

# MEANING AND EXISTENCE

*By the Same Author*

THE METAPHYSICS OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM  
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

*Gustav Bergmann*

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## *Intentionality\**

A BOOK on botany mentions plants, but it need not mention botany. A zoological text mentions animals, but it need not contain the word zoology. Intentionality is like botany or zoology, not like plants or animals and their kinds. That is why I shall hardly mention it in this essay. The things I shall mention are awareness, meaning, truth, and, my method being what it is, inevitably also language, particularly language about language. Concerning my philosophical method and my views on some philosophical problems, I am in a quandary. I do not wish to proceed as if they were known and I do not quite know how to proceed without assuming that they are. So I shall compromise. I shall not explain once more either the notion of an ideal language, which is not really a language to be spoken, or how, speaking commonsensically about it and what it is about, one philosophizes. For the rest, I shall tell a connected story. I realize, though, that in order to grasp it fully some readers may have to turn to what I said elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> One device I shall employ to provide as many connections and as much context as I possibly can are some "historical" passages about the recent as well as about the more remote past. These should be taken structurally, not as excursions into scholarly history; for I do not pretend to be a scholar living in history. Only, I wouldn't know how to philosophize without the history, or the image of history, that lives in me. For another, I shall not be able to avoid the use of symbols; but I shall keep it at a minimum; nor do I wish to pretend that I could do much better. For, again, I am not a mathematician any more than

\* *Semantica* (Archivio di Filosofia, Roma: Bocca, 1955), 177-216. Reprinted by permission.

<sup>1</sup> A collection of eighteen of my essays has been published under the title *The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism* (New York, London, Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1954). I shall quote these essays as MLP, followed by the number under which they appear in the volume.

I am a historian. Fortunately, certain matters can be left safely to the mathematicians, just as some others can be left to the historians. Every now and then, though, the philosopher who, since he is a philosopher, finds himself short of time and taste to emulate the achievements of these specialists, does need their services. Things would probably go more smoothly if those specialists were not all too often like miners who cannot tell the raw diamonds from the philosophical pebbles in the materials they bring to light. Some of the confusions I shall try to unravel can indeed be traced to the mathematical logicians. But, then, it may be fairer to lay them at the doorsteps of those philosophers who, admiring the mathematicians too much, knew too little of what they actually did.

Here is an outline of what I propose to do. *First*, I shall try to convince my readers that when we say, speaking as we ordinarily do, that *there are* awarenesses, what we say is true. If, then, there are awarenesses, one may ask whether they also *exist*, in the philosophical sense of 'exist'. (In its ordinary or commonsensical use 'exist' is expendable, since it can always be replaced by 'there are (is)'). Awarenesses do exist. By this I mean three things. I mean, first, that instances of awareness are particulars in exactly the same sense in which a tone is a particular. I mean, second, that there are certain characters, among them at least one that is simple, which are in fact exemplified by those and only those particulars I call awarenesses, in exactly the same sense in which the simple characters called pitches are in fact exemplified by those and only those particulars that are called tones. An awareness may, for instance, be *a* remembering, i.e., an instance of remembering, just as a tone may be *a* middle *c*, i.e., an instance of middle *c*. The third thing which I mean I shall mention presently. Like everybody else, philosophers are sometimes aware of their awarenesses. Many philosophers nevertheless deny that they exist. One very important one, Ludwig Wittgenstein, spent the second half of his life trying painfully to convince himself, not only that they do not exist, but even that there are none. Such persistent refusals to admit the obvious are so strange that one must try to explain them. That will be my *second* step. Philosophers did not see how they could consistently hold that there are awarenesses without also holding that there are interacting minds, i.e., mental particulars causally interacting with physical objects in exactly the same sense in which the latter interact among each other. Thus, when the belief in interacting minds became less and less tenable, some philosophers denied, with the intellectual violence that is so characteristic of all of us, that there are awarenesses. This is the story of the classical act and its later vicissitudes. In its final stages one kind

of concern with language came to the fore. Another kind lies at the root of all analytical philosophy. I shall turn in my *third* step to some aspects of this second concern with language. Each of the two different concerns produced some confusions; there were also some illegitimate fusions between the two. The fusions and confusions support each other. To clear up the latter and to undo the former is one half of the analysis which vindicates awareness. *Fourth*, I shall propose what I believe is the correct form of those sentences in the ideal language that mention awarenesses. This is the other half of the analysis which, in the nature of things, involves the analysis of meaning and truth. It is also the heart of the essay. All the latter amounts to, in a sense, is therefore a proposal for transcribing such sentences as 'I see that this is green' in the ideal language. The transcription will show that awarenesses and, in fact, only awarenesses exemplify certain peculiar characters, which I call *propositions*. (This is the third thing I mean when I say that awarenesses exist.) Because of these characters statements about awarenesses are, loosely and ambiguously speaking, statements about statements. To tighten the looseness and to eliminate the ambiguity is virtually the same thing as to clear up the confusions and to undo the fusions of which I just spoke. This is the reason for my expository strategy.<sup>2</sup>

# I

I stand in front of a tree, look at it, and see it. As we ordinarily speak, we say that the situation has three constituents, myself, the tree, and the seeing. Ordinarily we let it go at that. Upon a little reflection, still safely within common sense, we notice that 'myself', 'tree', and 'seeing' may be taken in either of two contexts. In one of these, the first two words, 'myself' and 'tree', refer to two physical objects, namely, my body and the tree, while the third, 'seeing', refers, not to a third physical object, but to a relation between such, namely, the relation exemplified whenever one says truly that someone sees something. About this very complex relation physicists, physiologists, and behavioristic psychologists know a good deal. In the other context, 'seeing' refers to something mental, as we ordinarily use 'mental', and this mental something is again distinct from myself, the seer, as well as from what is seen, the tree. This seeing is an awareness. An awareness is thus something mental, distinct from what, if anything, is aware

<sup>2</sup> The fundamental ideas of this essay are first stated, very badly, in two papers that appeared over a decade ago: "Pure Semantics, Sentences, and Propositions," *Mind*, 53, 1944, 238-57; "A Positivist Metaphysics of Consciousness," *Mind*, 54, 1945, 193-226.

as well as from what it is aware of. That much is evident and to that much I commit myself therefore without hesitation. To three other beliefs one is, I think, not committed by common sense. I, for one, hold all three to be false. One of them is crucial. Whether the other two are, in fact, false makes no difference for what I intend to say. Even so, I shall briefly mention all three; for it is well to grasp clearly what does and what does not depend on what.

I do not believe that an instance of seeing, or of any other awareness, is merely the exemplification of a relation, or of any other character, between two "things," as indeed the physical seeing is. I believe, instead, that an awareness is itself a "thing." I say thing rather than particular because it makes no difference for what I want to say right now whether or not the other two terms do or do not refer to particulars. (Presently we shall see that the content of an awareness could not possibly be a particular.) This is crucial. The second belief which I hold to be false is that there is a mental thing referred to by 'myself'. To make it quite clear that nothing I shall say depends on whether or not this belief is in fact false, I shall eventually transcribe, not 'I see that this is green' but, instead, '(It is) seen (by me) that this is green' without paying any attention to the problems connected with the two words in the second parenthesis. Third. Some philosophers believe that the object or, as one also says, the content of an awareness is, in some cases, a physical object. According to these philosophers, my illustration is such a case; the content in question is of course the tree, or, perhaps more accurately, something that is in some sense a part of its surface. To these philosophers I grant that when we use 'see' as we ordinarily do in such situations, we certainly mean to mention a physical object. Some other philosophers insist that the content of an awareness is always a mental object; in my illustration, a tree percept. To these philosophers I grant that there is a perfectly plain sense of 'directly apprehending' or of 'being directly acquainted with' such that what we directly apprehend, even in a so-called perceptual situation, is a mental object. But, again, nothing I shall say depends on which side one takes on this issue, even though at one place I shall *seem* to side with the second view. (To dispel the appearance of this seeming is one of the things I cannot take time to do in this essay.)

Sometimes I shall find it convenient to speak of an awareness as a mental state of the person who, as one ordinarily says, has it or owns it. In fact, I do not know what one could possibly mean when, speaking literally, one says that someone has or is in a certain mental state if not that he has an awareness of a certain kind. But I shall ordinarily not call an awareness a mental content. The reasons for this caution as

well as for the qualification, ordinarily, are, I think, fairly obvious. Since I shall use 'content' to refer to what an awareness is the awareness of, and since I have committed myself to the distinction between the two, it is prudent to avoid expressions that may tend to blur it. The reason for the qualification is that one awareness is sometimes the content of another. (How would we otherwise know that there are any?) When I am aware of something, then I am aware of this thing, not of the awareness through which I am aware of it. But I may also, either at the same time or at some other time, be aware of that awareness. In this event the first awareness is the content of the second. Notice, though, that the second awareness is not, either directly or indirectly, an awareness of the content of the first, just as it is not, if I may so express myself, aware of itself.

Perceiving is one kind of awareness; directly apprehending, remembering, doubting whether, thinking of, wondering are others. The analysis of some of these kinds is very complex. For what I intend to do I can, happily, limit myself to direct apprehension. When I speak in the rest of this essay without further qualification of awareness I should therefore be taken to speak of direct apprehension. Similarly, when I speak of *an* awareness, I should be understood to speak of an instance of directly apprehending. Again, the difference really makes no difference. But I wish to make as clear as I can which problems I shall not discuss without, however, either belittling them or denying that they are problems.

Ordinarily we say 'I see this tree' but we also say 'I am aware of this being a tree', 'I know that this is a tree', 'I wonder whether this is a tree', and so on. If we choose, we can rephrase the first of these sentences: 'I see that this is a tree'. A statement mentioning an awareness can always be so rephrased that its content is referred to by a sentence. Grammatically this sentence appears in our language either as a dependent clause or as a participial phrase (e.g., 'this being a tree'). This is what I mean by the formula: *The content of every awareness is propositional*. If, for instance, I see (or directly apprehend, or remember; the difference makes no difference) a red spot, the content of my awareness is a state of affairs or fact, namely, a certain particular being red.

If one asks the proper question of one who has an awareness while he has it, one elicits a certain answer. If, for instance, somebody points at the tree while I am looking at it and asks me what it is, I shall say "This is a tree." This statement is the *text* of my awareness. This and only this sort of thing is what I mean by the text of an awareness. In many cases it is not easy to hit upon the right question or to be sure that the answer one receives is what one was asking for. In some cases



the difficulties are very great. But, no matter how formidable they may be, they lie always within the limits of common sense and its long arm, science; in no case are they philosophical difficulties. The notion of a text is therefore itself entirely commonsensical. Three things about texts are worth noticing, though. Notice first that the text of an awareness states its content and only its content, without mentioning the awareness itself. This jibes well with what I said in the second to the last paragraph. Notice next that this is the first time I mention language in a certain way. More precisely, this is the first time I mention linguistic behavior as such. Notice, third, that the connection I thus establish between an awareness and its text is purely *external*. This means, first, that I am not dealing with the awarenesses one may have of the words he utters or hears uttered; and it means, second, that I am at this point not concerned with the question whether or not and in what sense one's inner speech is a "part" of his awarenesses. (These comments lay the ground for the unraveling of some of the fusions and confusions I mentioned in the outline.)

Let us return to my awareness of the red spot. The situation involves two particulars, the spot and the particular awareness. It also involves *at least* two states of affairs or facts, referred to by statements, namely, first, the spot being an instance of red and, second, the awareness being an instance of perceiving or, perhaps, of directly apprehending. The first of the two states of affairs is the content of this particular awareness. I said at least because the analysis is patently still incomplete. What it omits to mention is, in fact, the very crux of the matter, namely, that the one particular, the awareness, is an awareness of the state of affairs of which the other particular, the spot, is an ingredient. This third constituent fact of the situation is, I submit, not (1) that two particulars exemplify a relation, nor (2) that the one particular, the awareness, and the state of affairs of which the other is an ingredient exemplify a pseudorelation, but, (3) that the awareness exemplifies another nonrelational character, of the sort I call a proposition, which I shall specify in good time when I shall state my proposal. Alternatives (1) and (2) bring us to the classical act and thus to the development I wish to consider in my second step. In this development the difference between (1) and (2) was not always clearly seen. Nor shall I bother to distinguish between them in my quasi-historical account of it. However, we shall need the distinction later on, in the fourth step; so I shall state it now. A (binary) relation obtains between what is referred to by two terms. A (binary) pseudorelation obtains either between what is referred to by a term and what is referred to by a sentence or between what is referred to by two sentences. Sym-

bolically, in the usual notation: ' $xRy$ ', ' $xPp$ ', ' $pPq$ '. Connectives are, of course, not pseudorelations but truth tables. Logical atomism is the thesis that the ideal language contains no pseudorelations.

## II

Draw on a sheet of paper two circles outside of each other; mark the two points, one on each circle, that are closest to each other; draw an arrow from one of them to the other. Replace, if you wish, the tip of the arrow by a sling or loop surrounding the circle at which the tip points. What you have drawn is, in either case, a graphic schema of the classical act, or, more precisely, of as much of it as belongs to my story. The seeing, which is the act, is the arrow or loop. Its being a loop or arrow, not a circle like the other two constituents, shows that an act is not a third thing but an exemplified relation (or pseudorelation). The circle from which the arrow issues represents me; the second circle, the tree. So far, so good; but there remains a question. We saw that, by our common sense, the situation involves two contexts. Which of the two does the diagram represent? Or does it represent them both indifferently? As long as one answers at all, the most nearly correct answer is that it represents them both, but inseparably, not indifferently. The best reply is that within the Aristotelian tradition, from which the act pattern stems and from which it has never really been freed, the question cannot even be asked. This is one reason why trouble brewed when it was asked. Clearly, the diagram does not do justice to some other peculiarities of the form-matter accounts of perception. The reason for this neglect is that my concern is really only with the post-Cartesian mind-matter distinction, which is of course quite different from the Aristotelian form-matter distinction. But it is worth noticing that according to the form-matter accounts of perception the perceiver is "active" in extracting from the perceived object its form even though perception is in a sense the least "active" of all acts. Only in "pure sensation," whatever that means, is he completely "passive."

To an act philosopher the analysis of 'meaning' offers no problems. An act was said to intend its content. The linguistic connection between 'meaning' and 'intending' is familiar. Instead of saying that an act intends its content I could have said that its content is its meaning. A thought's meaning, for instance, was said to "exist intentionally" in it, as its content. The act pattern is thus the archetype of the contemporary accounts of meaning according to which the meaning of a sentence is its referent. (Nor is this surprising in view of the often quite naïve realism of the proponents of these so-called reference theories of meaning.) As for the meaning of sentences, not of acts,

within the classical pattern itself, one must remember that, broadly speaking, language enters into this pattern only externally, in exactly the same sense of 'external' in which I called external the connection between an awareness and the text I coördinated to it. A sentence is therefore for the classical act philosopher merely a physical object or event, or perhaps, a kind of such. It has meaning only derivatively or, as I believe it was sometimes put, it signifies only by eliciting an act which intends what, as we now say, it refers to.

Upon the classical view, awarenesses are acts. Thus, when the classical act ran into difficulties, the place of awareness in the scheme of things seemed to be threatened, too. To understand what happened, we must briefly inquire into those difficulties.

Brentano and G. E. Moore, the last two of the great protagonists of the act, are both direct realists. This did not happen by chance. The classical act is a relation exemplified by things in space and time. In this respect my seeing the tree is not at all different from its being to the left of, say, a rock. This is one of the two features that determined the course of events. The other pertains to a difference between seeing and, say, being to the left of. The thing from which the act issues is in issuing it spontaneous or "active." Neither of the constituents of an instance of, say, a spatial relation "acts" in this categorical sense upon the other merely by exemplifying the relation. Because they are patently incompatible with the ideas that reached their first culmination in Newton, these two features were, more than any others, responsible for the decline and eventual downfall of the act. In Newton's world the realm of physical objects, which includes our bodies, is causally closed; its physical constituents can therefore not in the old categorical sense be "acted upon" by anything else; otherwise the physical realm would not be causally closed. The difficulties one creates by introducing into this world mental constituents that "interact" with the physical ones are insuperable. This is not to say, though, that any or all of the constituents, physical or otherwise, of a Newtonian world are "passive." The point is, rather, that in their old categorical sense neither 'active' nor 'passive' can be sensibly applied to them. To insist in such circumstances on applying that half of a dichotomy that *seems* to fit better is to court philosophical trouble. The troubles that ensued in this case are notorious.

At this point I had better say what I should not need to say. I believe as a matter of course that the world is Newtonian. That is to me just common sense. Or, if you insist, it is scientific common sense; I shall not quibble; for to tilt even against scientific common sense is quixotic. This, however, is only half of what needs to be said. The

other half is that common sense, including science, never answers the philosophical questions. It merely sets them to us. Awareness is a case in point. The classical act secured its place in the world. As the act became indefensible, that place was threatened. This proves that something was wrong; it does not prove that in order to defend awareness one must defend the classical act. To do that would be merely quixotic. The task is, rather, to disentangle awareness from the act so that its place may again be secure in a world that is, scientifically, Newtonian. I believe that my analysis does just that. This, however, I shall not show in this essay, since to show it I would have to analyze in its entirety the tangle which is known as the mind-body problem<sup>3</sup> and not only, as I proposed, a single strand of it.

I continue the schematic account, representing the next step by a modification of the diagram. Let the two circles stand for two spheres and make the sphere from which the loop or arrow issues hollow. Erase the tip or loop and let the remaining line represent all sorts of relations (and processes) among the material constituents of either sphere. The absence of the loop or arrow indicates that these are all Newtonian relations (and processes); their constituents are thus neither "active" nor "passive." Assume next that, as part and parcel of these Newtonian processes, all sorts of configurations appear, as on a screen, on the wall of the cavity of the hollow sphere. Finally, put in the center of the cavity a small sphere from which arrows issue toward the configurations on its wall. The structure represents a Lockean kind of world; an "inner" arrow, a Lockean kind of act; the inner sphere, a post-Cartesian Self or, as Hartley put it, "an eye within the eye." For what we are interested in, the decisive difference between the old and the new schema is that in the latter the arrows have been withdrawn into the cavity. Does this alteration suffice to make the schema fit Newton's world? The answer is clearly No. A schema that fits must not contain any arrows. Thus the "inner" arrows would have to be "withdrawn" once more. This shows what Hartley's admirable metaphor illuminates in a flash, namely, that the new schema merely starts its proponents on an infinite regress. The configurations on the wall cause no trouble, at least not for what we are interested in. (I am here not concerned with the perplexities of indirect realism.) The sphere inside the sphere may or may not have to go. (That is why I didn't even bother to mention that Locke does not have this sort of Self.) The one thing needful is to get rid of the arrows. To understand how that was done one must understand what the classical British philosopher-psychologists meant by "the analysis of the phenomena of

<sup>3</sup> See also MLP6.

the human mind." So I must next explain the idea of this sort of analysis or, as we would now say, of analytical introspection.<sup>4</sup> The way in which its original proponents explained it is full of difficulties. As I shall explain it, the idea is quite commonsensical. Since it is commonsensical, it can in principle be considered as the outline of a scientific research program. I say in principle because in practice it led to the impasse that was Wundtian psychology. This, however, is entirely beside the point; for the causes of that impasse were not philosophical.

Assume that someone, call him a psychologist, who has become very skillful in eliciting from people, call them his subjects, the texts of their awarenesses, engages in the following project. First he selects a limited vocabulary. Then he gives his subjects the following tripartite instructions: "(a) Familiarize yourself with this limited vocabulary. (b) I shall continue to ask you questions as before; continue to answer them as before, speaking as you ordinarily do, without any limitation on your vocabulary. (c) Having given me your answer, answer my question once more; in your second response use only the limited vocabulary." Assume that the game, or experiment, is carried on for a while and that in each case our psychologist writes down the subject's responses, the first on the white front of a card, the second on its pink back. His purpose is to discover empirically from his cards a set of rules (empirical laws) *R* that will enable him in each future case to infer what is written on the white front of a card from what is written on its pink back. This is the idea of analytic introspection. The way I explained it avoids many of the classical difficulties by bringing out two points. The first response is the text of the "original" awareness; the second certainly is not; it may be, and in fact is, that of another; but that need not concern us. This is the first point. All that could be meant by saying that the original awareness, whose text is the first response, "consists of" or has been "introspectively decomposed (analyzed)" into those of which the second response is or would be the text, is that the first text can by a set of empirical laws be inferred from the second. This is the other point. For about 150 years, roughly from 1750 to 1900, one of the major issues, if not perhaps the major issue, of psychology was whether a set of such rules *R* can be found; and if at all, for how limited a vocabulary (of the second response).

It is easy to see how this program, *if* it succeeds and *if* one is not too clear about what one means by 'consisting of', can be used to get rid of the act or, if you please, of the arrows and, incidentally, the inner sphere. Since awarenesses are sometimes the contents of others, the texts (first responses!) of some of the awarenesses of our psychologist's

<sup>4</sup> See also MLP17.

subjects will contain act verbs, such as 'thinking about', 'wondering whether', and so on. If, now, his experiment succeeds with a vocabulary so limited that it contains none of these expressions, that is, if he can for such a vocabulary (of the second response) find a set of laws *R*, then our psychologist will probably say that "there are no acts." This, at any rate, is what two generations ago the "content" psychologists, led by Wundt, said to the "act" psychologists, who gathered around Brentano. Their claim is thus that "introspective analysis" of any awareness yields only "contents," i.e., what the other side calls the contents of those acts whose contents are not themselves awarenesses. (This shows how 'content' is used in that literature. Whenever I shall use it in this sense I shall surround it by double quotes.)

By 1900 it was beyond doubt that Wundt's program—or should I say Hume's?—would never succeed. Its failure led, during the first decade of this century, to the rebellion, led by Kuelpe, of the so-called school of Wuerzburg. The ideas which the men of Wuerzburg propounded are still important. Also, they are, in substance, patently right. So I shall next explain these ideas in a way that will help my story along in other ways, too.

Assume that I and another person who does not know English both hear the sound of what I know but he doesn't know to be the English word "bell." Will our awarenesses have the same text? Wuerzburg's answer is No; and it is, at least for some such occasions, beyond all reasonable doubt. The way they put it, in the style of all introspectionists, the difference shows in the analyses (second responses) of the two awarenesses. The analysis of the other fellow's awareness will consist of that of his auditory percept of what he didn't know to be a word *and of nothing else*. The analysis of mine will have corresponding constituents but, *in addition*, a further one. Some of the Wuerzburgers called this additional constituent, which according to them is introspectively unanalyzable, "the meaning of 'bell' " or, also, "the awareness of the meaning of 'bell'." Take another case. Assume that both I and another person hear a sentence which we both understand but which I, unlike him, do not know to be true so that, hearing it, I wonder whether what it refers to is the case. Again, Wuerzburg claims, self-evidently I think, that there will be a difference between our two awarenesses. The analysis of mine will reveal a constituent which will not appear in that of the other person, namely, a "wondering about . . .," which, according to Wuerzburg, is again introspectively unanalyzable. Rather remarkably the Wuerzburgers insisted that these unorthodox unanalyzable constituents are not "acts," but "contents." In terms of our diagram this means that the "inner" arrow appears now among the



configurations on the wall. Whether the Wuerzburgers spoke as they did merely in order to limit the extent of their anti-Wundtian heresy is an historical question. Whatever the answer may be, the fact that they could consistently so express themselves shows that awarenesses can in principle be fitted into a Newtonian world. That, though, is a line of thought which I am not pursuing in this essay; I turn instead to two others.

For one, we have again encountered 'meaning'. The one thing to be grasped firmly and above all is that what we encountered is only in a peculiar sense a philosophical analysis of what we mean when we speak of the meaning of a sentence or, as in my illustration, of a word. What we are offered is, rather, a psychological analysis of how meaning, whatever it may turn out to be, is carried, or grasped, or represented in our minds. I prefer Titchener's phrase, carried, but I would not argue about the word. The point is that this piece of psychology becomes a philosophical analysis of meaning only if it is joined to the assertion that the psychological phenomenon in question is all that could be meant whenever we speak, in any context, of meaning. Since this assertion is patently false, any philosophical analysis of meaning of which it forms a part is certainly peculiar.

Notice, for another, that linguistic behavior enters the Wuerzburg account of awareness in a new way. I call it new because it appears here for the first time in our story, though, to be sure, not for the first time in history; but that is beside the point. In the introspectionists' peculiar sense of 'consisting of', the awareness itself consists, according to Wuerzburg, at least in part of verbal "contents," e.g., of the auditory percepts which both I and one who does not know English have upon hearing an English word. To distinguish this kind of connection between linguistic behavior and awareness from others, which I have mentioned before, I call it *internal*. A verbal "content" may be either an auditory percept or image (of speech), or a visual percept or image (of writing), or some kinaesthetic equivalent. Which it is in any given case may be of interest to psychologists; it is of no moment to us. I merely notice that the notion includes so-called inner speech. The thing important for what I am interested in is that the new twist makes the case against awareness appear sound. The appearance is deceptive. To understand why it is deceptive we must understand why it deceived some. What happened was, I believe, that a certain statement, which is true, was mistaken for another one, which is false. The truth is that many of our more abstract awarenesses—I use deliberately a vague word, abstract, for a vague idea—are indeed awarenesses of words. The decisive point is that on such occasions we find ourselves not just having

verbal "contents" but knowing them, wondering about them, entertaining them, and so on, as the case may be. To assert the true statement is therefore not to assert that awarenesses do not exist. To assert the latter, in the language of Wuerzburg, is to assert that those unorthodox constituents, which according to Wuerzburg are unanalyzable, do in fact yield to introspection with the result that they, too, turn out to consist of verbal "contents." This is the false statement I mentioned a moment ago. As to its falsehood, I can only say that I, for one, do sometimes have awarenesses which upon introspection (if it be necessary) yield the critical unanalyzable constituents. In the texts of these awarenesses 'knowing', 'wondering about', 'entertaining', and so on, do of course occur. This, however, is a different matter; for the connection between an awareness and its text is external.

Titchener, the one first-rate mind among the Wundtians, gave Wuerzburg a consistent reply. Somewhat quixotically he insisted that whenever those critical "contents," awarenesses and meanings, occur, they can be introspectively decomposed into more orthodox ones. But he added that in many cases they do not occur at all. Take meaning, on which he was more explicit, and consider again a person who both hears and understands (the meaning of) the word bell. Titchener then says three things. 1. More often than not such a person has on such occasions no other "contents" than, say, auditory ones. 2. These events, namely, the occurrences of the auditory "content," are among the causes of other events, among which are, as a rule, (the occurrences of) other *orthodox* "contents" of the person in question. 3. This latter fact, 2, is what a psychologist means, or ought to mean, by 'meaning'. Titchener's formula was: The meaning of a content is not another content but its *context*. Since I believe that there are (to speak with Wuerzburg) unanalyzable awarenesses (though not meanings!), I object to the qualification, orthodox, which I italicized. Otherwise Titchener's is the correct analysis of *one* of the commonsensical (and scientific) meanings of 'meaning'. Very admirably, he distinguished it from a philosophical or, as he said, logical analysis. Again I agree, although I wouldn't put it this way. I would rather say that a philosophical analysis of 'meaning' must not only explicate *all* its important uses but that it must be particularly careful not to omit the philosophical ones, i.e., those that point, however confusedly, at genuine philosophical problems.

Titchener's meaning of 'meaning' contains implicitly another. Take again our illustration. In trying to specify the very complex causal pattern or, if you please, context of the case, one will certainly have to mention circumstances, of the kind called psychological, that pertain to

people. But it will also be necessary to mention what the word refers to, namely, bells. If one disregards the psychological circumstances, one arrives at a *second* commonsensical (and scientific) meaning of 'meaning'. In this sense, the meaning of a (kind of) linguistic event, say, of a sentence, is what it refers to. When an anthropologist tells us that, as he discovered, in a certain aboriginal language a certain kind of noise means tree, he uses 'means' in this sense. Notice, though, that by acknowledging this meaning of 'meaning' we do not embrace a philosophical reference theory of meaning; for we know, first, that this is just one of the uses of 'meaning' and, second, that it is not even a philosophical use. I submit, finally, that all scientific uses of 'meaning' involve either reference in the sense of my anthropologist or context in Titchener's sense, and nothing else.

In substance, Titchener's view became dominant. It still is dominant. Those who made it so, in a different form, were the behaviorists. Metaphysical behaviorists, who deny that there are mental things, talk nonsense so manifest that nobody needs to pay any attention to them. Scientific behaviorists, who make eminent sense, merely insist for their own particular reasons on speaking about mental things in their own particular way, namely, as states of the organism which are defined, or, more realistically, in principle definable in terms of actual and potential behavior. Since their particular reasons do not belong to our story, I shall state the behaviorists' idea in the introspectionists' language. Thus stated, the idea is that a state of an organism is an awareness if and only if it contains either actual verbal "contents" or momentary dispositions to have such "contents." Scientifically, the idea is sound. Commonsensically and not at all scientifically and even less philosophically, the notion of a text acknowledges what is sound in it. This, however, is beside the point. My concern here is exclusively with the impact of the behaviorists' views on the philosophy of awareness. This impact is, I think, by now quite clear. Imagine a philosopher who, whether or not he knows it, is overly impressed by the behaviorists; who is not benighted enough to be a metaphysical behaviorist; and who therefore speaks without qualms the language of the introspectionists. Such a philosopher might hold, *first*, that there are no "contents" of the kind I called unorthodox; that, *second*, all there is to meaning is context; and, *third*, that so-called awarenesses are merely verbal "contents" in their contexts. Assume, furthermore, that my imaginary philosopher also suffers from the futilitarian or nihilistic delusion according to which all philosophical uses are not only, as I agree, always confused but also that there are no genuine philosophical problems which these confused uses indicate as smoke indicates fire.

Then he will also hold that, *fourth*, the first three sentences contain in principle everything anybody could possibly say about meaning and awareness.

The philosopher about whom I spoke is not at all imaginary but the other Wittgenstein, that is, the author of *Philosophical Investigations*. Negatively, this unfortunate book is nothing but a belated attempt to refute Wuerzburg. Positively it is, in dialectical disguise, a behavioristic-Titchenerian account of awareness and meaning. The words are of course not always those of the scientists. *Context*, for instance, becomes *use*, or perhaps, *rule of use*, or perhaps, *habit* conforming to a rule of use. Since I, for one, am willing to leave psychology to the psychologists, I naturally do not think that such distinctions are philosophically important. The author of the *Tractatus* is nevertheless one of the most important philosophers. That is why *Philosophical Investigations* marks a new low in the philosophical career of awareness. I am confident that this low is also the turning point.

There is still another reason why I introduce Wittgenstein at this crucial point of my exposition. Some futilitarians sometimes do propound philosophical doctrines—in the circuitous way that is forced upon them by their futilitarianism. The *Philosophical Investigations* propound the strange and erroneous doctrine that (A) awarenesses do not exist. I suggest that A is the one visible end of a hidden thread that connects the *Investigations* with one of the flaws of the *Tractatus*.<sup>5</sup> Its other visible end is the doctrine of the *Tractatus*, equally strange and erroneous, that (B) language cannot or must not speak about itself. In the next section I shall analyze some of the confusions that led some to accept B. In the fourth section I shall show that in some vague and confused sense statements mentioning awarenesses belong to language about language. That is the thread or, if you please, the hidden continuity between A and B. Since I am certain that this pattern illuminates some structural connections, I have patterned my exposition after it. Whether it contains also a biographical truth about Wittgenstein is a moot question. Perhaps it doesn't.

### III

Linguistic events, whether they are mental or noises, are events among events. Linguistic things, such as marks on paper, are things among things. Talking about either, one talks about language as part of the world. This is the way scientists talk about it. Philosophers look at language as a pattern, that is, as a picture of the world rather than as a part of it. Event vs. pattern, part vs. picture; the formula is sug-

<sup>5</sup> For an analysis of some other flaws see MLP3.



gestive. That is why I begin with it. Yet, like all formulae, it needs unpacking. The following three propositions and five comments state what is sound in it. Propositions and comments are both very succinct. If I went into detail, I would do what I said I would not do, namely, explain once more the method of philosophizing by means of an ideal language.

There is of course nothing that is not part of the world. Clearly, then, the negative half of the metaphor must not be taken literally. The following propositions unpack it. (1) The construction of the ideal language *L* proceeds syntactically, i.e., as a study in geometrical design, without any reference to its interpretation. A schema so constructed is as such not a language; it becomes one, at least in principle, only by interpretation. (2) The philosopher interprets *L* by coördinating to awarenesses not their actual texts but ideal texts, i.e., sentences of *L*. (3) Having so interpreted *L*, he can, by speaking about both it and what it refers to or speaks about, first reconstruct and then answer the philosophical questions. This is the meaning of the positive half of the picture metaphor, according to which the ideal language is a picture, or, in the classical phrase, a logical picture of the world. These are the three propositions. Now for the five comments. (a) Notice that in (2) 'sentence' is used proleptically. Only by interpretation of *L* do certain of its designs become "sentences." (b) The connection between an awareness and its ideal text is as external as that between it and its actual text. (c) In coördinating his ideal texts to awarenesses the linguistic philosopher acknowledges in his own way the Cartesian turn. (d) The text of an awareness refers to its content. Some texts, whether actual or ideal, refer therefore to awarenesses. But a text does not refer to an awareness merely because it is coördinated to one. (e) Familiarity with the traditional dialectic shows that the undefined descriptive constants of *L* must refer to what we are directly acquainted with, in the sense in which the classical phenomenologists maintained that we are not directly acquainted with physical objects.<sup>6</sup>

The picture metaphor also misled some, among them the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*. One of the several errors<sup>7</sup> it caused is the belief that the ideal language cannot "speak about itself." Let me first show how this confused idea came to seem plausible. Change the metaphor slightly, introducing a mirror instead of a picture. Take an object and let it stand for the world. The mirror may mirror the object; it does not and cannot mirror its own mirroring it. One may, of course, place

<sup>6</sup> This is the issue mentioned earlier on which I *seem* to side with the classical phenomenologists. The appearance is dispelled in MLP.

<sup>7</sup> For an analysis of some others see MLP3.

a second mirror so that it mirrors the object, the first mirror, and the latter's mirroring of the former. But now one who understood what was said before might remark that when this is done then the first mirror and its mirroring have themselves become part of the world (of the second mirror). The remark is not yet the analysis, but it points at the crucial spot. The source of the confusion is an unnoticed ambiguity of 'about'. This ambiguity is not likely to be noticed unless one distinguishes clearly between the two ways of looking at language, once as part of the world, once as its picture.

Commonsensibly we say that a sentence (or a word) *refers* to, or is *about*, a state of affairs (or a thing). This makes sense if and only if what is said to refer to something, or to be or speak about something, is a linguistic event or a kind of such. Notice, first, that in the two comments (d) and (e) above I myself used 'refer' and 'about' in this sense. In fact, I never use them otherwise; for I do not understand any other use of them. Notice, furthermore, how well all this fits with what was said earlier. What a linguistic event or a kind of such refers to is also its meaning, in one of the two commonsensical and scientific meanings of 'meaning'. And when scientists speak about language they speak of course always about linguistic events. What one asserts, then, when one asserts, with this meaning of 'about', that language cannot "speak about itself" is that there cannot be kinds of noises which, as we use them, refer to other kinds of noises. The assertion is so implausible that I hardly know how to argue against it. The best one can do if one wishes to dispose of it as thoroughly as possible is what I am doing in this section, namely, analyze the major sources of the illusion. But let me first dispose of what is even more obvious. If we use a language in which reference is not univocal, we will eventually get into trouble. This is just common sense. Thus, if we use a certain kind of noise to refer to a certain kind of animals, say, dogs, we had better not also use it to refer to something else and, in particular, not to itself, i.e., to this particular kind of noise. Any adequate language will therefore distinguish between the two kinds of design on the next line:

dog

'dog'.

This is the origin of the quoting device. In any language that is not on grounds of sheer common sense foredoomed, the linguistic events about linguistic events, or, if you please, the part of the language that is "about itself" are therefore those and only those that contain single quotes or their equivalents, e.g., the phrase 'the word dog'.

What, if anything, could be meant by saying that the ideal language speaks about itself? Every awareness has an ideal text. Let 'b' be the

name of (refer to) an awareness and let '*gr(a)*' ('This is green') be its text. From what was said earlier we know that the name of an awareness, in this case '*b*', could not possibly occur in its text, in this case '*gr(a)*'; for the text of an awareness refers to its content, which is always distinct from the awareness itself. But consider now another awareness, *c*, whose content contains *b*. Since *c* is about *b*, its text contains at least one clause that predicates some character of *b*; for otherwise it wouldn't be about *b*. Let '*. . . (b)*' be this clause, with the dots marking the place of the name of that character. Assume next that *L* contains as the name of the character the predicate expression '*gr(a)*'.<sup>8</sup> Then the text of *c* contains '*gr(a)*' (*b*). *L*, therefore, contains an expression of its own between single quotes. This is the exact point at which the illusion arises that the ideal language may speak about itself *in the same sense* in which language as event may do so. Or, to put the same thing differently, this is the only clear sense in which the ideal language as a pattern could be said to "speak about itself." Moreover, this is, as we now see, *not* the sense in which language as a part of the world may speak about itself. After one has seen that, one may if one wishes continue to use the phrase, as I occasionally shall, and say that *in this sense* the ideal language may and must "speak about itself." Only, and this is my real point, or, rather, this is the point that matters most for my story, there is again no reason whatsoever why in this sense the ideal language should not or could not "speak about itself." Again, the assertion is not even plausible. One of two apparent reasons that made it seem plausible is, if I may so express myself, the grammar of the picture metaphor. This, I believe, is the reason why Wittgenstein propounded the dogma in the *Tractatus*. The other reason, which probably did not sway Wittgenstein but which seemed a good reason to some others, is that the mathematicians proclaimed they had proved that language cannot both be consistent and say certain things "about itself." The mathematicians had indeed proved something. They usually do. Only, what they had proved was not by any stretch of the imagination what they mistook it for. It took indeed all the philosophical clumsiness and insensitivity which mathematicians sometimes display to make this mistake, just as it took the wrong kind of awe in which some philosophers hold mathematics to believe them. In the rest of this section I shall analyze the mistake; partly in order to dispose of the strange dogma as thoroughly as I possibly can; mainly because this is the best place to introduce the notion of *truth* into the story. For the philosophical analyses of awareness, meaning, and truth belong together.

<sup>8</sup> These are not double quotes but one pair of single quotes within another.

The mathematicians thought they had proved that a schema syntactically constructed cannot (a) be consistent<sup>9</sup> and upon interpretation contain (b) arithmetic as well as (c) a predicate with the literal meaning of 'true'. To be a plausible candidate for the role of ideal language, a schema must obviously satisfy conditions (a) and (b). As to (c), one of the things one would naturally want to say in a language that "speaks about itself" is that its sentences are true or false (not true), as the case may be. Thus, if the mathematicians had proved what they thought they proved, there would be a difficulty. In fact, they proved that no schema can simultaneously fulfill (a), (b), and a third condition, (c'), which they mistook for (c).

In order to fix the ideas I speak for the time being about language as part of the world. Sentences, then, are kinds of linguistic events (or things). Literally, only sentences are true or false. Explicitly, 'true' is therefore a linguistic predicate in the sense that it is truly predicated only of the names of certain linguistic kinds. This, by the way, is the only meaning of 'linguistic' that is clear and does not stand in need of explication. Implicitly, truth involves more than the linguistic events themselves. *A sentence is true if and only if what it refers to (means) is the case.* Let me call this sentence (A). It is a truism: yet, firmly grasped, it has three important consequences. *First.* Some linguistic properties are syntactical properties. In the case of marks on paper, for instance, a property of a sentence or of any other expression is syntactical if and only if it is defined in terms of the shapes and the arrangement of its signs and of nothing else. Truth is obviously not a syntactical property of sentences. *Second.* Introducing 'true' into a schema means two things. It means (α) introducing into the schema a sentence which upon interpretation becomes (A). It means (β) that this sentence ought to be a "linguistic truth," in a sense of the phrase, linguistic truth, which is by no means clear and must therefore be explicated. It follows, *third*, that if all this is to be achieved, the schema must contain certain expressions, one which can be interpreted as 'refer' and others that can be interpreted as names of sentences. In the nature of things, these expressions must be descriptive.

*The property mentioned in (c') is a syntactical property of sentences; truth, the linguistic property mentioned in (c), is not.* Not to have seen this is the mathematicians' major mistake. They also made two subsidiary ones. One of these is that, accurately speaking, the property mentioned in (c') is not even a syntactical property.

Goedel, who did not make any of these mistakes, invented a method that allowed him to use arithmetic in speaking commonsensically about

<sup>9</sup> Consistency can be defined syntactically.

an uninterpreted schema. Specifically, he invented a rule by which to each expression of the schema<sup>10</sup> one and only one integer is coördinated in a manner that depends only on the shapes and the arrangement of the signs in the expression itself. (This is, in fact, the least achievement of that great mathematician.) In speaking commonsensically about the schema we can therefore use the number ( $n_A$ ) which by the rule corresponds to an expression 'A' as the "name" of this expression. By the same rule, a class of integers corresponds to every syntactical property, namely, the class of all the integers coördinated to expressions which have the property. The name of a class of integers is called an arithmetical predicate. (E.g., 'square' is the name of the class [1, 4, 9, . . .].) Now remember (b). By assumption our schema contains number-signs (not numbers!), i.e., expressions we intend to interpret as referring to integers, and arithmetical-predicate-expressions, i.e., expressions we intend to interpret as referring to classes of integers. Assume now that one of these latter expressions, ' $pr$ ', upon interpretation becomes an arithmetical predicate that is coördinated to a syntactical property. In this case the mathematicians say that the schema contains the "name" of the syntactical property, just as they say that in the number-signs it contains the "names" of its own expressions. This use of 'name' is inaccurate. For one, an uninterpreted schema does not contain the name (or the "name") of anything. For another, in the intended interpretation ' $pr$ ' obviously refers to a class of integers and not to a syntactical property just as the number-signs refer to integers and not to expressions. Assume, third, that we actually use the (interpreted) schema as a language. We could not *in* it state what the mathematicians say *about* it unless it contained further expressions, namely, those which upon interpretation become the names of expressions and of their syntactical properties, and, in addition, the means to state *in* the schema the rules by which, speaking *about* it, we make integers and classes of integers the "names" of linguistic things and characters. This is the reason why, as we shall presently see, the property mentioned in (c') is, accurately speaking, not even a syntactical property. Not to have seen that is one of the two subsidiary mistakes. Its root is the mathematicians' special use of 'name'. For their own special purposes it is, as it happens, quite harmless. Philosophically, it is disastrous to believe that one can state *in* the interpreted schema what can only be stated *about* it. Why this is so is obvious. The one and only schema which interests the philosopher is that which upon interpretation be-

<sup>10</sup> More precisely, the rule works only for schemata of a certain kind; all plausible candidates for the role of ideal language belong to that kind. This is but one of the many omissions I shall permit myself on more technical matters.

comes  $L$ , the ideal language. And in  $L$  one must in principle be able to say everything nonphilosophical.

I am ready to state what the mathematicians did prove. Let 'A' be a sentence of a schema that satisfies (a) and (b) as well as some other conditions, of a purely technical nature, which every plausible candidate for the role of  $L$  must satisfy. Let  $n_A$  be the number we have coördinated to 'A'; let ' $N_A$ ' be the number-sign of the schema which upon interpretation transcribes  $n_A$ ; let finally ' $pr$ ' be an arithmetical-predicate-expression. What has been proved is this.<sup>11</sup> The schema contains no ' $pr$ ' such that

$$(T) \quad pr(N_A) = A$$

is *demonstrable* for all (closed) sentences of the schema. But I see that I must again explain, first what demonstrability is, then why anybody should think that (T) ought to be demonstrable.

Analyticity is a syntactical property of sentences. More precisely, what philosophers mean by 'analytic' can and must be explicated by means of a syntactical property. Demonstrability is another syntactical property of sentences. Every demonstrable sentence is analytic, though not conversely. (The second half is one of Goedel's celebrated results.) Thus, while there is no ' $pr$ ' for which (T) is demonstrable, there could conceivably be one for which it is analytic. That there actually is none is a purely mathematical matter which does not interest me here at all. The question that interests me is: Why should one who believes, however mistakenly, that an arithmetical-predicate-expression could ever transcribe 'true', also believe that the transcription is adequate only if (T) is demonstrable? The answer is instructive. Remember the condition ( $\beta$ ), which requires that (A) be a "linguistic truth." (T) was mistaken for the transcription of (A); demonstrability was implicitly offered as the explication of the problematic notion of linguistic truth. This is the second subsidiary mistake. It is a mistake because in the light of Goedel's result demonstrability is not at all a plausible explication of 'linguistic truth'. Analyticity might be. In the next section I shall propose what I believe to be the correct transcription of (A) in  $L$ ; and I shall show that this transcription is analytic.

#### IV

The sentence I proposed to transcribe in the ideal language is 'I see that this is green'; or, rather, in order to sidestep the issue of the Self, '(It is) seen (by me) that this is green'; or, still more precisely, since I

<sup>11</sup> D. Hilbert and P. Bernays, *Grundlagen der Mathematik* (Berlin: Springer, 1939), Vol. II, pp. 245 f.



wish to limit myself to the indubitably simple character of direct acquaintance, 'direct acquaintance with this being green'. Let the undefined descriptive constants '*a*', '*aw*', '*gr*' name a particular and two simple characters, direct acquaintance and greenness, respectively. Consider '*aw(gr(a))*'; call it (1). On first thought one might hit upon (1) as the transcription of our sentence. A little reflection shows that for at least two reasons we are already committed to reject (1).

To be a direct acquaintance, or an imagining, and so on, are, as we saw, characters of particular awarenesses. Let '*b*' be the name of the awareness whose text I wish to transcribe. '*aw*' must then be predicated of '*b*' and not, as in (1), of '*gr(a)*', which refers to the content of *b*. This is the first reason why we must reject (1). '*gr*' and '*a*' refer to a character and a particular with both of which I am directly acquainted. Speaking as we ordinarily do, what they refer to is thus called mental. (This is my "point of contact" with the phenomenologists.) Change the example; consider '*kn(p<sub>1</sub>)*'; call it (1'); let '*kn*' and '*p<sub>1</sub>*' stand for 'known that' and 'This stone is heavy' respectively. '*p<sub>1</sub>*' refers to a physical state of affairs; to say that it refers to anything mental is to fall into the absurdities of the phenomenologists. '*kn*', on the other hand, names a character which, speaking as we ordinarily do, we specifically and characteristically call mental.<sup>12</sup> It follows that (1') mixes the physical and the mental in the manner that leads to the interactionist catastrophe. Perhaps this becomes even clearer if for a moment I write, relationally, '*aw(self, p<sub>1</sub>)*', which is of course the pattern of the classical act. However, the difference between the relational and non-relational alternatives makes no real difference so far as mixing the physical and the mental goes. This is the second reason why we must reject (1). But now a critic might insist that when somebody knows or sees something there is indeed a transaction<sup>13</sup> between what is known or seen and the knower or seer. Quite so. Only, this transaction is properly spoken of as the scientists speak about it, that is, in principle, behavioristically. (This is my "point of contact" with materialists and epiphenomenologists.) Notice that, in spite of the "phenomenalistic" feature of my ideal language, I can say all this and even find it necessary to say it. This alone should go a long way toward convincing anyone that I avoid the absurdities of the various classical positions.

Let us take stock. Negatively, we understand why (1) cannot be

<sup>12</sup> So used, 'knowing' refers to a character of awarenesses. To insist on that one need not deny that there are other uses of the word, e.g., those of which Ryle now makes too much.

<sup>13</sup> I use this clumsy word in order to avoid 'relation', which would be syntactically false since the "transaction" is a pseudorelation.

the transcription. Positively, we see that the transcription must contain the clause '*aw(b)*'. In this clause, by the way, '*aw*' is a predicate and therefore, strictly speaking, the name of a character. In (1) it is a nonrelational pseudopredicate and therefore, as I use 'character', not really the name of a character. Of this presently. For the moment we notice that '*aw(b)*' could not possibly be the whole ideal text of our sentence since it does not say what *b* is an awareness of. Thus, there must be at least one more clause. To provide it, I make use of an idea I introduced before. That an awareness is an awareness of something I represent in the ideal language by a character of this awareness which is *in some sense* (I shall presently explicate it) a simple character; in our instance, call this character '*gr(a)*'<sup>14</sup>; generally, I call it '*p<sub>1</sub>*', where '*p<sub>1</sub>*' refers to the content of the awareness or, what amounts to the same thing, is its (ideal) text. The transcription of our sentence becomes then

$$(2) \quad aw(b) \cdot 'gr(a)')(b)$$

Undoubtedly there is something peculiar about '*gr(a)*'. For one, the expression itself is very complex, even though it names a character that is simple. For another, the expression is not, as a syntactically introduced undefined descriptive predicate ought to be, wholly innocent of its interpretation. One can, of course, as I presently shall, syntactically construct a schema that contains it. But that in itself means nothing. Even so, '*gr(a)*' is innocent of the intended interpretation in that ( $\alpha$ ) it remains fully indeterminate as long as '*gr*' and '*a*' are. But it is not so innocent in that ( $\beta$ ), after '*gr*' and '*a*' have been interpreted, if I am to achieve my purposes, '*gr(a)*' must be interpreted as the name of the character which an awareness possesses if and only if it is an awareness of what '*gr(a)*' refers to. On the other hand, we would like to say that ( $\beta$ ) is "merely a linguistic matter" or, as I once put it, that to be an awareness of a certain kind and to have a certain content (and, therefore, text) is one thing and not two. Let there be no illusion. In so speaking we ourselves use 'linguistic' philosophically, i.e., in a problematic way that needs explication. The point is that what I am saying in this section is, among other things, the explication. The following are three salient points of it. (a) I introduce into the ideal language the sentence '*gr(a)Mgr(a)*' as the transcription of what we *sometimes* mean when we say that the proposition (or sentence) this is green *means* that this is green. (b) I so extend the notion of a logical sign that '*M*' becomes logical and not descriptive. (c) I so extend the notion

<sup>14</sup> Again, these are not double quotes but one pair of single quotes within another.

of analyticity that ' $gr(a)Mgr(a)$ ' and all similar sentences become analytic.

Sometimes, when we assert such things as, say, that the proposition (or sentence) this is green means that this is green, we would be dissatisfied if we were told that in asserting it we use 'means' in the sense of either reference or context. The cause of the dissatisfaction is that we feel, however confusedly, that we did not say anything, or did not want to say anything, about linguistic events. Or, if you please, we feel that what we really wanted to say is something "linguistic" in some other sense of this problematic term. ' $M$ ' transcribes this meaning of 'means'. I am tempted to call it the hidden or philosophical meaning; hidden, because it got lost in the development I described in the second section; philosophical, because I believe that it is what the philosophers who were not sidetracked by that development groped for. However, I ordinarily call meanings (or uses) philosophical if and only if, remaining unexplicated, they produce philosophical puzzlement. So I shall resist the temptation and call this third meaning, transcribed by ' $M$ ', the *intentional* meaning of 'means'.

This is as good a place as any to introduce a fourth meaning of 'means' (and 'meaning'). This I call the *logical* meaning. But first for two comments that might help to forestall some misunderstandings. (a) I have mentioned four meanings of 'means'. Two of them, reference and context, I called scientific; one I call logical; another I was at least tempted to call philosophical. There are good reasons for choosing these names; but one must not let the names obscure the fact that '*means*' occurs with each of these four meanings in ordinary discourse, sometimes with the one, sometimes with the other, sometimes with some combination. As long as one speaks commonsensically one does not get into trouble. As soon as one begins to philosophize in the traditional way about "meaning," the fourfold ambiguity begins to produce the traditional philosophical troubles. (b) There are quite a few further meanings of 'meaning'. They occur in moral, esthetic, and scientific discourse and in discourse about such discourse. I know this as well as the next man, even if that man should hail from Oxford. The four meanings I single out are nevertheless those which through fusion and confusion have produced one of the major tangles of first philosophy. Compared with the task of untying this fourfold knot the explication of the other meanings of 'meaning' is not very difficult.

Logicians often say that two sentences of a schema, ' $p_1$ ' and ' $p_2$ ', have the same meaning if and only if ' $p_1 \equiv p_2$ ' is analytic. This is the logical meaning of 'means'. In logic the idea is important; hence the adjective, logical. Nor is there any doubt that it explicates *one* of the ordinary

uses of 'means'. Technically, the basic notion in this case is not meaning but having-the-same-meaning; so the former must be explicated in terms of the latter, say, as the class of all sentences having the same meaning. These, however, are mere technicalities with which we need not bother.

I am ready to put the last touch to my main proposal. One may wonder whether

$$(2') \quad aw(b) \cdot 'gr(a)'(b) \cdot 'gr(a)Mgr(a)$$

is not preferable to (2). (2') has the advantage that, since its third clause mentions the content of the awareness whose text it transcribes, one can be quite sure of what in the case of (2) one may conceivably doubt, namely, that nothing essential has been omitted. Interestingly, one need not choose. The third clause of (2'), the one which makes the difference between it and (2), is, as I mentioned before, analytic. (2) and (2') are thus like ' $p_1$ ' and ' $p_1 \cdot p_2$ ', where ' $p_2$ ' is analytic. In this case ' $p_1 \equiv p_1 \cdot p_2$ ' is also analytic. (2) and (2') have therefore the same logical meaning. The meaning transcription must preserve is logical meaning. It follows that the difference between (2) and (2') makes no real difference.

Consider everything I have said so far in this section as preliminary, merely an exposition of the main ideas, to be followed by the more formal presentation and argument on which I am about to embark. First, though, I want to attend to two related matters.

The predicates of the ideal language  $L$  which I form by surrounding sentences of  $L$  with single quotes name those characters which I call *propositions*. Propositions are therefore not kinds of linguistic things or events in the sense in which certain marks on paper, certain sounds, and certain visual and auditory "contents" are linguistic things or events. And this latter sense is, as we know, the only clear and unproblematic sense of 'linguistic'. It is therefore a mistake, or, at least, it is confusing to say that what I call a proposition is a linguistic character. If a qualifying adjective must be used at all, I would rather say that propositions are mental or psychological characters. But then again, it would be another mistake to think that I propose what is traditionally called a psychological theory of propositions. To understand why it is a mistake one merely has to remember that, as the term is traditionally used in philosophy, propositions are a peculiar kind of entity of which some philosophers claim they are the real contents of awarenesses. I do not believe that there are propositions in this sense. So I would not propose a theory, either psychological or otherwise, to provide some status for these chimaeras. Why then, one



may wonder, use a word that invites mistakes and confusions. I hold no brief for the word. I needed a name. This one came to mind. It is, I think, as good as any other. Also, I welcome the opportunity it provides to cast new light on certain kinds of mistakes and confusions. This is one of the two matters to which I wanted to attend.

Some particulars are tones. This does not imply that  $L$  must contain an undefined predicate interpreted as 'tone'. If, for instance,  $L$  contains the undefined names of the various pitches, middle  $c$ ,  $c$  sharp,  $d$ , and so on, one could try, in  $L$ , to define a tone as anything that exemplifies a pitch. The technicalities of this business need not concern us here.<sup>15</sup> Similarly, since awarenesses are in fact those particulars which exemplify propositional characters, one may wonder whether  $L$  must contain undefined descriptive predicates, such as ' $aw$ ', which are interpreted as the names of different modes of awareness, in the sense in which direct acquaintance, wondering, remembering, doubting, and so on, are modes of awareness. There are undoubtedly such modes, just as there are shapes, tones, smells, and so on. The only question is whether, omitting from  $L$  all undefined names for any of them, one can in  $L$  still account for the differences among them; that is, whether one can in principle account for these differences in term of "content" and of "content" alone. I have pondered the question for years. (Hume threw out a casual suggestion concerning it when he distinguished "ideas" from "impressions" by their "faintness.") I am not sure what the answer is, though I am now inclined to believe that it is negative. That is why I proceed as if it were negative. But it is also important to see clearly that whatever it is does not make much difference for anything else I have said and shall still say in this essay. The only difference is that if the answer were positive then propositions would be the only characters that are in fact exemplified by awarenesses alone. This is the other matter to which I wanted to attend.

Russell and the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* were the first who practiced the method of philosophizing by means of an ideal language. Since then quite a few philosophers, whether they knew it or not, have more or less consistently employed this method. With two exceptions, they all proposed essentially the same syntactical schema. This schema, I shall call it the conventional schema or  $L_c$ , is of the *Principia Mathematica* type. The New Nominalists are one exception; the other, for over a decade now, has been myself. The New Nominalists, who do not belong in our story, believe that  $L$  must be syntactically poorer

<sup>15</sup> See also MLP12 and "Undefined Descriptive Predicates," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 8, 1947, 55-82.

than  $L_c$ .<sup>16</sup> I believe that  $L_c$  is in one respect and in one respect only not rich enough to serve as  $L$ . My reason should now be obvious. I do believe that  $L_c$  can serve as a clarified language to be spoken, in principle, about everything which, as one usually says, is an object of mind—including mind itself, as long as we speak about it scientifically, that is, in principle, behavioristically. But I also believe that  $L_c$  does not provide adequate transcriptions for many statements we make about minds or mental things when we speak commonsensically. It follows, on my conception of philosophy, that one cannot, by talking about  $L_c$  and what it talks about, solve some of the philosophical problems concerning mind and its place in nature.<sup>17</sup> Hence  $L_c$  cannot be the ideal language. Positively, I believe that  $L_c$  becomes the ideal language if it is supplemented by two further primitive signs, namely

$M$  and ' . . . . . ',

i.e., the relational pseudopredicate which I interpret as the intentional 'means' and the quoting operator. We have incidentally come upon another reason why the question whether  $L$  must contain ' $aw$ ' and other undefined names for the several modes of awareness is not as fundamental as it might seem. ' $aw$ ' and its cognates are predicates; thus they exemplify a syntactical category provided by  $L_c$ . ' $M$ ' is a pseudopredicate. Thus it belongs to a syntactical category unknown to  $L$ . As it happens, it is also the only primitive sign that represents this category in  $L_c$ . And what holds for ' $M$ ' in these two respects also holds for the quoting operator. Presently I shall make much of these points. But I see that I am once more illuminating basic ideas when the ground for a more formal presentation has already been laid. So I shall proceed as follows. *First*, I shall very concisely describe those features of  $L_c$  that matter most for my purpose. *Second*, I shall construct syntactically the schema I believe to be  $L$ . It contains the two syntactical categories represented by ' $M$ ' and by the quoting operator. This feature requires a redefinition of the syntactical notions of *logical sign* and *analyticity*. The two new notions are broader than the conventional ones in that every primitive sign logical in  $L_c$  and every sentence analytic in  $L_c$  are also in  $L$  logical and analytic respectively, but not conversely. *Third*, I shall state explicitly what is implicit in this essay as a whole, namely, that the enriched schema can be made to bear the burden of the philosophy of mind.

<sup>16</sup> For an analysis of the New Nominalism see MLP4, MLP5, and "Particularity and the New Nominalism," *Methodos*, 6, 1954, 131-47, and also pp. 91-105 of this book.

<sup>17</sup> See also MLP6.

The primitive signs of  $L_c$  fall into two classes, logical and descriptive. The logical signs are of two kinds. There are, first, two signs, each individually specified, each belonging to a syntactical category of its own, each the only primitive representative of its category in  $L_c$ . These two signs are, of course, a connective and a quantifier, interpreted in the familiar fashion as, say, 'neither-nor' and 'all'.<sup>18</sup> The second kind of logical signs, not individually specified, consists of an indefinite number of variables of each of the several types. Each type is a syntactical category; but they are all categories of "terms." The essence of a term is that it combines with terms to form sentences.  $L_c$  contains no pseudo-terms, i.e., no category (except connectives) whose members combine either with sentences or with terms and sentences to form sentences. The primitive descriptive signs or, as one also says, the undefined descriptive constants of  $L_c$  are distributed over the various types of "terms." If a sentence  $S$  of  $L_c$  contains descriptive terms, then replace them all according to certain rules by variables. Call the resulting sentence the "form" of  $S$ . The syntactical definition of analyticity is so constructed that whether or not a sentence is analytic depends only on its "form." The syntactical significance of the distinction between the two kinds of signs lies thus in the role it plays in the syntactical definition of analyticity. The philosophical significance of the latter, and thus of both syntactical distinctions, lies in the circumstance that *in all cases but one* it can serve as the explication of what philosophers mean when they say that a sentence is "analytic," or a "formal" truth, or a "linguistic" truth. The exception where the conventional definition of analyticity is not adequate for this purpose is, as one might expect, the case of such sentences as "The sentence (proposition) this is green means that this is green," when 'means' is used intentionally.

That the definition of analyticity in  $L_c$  achieves its philosophical purpose depends of course on its details; they are specified in what is technically known as validity theory. I cannot here state the definition accurately; but I shall recall its nature by means of two elementary illustrations. Take the two forms ' $p \vee \sim p$ ' and ' $(x)f(x) \supset (\exists x)f(x)$ '. The first is analytic because its truth table is tautological; the second is analytic because if ' $f(x)$ ' is read ' $x$  is a member of  $f$ ', then it becomes a set-theoretical truth for all subsets of all nonempty sets. The definition of analyticity (validity) is thus combinatorial; arithmetical in the simplest case, set-theoretical in all others. What makes it philosophically significant is, first, the combinatorial feature, and, second, the

<sup>18</sup> If, as strictly speaking one must, one is to dispense with definitions, then a third logical primitive, the abstraction operator, is necessary. This is another of the omissions and simplifications for which I must take the responsibility.

circumstance that as far as we know all analytical statements are in fact true.<sup>19</sup>

Technically, validity theory is a branch of mathematics with many difficult problems. So it is perhaps not surprising that it, too, provided the philosophers with an opportunity to be misled by the mathematicians. The following two comments will show what I have in mind. (a) For all philosophical purposes (with the one notorious exception) our definition is an adequate explication of what philosophers mean by 'analytic'. Mathematically, it is not as interesting. It would be, if we knew a procedure which, applied to *any* sentence  $S$  of  $L_c$ , after a finite number of steps yielded an answer to the question whether  $S$  is analytic. There is and there can be no such procedure. (That there can be none even if one restricts  $S$  to the so-called lower functional calculus is the famous result of Church.) This is the reason why mathematicians are not very interested in validity; unfortunately, their lack of interest has blinded some philosophers to the philosophical significance of this explication of 'analytic'. (b) In speaking about a schema we always speak commonsensically. In framing the explication of analyticity in terms of validity we use set theory "commonsensically." Yet it is a matter of record that "commonsensical" set theory itself got into difficulties that had to be straightened out by the construction of schemata. Mathematicians may therefore feel that the explication of analyticity in terms of validity uncritically takes for granted what is in fact uncertain and problematic. For some mathematical purposes that may indeed be so. Yet, we must not allow the mathematicians to persuade us that we, as philosophers, ought to strive for certainty, or constructivity, or decidability, in the sense in which the finitists among them do. We seek, not certainty of any peculiar noncommonsensical kind, but, rather, the clarity achieved by explications framed in terms of common sense, that common sense of which science and (nonformalized) mathematics are but the long arm. If yesterday's "common sense" got us into trouble that had to be straightened out by the construction of schemata, we shall today still use this "amended common sense" to construct "commonsensically" the schemata of today. And if tomorrow we should get into trouble again, we shall start all over again. For what else could we possibly do?

One more feature of  $L_c$  must be mentioned. Let ' $F_1$ ' and ' $F_2$ ' be predicate expressions of any type, ' $X$ ' a variable of its subject type, ' $\Phi(F_1)$ ' any sentence containing ' $F_1$ ', ' $\Phi(F_2)$ ' a sentence made out of ' $\Phi(F_1)$ ' by replacing at least one occurrence of ' $F_1$ ' by ' $F_2$ '. It is a consequence of our definition of analyticity that

<sup>19</sup> See also MLP4, MLP14.

(E)  $(X)[F_1(X) \equiv F_2(X)] \supset [\Phi(F_1) \equiv \Phi(F_2)]$

is analytic. Thus, if the antecedent of (E) is true, so is the consequent; and if the antecedent is analytic, so is the consequent. This feature is called the extensionality of  $L_c$ . I turn to the syntactical description of  $L$ . With the qualification entailed by 1 it contains  $L_c$ .

1. Only closed expressions are sentences of  $L$ . (This is merely a technical detail, necessary to avoid undesirable consequences of the quantification rules for expressions containing ' $M$ '.)

2.  $L$  contains sentential variables. (Since  $L$  contains no primitive sentential constants, this modification has, upon my conception of ontology,<sup>20</sup> no untoward ontological consequences.)

3.  $L$  contains two additional primitive signs, the relational pseudo-predicate ' $M$ ' and the quoting operator, with the following formation rules:

a. Every sentence of  $L$  surrounded by quotes becomes a nonrelational first-order predicate (type  $f$ ) with all the syntactical properties of a primitive descriptive predicate.

b. Every sentence of the form ' $fMp$ ' is well formed. Call these sentences the simple clauses of ' $M$ '.

These are the formation rules of  $L$ . Now for the definition of analyticity.

4a. Every sentence analytic according to  $L_c$  is analytic.

4b. Every simple clause of ' $M$ ' is either analytic or it is contradictory, i.e., its negation is analytic. It is analytic if and only if the predicate to the left of ' $M$ ' is formed by the quoting operator from the sentence to the right of ' $M$ '.

The part of  $L$  that contains ' $M$ ' is not extensional. To see that, let ' $A$ ' be a constant of the same type as ' $X$ ' and assume that ' $(X)[F_1(X) \equiv F_2(X)]$ ' is true. If  $L$  were extensional, then ' $F_1(A)'MF_1(A)$ '  $\equiv$  ' $F_1(A)'MF_2(A)$ ' would have to be true. In fact, this sentence is not only false, it is contradictory; for by 4b its left side is analytic and its right side is contradictory.

I call ' $M$ ' and the quoting operator, together with the two primitive logical signs of  $L_c$ , the four primitive logical signs of  $L$ . But then, one may ask, are the two new signs "really" logical? I can of course call them so. Yet, obviously, I do not wish to argue merely about words. The only real argument consists in stating clearly the similarities and the differences between the old and the new "logical" signs. I shall present this argument or, as I had better say, these reflections in three steps. *First*. Each of the four signs, both old and new, is individually

<sup>20</sup> See also MLP4, MLP13, and "Particularity and the New Nominalism."

specified. Each of the four signs, both old and new, belongs to a syntactical category of its own. Each of the four signs, both old and new, is the only primitive member of the syntactical category to which it belongs. These similarities are impressive. Nor is that all. *Second*. Consider the role the four signs play in the definition of analyticity. If in view of the three similarities just mentioned one accepts the two new signs as logical, then one can in view of 4a and 4b again say that whether a sentence of  $L$  is analytic depends only on its "form." This similarity, too, is impressive. But there is also a difference with respect to analyticity which I do not at all intend to minimize. For philosophy, as I understand it, is not advocacy, least of all advocacy of uses of words, but accurate description. The difference is that 4b is not a combinatorial criterion in the sense in which 4a is one. On the other hand, though, the "new" analytic sentences, i.e., those which are analytic by 4b, have a unique feature which in its own way is just as sweeping as any combinatorial one. They are all simple clauses of ' $M$ ' and each of these clauses is either analytic or contradictory. *Third*. Sentences which are analytic in the "old" sense of  $L_c$  (or 4a) are also called "formal" or "linguistic" truths. These are of course philosophical and therefore problematic uses of 'formal' and 'linguistic'. Analyticity in the old sense is their explication. Now we know that such sentences as "The sentence (proposition) this is green means that this is green" are sometimes also called "linguistic" truths and that this use of 'linguistic' is equally problematic.  $L$  transcribes these sentences into those that are analytic by 4b. Our "new" notion of analyticity thus clarifies two of the problematic uses of 'formal' and 'linguistic'; it exhibits accurately both the similarities and the differences between them; and it does not tear asunder what in the structural history of philosophical thought belongs together.

I have not, I shall not, and I could not in this essay show that  $L$  is the ideal language. What I have shown is merely this. If  $(\alpha)L_c$  is an adequately clarified language which one can in principle speak about everything except minds, and if  $(\beta)L$  provides in principle adequate transcriptions for what we say, commonsensically and not behavioristically, about minds, then  $L$  is the ideal language. Furthermore, I have shown  $(\beta)$  by showing, at the beginning of this section, that  $L$  contains adequate transcriptions of such sentences as 'direct awareness of this being green'. With this I have accomplished the main task I set myself in this essay. Again, if this is so, then the differences between  $L$  and  $L_c$  must provide us with the accurate description, or, in the classical phrase, with the logical picture of the nature of minds and their place in the world. Let us see. In the world of  $L_c$  there are tones, shapes,



colors, and so on. That is, there are particulars such that *in fact* they and they alone exemplify certain simple characters, say, in the case of tones, the pitches. In the world of *L* there are in addition also awarenesses. That is, there are particulars such that *in fact* they and they alone exemplify certain additional simple characters, those I called propositions and, probably, also some among those I called modes of awareness. These, to be sure, are important differences; yet they are not as radical as the one I saved quite deliberately for the end of the list. This difference is that *L* requires two new logical primitives. For what novelty, I ask, could possibly be more radical than one which cannot be spoken about without new syntactical categories. Notice, finally, that the two new primitives determine *in a minimal fashion* that part of *L* which is, in a technical sense I explained, nonextensional. So far I have avoided the use of 'intentional' for 'nonextensional'. Now we might as well remember that philosophers, speaking philosophically, have insisted that "intentionality" is the differentiating characteristic of minds. Since they spoke philosophically, one cannot be completely certain what they meant. Yet, I am confident that my analysis is the explication of what they reasonably could have meant.

It will pay to reflect briefly on why I used the phrase 'in fact' at the two italicized places above. Interpret '*bl*' and '*a*' as 'blue' and as the name of a particular which is a tone. Let '*p<sub>1</sub>*' stand for the name of a propositional character. Both '*bl(a)*' and '*p<sub>1</sub>(a<sub>1</sub>)*' are well-formed sentences; all one can say is that they are *in fact* false. To say anything else, such as, for instance, that they are ill-formed or, even, that they are contradictory, amounts to accepting some form of the synthetic *a priori* and, probably, also some form of substantialism. I, for one, accept neither.<sup>21</sup>

In the third section I told one half of the story of truth. I am now ready to tell the other half. Then I shall be done.

In an unforgettable metaphor G. E. Moore once called awareness diaphanous or transparent. What he wanted to call attention to was that, because we are so prone to attend to their contents, the awarenesses themselves easily elude us. Intentional meaning is, as we now understand, closely connected with awareness. Not surprisingly, then, it is similarly elusive. That is why, when I first mentioned it, I proceeded negatively, as it were. Remember what I did. I selected a sentence to serve as illustration: "The sentence (proposition) this is green means that this is green." Then I insisted that we sometimes so use such sentences that we do not speak about either the contexts or the referents of linguistic events, in the only clear sense of 'linguistic

<sup>21</sup> See MLP3, MLP8, MLP11.

event'; but, rather, about something "linguistic" in a sense of 'linguistic' which is problematic and therefore in need of explication. The explication, as we now know, is this. (a) The sentence is transcribed by '*gr(a)*'*Mgr(a)*', which is analytic. (b) '*gr(a)*' refers to or names a proposition, i.e., a character of awarenesses. (c) '*gr(a)*' refers to a state of affairs. (d) '*M*', being a logical sign, does not refer to or name anything in the sense in which descriptive expressions refer to something. (a) and (d) are the source of the problematic use of 'linguistic'. (b) and (c) show that intentional meaning is a logical pseudorelation between a propositional character and a state of affairs; they also show accurately in which respects it makes no sense whatsoever to say that intentional meaning is "linguistic."

When I spoke in the third section about truth, I spoke about language as event—with some reservation, or, as I put it, merely in order to fix the ideas. The reason for the reservation was that 'true', like 'means', has an intentional meaning. Or, to say what corresponds exactly to what I said before and just repeated in the case of 'means', sometimes, when we say "The sentence (proposition) this is green is true if and only if this is green," we speak neither about the contexts nor about the referents of linguistic events but, rather, "linguistically" in a problematic sense of 'linguistic'. I shall now explicate this sense by first proposing a definition of 'true' in *L* and then commenting on it.

A defined sign or expression is logical if and only if all the primitive signs in its definition are logical. Defined logical signs, like primitive ones, do not refer to anything in the sense in which descriptive ones do. 'True', as I explicate it, is a defined logical predicate of the second type with a nonrelational argument. Thus 'true', or, as I shall write, '*Tr*', like '*M*', does not refer to anything in the sense in which '*a*', '*gr*', '*gr(a)*', and '*gr(a)*' all do. The idea is, as one might expect, to define '*Tr*' in terms of '*M*' and of other logical signs, i.e., variables, quantifiers, and connectives. The actual definition is

(D) 
$$'Tr(f)' \text{ for } '(\exists p)[fMp \cdot p]'$$

Notice that although '*Tr*' can be truly predicated only of the names of characters which are propositions, its definition is nevertheless in terms of the variable of the appropriate type. '*Tr(gr)*', for instance, though it is false, is therefore well formed. To proceed otherwise amounts to accepting some version of the synthetic *a priori*. This is the same point I made before. Now for four comments to establish that (D) is in fact an adequate transcription of the intentional meaning of 'true'.

I. Remember the sentence I called (A): A sentence is true if and

only if what it refers to (means) is the case. Since we are now dealing with intentions, I had better amend it to (A'): *A proposition is true if and only if what it means is the case.* Consider next that in view of (D)

$$(D') \quad Tr(f) = (\exists p)[fMp \cdot p]$$

is analytic; for our notion of analyticity is of course so arranged that every sentence that stands to a definition in the relation in which (D') stands to (D) is analytic. (This is just one of the many details I skipped.) Now read (D') in words: Something is true if and only if there is a state of affairs such that it means this state of affairs and this state of affairs is the case. The only verbal discrepancies between this sentence and (A') are due to the greater precision which the formalism forces upon us. We must say 'something' instead of 'proposition'; and we must make the existential quantification explicit. (D'), being analytic, is thus an adequate transcription of (A'). A little reflection shows that 'Tr' is and is not "linguistic" in exactly the same senses in which 'M' is. I don't think I need to repeat the distinctions I just made under (a), (b), (c), and (d).

II. Ordinarily we think of true and false as contradictories. I define 'Fs', to be interpreted as 'false', by

$$'Fs(f)' \text{ for } '(\exists p)[fMp \cdot \sim p]'$$

It follows that 'Fs' and 'Tr' are not contradictories, or, what amounts to the same thing, that '(f)[Tr(f)  $\vee$  Fs(f)]' cannot be shown to be analytic. On first thought this may make our transcription look less than adequate. Closer examination reveals that we have come across one of its strengths. We do not really want to say that "everything" is either true or false. What we want to say is, rather, that "every sentence" is either true or false. Technically, this means that 'Tr('p<sub>1</sub>')  $\vee$  Fs('p<sub>1</sub>')' ought to be analytic for every proposition. And that this is so is easily shown. For those who care for this sort of detail I write down the steps of the demonstration: 'p<sub>1</sub>'Mp<sub>1</sub>; 'p<sub>1</sub>'Mp<sub>1</sub> · (p<sub>1</sub>  $\vee$   $\sim$ p<sub>1</sub>); ( $\exists p$ )['p<sub>1</sub>'Mp · (p  $\vee$   $\sim$ p)]; ( $\exists p$ )['p<sub>1</sub>'Mp · p]  $\vee$  [( $\exists p$ )'p<sub>1</sub>'Mp ·  $\sim$ p].

III. We are in a position to dispose of a question over which recently more ink has been spilled than it deserves. Do 'p<sub>1</sub>' and 'Tr('p<sub>1</sub>')' have the same meaning? To ask this question is, as we know, to ask four. With respect to *context*, we do not care and we need not bother. Take the two sentences 'Peter died' and 'It is true that Peter died'; and assume that a person hears once the one and once the other. Whether what he does is the same and whether his mental states are the same on the two occasions is a question for psychologists and psychologists only. As a matter of common sense, though, the answer will vary, depending on many circumstances, from sentence to sentence, from person to

person, and, for the same person, from occasion to occasion. The attempt to answer this question by constructing schemata and trying to discern in them something that corresponds to this meaning of having-the-same-meaning is thus patently absurd. Unhappily, Carnap and some of his students have recently spent a good deal of time and effort on this goose chase. With respect to *reference* the answer is obvious. The two sentences do not refer to the same thing. The same holds for *intentional* meaning. To see that, one merely has to consider that while 'p<sub>1</sub>'Mp<sub>1</sub>' and 'Tr('p<sub>1</sub>')'MTr('p<sub>1</sub>')' are analytic, 'p<sub>1</sub>'MTr('p<sub>1</sub>')' and 'Tr('p<sub>1</sub>')'Mp<sub>1</sub>' are contradictory. There remains *logical* meaning, or, what amounts to the same thing, there remains the question whether 'p<sub>1</sub> = Tr('p<sub>1</sub>')' is analytic for every proposition. This, I believe, is the question which most of those who recently dealt with the issue wanted to discuss. The answer is affirmative. Upon our broader conception of analyticity the sentence is analytic. Some will probably consider that another strength of our transcription. For those who care for this sort of thing I again write down the steps of the demonstration. For the proof that 'p<sub>1</sub>  $\supset$  Tr('p<sub>1</sub>')' is analytic they are: p<sub>1</sub>; 'p<sub>1</sub>'Mp<sub>1</sub> · p<sub>1</sub>; ( $\exists p$ )['p<sub>1</sub>'Mp · p]; p<sub>1</sub>  $\supset$  ( $\exists p$ )['p<sub>1</sub>'Mp · p]. To prove that 'Tr('p<sub>1</sub>')  $\supset$  p<sub>1</sub>' is analytic, the definition of analyticity in *L* must be technically implemented with what is intuitively obvious. I add then to 4a and 4b a third clause 4c: If ' $\Phi(p)$ ' is an expression such that when a sentence of *L* is substituted for the variable the sentence it becomes is analytic for every sentence of *L*, then ' $\langle p \rangle \Phi(p)$ ' is analytic. Now the proof proceeds as follows. 'p<sub>1</sub>'Mp<sub>1</sub> · p<sub>1</sub>  $\supset$  p<sub>1</sub>' is obviously analytic. For every other p<sub>i</sub>, 'p<sub>i</sub>'Mp<sub>i</sub> · p<sub>i</sub>  $\supset$  p<sub>i</sub>' is analytic because the first factor in the antecedent is contradictory. Hence, by 4c, ' $\langle p \rangle$ ['p<sub>1</sub>'Mp · p]  $\supset$  p<sub>1</sub>' is analytic. This sentence is equivalent to the one to be proved.

IV. Everybody is familiar with the Liar paradox, that is, with the difficulties one can produce by supposing that a sentence "says about itself" that it is false. When the mathematicians proved what I explained in the third section, they drew part of their inspiration from this conundrum. Assume 'pr' to be an arithmetical-predicate-expression that can be interpreted as 'false'. We know this assumption to be absurd; but that is not the point now. If there is such a predicate expression then one can by using Goedel's ideas show that there is an integer, *n*, such that if '*N*' is the number-sign interpreted as *n*, the number coördinated to 'pr(*N*)' is *n*. Speaking as inaccurately as the mathematicians do, one could then say that 'pr(*N*)' says about itself that it is false. That is why, by a pattern taken from the Liar paradox, the mathematicians drew their conclusions from this sentence. Under the circumstances it is worth noticing that *L* could not possibly contain a



sentence which literally "says about itself" that it is false, or, for that matter, anything else. Assume that *S* is such a sentence and that, written down, it is a sequence of, say, 17 primitive signs. Its name is then a sequence of 18 primitive signs, the 17 original ones and the quoting operator. Since this name is a predicate and not itself a sentence, any sentence containing it is a sequence of at least 19 primitive signs. *S*, which is a sequence of only 17 primitive signs, cannot be such a sentence and can therefore not literally say anything about itself. It follows that no sentence of a clarified language can literally say anything about itself.<sup>22</sup> The belief that there are such sentences is one of the illusions created by the logical deficiencies of our natural language.

<sup>22</sup> As I recently discovered, this idea can be read into prop. 3.333 of the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein made an essential mistake, though. He omitted the quotes.

## *The Revolt Against Logical Atomism\**

Explaining metaphysics to the nation—  
I wish he would explain his explanation.  
Byron, *Don Juan*.

PHILOSOPHICAL movements rise and fall, not excluding those that set out to end all movements or even philosophy itself. Having run its course, a movement is either found wanting or judged to have made a contribution. In either case, it is vigorous while the clever young men gather around its banner. And, of course, there are always many clever young men eager to enlist. Oxford is now the center of a vigorous movement. Surely it is not the whole of contemporary British philosophy. Yet hardly anyone now philosophizing in Britain or, for that matter, in this country, is unaware of it.

Urmson's<sup>1</sup> recent book hails from Oxford. For at least two reasons it makes an excellent text for a critical study. One reason is that it is very good of its kind. The other is its major theme. Urmson tries to show, successfully I think, that the two main slogans of Oxford are reactions against certain ideas of the classical analysts. The word 'slogan' is his. The phrase 'the classical analysts' is mine. I shall use it to refer to the members of the movement or movements over which Russell and Wittgenstein<sup>2</sup> presided, with G. E. Moore as the most important figure in the near background.

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<sup>1</sup> *Philosophical Analysis: Its Development Between the Two World Wars* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956).

<sup>2</sup> I.e., throughout this essay, the author of the *Tractatus*, not of the *Investigations*. In another long essay, I traced the tragedy of the second book to a fundamental shortcoming of the first. See "Intentionality," *Semantica* (Archivio di Filosofia, Roma: Bocca, 1955), pp. 177-216, and also pp. 3-83 of this book.