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#### McGILVARY, Evander Bradley (1864–1953)

Evander Bradley McGilvary was born on 19 July 1864 in Bangkok, Siam (now Thailand). His father Daniel McGilvary (Princeton class of 1856) and mother Sophia (Bradley) McGilvary were Presbyterian missionaries to Siam. In 1867 the family went to the northern Siam province of Chiang Mai in 1867 as founders of the Laos Mission, where McGilvary grew up. He returned to the United States at the age of nine to live in North Carolina and attend Davidson College, where he received his BA and graduated valedictorian of his class in 1884. After studying theology at Princeton Theological Seminary, where he received an MA in 1888, he returned to Siam for three years of service during 1891–4 as a translator to his father's Presbyterian Seminary in Chiang Mai. Upon returning to the US he obtained his PhD in philosophy from the University of California at Berkeley in 1897, writing a dissertation on "The Principle and the Method of the Hegelian Dialectic: A Defense of the Dialectic Against Its Critics." McGilvary also taught philosophy at Berkeley, first as an instructor during 1895–7 and as an assistant professor during 1897–9. In 1899 he became Sage Professor of Ethics at Cornell University. In 1905 he became professor of philosophy and head of the department at the University of Wisconsin, holding these positions until his retirement in 1934. McGilvary died on 11 September 1953 in Madison, Wisconsin.

McGilvary was frequently invited to lecture at several universities. McGilvary delivered the

Howison Lecture in 1927, and the Mills Lecture in 1928, both at Berkeley. In 1939 he gave the Paul Carus Lectures for the American Philosophical Association. In these lectures he began putting together the views he had been developing for many years. His written account of the lectures was never completed; in 1956 it was published posthumously with a number of previously published essays as *Towards a Perspective Realism*. McGilvary was President of the Western Philosophical Association in 1911–12, and the American Philosophical Association (now Eastern Division) in 1913–14.

Unlike Descartes's metaphysics, which begins with an attempt at doubting all common sense, McGilvary's metaphysics is an effort to preserve as much of common sense as possible. McGilvary described his own philosophy as "perspective realism." Insofar as perspective realism is a metaphysics, it is to be conceived as an integration of physics and psychology. Visual perspectives provide the most intuitive examples of what perspectives are, although McGilvary would eventually extend the notion of a perspective to every aspect of reality, going so far as to consider even beauty a property objects have from a certain biological perspective. In the visual case, an array of "objects sensibly perceived by an observer from any one of the positions his eyes may occupy is his perspective from that position, and any object in that field is 'in that perspective'" (1956, p. 156).

In 1907, before adopting perspectivism as his central philosophical tenet, McGilvary published his first major work, "Pure Experience and Reality," in which he alleged a "crisis" in John DEWEY's system. In particular, he alleged that at the very least Dewey was "anti-realist" and, perhaps, even an idealist. Dewey replied energetically, denying McGilvary's numerous claims without, however, explicitly rejecting idealism in the precise terms that McGilvary demanded. McGilvary was given "a page and a day" to reply. Perhaps realizing that his response had been weak, one year later he pub-

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lished "The Chicago 'Idea' and Idealism," which straightforwardly invited Dewey to deny that he was an idealist. Dewey in a complimentary and sometimes even flattering rejoinder to McGilvary stated explicitly: "I deny I am an idealist." Henceforth, McGilvary spoke in laudatory terms of both Dewey and his philosophy.

Pragmatism exerted considerable influence on McGilvary's thinking, particularly in his rejection of what he regarded as the dogmatic approach of past philosophies. His rejection of dogmatism resulted in his acceptance of the method of postulates. Postulates he viewed not as dogmas but, rather, as useful assumptions in guiding his own inquiry. One postulate central to his philosophy was that every relation is a relation between terms that are not analyzable into relations, suggesting familiarity with the central arguments of F. H. Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. It is likely that McGilvary's postulational approach was to a degree inspired by the American postulate theorists. These were philosophically aware mathematicians, mostly at Harvard University, whose interests were closely tied to another perspectivist philosopher, Bertrand Russell. Among them were such luminaries as Oswald VELEN, an influential topologist and a relation of Thorstein VELEN, and E. V. HUNTINGTON, who had authored a widely read introduction to the mathematical theory of continuity.

McGilvary's postulational approach implicitly defined the strength and limitations of his ontology, which relied in large measure on two fundamental distinctions, that between two kinds of properties: dynamic and nondynamic, and two kinds of individuals: things and substances. Dynamic properties constitute the subject matter of physics and provide the basis for nondynamic properties, such as secondary qualities. While substances are the sorts of individuals that consist in dynamic properties, things consist in substances combined with the nondynamic properties to which the substance's dynamic properties give rise. As for the relation between dynamic and nondynamic

properties, McGilvary tells us only that the latter "grow" from the former "like branches grow from a tree" (1956, p. 35).

Physical objects and their properties are real, not ideal, according to McGilvary. But the properties a thing has are not had absolutely but rather are had from a perspective. This is true of both primary qualities (for example, shapes) and secondary qualities (for instance, colors). Colors, in fact, become properties of objects "from the perspective of the eye." Such relativity to perspective is a distinguishing characteristic of McGilvary's "perspective realism," a term he coined to distinguish his own position from that of earlier perspectivists such as Russell, A. N. WHITEHEAD, Samuel Alexander, and George H. MEAD. For the most part, earlier perspectivists had concentrated on space and spatiality, but McGilvary attempted to extend perspectivism to memory and even the physical and physiological conditions that determine the attributes an object possesses. His realism, however, was less radical and merely acknowledged that the world given to experience is the real world as "common sense" would have it.

McGilvary cited William JAMES as the greatest single influence on his own work. There were, however, two important respects in which they differed. James had held that consciousness was not a thing but a relation. This position appears to have had an enormous effect on both McGilvary's metaphysics and his theory of knowledge. But the influence did not endure unqualified. Although for a number of years McGilvary held that vision was a relation, much like the relation *being a grandfather*, rather than an action, he later came to maintain that it involved both an activity as well as a relation. This activity he identified as a brain activity, an activity that gives rise to the nondynamic relation of consciousness: "We are now in a position to define the perspectivist's mind as an organism whose dynamic brain action is conditioning, or giving rise to, a nondynamic conscious relation of which it thereby becomes a term." (1956, p. 67)

Despite this introduction of dynamics to his

relational theory of consciousness, McGilvary retained relations as basic ingredients of his ontology. Historically, they have always been of paramount interest to perspectivist philosophy. McGilvary's radical perspectivism was no exception. "Things" become little else than the "entireness" of their relational characters (for example, "being the grandson of T. H. Huxley"), while relations themselves depend on terms for their being, since their being is merely "being between." Nothing on this view either exists or is known to exist independently of its relation to other things. Notwithstanding James's enormous influence on McGilvary, it would be a mistake to characterize his philosophy in the broadest of terms as "philosophical psychology." Even though consciousness occupies center stage in a great number of McGilvary's published works, discussion very quickly turns to either what neurologists had uncovered or to metaphysical discussion of the relations of mind and matter. In regards to the former, McGilvary was particularly taken by the extraordinary work of the British neurologist, Charles Sherrington, whose "masterly guidance" he frequently acknowledged. Particularly towards the latter part of his philosophical life, McGilvary integrated what he took from the neurologists into an understanding of the relation of mind and matter. As he did so, his thinking became at once richer and more original.

Consciousness, secondary qualities, and visual objects induced by cortical stimulation are described as "epiphysical," meaning that they are the *result* of physical events without themselves *being* physical events. Further, coming into consciousness no more transforms the biological organism than entering into the relation of matrimony transforms the groom. Epiphysical phenomena are the byproducts of emergent nonphysical relations which give rise to mind – a mind being any "conscious biological organism." Although McGilvary relies on the concept of emergence, he is careful to distinguish his own position from "creative evolution," a theory brought into prominence

by Henri Bergson as well as C. Lloyd Morgan's "emergent evolution." Such descriptions, McGilvary avers, place insufficient emphasis on novelty as an essential consequence of emergence. Because of this, he prefers the expression "innovative evolution." It is not to be ignored that perspective, also, enters into the production of epiphysical qualities and, therefore, innovative evolution.

McGilvary regarded consciousness, considered as an epiphysical relation dependent on nerve activity, as the defining feature of his own "perspective realism." Consciousness is a nondynamic relation, which "supervenes" upon a dynamic process under dynamic neurological conditions. While it is tempting to view McGilvary's position as epiphenomenalism, he is careful to distinguish his own epiphysicalism from epiphenomenalism, a theory that enjoyed considerable popularity among philosophers of the period. Whereas epiphenomenalism maintains that a cognitive mental event, say, occurs at the end of a causal sequence beginning at one's sensory surface, epiphysicalism holds that the mental event while in some sense the "result" of physiological processes is not an "effect" of those processes in the way our understanding of causation in physics would have it. Notwithstanding this important difference between effect and result, inasmuch as consciousness supervenes on neurological processes, we are told that were there no such thing as consciousness, the nature of the physical world would not be what it is. This characterization anticipates the more general features of contemporary "supervenience" approaches to the philosophy of mind, championed in particular by Jaegwon KIM. Earlier, McGilvary had distanced himself from epiphenomenalism by rejecting the notion that mental events had no causal consequence on the physical world, a common objection to epiphenomenalism, which denied the possibility of such two-sided interactionism.

While his reliance on perspectives in his treatment of problems of the relation of mind and

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matter is sometimes difficult to discern, this is less so in the case of his examination of problems of space and time. On matters of space and time McGilvary assumed a largely orthodox point of view. But on the philosophical matter of how perspective space is to be regarded, he took a somewhat different view than other perspectivists who had fallen under the spell of what was then the “new physics.” In a paper written in 1930, “A Tentative Realistic Metaphysics,” he rejects the idea that there are different spaces associated with our various senses. This view had been upheld by Russell but rejected by Samuel Alexander. McGilvary sides with Alexander but is drawn to the somewhat startling conclusion that the objects of our dreams hover about our heads in the very same space.

McGilvary’s perspectivism, as well as that of those of his predecessors he acknowledges, owes a great deal to the revolution in physics initiated by Albert EINSTEIN. Philosophers had, since Leibniz, been familiar with the general features that define a perspective. The idea, however, had remained largely dormant until Einstein applied a relativity principle to all physical phenomena, not just dynamic ones, and then went on to apply such a principle to all frames of reference. It was the relation of frame of reference to perspective that generated a new interest in the philosophical notion of a perspective. McGilvary authored one paper explicitly devoted in its entirety to the theory of relativity, “The Lorentz Transformation and ‘Space-Time’.” In explaining the negative results of the Michelson–Morley experiment, H. A. Lorentz had produced equations that could be explained by assuming that the distance between two points on a solid object moving parallel to the motion of the earth would change if the object were rotated 90 degrees. Einstein had provided a derivation of these results that made no such assumption. McGilvary suggested an alternative, albeit based in principle on Einstein’s postulates. While an assessment of the value of this exercise may be inconclusive, McGilvary’s philosophi-

cal remarks on the nature of time and the present in particular retain a degree of importance that cannot be ignored.

McGilvary incorporated past events into present perspectives. Moreover, memory perspectives, for example, include what is perceptually past. Unlike perceptual perspectives where the past is merely inferred, past perspectives may be given in present memory perspectives. The objects of awareness from the perspective of a memory will have properties differing from the original, owing to the occurrence of new experiences and relations that intervene between the time of one’s original experience of the object and the time of the occurrence of the memory itself. This characterization, although somewhat different, bears a striking resemblance to the very conception McGilvary had alleged, years earlier, to exist as part of what he regarded as Dewey’s idealism.

McGilvary accepted the idea that the present has duration and is not instantaneous. For this reason it has frequently been referred to as the “specious present.” Acceptance of such a notion necessitated on his part a reconsideration of the meaning of the word “past” which, given his acceptance of a specious present, requires disambiguation. McGilvary argued that while an object in my room may be to the north of some other object in my room I cannot say of either object that one is to the north of my room. There may be other objects outside my room that are to the north of it, but they cannot be said to be to the north of it in the same sense of “north.”

McGilvary takes this point to be analogous to the fact that within a specious present one event is not “past” with respect to some other event within that same specious present in the same sense that an event may be “past” relative to the specious present itself. In other words, events within a specious present precede one another in a different sense from that in which events outside a specious present may precede that very same specious present. Just as Hume had taken empiricism to whatever conclusion it led him, if McGilvary is to be remembered,

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he will be remembered as the philosopher who once having accepted perspectivism, carried it as far as his realism would allow.

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Steven Bayne

## MACKENZIE, John Stuart (1860–1935)

John Stuart Mackenzie was born in Glasgow on 29 February 1860 and died at his home in Brockweir, overlooking Tintern Abbey, on 6 December 1935. His family emigrated in 1868 to Buenos Aires, but shortly afterwards both parents died, and the children were brought back to Scotland to be cared for by an aunt. Mackenzie went in 1877 to Glasgow University (where he studied under Edward CAIRD), and then in 1886, encouraged by his friend and contemporary W.R. SORLEY, to Trinity College, Cambridge. It was here that he formed a close friendship with MCTAGGART which introduced him to the philosophy of Hegel. After his election in 1890 to a Fellowship at Trinity, he became (at the same time) assistant to Professor Robert ADAMSON at Owens College, Manchester until, in 1895, he succeeded Sorley as Professor of Philosophy