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of the organism and its relation to the environment, I have no objection to this relative use of the word; but I should prefer "adaptation." Darwin assumed only variation and natural selection, resulting in adaptation. The "results" are the same as if they had been "intended." I do not see what new knowledge is added by calling the result "teleological."

9. *Conclusion.*—There are many other points to be discussed; but I have taken too many words to discuss even these few. I wish, however, to say with Dr. Russell how highly the scientific and philosophical worlds appreciate Dr. Haldane's fine physiological researches. In what I have said, I have spoken only as a "consumer" of scientific ideas, anxious to get something clear in my own mind for my personal use. I am not adequately equipped to offer a real scientific criticism of Dr. Haldane's work and that is why I have kept to general terms. But I should like to know from him whether, in his own imagination, he does not contemplate some actual physical "mechanism," even for the extraordinarily delicate business of "physiological regulation."

Psychology and physiology, so far as the human being is concerned, seem to me converging sciences. They are the study of two primary phases of a single organism, which we may designate a psycho-physical unity. I am sorry that Dr. Haldane sets aside physiological psychology; for under that or another name, the organism must continue to be investigated from the two standpoints. To call the whole science "psychology" and to expound all the phenomena as "mental" does not in the least alter the facts to be studied in the ordinary scientific world, namely, sensations of vision, of hearing, of touch, of movement, of organic processes, instincts, emotions and all the other mental phenomena shown through physical organs.

## V.—ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICULAR THINGS UNIVERSAL OR PARTICULAR?

By G. E. MOORE, G. F. STOUT and G. DAWES HICKS.

I.—By G. E. MOORE.

I UNDERSTAND that the object of this Symposium is to discuss a view advocated by Prof. Stout in his Hertz Lecture to the British Academy on "The Nature of Universals and Propositions." (*Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. X, 1921-22.) He there advocates some view, which he seems to think can be properly expressed by the words: "Every character which characterizes either a concrete thing or a concrete individual is particular and not universal." And I understand that what we are wanted to do is to discuss the view which *he* expresses by those words. We are not to give to the words the sense or senses which *we* may think they ought to bear, and then to discuss whether the view or views they would *then* express is true or false. What we have to do is to try to discover what Prof. Stout means by them, and then merely to discuss whether the view which *he* uses them to express is true or false, even though we may think that the view in question is one which cannot be properly expressed by them at all.

Now I confess that I think it extremely difficult to be sure what Prof. Stout does mean by those words. All that I can do, therefore, is to try to state as clearly as possible the only views which, so far as I can see, he might mean by them, and to discuss whether those are true or false. It is, of course, possible that I may have overlooked just the view which is what he really does

mean; but, if so, I hope that what I shall say will at least have the use of making it easier for him to point out to us what he does mean.

There are two main points as to which I feel doubt. The first is as to what precisely he means by the expression "*is particular*" (or "*is a particular*"; for he sometimes uses this latter expression also, as equivalent to the former, *e.g.*, p. 8) in the sentence, "Every character which characterizes a concrete thing *is particular*." And the second is as to how, precisely, he uses the term "character."

As regards the first point, I feel no doubt whatever that *part, at least*, of what he means by "is particular" is "characterizes one thing only." Part, at least, of what he means to assert with regard to every entity of which it can be truly said that it is "a character of a concrete thing," in the sense (whatever it may be) in which he is using the term "character," is, quite clearly, that every such entity *characterizes one thing only*; or (what is equivalent to this) that no such entity characterizes more than one thing—no such entity is a "common character" of two or more things. This notion, of characterizing one thing only, seems to me to be a perfectly clear conception; and hence, if only we can discover what Prof. Stout means by "characters," we shall have one perfectly clear proposition, which is certainly part at least of what he means to assert, and which we can discuss. My only doubt is as to whether "characterizes one thing only" can be *all* that he means by "is particular" or "is a particular." But here I have to confess that, if Prof. Stout does mean anything else, I have not been able to form the faintest notion of what else he does mean. I shall, therefore, have to content myself with discussing, with regard to certain classes of entities, whether it is or is not true of them that every such entity *characterizes one thing only*, although I recognize that this is probably only a part of what Prof. Stout means to assert.

It seems to me, I may explain, a wholly indefensible misuse of language, to use the expressions "is particular" or "is a particular" in such a way that the proposition "P is particular" or "P is a particular" implies "P characterizes one thing only." None of the various senses in which "is particular" can be properly used seems to me to carry with them this implication. But I think there is no doubt that Prof. Stout is using them in some sense which does carry this implication; and, as I have said, I understand that we are to discuss only views which he does mean, and not views which we may think his words ought to mean.

But there is one meaning which might be attached to the expressions "is particular" or "is a particular," with regard to which I think it is very important to point out that Prof. Stout cannot, consistently with statements of his own, be using the expressions with *that* meaning. In the formulation of our question the phrase "particular things" is apparently used as a synonym for the phrase "concrete things," which Prof. Stout uses on pp. 4 and 5; and Prof. Stout himself so uses it at the top of p. 5. And I think that undoubtedly one correct usage of "is particular" or "is a particular" is as a synonym for "is a particular thing" or "is a concrete thing." If Prof. Stout were using the expressions in this sense, his statement "Every character of a concrete thing is particular" would, of course, mean the same as "Every character of a concrete thing is itself a concrete thing." And it might perhaps be thought that this is what he does mean. But he certainly cannot *consistently* mean this; since on p. 7 he declares that a sneeze certainly is "particular," while he implies that nevertheless it is *not* a "substance"—the expression "is a substance" being one which he uses throughout from p. 7 onwards as equivalent to "is a concrete thing or individual." He implies, therefore, that a sneeze, while it is "particular," in the sense (whatever that may be) in which he

maintains that all "characters" of concrete things are "particular," is *not* itself a "concrete thing." And in the same passage he employs a useful mark for distinguishing "characters" from "concrete things" or "concrete individuals." Nothing, he implies, can be a "character," *unless* it is *predicable of something else*; and nothing can be a "concrete thing" or "concrete individual" or "substance" *if* it is *predicable of something else*; from which it would again follow that, according to him, *no* character can be "particular" in the sense of being a concrete thing. It seems to me that the notion of being *predicable of something else* is a clear one, and that it is undoubtedly in accordance with usage to confine the term "character" to what is predicable of something else, and the terms "concrete thing," "concrete individual" and "substance" to what is *not*. I should myself be inclined to use the term "is a character" as *equivalent* to "is predicable of something else"; so that not only would every "character" be predicable of something else, but everything that is predicable of anything else would be a "character": I fully recognize, however, that it is legitimate to use the term "character" in a more restricted sense, so that some only of the entities which are predicable of something else would be "characters." But that nothing can be properly called a "character," *unless* it is predicable of something else, I do agree with Prof. Stout; and that is why, by the way, I wholly dissent from his proposition that a sneeze is a "character." I may say of a given individual A: "It was A that sneezed that sneeze"; and here the words "sneezed that sneeze" may, I think, express a "character," since they may express something which is predicable of A. But that the sneeze itself is predicable of anything whatever, I wholly deny. What we mean by "sneezed that sneeze" is *not* the same as what we mean by "that sneeze." The sneeze itself is, I should say, quite clearly an *event*; and every event is quite as incapable of being predicated of anything

else, as is a concrete thing or concrete individual or substance. All events, including sneezes and flashes of lightning, are, I should agree with Mr. Johnson, what he calls "substantives proper"—a category which excludes their being "characters," for the very reason that no "substantive proper" is predicable of anything else. But though all events are "substantives proper," it appears to me, as I gather it does to Mr. Johnson, a mere misuse of language to call events, as Dr. McTaggart does, "substances." When he asserted on p. 7, that Mr. Johnson says that a flash of lightning is a substance, Prof. Stout must, I suppose, have been assuming that Mr. Johnson would use the term "substance" as a synonym for "substantive proper"; whereas, while Mr. Johnson does hold that a flash of lightning is *not* a "character," he also holds that it is not a "substance," since he recognizes a category of entities which he calls "occurrences," which, though they share with "substances" the characteristic that they are not predicable of anything, and are therefore not "characters," differ from "substances" in other respects.

To return from this digression. The only meaning which I can see Prof. Stout to be attaching to the expressions "is particular" or "is a particular" is the meaning "characterizes one thing only," and hence the only possible meanings of his sentence "Every character of a concrete thing or a concrete individual is particular," which I can discuss, will be meanings obtained by understanding "is particular" in this sense.

But there remains the question: In what sense is he using the term "character"?

The sentence "Every character of a concrete thing characterizes one thing only," would, I think, be naturally understood in a sense from which it would follow that, if A and B are two different concrete things, then it cannot be true, *e.g.*, both that A is round, and that B is round; both that A is red, and that B is red, &c. This is what would be naturally implied by saying

that two concrete things never have a common character. But these propositions are obviously monstrously false, and I think it is quite plain that Prof. Stout does not mean to assert that they are true. He is obviously willing to allow that, where "A" and "B" are names of two different concrete things, the expressions "A is round" and "B is round," may, nevertheless, each of them express a true proposition. But what, then, does he mean by saying that, if A and B are two different concrete things, every character which belongs to A belongs to A only, and every character which belongs to B to B only?

So far as I can see, there are only two possible alternatives as to his meaning. (1) He might possibly be meaning to say that, if, where "A" and "B" are names of two different concrete things, the expressions "A is round" and "B is round" both express true propositions, the sense in which "is round" is used in the one must be *different* from that in which it is used in the other. Or (2) he may be using the term "character" in a quite indefensibly restricted sense; so that, while admitting that what is predicated of A in a true proposition expressed by "A is round" may be exactly the same as what is predicated of B in a true proposition expressed by "B is round," he would maintain that what is, in such cases, predicated of both, cannot properly be called a "character."

As regards (1) I think it is just possible that Prof. Stout does mean to say this, because, in a former publication of his on the same subject (*Aristotelian Proceedings*, 1914-15, p. 348), he has said something which seems to imply it. "When I assert," he there says, "that the sense-datum is red, I mean just that particular red with which I am immediately acquainted." This ought to mean, I take it, that if I have two different sense-data, one of which, A, presents to me one particular shade of red,  $R_1$ , while the other, B, presents to me a different particular shade,  $R_2$ , then what I should mean by the expression "is red," if I said of

A "A is red," would be "A is characterized by  $R_1$ ," while what I should mean by "is red," if I said of B "B is red," would be "B is characterized by  $R_2$ ," and that, therefore, I should be using "is red," in the two cases, in different senses. But, if Prof. Stout does mean this, then I think what he means is obviously false. If I merely tell somebody that one of my sense-data is red, I am obviously *not* telling him what particular shade of red it is of. That is to say, I am *not* using "is red" as a name for the particular shade which it, in fact, presents to me. Suppose the shade in question is  $R_1$ . I am *not*, as Prof. Stout seems to imply, using "is red" as a name for  $R_1$ . And what I am using it as a name for, is, I think, pretty obvious. I perceive with regard to  $R_1$ , that it has a certain character, P, which belongs also to the shade  $R_2$  and to an immense number of other particular shades, and what I mean by "is red," is simply "has *some* character of the kind P." And what I am telling anybody, if I tell him, with regard to another sense-datum, B, which presents to me the shade  $R_2$ , that it also is red, is *precisely the same thing*, namely, that B also "has *some* character of the kind P." It is true that how I know, in the case supposed, that the sense-datum A has *some* character of the kind P, and that the sense-datum B also has *some* character of the kind P, is because I know in the case of A that it has  $R_1$ , and that  $R_1$  has the character P, and in the case of B that it has  $R_2$ , and that  $R_2$  has the character P. But is it not obvious that this extra knowledge, which I, in fact, have with regard to A and B, namely, that A has the shade  $R_1$ , and B the shade  $R_2$ , forms no part of what I *express* by "A is red" or by "B is red"? The opposite view that what I express by "is red" in the one case is "has  $R_1$ ," and in the other "has  $R_2$ ," and is therefore something different in the two cases, can, I think, be refuted by a *reductio ad absurdum* as follows. Suppose  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  are not only shades of red, but also shades of scarlet. I can then truly use the words "A and B are both scarlet" as

well as the words "A and B are both red." But if what I meant by "A is red and B is red" were "A has  $R_1$  and B has  $R_2$ ," then obviously what I shall mean by "A is scarlet and B is scarlet" would also be "A has  $R_1$  and B has  $R_2$ ." That is to say, the view that what I mean by "A is red" is something different from what I mean by "B is red," namely, in the one case "A has  $R_1$ " and in the other "A has  $R_2$ ," involves the absurd consequence that what I mean by "A is scarlet" is the *same* as what I mean by "A is red." Quite obviously this consequence is absurd, and therefore the view which entails it is false.

I doubt whether Prof. Stout would really disagree with what I have just been saying. On the contrary, my contention that what we do mean by "is red" is just "has *some* character of the kind P" is, I think, *part* (not the whole) of what he himself, on p. 14, is asserting to be true and taking Mr. Johnson to deny, when he says that "colour" and "redness" are "general kinds of quality" and are *not* "both singular, each standing for a single positive quality." *Part* of what he means by this is, I think, just that what "A is red" stands for is merely something of the form "A has *some* character of the kind P," and what "A is coloured" stands for is merely something of the form "A has *some* character of the kind Q"; though this is not the whole, since he conjoins with this contention a further view, which I think certainly false, as to the analysis of propositions of the form "A has *some* character of the kind P." What I want to insist on is that the view that "A is red" is to be analysed in this way, so far from supporting, is definitely incompatible with the view that, when I truly say, of two different concrete things, A and B, both "A is red" and "B is red," what I express by "is red" in the one sentence must be different from what I express by "is red" in the other. On the contrary, the character for which I use "is red" as a name is, in each case, precisely the same, namely, "has *some* character of the kind P."

It follows that the first of the two alternatives as to Prof. Stout's meaning, which seemed to me to be the only possible ones, is such that, if he does mean what it would suppose him to mean, then what he means is certainly false. It is false that what we express by "is red" is something which cannot characterize more than one concrete thing. And since what we express by "is red" certainly is a character, in any legitimate sense of the term "character," Prof. Stout's sentence, "Every character of a concrete thing characterizes only one thing," can only be true if he is using "character" in some quite improperly restricted sense.

That he is doing this—that just as he means by "is particular" something which nobody ought to mean by "is particular," so he means by "Every character" something which nobody ought to mean by "Every character"—was the second alternative as to his meaning which I distinguished above. And we can now see, I think, what the unduly restricted sense in which he is using the term "character" is. He is using it in such a sense that no *generic* character such as those which are expressed by "is red," "is round," "is coloured," &c., is, in his terminology, a character at all. Of such generic characters it is perfectly obvious that they may characterize two or more concrete things; and we saw that Prof. Stout does not seem really to wish to deny this. It remains that when he says "Every character," what he really means must be "Every *absolutely specific* character"; where by "absolutely specific" we mean the same as "not generic." In other words, he is talking, quite unjustifiably, as if absolutely specific characters could alone be properly called "characters." And the proposition he really wants to maintain is this: "Every absolutely specific character, which characterizes a concrete thing or individual, characterizes one thing only."

This, so far as I can see, is the only proposition which Prof. Stout's arguments, if sound, could have any tendency to show.

And I will try first, briefly, to explain my own attitude towards it, and then to deal with his arguments.

That it is certainly false I see no way of proving. But the contention that it is *true* can, I think, obviously only be justified by the contention that it *must* be true; since it is obviously impossible to justify it by comparing every concrete thing in turn with every other concrete thing, and seeing that every absolutely specific character which belongs to each does in fact belong to no other. Prof. Stout, therefore, must be holding that we can see, *a priori*, that an absolutely specific character, which characterizes a concrete thing, *must* characterize one thing only, or *cannot* be a common character. And *this* proposition, I think, I can see to be certainly false. In the case of two sense-data, A and B, both of which appear to me to be red, I often cannot tell that the most specific shade of red which A presents to me is not exactly the same as the most specific shade which B presents to me. I also cannot tell that the most specific shade which A presents to me is not an absolutely specific shade. And I think I *can* see quite clearly that it is *logically possible* both that it is an absolutely specific shade, and that it does in fact characterize both A and B. While I allow, therefore, that it *may, as a matter of fact*, be true that the same absolutely specific shade never does in such cases characterize both A and B, I contend that Prof Stout cannot possibly have any good reason for saying that it is so; and that, if he holds that it *must* be so, he is certainly wrong.

Let us now turn to Prof. Stout's arguments in favour of his proposition, which are given on pp. 7-9. With the first argument on p. 7, since it only professes to prove that *some* absolutely specific characters of concrete things "are particular," we need not trouble ourselves. I have already explained that I think it fails to prove even this, because what Prof. Stout there takes to be "characters," namely, such entities as "a sneeze, the flight of a bird, the explosion of a mine," are, in my view, clearly not

"characters" at all, but events or occurrences. But even if Prof. Stout had proved that *some* absolutely specific characters of concrete things characterize one thing only, this would clearly by itself have no tendency to prove that the same is true of *all*.

The arguments which concern us, therefore, are only those beginning at the bottom of p. 7, where Prof. Stout expressly sets out to prove that "*all* qualities and relations" "are particulars." And, so far as I can make out, he has only two such arguments.

The first is that developed on p. 8; and, so far as I can make out, the point of it is this. Prof. Stout urges that, in the case of any two perceived concrete things, which I "know or suppose" to be "locally separate," I must also "know or suppose" that the specific colour or shape, which the one presents to me, is also "locally separate" from that which the other presents to me. And I suppose he infers that if the specific colour of A is "known or supposed" to be "locally separate" from the specific colour of B, it cannot be identical with the specific colour of B.

But this inference seems to me to be a mere mistake. I admit the premise that if A is locally separate from B, and if A really has the colour which it presents to me, and B really has the colour which it presents to me, then the colour which A presents to me really is "locally separate" from that which B presents to me. But I deny that, even if this is so, it follows that the colour of A is not identical with the colour of B. Prof. Stout's whole point seems to me to rest on supposing that there is no distinction between the sense in which two *concrete things* can be said to be "locally separate," and that in which two *characters* can be said to be so. Of local separation or mutual externality, in the sense in which we use this term of concrete things, it does seem to me to be self-evident (though this is sometimes disputed) that it is a relation which nothing can have to itself. In other words, I admit, as Prof. Stout seems to assume, that it is impossible

for one and the same concrete thing to be in two different places at the same time. But when we speak of two qualities as "locally separate" we seem to me to be using the phrase in an entirely different sense. All that we mean, or can mean, by it, is, I think, that the first belongs to a concrete thing which is locally separate (in our first sense) from a concrete thing to which the second belongs. And with *this* sense of "locally separate," it seems to me perfectly obvious that a quality can be "locally separate" from itself: one and the same quality *can* be in two different places at the same time. Indeed, to deny that it can be is simply to beg the original question at issue. For if to say "the specific colour of A is locally separate from the specific colour of B" merely *means* that the specific colour of A belongs to a concrete thing which is locally separate from a concrete thing to which the specific colour of B belongs, it follows that the specific colour of A *can* be "locally separate" from itself, provided only it is true that the specific colour of A *can* belong to each of two concrete things.

This answer, if sound, is, so far as I can see, an absolutely complete answer to Prof. Stout's first argument, and makes it unnecessary for me to examine the argument on p. 8 by which he tries to show that the "same indivisible quality cannot appear separately in different times and places," unless it really *is* locally or temporally separate. For I maintain that the same indivisible quality can really *be* locally or temporally separate; maintaining that all this means is that it can really belong to both of two concrete things or events which are, in the fundamental sense appropriate to concrete things or events, locally or temporally separate. Prof. Stout must be assuming that absolutely specific characters can really be "locally separate" in the *same* sense in which "concrete things" are so, and "temporally separate" in the *same* sense in which events are so; and that, as a matter of fact, in a case where A and B are two

"locally separate" coloured concrete things, the absolutely specific colour of A must always, in *that* sense, be "locally separate" from the absolutely specific colour of B. I admit that, if this were so, it would follow that the absolutely specific colour of A cannot be identical with that of B. But I deny that any two characters can ever be "locally separate" in the sense in which two concrete things can be, or "temporally separate" in the sense in which two events can be.

Prof. Stout's second argument is that which begins at the bottom of p. 8 and is continued on p. 9. And it is clear, with regard to this argument, that he starts with some premise (1) which he expresses by the words "A substance is nothing *apart from* its qualities"; that he infers from this premise some proposition (2) which he expresses by the words "to know a substance without knowing its qualities is to know nothing"; and that from (2), in its turn, he states that there follows a proposition (3) which he expresses by the words "we cannot distinguish substances from each other without discerning a corresponding distinction between their qualities." It is clear also, that it is only by the help of (3) that he professes, in *this* argument, to be able to reach the conclusion that every absolutely specific character of a concrete thing characterizes one thing only.

What, precisely, then, does (3) assert?

It is clear that, whatever Prof. Stout may mean by "*discerning* a corresponding distinction between their qualities," he means something which we cannot do, unless there *is* "a corresponding distinction between their qualities." He is, therefore, here asserting at least this: that we cannot ever distinguish two concrete things unless there *is* "a corresponding distinction between their qualities." But what exactly does he mean by this? I take it that what he must mean is at least this: that we can never distinguish two concrete things, A and B, unless A has at least one quality which is *not* possessed by B, and B at least one

quality which is *not* possessed by A. He may, of course, mean more than this : he may mean that *every* quality which is possessed by A must be a quality which is not possessed by B, and *vice versa*. But he must mean, *at least*, what I have said : that, if we can distinguish A and B, then A must have at least one quality, not possessed by B, and B at least one, not possessed by A.

But, then, returning to the question what he means by "*discerning* a corresponding distinction between their qualities," I think it is clear that he must at least mean this further thing by (3) : namely, that we cannot ever distinguish two concrete things, A and B, unless at least one quality, which we *perceive* to belong to A, is not possessed by B, and at least one, which we *perceive* to belong to B, is not possessed by A. For you certainly cannot be said to "*discern* a distinction" between two qualities, unless you perceive both of them. What I am in doubt about is whether he also means to assert or not this further thing : that we cannot distinguish between A and B, unless, with regard to at least one quality, which we *perceive* to belong to A, we *perceive* that it does not belong to B, and, with regard to at least one quality, which we *perceive* to belong to B, we *perceive* that it does not belong to A. I think very likely he does *not* mean to assert this. But it is on the question, whether he does or does not, that my attitude towards his proposition (3) depends. If he *does*, then I wish to maintain that his proposition (3) is false. If he does *not*, I only wish to maintain that it is a proposition which there is no reason whatever to believe.

First, then, I wish to maintain : That I certainly do, in some cases, distinguish between two concrete things, A and B, without *perceiving*, with regard to any *quality*, which I perceive to belong to A, that it does *not* belong to B, or *vice versa*. But I want to emphasize that it is only of *qualities*, strictly so-called, as opposed to relational properties, that I wish to maintain this. That I can ever distinguish between two concrete things, A and B,

without perceiving, with regard to some *relational property*, which I perceive to belong to A, that it does not belong to B, I do *not* wish to assert. But, I think, it is clear that Prof. Stout, if he is to prove his point, must maintain that his proposition (3) *is* true of *qualities*, strictly so-called, as opposed to relations : since his conclusion is that *every* absolutely specific character of a concrete thing, including, therefore, absolutely specific *qualities*, characterizes one thing only ; and plainly this conclusion cannot be proved by any premise which makes no assertion about *qualities*.

This being understood, I should propose to prove my proposition by reference to cases of the very kind to which Prof. Stout immediately goes on to refer. He insists (and I fully agree) that there are cases in which I can distinguish between two concrete things, A and B (as, for instance, when I distinguish between two different parts of a sheet of white paper), although I cannot perceive that A is *qualitatively unlike* B in any respect whatever—either in shape, or size, or colour. But to say that I cannot perceive A to be *qualitatively unlike* B in any respect whatever is, according to me, the same thing as to say that whatever quality I take, which A appears to me to possess, I cannot perceive that just that quality does not *also* belong to B, and that whatever quality I take, which B appears to me to possess, I cannot perceive that just that quality does not *also* belong to A. And if these two propositions *are* identical, then my proposition is proved. Does Prof. Stout mean to dispute that they are identical ? I cannot tell. But if he does, I think it is clear that his only ground for doing so, must be that he is assuming the truth of the peculiar doctrine as to the relation between a concrete thing and its qualities, which he goes on to expound on p. 11. If that peculiar doctrine of his were true, it would, I think, really follow that where, in a case like that we are considering, I perceive that A is other than B, what I am doing is to perceive

with regard to some quality or set of qualities P, and some *other* quality or set of qualities Q, that *the* "complex" to which P is related in a certain way is other than *the* "complex" to which Q is related in the same way. My perception that A is other than B would be *identical* with a perception, that *the* complex to which P has the relation in question is other than *the* complex to which Q has the same relation. I should, that is to say, be perceiving, *ex hypothesi*, that P had the relation in question to only one complex, and that Q had it also to only one complex, and that the one to which P had it was *other* than that to which Q had it; and, perceiving all this, I could hardly fail to perceive also that P had *not* got the relation in question to the complex to which Q had it, and *vice versa*; which would, *ex hypothesi*, be the same thing as perceiving that P did not belong to B, and that Q did not belong to A. If, therefore, this peculiar doctrine of Prof. Stout's were true, it would, I think, really follow that I could not perceive A to be other than B, without perceiving, with regard to some quality which I perceived to belong to A, that it did *not* belong to B, and *vice versa*. But one reason why I think that that peculiar doctrine of his cannot be true, is just that it has this consequence. It seems to me quite plain (1) that I can distinguish an A from a B, where I cannot perceive A to be in any respect *qualitatively unlike* B, and (2) that this means that I can do it, without perceiving with regard to any quality, which I perceive to belong to A, that it does *not* belong to B, or *vice versa*. And, since, if Prof. Stout's peculiar doctrine were true, it would follow that I couldn't, I infer that his doctrine is false.

If, on the other hand, all that Prof. Stout means to assert in his proposition (3) is that I cannot distinguish A from B, unless some quality which I perceive A to possess, does not in fact belong to B, and *vice versa*, then I have to confess I see no way of proving that he is wrong. All that I then maintain is that there is no reason whatever to suppose that he is right.

For, so far as I can see, the only reason for supposing so would be, if, in every such case as I have been considering, I could *perceive* that some quality, which I perceived to belong to A, did not belong to B. This, for the reasons I have given, I think I cannot do. It remains, therefore, a bare possibility that though I cannot *perceive* that any quality, which I perceive to belong to A, does not belong to B, there may nevertheless really *be* some quality, which I perceive to belong to A, and which does not belong to B.

It seems to me, finally, that Prof. Stout is in any case mistaken in supposing that his proposition (3) follows either from (1) or from (2). I am perfectly willing to admit both (1) that a concrete thing *must* have some qualities; which is all that I take Prof. Stout to mean by saying that it is nothing *apart from* its qualities, since he himself holds that it is certainly *other* than any one of its qualities or all of them put together. And also (2) that I never do, and even never *can*, perceive any concrete thing without its appearing to me to have some absolutely specific quality—that to say that I perceive it, is the same thing as to say that there is some such quality which it appears to me to have; and I even think it quite likely that I never can perceive any concrete thing, without *perceiving* it to have some absolutely specific quality. But none of these admissions seems to compel me to admit any probability whatever in favour of (3). So far as I can see, they have nothing whatever to do with (3), nor, therefore, with the question we were asked to discuss. It is true that, if we grant the premise that I cannot perceive any concrete thing without perceiving, with regard to some absolutely specific quality, that it has that quality, it will follow that I cannot *distinguish* two concrete things, A and B, both of which I perceive, without perceiving, with regard to *some* absolutely specific quality, that A has it, and with regard to *some* absolutely specific quality, that B has it. But how can the premise in question

possibly prove any more than this? How can it prove that it is not possible that when I distinguish A from B, every absolutely specific quality which I perceive to belong to A should *also* be one which I perceive to belong to B, and *vice versa*? Our premise only tells us that, in the case of every concrete thing which I perceive, there must be *some* absolutely specific quality which I perceive to belong to it, and cannot possibly, therefore, imply anything at all, as to whether, when I perceive *two*, it may or may not be the case that every absolutely specific quality which I perceive to belong to the one is also perceived by me to belong to the other.

My answer to our question is, then: That if (as we must do, if we are to deal with any question raised by Prof. Stout) we understand the expression "is particular" in some sense which logically implies "characterizes one thing only," then, quite certainly, *many* characters of concrete things are *not* particular; and that there is no reason to suppose that absolutely specific characters are any exception to the rule.

As for the question whether *any* characters of concrete things do characterize one thing only, that will depend upon what is meant by "characters"; and it seems to me possible that there may be some legitimate sense of the term "character," such that, in that sense, *none* do—that *all* characters of concrete things are common characters. If, however, the term "character" is used in the wide sense in which whatever is truly predicable of anything is a character of it, then, in this sense, it is quite certain that many characters of concrete things do belong, each of them, to one thing only. If we use "character" in this sense, then, it is quite certain both that many characters of concrete things *are* common characters, and also that many are *not*. And if (as Prof. Stout must be doing) we use the phrase "is a universal" in a sense which logically implies "is a common character," it follows, of course, that, with the same wide sense of "character,"

we shall have to say that many characters of concrete things are universals, and many are not. It is, however, I think, worth emphasizing that there is one well-established usage of the expression "is a universal," which is such that, in that sense, every character without exception—characters which belong to only one thing, just as much as common characters—is quite certainly a universal: that sense, namely, in which "is a universal" is simply logically equivalent to "is either predicable of something or is a relation."

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