or relation. Without 'a' there is nothing differentiated, and so no quality: without 'a' there is no differentiation and thus nothing at all.

Any relational situation⁽²⁾ is at once itself 'a', and its differentiation 'a', and this identity of A, which is A, a, a, implies its differentiation, which is 'a'. This is to say that the quality A is the moment of immediacy 'a' *and* the moment of mediation by which that moment of immediacy is differentiated from other qualities and relations. In short, that A may be at all, it must be at once what falls in process within itself, and what falls in process between itself and all else. Thus A is at once itself and transcendent of itself. Accordingly, no quality will be self-sufficient or self-contained; no quality will be self-identical. For a quality will be distinct if, and only in so far as it is differentiated from other moments of becoming. And the relation by virtue of which a quality is differentiated will fall to some extent beyond that moment of immediacy. Yet, at the same time, that differentiation will contribute to constitute that quality. For without that differentiation, the quality A would not be differentiated as it is differ-

⁽¹⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁽²⁾ The phrase is Bradley's. See the essay on *Relations* in his *Collected Essays*.

entiated, and so would not be the quality it is. Thus we may realize that no quality is self-consistent. Since, for Bradley, being more or less self-consistent is the criterion of being more or less self-coherent or intelligible, the conclusion that no quality is or could be wholly self-consistent or self-coherent means that no quality is wholly intelligible, or self-consistent.

Thus, "we have found that qualities, taken without relations have no intelligible meaning. Unfortunately, taken together with them, they are equally unintelligible." So far, it has been pointed out that qualities without relations would be undifferentiated, and so would be not many but one. It is impossible, we have noticed, that there might be a plurality of qualities in the absence of relation or differentiation. Yet we have seen that taken together with its relations no quality is wholly self-consistent, or intelligible.

"We may briefly reach the same dilemma from the side of relations. They are nothing intelligible, either with or without their qualities."⁽¹⁾ As relations apart from qualities would be the verbiage of relations without terms, so together with qualities, relations are in no finite context completely intelligible. In order that a relation may differentiate its qualities, a relation must "penetrate and alter" them, and thus be literally implicated in their respective natures. Yet, that this differentiation may not be absorbed into its qualities, it must "fall" to some extent "between" the qualities which it differentiates and thus relates. This is why a relation involves within itself a contrariety: a relation or differentiation is at once implicated in and transcendent of its qualities. And so, "Again we are hurried off into the eddy of a hopeless process, since we are forced to go on finding relations without end".⁽²⁾ But, on the other hand, in so far as a relation or differentiation is implicated in its qualities, so far it does not fall between them. In so far as this is the case at any moment in process, a differentiation fails to be a relation

⁽¹⁾ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 27.

⁽²⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

at all. Yet in so far as a moment of mediation falls between moments of immediacy, it is outside them both, and thus again it fails to relate them.

So much may suffice to indicate why it is that for Bradley no moment of differentiation may be absolute or self-contained. In any process of fission, no standing distinction between the moments of quality and the moments of differentiation is to be found. There is "a diversity which falls inside each quality. Each has a double character, as both supporting and as being made by the relation".⁽¹⁾ Likewise, each relation has a double character, as both supporting and as being made by its terms. Qualities taken without relations or as absolute, and relations as separate entities, are alike inconceivable, in Bradley's view.

Yet qualities, taken as moments of immediacy that are at once made by and essential to their differentiations, are in no case absolutely self-identical; for qualities are differentiated by their differentiations or relations. And so their respective identities are relational, in Bradley's sense of the term. Likewise, relations taken as moments of differentiation that are in no case absolute relations, for any relation will involve within itself that infinite regress in relational identity that is the principle and content of degrees of truth and reality.

The foregoing statement of Bradley's positive theory of relations, although overly brief, may suffice to indicate why that theory entails the consequence that "identity implies difference." We have noticed above that the identity or character of a quality is what it is by virtue of the relations that differentiate it—that make it the quality it is. And since a quality is *that* quality and no other one by virtue of its differentiations or relations, any alteration in those differentiations *ipso facto* is an alteration in the quality they differentiate. For those relations constitute the context which determines the identity of that quality.

We have also noticed that the nature or character of a

⁽¹⁾ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

relation is what it is by virtue of the qualities that are differentiated by that relation. The "infinite process" is reciprocal. Just as qualities are determined by their differentiations to be what respectively they are so those relations are determined to be the differentiations they are by the qualities they differentiate. That is why any alteration in those qualities *ipso facto* alters those qualities.

Now this is held to be true of all qualities, and of all relations, not only of some of either, or of both. Nor is Bradley's position in *Appearance and Reality* at all arbitrary. That all relations are internal everywhere and always follows from the exclusion of external relations in Chapter II, and the positive doctrine of Chapter III. Were it suggested that some relations are only internal, whereas some are external, the suggestion would fly in the face of the well-known argument of Chapter II of *Appearance and Reality*, to the conclusion that any notion of wholly external relations would be verbiage.

Since the universality of internal relations is categorical, it follows that no limit (in theory) to the differences that differentiate a quality may be prescribed. Any quality is differentiated from all else, not merely from some other appearances. Identity implies difference because where there were no difference there would be no distinction, and therefore nothing distinct from anything else. "I rest my argument upon this, that if there are no differences, there are no qualities, since all must fall into one. But, if there is any difference, then that implies a relation. Without a relation it has no meaning;—." (1) "And this is the point on which all seems to turn. It is possible to think of qualities without thinking of distinct characters." (2) Bradley answers (p. 25) that this is not possible. The distinction or difference here could not be the bare numerical or existential difference of two qualities that would be indiscernibly the same.

We have seen above that, for Bradley, identity implies *qualitative* difference. "All identity then is qualitative in

(1) *Appearance and Reality*, p. 42.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 25.

the sense that it all must consist in content and character. There is no sameness of mere existence, for mere existence is a vicious abstraction." (1) "Numerical distinction is not distinction without difference, that once more is senseless . . ." (2) And, "without difference in character there can be no distinction, and the opposite would seem to be nonsense." (3) Two indiscernible qualities would be not two but one. A quality that were not different from all other qualities would be indiscernibly the same as *some* other quality or qualities. The alternative to this (if there be qualities at all) is that every quality be differentiated from all else.

The same considerations, *mutatis mutandis*, apply to relations. It follows that every quality and every relation is unique. No two qualities, no two relations, can be the same or indiscernible. Were it true that all difference is difference in quality, it would be the case that every quality and every relation is unmatched. The contradictory of this consequence, viz., that *some* qualities and relations are not unique but numerically different merely, is incompatible with Bradley's theory of relations and the consequence it entails; viz., that identity implies qualitative difference. For were there two simple qualities A_1 and A_2 that differed *solo numero*, there then would be one quality, A_2 , that did not imply its qualitative difference from all else.

The suggestion that two qualities might be merely numerically different (or qualitatively the same) in one respect (e.g. hue) and qualitatively different in another respect (e.g. saturation), plainly fails to square with the consequence of this theory of relations that all difference is difference in quality. On that consequence every difference would be unique; no quality or relation could be strictly the same as any other one. Thus the notion of partial sameness would seem to afford no escape from the consequence that, in Bradley's view, identity implies qualitative difference.

Presumably it is fairly plain that on Bradley's theory

(1) *Ibid.*, p. 527.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 531.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 532.

of relations no two appearances may be strictly the same. Any two qualities, or any two relations, that were strictly the same in character would be indiscernible in character. Their difference would be numerical or existential merely. And any such state of affairs is ruled out by Bradley's dialectic as "senseless". Since no two appearances may be strictly the same, there may be no resemblances that are exact.

The dialectic of contraries entails the consequence that every quality and relation, however tenuous, is unique. For that reason alone, on the dialectic of contraries, there could be no exact resemblances. For those of us who find such resemblances in our own experiences, the denial of exact resemblances by the dialectic of contraries is sufficient reason for regarding that doctrine as being profoundly suspect.