

blance" will consist of those respects in which my copy of Fitzgerald's translation resembles your copy of it. Thus, to say "this copy of the Rubaiyat resembles that one" is to use "resemblance" to refer to the qualitative identities of which that factual resemblance consists; those qualitative identities are the referent of the abstract term "resemblance" as it is used in that statement.

Thus we may see that the connotation of the abstract term "resemblance" derives from the context in which it is used. This connotation may be comparatively simple, as in the description of the resemblance of two cases of ultramarine ash. Or again the context from which the abstract term "resemblance" derives its connotation may be comparatively elaborate, as in the case of a description of the respects in which two basket capitals resemble each other. In any case of its use, the abstract term "resemblance" will derive its connotation from the context of that use.

The term "resemblance" is sometimes held to be the name of the primary relation of comparison. For without a resemblance of some sort, no comparison would be possible. Thus, taken as the name of the primary relation of comparison, "resemblance" will be the name of any qualitative identity distributed in at least two cases of itself.

CHAPTER VII

ON TWO BASIC SENSES OF RESEMBLANCE

THERE are many things that resemble each other, in some sense or other of that term. Thus two copies of a book resemble each other, as do two prints drawn from a single plate. These two resemblances, that of the one book to the other, and that of the two prints, are called by the same name. Does that mean that these two resemblances must therefore have a common nature or characteristic that would be their resemblance?

We have seen that this question ought to be answered in the negative. In being common to diverse resemblances, this common nature or characteristic could not be any single resemblance, such as that of the hue of two current ten-cent stamps. Since the common nature in question would be common to various resemblances, the whole of it could not be exhausted by any one resemblance. No more could it be exhausted by any range of them, however broad. For were this alleged common nature exhausted by the respective resemblances x to n , it would be nothing distinct from them; it would be nothing more than the respective resemblances themselves.

Yet if this nature or form that is alleged to be common to various resemblances is to be anything more than those very resemblances themselves, then it must be distinct from them. But as distinct from resemblances x to n —where x to n stands for all discriminable, or determinate, resemblances—this alleged common nature could only be resemblance-indeterminate. And being-indeterminate is unthinkable.

Thus we are constrained to conclude that the abstract term "resemblance" is not the name of a common nature or form. This conclusion does not even tend to deny either

the reality of discriminable, determinate resemblances, or that they are properly so-called. A resemblance such as that of two cases of perceived orpiment, a resemblance such as that of two cases of perceived middle C, or any other perceived resemblance, is properly so designated. But an alleged resemblance that would be common to determinate resemblances, *such as* those mentioned above, could be no resemblance *such as* this one, or *such as* that one; rather, it would be resemblance *as such*. This would be distinct from all determinate resemblances, to be sure; but that is to say that it would be resemblance-indeterminate. And resemblance-indeterminate is verbiage.

So far, one of two radically different senses of "resemblance" has been under consideration. In this sense of the term, two copies of the same book exhibit resemblances, as do two engravings drawn from the same plate. These diverse resemblances resemble each other in being the same. The characteristics that constitute the resemblance of two copies of a book are the same in both books; as is also the case in the two engravings.

In the sense of the term "resemblance" in which characteristics that resemble each other are the same, resemblances may be comparatively complex, or comparatively simple. The examples mentioned above exhibit resemblances that are complex. Two cases of perceived middle C constitute a comparatively simple resemblance. For reasons that may be rather evident, but which cannot be even touched upon here, this comparatively simple sense of "resemblance" is logically prior to the complex sense that derives from it.

Now when "resemblance" is used in no abstract sense, but rather to refer to a discriminated resemblance such as that of the hue of two three-cent stamps, "resemblance" is not the name of a qualifying predicate. In two cases of the same pitch, for example, there is no nature, form, or characteristic distinct from the pitches themselves that could be discriminated and called their resemblance, or their sameness. In any case of resemblances that are the same,

such as that of two cases of the same hue, we have a single qualitative identity repeated in two cases of itself.

Before going on to indicate the second one of the two radically different senses of resemblance that are the concern of this chapter, it may be well at this juncture to consider several of the commonplace criticisms of what has been so far submitted in this chapter.

It may be objected that my use of resemblance is in defiance of ordinary usage and not in accordance with careful existing English. Such an objection would seem to speak for a rather broad area of usage. Any attempt to emulate it would be rather silly. My use of the term resemblance follows that of Hume.

Again, it may be urged that identity or sameness are words that should have been used instead of resemblance. Yet with reference to resemblances that are the same, I have submitted that "in any such case, we have a single qualitative⁽¹⁾ identity repeated in two cases of itself". And it has been urged by me again and again that resemblances that are the *same* are qualitative *identities*.⁽²⁾

Moreover, the arguments by which the conclusion is reached that resemblance as an abstract noun is not the name of a nature or form that would be common to discriminated resemblances are not taken into account at all by such critics. Some assert that my critique of the notion that resemblance as such (or colour, or beauty as such) as distinguished from this resemblance or that one, rests mainly on the *statement* that "to be is to be determinate". This appears to me to be not so. For, in another connection this matter is argued out in some detail; it is not simply rested on a statement.⁽³⁾

Then again, there are those who deny the validity of the tautology, "to be is to be determinate". Indeed, in their declared view, they are able to think things that are completely indeterminate. Some of them even write that

⁽¹⁾ As distinguished from substantial identities.

⁽²⁾ *An Essay on Critical Appreciation*, R. W. Church. Allen and Unwin, London. Ch. I.

⁽³⁾ *Ibid.*

any statement that the completely indeterminate can neither be nor be thought is obviously mistaken, for when a man hears or sees the words "completely indeterminate", he does understand them, and to understand them is to think what they mean.

In this sense of the verb "to understand", anyone familiar with English syntax can understand even a contradiction in terms, such as "an animated corpse". But to understand that phrase as a phrase in English is not to be made aware of a living creature that is dead.

Apparently, it is less than evident that the statement, "to be is to be determinate", is a tautology. For in this statement the predicate term says what is said by the subject term. "To be determinate" means what is meant by "to be", for the reason that any being, however elaborate, simple, or tenuous, is *that* being, and no other one; it is determinate, not absolutely indeterminate or amorphous. Thus "to be determinate" is equivalent to "to be a being" for the reason that to be a being is to be a determinate being, not a characterless, amorphous nothing.

Those who assert that they can think being completely indeterminate, because they can understand the words, and that to understand the words is to think *what* they mean would seem to go rather far. Indeed, that assertion would seem to lay claim to a capacity that a mystic would care to have. For the ultimate beatific vision is no amorphous characterless nothing; rather, it is something determinate, since it is distinct from the lesser beatitudes. To be determinate is to be distinct from something or anything else, and to be distinct is to be determinate—and that is to be a distinct being. A being that *were* not distinct from nothing would not be distinct from nothing at all.

In the one sense of resemblance that we have so far considered, the term refers, by virtue of its context, to a characteristic that is repeated in at least two cases of itself. Thus the statement, "This shade of crimson resembles that shade of crimson" means what is meant by "This shade of crimson is the same as that shade of crimson". And that

last statement means that the two shades of crimson are the same in the sense that they are identical in quality or character. In this sense of the term, a resemblance is a qualitative identity repeated in at least two cases of itself.

As we noticed in the preceding chapter, ordinarily we do not compare two or more cases of a single quality. Rather we usually compare individuals, or substances, as resembling each other more or less. The way in which we do this that is logically cognate with the comparison of qualitative identities may be indicated very briefly as follows. Let $a, b, c, d, e, q, r, s, t$ be the characteristics that are the same or repeated in the individuals I^1 and I^2 . And let q, r, s, t be the characteristics that are repeated in I^3 and I^4 . Clearly, more characteristics would be repeated in I^1 and I^2 than in I^3 . So the statement, " I^1 resembles I^2 more than it resembles I^3 ", means that more characteristics are repeated in I^1 and I^2 than are repeated in them and in I^3 .

Now let us notice that when we compare two or more cases of a single characteristic (a single shade of blue, for example) then each term of the comparison is that very single characteristic repeated in those two or more cases of itself. Let us consider also that when we compare several individuals as being more or less resembling (in this one of two basic senses of that phrase), we do so in respect of the superior and inferior numbers of perceived characteristics repeated in the individuals compared. These considerations may enable us to notice that in both of the two senses of "resemblance" which we have distinguished so far, "resemblance" designates (by virtue of its context) characteristics that are the *same* characteristics, in the two or more cases compared.

Yet, very often we compare characteristics that are *diverse*, not the same. We say rightly that perceived orange is more like red than green. But this is not so because more red is repeated in orange than in green. For no single hue in the range of hues that we designate as "red" (or by cognate names) is repeated in any hue other than two or more cases of a hue properly called "red".

The fact that a red pigment can be mixed with a yellow pigment to yield an orange hue makes it seem plausible to say that orange is more like red than green, because orange is red to a degree higher than the degree to which it is yellow. Yet once it has been produced by the additive mixing of pigments, the perceived orange is the shade of orange that it is. And on the logic of contradictories, a quality may not be itself more or less. For A is A absolutely, not to this or that degree. Whenever we compare either individuals or complexes of qualities, we may speak of a superior number of repeated qualities as a superior degree of resemblance, if it be convenient to do so. But to refer to a shade of orange as either being or resembling any shade of red to a degree, would be to forget that (on a logic of absolute identity) any shade of orange is itself absolutely, not relatively; it would be to overlook the intrinsic self-identity of that hue.

In propositions which state comparisons of individuals (or of complexes of qualities) as resembling each other more or less, the referent of the phrases "more resembling" and "less resembling" will be the very qualities *repeated* in such individuals in point of superior and inferior number. Thus, when an individual I^1 is said to resemble I^2 more than I^3 , this will be so whenever the number of discriminated resemblances found in S^1 and S^2 exceeds those discriminated in S^1 and S^3 . In any such context, wherein individuals are compared in respect of self-identical resemblances repeated in them, the phrase "more resembling", or a collateral phrase, will refer to the discriminated resemblances whose number, in the case of I^1 and I^2 , is superior to the number of resemblances that are found in I^1 and I^3 .

Clearly this form of comparison, in which the terms compared are qualitative identities repeated in at least two cases of themselves, does not take into account the comparison of degrees of quality. The two modes of comparison are radically different. In the one, the terms compared are the same, as in the example of two cases of the same shade of red. In the other, the terms compared are

diverse, as are orange, red and blue. Therefore the referents of a statement of degrees of resemblance may not be a repeated quality. What, then, is that referent? Not a quality that is that quality to any degree or other. For, as we have noticed above, on a logic of contradictories, the self-identity of a quality may not be a matter of degree.

Now it is easy to confuse these two senses of "resemblance". This confusion can engender a false demand. A man may notice that in any case of a resemblance where the terms compared are strictly the same, the terms have in common those very qualitative characters. If he fails to distinguish between resemblances that are the same and resemblances that are diverse, he may fall into the habit of feeling that diverse resemblances also must have a common nature.

Consequently, in some quarters it is an established practice to urge that things called by the same name must have *something* or other in common *because* they are called by the same name. These things are called by the same name; therefore, they must be in some respect, at least, the same.

Those who stand on this argument recognize that both a way over a river and a card game are called by the same name, "bridge". Yet they do not assert that the way over a river and a card game have something, or even anything, in common. Nevertheless, they do urge that felt beauties *must* have a common character *because* they are called by the same name, "beauty". For surely, things that are properly called by the same name must be in some respect the same.

In view of the many exceptions which this line of argument even acknowledges, it ought to be suspect on the face of it. There is no impropriety in referring in French to a host as a *hôte*, and in referring also to a guest as a *hôte*. The argument that, because things are called by the same name, they must be the same "in some sense", is more than suspect; it is fallacious.

To be sure, every single case of the same thing should be called by the same name, if we are to avoid equivocation. Now, from this it is assumed to follow that every use of the

same name must be made with reference to the same thing. Thus, as convertend we have the proposition, "All cases of the same thing should be called by the same name". This is alleged to yield the converse, "all uses of the same name must be made with reference to the same thing". Plainly, this is the illicit conversion of a universal proposition. All that follows from the convertend in question is that *some* uses of the same name must be made with reference to the same thing; namely, those uses of a name under rules that render it a technical term.

Thus we may notice that arguments to the conclusion that things called by the same name, must, therefore, be the same, derives from an elementary confusion. The fact that a way over a river and a card game are properly called by the same name does not even tend to prove that these diverse matters have something in common. And the alleged logic of the matter is illicit.

Presumably it will be urged again that, even so, diverse resemblances are in fact called by the same name. Surely, it may be said, this must mean that the resemblances of architecture and music, poetry and painting, sculpture and the dance are in some sense the same.

This pertinacity constrains us to ask all over again what it means to say of any two experiences that they are the same, or that they have something in common.

To say that two experiences are the same is to say, at least, that they resemble each other. Thus, whenever we insist that diverse resemblances are the same in that they are resemblances, we assert that diverse qualities *resemble* each other in being the same.

The theory that diverse resemblances have something in common assumes that there is a common nature or form or characteristic in respect of which diverse items are resembling, or exactly the same. This nature, form, or characteristic is the mutual resemblance that diverse resemblances bear to each other. Let us, then, ask again what it means to say of two experiences that they resemble each other. This may help us to realize how much we take for granted in

assuming that diverse resemblances have something or anything in common. For whenever resemblance-as-such is taken to be the name of a nature, form, or characteristic that is common to diverse resemblances in fact, it is then assumed to be a form in respect of which diverse resemblances are in some respect or other the same.

For consider, again, there are resemblances that are different. One twin resembles the other twin in many respects. One paper clip resembles another paper clip. The resemblances obtaining between the twins, and those found in the paper clips, are different resemblances. Neither twin resembles a paper clip, and no paper clip resembles a twin in very many respects. Yet the respects in which the twins are the same, and the respects in which the paper clips resemble each other, are designated by the same term, "resemblance".

Thus we may remind ourselves that resemblances which are diverse nevertheless do have a common designation; namely, "resemblance". Now if diverse beauties must have something in common because they are called by the same name, then, for as good a reason, resemblances that are diverse should have something in common.

Yet what could this alleged common nature *be*? Since it would be common to different resemblances, it could be no determinate resemblance, such as the hue of two ten-cent stamps. No more could this universal resemblance be any range or set of determinate resemblances, x to n . For were it that this alleged common nature were exhausted by, or wholly present in, any range of resemblances, it would be identical with those determinate resemblances. In that case, the common nature in question would be nothing in its own right, for it would not be distinct from those respective resemblances themselves.

Thus we may notice that resemblance-as-such may be no determinate resemblance such as that exhibited by two cases of middle C, and that it may be no range of determinate resemblance whatever. Since resemblance *as such* could be no determinate resemblance such as this one, or *such as*

that one and so on to *n*, resemblance as such would have to be distinct from all determinate resemblances. Consequently, resemblance as such would be resemblance-indeterminate. And being-indeterminate is verbiage. For to be at all is to be determinate—to be distinct from something else.

We are thus obliged to conclude that the abstract noun "resemblance" is not the name of a common nature, form, or characteristic. In two cases of the same hue we have a resemblance. In two cases of the same pitch we have another. Both the resemblance in the hues, and that in the pitches are designated by the same term "resemblance". We have asked whether or not they have in common a nature, or characteristic, or form. Since this common character could be no determinate resemblance, nor yet any range of resemblances, it could only be resemblance-indeterminate. And the indeterminate would be distinguishable from nothing at all.

Thus, in the case of diverse hues, it might be urged that because two cases of cobalt blue are the same *and* are said to be "resembling", and because orange and red also are said to be "resembling", therefore orange and red must be the same in some sense or other. This habit of feeling that diverse resemblances must be the same, or have something in common, because resemblances that *are* the same do have what they are in common, is an habitual confusion that is enforced by a fallacy.

Any two (or more) resemblances that are strictly the same exhibit an identity in the very qualitative identity that is the qualitative character which those resembling qualities are. And if we confuse the use of "resemblance" in this sense with that in which the same term is used with reference to resembling qualities that are diverse, naturally we feel that these diverse resemblances must have an identity "in" the diverse qualities that they are. Two cases of the same shade of green resemble each other in being the same. Red, orange, and yellow resemble each other, though they are diverse. Anyone who failed to distinguish these two

senses of resemblance, and thus took it that the referent of the second sense must be a resemblance in the first sense, naturally would posit a qualitative identity "in" (say) red, orange, and yellow as being their resemblance. And thus a demand would arise for a nature or form that would be common to any range of resemblances that are called by the same name; such as, for example, the diverse hues.

Yet, what could this nature or form be? Clearly it could be no single discriminated hue, however nearly amorphous and circumambient. No more could it be any range of determinate hues—even though they were comparatively indeterminate and fluctuating in perception. Since this alleged identity in diverse hues could be no determinate hue, or range of determinate hues, it would be colour-indeterminate. And as Aristotle, Berkeley, and Hegel have pointed out in their various ways, being-indeterminate is nothing at all (other than a phrase). What, then, is the referent of "resemblance" in statements about hues as being more or less resembling?

It is sometimes said that no hue is definable. And there is a sense of "definable" in which as much could hardly be denied. But to conclude from this that there is no sense in which a hue can be defined would be to infer too much. A hue can be defined in the sense that it can be identified by a statement which designates that hue and no other one.

Hues that are near each other in the circle of hues are sometimes called analogous hues. This name for them may serve to remind us that orange is to yellow and red, as red is to orange and purple, and so on. Therefore the statement, "orange stands between yellow and red in the order of analogous hues" identifies a range of orange hues. And that statement identifies no other hue. For it is of the nature of orange and only orange that it is to red and yellow, as red is to purple and orange.

In the order of analogous hues, any hue stands where it stands because it is that hue. Thus orange is to red and yellow as red is to purple and yellow for the reason that orange is orange. To say that orange might not stand

between red and yellow in the order of analogous hues, would be to say that orange might not be orange. This is the case, *mutatis mutandis*, with any hue in that order.

Now let us notice also that the redness of a red is intrinsic to it. The *existence* of a perceived red requires an efficient cause, to be sure; but the *being* of a red is its formal cause. The being of any red is what it is. Just so with any quality. The reason for this is apagogic. To say that a red might not be what it is, would be to say that a red might not be red.

This may suffice to indicate (albeit very inadequately) that nothing extrinsic to a perceived red is required for an understanding of why it is that red stands between purple and orange in the order of analogous hues. It is of the very nature of any red that this should be so. It is also of the nature of any other hue that it should stand where it stands in the order of analogous hues. Nothing extrinsic to the perceived hues themselves is required that the ontological order of hues should be the order that it is. Red, orange, yellow, green, blue and purple stand to each other in that order because in their respective ranges of being they are purple, blue, green, yellow, orange and red.

The analogous order of hues is intrinsic to the hues of which that order consists. This is to say that the being of the order in question is exhausted in the respective natures of the hues that constitute it; for those hues stand to each other in that order because they are respectively the hues they are. Red is to orange as orange is to yellow for the reason that red is red, orange is orange and yellow is yellow.

In my view, this intrinsic order is the referent of "more (or less) resembling" in statements about hues as resembling each other more or less. To say that orange resembles red more than blue is to refer to the order of analogous hues, in which it is the case that orange is nearer red than blue. The statement, "orange is more like red than blue" means what is meant by orange is nearer red than blue in the order of the analogous hues. And that statement means that orange is nearer red than blue in that order, in the sense that

between (say) yellow, orange and vermilion there are fewer hues than there are between vermilion and (say) azurite.

Thus comparable qualitative positions in the analogous order of the qualities that are those positions, will be the referents of statements about degrees of resemblance in the qualities thus ordered. The referent of "degrees of resemblance", in this basic sense of the phrase, is not at all a relation of comparison; viz., a qualitative identity that requires at least two cases of itself for its illustration. For in this case, that referent is not a quality of any sort. Rather it is an intrinsic order of analogous items. That order *consists* of the analogous items which may be compared not in themselves alone, but as nearer to or further from one another in the order which they, in their being analogous to each other, exhaustively constitute.

In recapitulation, consider: in the course of this chapter we have noticed that there are two senses of resemblance that are radically different. It may be well to say in passing that the term "radical" is here used in its drastic etymological sense.

In the one sense there are resemblances that are strictly the same: they are two examples of one qualitative identity (or relation) repeated in two cases of itself.

And in the second, and no less radical sense, there are resemblances that are diverse (as a red hue and an orange hue are diverse), and yet analogous.

In the following chapter, we shall see that the two radical senses of resemblance made out in this chapter yield two derivative senses of resemblance. And we may notice that a failure to distinguish between these four senses of resemblance may easily issue in avoidable confusion.