AN EXCERPT FROM C. D. BROAD DEFENDING EPIPHENOMENALISM FROM ONE SORT OF ARGUMENT
(1)An experience is not a state or a modification of any substance,
if "substance" be understood to mean a particular existent of a peculiar
kind, other than a set of intimately inter-related events, which
has qualities, states, and dispositions, but is not a
quality or a state or a disposition of anything. (2) The complete
immediate cause of any experience is a simultaneous bodily event in the
brain or nervous system of some one living organism. (3) No experience
is a cause-factor in the total cause of any bodily event. (It is
unnecessary to add that no experience is a cause-factor in the total
cause of any mental event, for that follows immediately from
Proposition (2) above.) So far as I can see, these three propositions
are logically independent of each other. It is worth remarking that much of the discussion of epiphenomenalism
as well as other significant issues in philosophy of mind, e.g.,
phenomenalism, would be changed radically following what Bergmann
described as the "linguistic turn." The above is a small specimen of
analysis prior the transformation brought about by the linguistic turn.
Steve Bayne (www.hist-analytic.org)
There is a single paragraph from Broad's monumental classic,
The Mind and Its Place in Nature, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
London. 1925. p. 470-471, which I will conclude by quoting in full. It is
selected as an example of the way an empiricist of Broad's sort argued.
Its focus is on the relation of neurology, on the one hand, and sensation
and volition, on the other, and it bears on the argument that
epiphenomenalism makes it impossible to account for the difference between
passive and active experience. As for what 'epiphenomenalism' means,
consider Broad's remark made in reply to Wm Kneale's marvelous essay,
"Broad on Mental Events and Epiphenomenalism" (The Philosophy of C. D.
Broad Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. Tudor Publishing. 1959
pp.437-457); it is taken from p. 791 of the Schilpp volume.
I think epiphenomenalism, in the sense in which Mr. Kneale
takes it, is equivalent to what T. H. Huxley called the "conscious
automaton theory." It may be summed up in the following three
propositions: -
It is worth
noting that Broad had earlier, in Mind and Its Place in Nature (p.
118) described one form of mind-body relation as "One-sided Action." There
he associates this view with epiphenomenalism in particular, adding that
the it can be understood in terms of four propositions:
(1) Certain bodily events cause certain mental events. (2)
No mental event plays any part in the causation of any bodily event. (3)
No mental event plays any part in the causation of any other mental
event. Consequently (4) all mental events are caused by bodily events
and by them only. Thus epiphenomenalism is just One-sided Action of Body
on Mind, together with a special theory about the nature and structure
of mind.
Before citing the passage where Broad discusses
passive and active experience, I would urge the reader to consider that
Broad is responding in large measure to the sort of view that had been
advanced by Bertrand Russell in An Analysis of Mind. Besides that
work, which is very much underrated among Russell's works, I would suggest
a careful look at the theory of "neutral monism" (James) (Broad's
criticisms in MPN are very much worth considering). In connection with
neutral monism the reader will find it much to his advantage to carefully
examine Ian Gallie's "Mental Facts" in Proc. of the Aristotelian
Society 1937. pp. 192-212. I might add here that the following
quotation comes from a chapter in Broad's book which was probably less
often read than practically any of the others. In the archived material of
the philosopher Gustav Bergmann, who used Broad's book in many of his
classes, and who described Broad as "the best second rate mind of the
twentieth century," there are notes obviously written in rage over how
boring this chapter is. Here I disagree with my "hero" Prof. Bergmann; now
for the actual quote.
Is there any conclusive objection to a purely physiological
theory of traces and dispositions, and to the purely epiphenomenal
theory of mind which seems to me too be its natural complement? At first
sight there seem to be several objections, and the question is whether
they are really conclusive. (1) We have certain experiences in which it
seems to us that our minds are acting on our bodies, and we have other
experiences in which it seems to us that our bodies are acting on our
minds. The voluntary initiation and control of bodily movements is an
example of the first kind of experience, and the occurrence of a new
sensation is an example of a second kind. Now, it might be said that
this distinction between "active" and "passive" experience could not
exist, if epiphenomenalism were true; for in all cases our
experiences would be merely idle accompaniments of certain physiological
processes, and the latter would be the only real "agents". I do not
think that this is the right way of putting the case. It is true that
the interpretation which we put on this distinction would be
mistaken, but it seems to me that the existence of the
distinction could be explained perfectly well on the epiphenomenalist
theory. Let us consider the observable differences between a volition
which is followed by the desired bodily movements, and a sensation which
arises when someone sticks a pin into me. The volition forms the
end-point of a certain conscious mental process, viz. a process of
deliberation, which has a characteristic kind of internal unity. It is
no doubt succeeded by other mental events, but they do not form a
continuation of the process of deliberation. The subsequent events which
are specially closely connected with the volition are simply the
sensations due to the bodily movement. Now contrast this with the new
sensation. This is not a continuation of any conscious mental process
which was going on before it happened, though it may form the starting
point of a characteristic conscious mental process which succeeds it.
The previous events with which it is most closely connected are events
in my body which are unaccompanied by conscious mental events. We feel
"passive" par excellence at those critical points where a
physiological process which is not accompanied by consciousness passes
into a physiological process which is accompanied by consciousness of a
characteristic kind. We feel "active" par excellence at those
critical points where a physiological process which has been accompanied
by a series of mental events so related as to form a single conscious
process passes into a physiological process which is either not
accompanied by consciousness at all or is accompanied by mental events
which are not continuations of the previous conscious mental process.
Thus epiphenomenalism would seem to be quite capable of accounting for
the existence of the distinction in question.