


Russellian *Annahmen*

BRS Society Meeting - Monmouth University


Steven R. Bayne

(June 1999)


The model for understanding general principles of "signification" in Meinong is (Ass p.25)



Russell's model at one point (OMD 317-318) looks like this:



Russell abandons the notion that propositions have both a sense and a denotation, instead he suggests (OMD:327) a model such as the following:



The "constituents" here are not "meanings" but merely "analogous" to meanings.

Russell seems reasonably clear that he means 'designation' in the following quotation:


It is to be observed...that a phrase which affirms a proposition is not a name of the proposition in the same sense in which "Mr. Arthur Balfour" or "the present Prime Minister of England" is a name of a certain man. The phrase does not *designate* the proposition, but affirms it. "All men are mortal" affirms a proposition;

"the proposition that all men are mortal" names the very same proposition. Thus although propositions can be named or designated, this is not done by phrases which affirm them. (OMD:319)

We see in Moore a reason for distinguishing affirmation as something subjective from something objective:

...a proposition is here to be understood, not as anything subjective - an assertion or affirmation of something - but as the combination of concepts which is affirmed. (The Nature of Judgment. p.183)

The unstable model Russell eschews:



Suppose (A):

A. *True* as an adjective differs from *truth* as a term

A₁. *True* cannot be made a substantive

B. *True* is not a substantive

C. *True* is a substantive.

1. I don't anticipate John's being here
2. I don't regret John's being here
3. Bill's fear that they will not go on vacation is regretted by his parents
4. A believes B's belief that p
5. A believes that B believes that p
6. A believes the proposition that B believes that p
7. A believes the proposition that B believes t

- D1. Mother fears Tom is angry
 - 2 Mother fears Tom's anger
 - 3 Mother fears Tom's being angry

- E1 Mother regrets that Tom is angry
 - 2 Mother regrets Tom's anger
 - 3 Mother regrets Tom's being angry

Example of how Russell uses nominalization:

We can transform "Caesar died" into "the death of Caesar is true; or, if "Caesar died" is not asserted, but merely (in Meinong's phrase) *assumed*, into "the death of Caesar". The object denoted by "Caesar died" and by "the death of Caesar" is exactly the same, but the meaning is different. The latter has two terms, *death* and *Caesar*; for the word *death*, where it denotes its object, and does not mean it...The object denoted by "the death of Caesar is a proposition, though it is not *asserted* in this phrase. The same holds of "the baldness of Caesar", "the success of Caesar"...and so on. (On the Meaning and Denotation of Phrases.(1903) p. 289)