

# LOGIC AND REALITY

*By the Same Author*

THE METAPHYSICS OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

MEANING AND EXISTENCE

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in recent British journals. These I don't mention, partly because I do not wish to put the finger on anyone. In this country, there is the recoil from those frankly professed "prolegomena to a future science of language." There is, most ominously of all, The Big Yawn, often no longer covered by a polite or diplomatic hand. The signs add up. Strawson's book is more than just a sign. It shows a way out to those who, partly because of the way he says what he says, are more likely to listen to him than to anyone else. From where I stand, I had to make it clear that I judge him to have failed. But then, in philosophy, who hasn't failed or doesn't fail eventually? It is enough, more than enough, to have done as well as Strawson did. *In magnis voluisse sat est.*

## The Ontology of Edmund Husserl\*

THERE is reading and reading. We insist that our students read some of the classics. Most of them do not know what they have read. They just read *in* them. Recently I spent several months reading Husserl.<sup>1</sup> Naturally, I had read in him before, though not very much and not during the last fifteen years or so, while I worked out my own views. Now, having really read him, I am profoundly impressed by the greatness of his achievement. I also see how much of what slowly and painfully I have discovered for myself I could have learned from him. I thus paid the usual price of ignorance. Ignorance, or even its confession, is hardly an excuse for an essay. Again as usual, though, there is a twist. Had I in good time learned from Husserl all there was to be learned, I probably would not have avoided what, from where I now stand, I take to be his fatal mistakes. In a sense, though not exclusively to be sure and not I hope in a niggardly fashion, those mistakes are the subject of these *méditations husserliennes*.

In first philosophy, 'realism' has two major uses. Call realism as opposed to nominalism, realism<sub>1</sub>; as opposed to idealism, realism<sub>2</sub>. If challenged to squeeze as much as possible about Husserl into three short sentences I would say this: Taught by Brentano, he started from and always held fast unto the act; at first, he was a realist<sub>2</sub>; eventually he became an idealist. These three things I had long known, of course, from having read in him or, even, about him. They were in fact what

\* *Methodos*, 12, 1960, 359-92. Reprinted by permission.

<sup>1</sup> This essay is based on a complete reading of *Logische Untersuchungen, Ideen* (Erstes Buch), *Méditations Cartésiennes, Erfahrung und Urteil*. I have also read much of the material now being published as *Husserliana* by the Husserl Archive, particularly the later books of *Ideen*. But I shall not, except at a few salient points, either quote or cite.

now led me to read him. To explain the attraction, I must talk about myself. My first teachers were the logical positivists who, whether or not they know it, are all either materialists or phenomenologists. Phenomenology is a kind of idealism. When, dissatisfied, I tried to think for myself, I discovered the act. (In this, as it happened, I took the cues from Moore and Brentano rather than from Husserl.) Guided by the discovery, I now find myself structurally a realist<sub>2</sub>. I say structurally, because the classical realists would probably not welcome me into their company. But this I believe is so merely because, while they philosophized before, I philosophize after the linguistic turn. In other words, the anticipated rejection reacts to my method of philosophizing rather than the structure of my philosophy.

Husserl built everything on the act. So do I. In this there is no difference. He moved from realism<sub>2</sub> to idealism. I traveled in the opposite direction. The difference is massive and striking. Yet the differences between our analyses of the act seem, and in many though not in all respects in fact are, minor. What, then, are the major structural differences to account for the opposite movements, towards and away from idealism? The question drove me to the books. The answer I found there is that Husserl made two major mistakes. For one, he is a nominalist. For another, his analysis of relations is inadequate. From these two mistakes, either by themselves or in conjunction with a few subsidiary patterns, all others follow. Both already occur in the *Untersuchungen*. In fact, they dominate them. This is the case I shall argue. If I am right, then the later idealism is already implicit in this explicitly realistic work. (I am a realist<sub>1</sub>, and, taught as I was by Russell, started with an adequate analysis of relations.)

Calling Husserl a nominalist jars. So I hasten to add that there are several kinds of nominalism. All but one are rather shallow dead ends, mere variants of that "psychologism" Husserl himself tracked down so relentlessly. His is the one serious kind. I hope to give good reasons for calling it conceptualism rather than nominalism. But there are also several kinds of conceptualism. Again, all but one are shallow dead ends, more or less "psychologistic." And again, Husserl's is the one serious kind, which is really a variant of Platonism. Of all this presently. Now I merely want to make sure that the reader will keep his peace until I have had my say.

Even mere exposition often gains from what a critical discussion cannot do without, namely, a foil. What has been said makes it plausible that my own ontology is a suitable foil for Husserl's. Nor does the interest of the purely structural points which are my main concern and which this foil sets off depend on original and foil being held in equal

esteem. Thus I feel free to proceed as I shall. And I shall, for brevity's sake, speak of Husserl's and my ontology as the *system* and the *foil*,<sup>2</sup> respectively.

Nothing is ineffable. Some things, though, are peculiar in that before they have been said it seems very difficult to say them while afterwards they seem very simple. These things are then called ultimate or profound. Naturally, they have a lure all their own. The danger is that one mistakes for profound what is merely trivial. In philosophy both lure and danger are greatest in what (I believe) Wolff first called *ontologia generalis sive formalis*. Its air is thin and heady indeed. No matter what mistakes Husserl may have made in it, he was one of its few recent masters. I am becoming ever more sensitive to its lure. So I shall court danger by starting with some reflections on general ontology. Next I shall very briefly outline my own; then with much more detail Husserl's. Next I shall exhibit the two fundamental mistakes. Then I shall be ready to attend to some of their consequences. At that point the further order of exposition will be obvious.

## I

Ontology asks what there is. The answer expected is or yields a classification. The use of 'is' in the question is philosophical. A phrase and a word will help us to avoid it. Whatever is assigned a place in the classification is given some *ontological status*. To have some ontological status is to be an *entity*. Call the most comprehensive or highest classes (ontological) *modes*; those immediately below them, (ontological) *kinds*. How many modes does an ontologist recognize? How many kinds in each mode? How many entities in each kind? The questions direct us toward salient differences among ontologies. Traditionally, 'real', 'ideal', 'existent', 'subsistent' indicate (membership in) modes. Since the traditional uses are all philosophical, the safest thing is to set them off, say, by double quotes. But since I shall never employ either these or any other words from the traditional vocabulary without eventually explicating how philosophers have used them, and, for a few of them, how I use them myself, we shall be safe without typographical pedantry. 'Exist' will be used mostly for a mode, but occasionally also as a convenient substitute for the clumsy 'having some ontological status'. The latter use will always be marked by double quotes.

Ontologists disagree on which entities, if any, should be classified

<sup>2</sup> For exposition, see *Meaning and Existence* and two later essays: "Dell'Atto," *Rivista di Filosofia*, 51, 1960, 3-51, and pp. 3-44 of this book; "Ineffability, Ontology, and Method," *Philosophical Review*, 69, 1960, 18-40, and pp. 45-63 of this book.

as individuals and characters respectively. Some propose such things as apples and their (perceptual) colors. Others propose instead *sensa* and their (phenomenal) colors. With a certain precaution, individuality and universality are nevertheless good examples of ontological kinds. The precaution has something to do with things to come. Some philosophers are so impressed with the dialectic of the One and the Many that, building their whole ontology around it, they assign whatever they call individuals and characters not only to different kinds but to different modes. Others are content to make individuality and universality two kinds of one mode. The latter I call *realists*<sub>1</sub>; the former, *nominalists*. There are of course also those who deny all ontological status to colors. They too are called nominalists. But they are merely stuck in a shallow blind alley.

Some ontologists wish to speak so that there is only one entity; others, so that there are several. The former are called *monists*; the latter, *pluralists*. Monism I shall not consider. The pluralists all have a problem in common. To spot it, I introduce an example from which we shall get a lot of use.

I hear a dichord; *c* and *e* of the middle octave; the former soft, the latter loud. Since we have no ready words for loudnesses, let me use '*sft*' and '*ld*' for these two particular ones. That makes '*(c, sft)*'; '*(e, ld)*' an adequate notation for the dichord. Hearing it, I do not hear *(c, ld)*; *(e, sft)*, which is another dichord. Hearing them both, in succession, I know them from each other. That is so because in the one *c* is tied to *sft* while in the other it is tied to *ld*. Correspondingly for *e*. In the notation the parentheses represent the ties which make the difference.

Assume that *c*, *e*, *sft*, *ld* are all counted as entities. The tones themselves, *(c, sft)*, and so on, may or may not be so classified. If one counts them as entities, one will naturally call them *complex entities*. Otherwise one will speak of a *complex of entities*, thus by implication denying ontological status to complexes. In this respect pluralists have a choice. In another they don't. No pluralist can get along without at least one of the two, complex entities and complexes of entities. What "makes" either is of course the tie. The tie itself must therefore be grounded ontologically. From here a single step will quickly take us to the problem all pluralists must face.

Notice first how the example was put. One hears a dichord. One hears another. One knows them from each other. The example was put epistemologically, as one says. As so often, this is a most natural way to introduce an ontological issue. It is also a proper way, since whatever we perceive and whatever we know, as well as our perceiving or knowing it, must be grounded ontologically. On this all philosophers

who know their business agree. Their disagreements lie elsewhere. An idealist, for instance, may ground either in Selves or in their characters what a realist<sub>2</sub> grounds in entities which are neither.

The only way to ground the tie is to make either it or an "ingredient" of it an entity. Choosing the latter alternative, one arrives after some steps at the former. So we may as well start with the former. Calling the tie '*t*', we may then consistently write *(c, t, sft)*, *(e, t, ld)*, and so on, for the four tones. The parentheses spot the problem. How are the three entities *c*, *t*, *sft* tied together? We cannot dodge the question. Yet we seem to be started on an infinite regress. There are but two ways of avoiding it. One may at this juncture opt for monism. This is what Bradley did. Or one admits at least one entity which ties others into complexes (or complex entities) without need of a further entity to tie it to what it ties. Any such entity I shall call a *fundamental tie*, or a *nexus*. We may say, then, that a pluralist must give ontological status to at least one fundamental tie. Ever since Bradley this should have been a truism of general ontology.

Every workable ontology contains in fact a plurality of nexus, which plurality divides into kinds. As to the number of such kinds ontologies significantly differ. Consider as an abstract possibility one with two modes. It must contain at least one kind (if only with a single member) to connect (tie) entities from different modes. Otherwise the world falls apart. (Platonic participation is such a tie.) Also, it will plausibly contain two more kinds, one "within" each mode. Presently we shall see that the system realizes this possibility. It looks as if by pursuing such patterns we may gain some rather radical structural insights. Unhappily, we are also approaching the point where the price of complete generality is either tedium or emptiness or both. One more comment, though, is perhaps worthwhile. No matter how many fundamental ties or kinds of such there are, each is itself an entity and the ontological classification is all-inclusive. Where then, in it, fall the fundamental ties? There are two styles, as it were. One may gather into one mode all the fundamental ties and *whatever goes with them* but nothing else. Or one may make this class but a kind within a mode. The latter, we shall see, is the system's style; the former, the foil's.

To unpack next the italicized phrase. The ontological categories are themselves entities; otherwise the classification wouldn't be all-inclusive. Consider now an ontology containing two kinds and an (asymmetrical) tie connecting two entities, one from each of these two kinds, and no others. The two kinds will then "go with" this tie. That unpacks the phrase. For an example, think of (the realist's) individuals and (nonrelational) characters as the two kinds. That makes (nonrelational)

exemplification the tie; individuality and (nonrelational) universality, the two entities that "go with" it.

One more comment about fundamental ties as such. Remember that I wrote *c, t, sft; e, t, ld*; and so on. (The parentheses are now suppressed; the semicolons will do.) Had I sought generality for its own sake, I could have written *c, t<sub>1</sub>, sft; e, t<sub>2</sub>, ld*; and so on. As far as I know no one has ever explored this possibility. That is, the "sameness" of a nexus in its several "instances" has never been probed dialectically. Or, as some now may want to put it, the grammar of 'same', 'instance', and 'nexus' is such that the phrase 'instance of a nexus' makes no sense. I nevertheless just introduced the dialectic of the One and the Many into that of the nexus. True, I introduced it only in order to dismiss it. Yet there is some small point in confronting the two. Some ontologies, we know, are built around the One and the Many. If such an ontology has been built by a master, then we shall expect to find all nexus, no matter what they connect, in the mode of the One. This is the point. The master I have in mind is Husserl.

Speaking as we ordinarily do, whenever two or more "things" are somehow "connected," we say that they are related. I spoke instead of a fundamental tie or nexus. Only a philosopher with an axe to grind would do that. Let me unsheathe the axe. In the foil, something being green involves two entities which are not nexus, call them for the moment ordinary entities, held together by the nexus of (nonrelational) exemplification. Similarly, something being to the left of something else involves three ordinary entities, one of them an ordinary relation, held together by the nexus of (relational) exemplification. To propose this account is to claim that there is at least one striking difference between an ordinary relation and a nexus. One who uses the same word for both is in danger not only of prejudging that claim but also of making mistakes in his analysis of (ordinary) relations. Husserl did use the same word, calling inner and outer relations what I call a nexus and a relation, respectively.<sup>3</sup>

Take a tone which is *c* and *sft*. In the foil it assays as follows. In addition to *c* and *sft*, which are counted as (simple) characters, there is a third entity, which is counted as an individual. These three are held together by two (kinds of) nexus. Conjunction ties *c* and *sft* into the (compound) character *c-and-sft*; the latter and the particular are tied

<sup>3</sup> In the foil and elsewhere a distinction is made between descriptive (e.g., being to the left of) and logical (e.g., being the converse of) relations. The point above does not depend on the example being descriptive. Brentano's analysis of relations is as inadequate as Husserl's; for details see R. Grossmann, "Acts and Relations in Brentano," *Analysis*, 21, 1960, 1-5.

into one fact by exemplification. Alternatively, exemplification ties each of the two (simple) characters to the individual, thus yielding two facts, which conjunction in turn ties into one. The difference between the alternatives makes no ontological difference. (More precisely, it makes no difference provided all facts are considered compounds and no compound an entity.) In the system, the tone's ontological assay is quite different. Of this presently. Now I merely want to call attention to the connectives, conjunction, disjunction, and so on, since they are a kind of nexus. Both system and foil account for them. Nor will it be necessary for us to examine either account. That is why I mention the connectives now, lest not mentioning them at all in a discussion of fundamental ties cause either puzzlement or confusion.<sup>4</sup>

## II

There are really two systems; the first, that of the *Untersuchungen*, realistic<sub>2</sub> at least in intent; the second, of the *Ideen* and thereafter, explicitly idealistic. I turn now to what I take to be the first system of a truncated world, i.e., a world otherwise like ours but without minds. Again, it will help to begin with the truncated foil.

An entity either *exists* or *subsists*. Existence and subsistence are the two modes of the foil. Existents are either *individuals* or *characters* (relational or nonrelational). The nexus between the two kinds is exemplification (unary, binary, and so on.) Except for the connectives, *exemplification is the only nexus*. The only subsistent entities are the fundamental ties and, roughly, what "goes with them." I say roughly because while some entities, such as individuality and universality, obviously go with them, this is not so obvious for quantity (all, some) and arithmetic. That dialectic, though, is not the concern of this study.

What "*exists*" is simple. In this formula 'exist' and 'simple' are both used philosophically. Unexplicated, the formula thus literally makes no sense. After the two uses have been explicated, it will be either true or false, depending on the two explications. That shows in which sense I do not take a stand on the classical issues. Rather, I insist that in order to understand some of the classical ontologies, one must realize that their authors, speaking philosophically, used their words so as to make the formula true. A formula that provides this sort of key I call a *pattern*.<sup>5</sup> This particular ontological pattern is the simplicity pattern.

<sup>4</sup> On the connectives, see "Ineffability, Ontology, and Method."

<sup>5</sup> Recently I exhibited the eight (!) patterns on which the realism-phenomenalism controversy, as it reflects itself in the philosophy of physics, depends. See "Physics and Ontology," *Philosophy of Science*, 28, 1961, 1-14, and pp. 108-23 of this book.

For existents, though not for subsistents, an explication (we need not tarry with it) for this use of 'simple' is provided in the foil; 'exist' is so explicated that only simples "exist." (In its commonsensical use 'exist' is here always replaced by 'there is'.) In this sense, the foil may be said to accept the *simplicity pattern*. Some *things*, i.e., all individuals and some characters, are simples; even the "simplest" *fact*, an individual exemplifying a (simple) character, is not. Hence, no fact "exists."

The existents of the foil are all phenomenal entities, either *sensa* or characters they exemplify. Which pattern controls this choice? How can a realistic<sub>2</sub> ontology be built on it? The questions are urgent. Yet, expository strategy requires that the answers be postponed. The deliberate abstractness of the exposition serves among others the purposes of this strategy. But strategy must not be carried to extremes. The hint just dropped permits a comment now in order.

Earlier, simultaneous, to-the-left-of, extended, and so on, are either temporal or spatial characters, the first three relational, the fourth nonrelational. The only entities exemplifying them are *sensa*. This is expressed by saying that the individuals of the foil are *in* (phenomenal) *space* and *time*. Characters, including of course the spatial and temporal ones, are not in this sense in either space or time. Hence, only individuals are. Perceptual objects (apples and chairs) are not phenomenal ones. But again, perceptual objects are in perceptual space and time; their characters are not. That shows how I use 'phenomenal' and 'perceptual'. It also shows that the matters touched upon lie deeper than the phenomenalism-realism<sub>2</sub> issue. Perceptual objects, however, are *continuants* (in time); *sensa* are momentary. Hence, *no existent is a continuant*.

If a character which was presented to me yesterday is presented to me again today, I recognize it, directly or as such. *Sensa*, being momentary entities, are in fact never presented twice. Yet, if one were presented to me twice, I would not the second time recognize it as such. (This holds also for perceptual objects and their characters; which shows that this matter, too, lies deeper than the phenomenalism-realism<sub>2</sub> issue.) Entities not recognizable in this sense I call *bare*. (The traditional phrase, which I shall avoid, is *bare particulars*.) One who grants ontological status to bare individuals must consistently also grant it to exemplification. Remember the dichord. If, being presented with it, I were not also presented with exemplification, how would I know which characters go together, i.e., are exemplified by the same bare individual? And one can of course not be presented with anything having no ontological status. Behind the refusal to grant such

status to anything bare is a pattern. *We know only what, if it be presented to us again, we recognize*. Call it the *recognition pattern*. As stated, it is epistemological rather than ontological. To grasp its ontological impact, build a verbal bridge, replacing 'know' by 'know to exist'. Since it makes no sense to talk of what "cannot be known," the bridge is plausible.

That will do for the foil; now for the system.

An entity is either *real* or *ideal*; if the latter, it is called an *essence*; if the former, I shall call it an *item*.<sup>6</sup> Reality and the realm of essences are the two modes of the system. Behind the dichotomy are two major intellectual motives, each corresponding to a pattern. *What "exists" is localized in space and time*. This is one of the two. Call it the *localization pattern*. 'Localized in' is stronger than 'in'. A continuant, for instance, though in space and time, is not localized in time. Husserl's own phrase, *hic et nunc*, surely is as strong as one can make it. As it stands, the pattern leads to catastrophe, either materialism or Humeism, depending on whether time and space are taken perceptually or phenomenally. Husserl avoided both traps. Yet he was swayed by the pattern. So he modified it: What is real (though, since there are also essences, not every "existent") is localized in space and time. That shows the power the pattern had over him. Notice an immediate consequence. *No item is a continuant*.

What is an item? There is a red round spot on my blotter. What I see when now looking at it involves three items. Call them *red<sub>1</sub>*, *round<sub>1</sub>*, *spot<sub>1</sub>*. Tomorrow, when I shall look at the spot again, there will be three further items, *red<sub>2</sub>*, *round<sub>2</sub>*, *spot<sub>2</sub>*; and so on. In this respect, simply because they are *hic et nunc*, items are like *sensa*. Also, items, like *sensa*, are things. Yet an item is *not* a phenomenal thing. They are all (rudimentary) perceptual ones. To make that as clear as possible I use an ink spot rather than a tone. But a tone, as I hear it, also involves three items, say, *c<sub>1</sub>*, *sft<sub>1</sub>*, *tone<sub>1</sub>*.

The system does distinguish between simples and compounds. In the example, *spot<sub>1</sub>* and *spot<sub>2</sub>* are compounds; the other four items are simples, or so I assume for the sake of the argument. But the system rejects the simplicity pattern. That is why we have here six items and not just four. Accordingly, the thing-fact distinction is less crucial than in other ontologies. A compound is also called a *whole*. A whole is what-

<sup>6</sup> Because of the clash with 'idealism', 'ideal' will henceforth be avoided. Husserl typically uses several words for one idea. I always use only one and stay as close as possible to English usage, either literally translating (e.g., 'essence' for 'Wesen') or approximating (e.g., 'item' for 'Moment') the most suitable one among the several.

ever has parts.  $Red_1$  and  $round_1$  are severally parts of  $spot_1$ ;  $red_2$  and  $round_2$ , of  $spot_2$ ;  $c_1$  and  $sft_1$ , of  $tone_1$ .

*Being-a-part-of is the only fundamental nexus between items.* I shall occasionally mark it by 'C', e.g.,  $red_1$  C  $spot_1$ . What does 'C' stand for? We are at the limits of communication. That makes it easier to say what it doesn't stand for. Certainly not for the homonymous set-theoretical relation. Nor simply for the geometrical one, as is shown by  $sft_1$  C  $tone_1$ . On the other hand, take the two halves into which a diagonal divides the area of a square. More precisely, take a triple of corresponding items. The two triangular ones are said to be parts of the square. The notion thus comprehends the geometrical one. It is in fact very broad. Distinctions can and must therefore be made. Of these later, in Section Three.

All fundamental ties—except for C and of course the connectives we do not yet know what they are—as well as what “goes with them” are essences. Despite the differences among the ties themselves, in this respect there is no difference between foil and system. Essence, however, contains two further kinds. This difference in style was mentioned in Section One. One additional kind are the *universals*. Red or redness though not of course  $red_1$ ,  $red_2$ ;  $c$  and  $sft$  though not of course  $c_1$ , and so on, are universals. So are triangle or triangularity, pitch, tone, and countless others. The second additional kind are the *essential facts*, i.e., all and only those facts whose constituents are all essences. Since the simplicity pattern is rejected, we are not surprised to encounter this kind. Nor shall I make much of it, any more than of the thing-fact dichotomy. Notice, though, that while universals, like items, are things,  $red_1$  C  $spot_1$ , being expressed by a sentence, is what everyone would call a fact although, two items being among its constituents, it is not an essential fact. Since all real entities are items, which are things, facts like this one are ontologically homeless. Such impoverishment of reality as compared with the realm of essence is striking. It will be well to keep it in mind.

*Pitch* C *tone* is an essential fact; so is *red is a color*. The first shows that C is also a nexus among essences. In the second sentence, 'is' stands for *predication*, the second nexus, one among essences and essences only. The linguistic connotation of the word, predication, makes it awkward. Yet, 'exemplification' is pre-empted, and I know of no better word. It is at any rate Husserl's own; just as he himself insists that the copula in the commonsensical 'This is red' does not stand for predication.<sup>7</sup> The latter sentence will be discussed in Section Six.

<sup>7</sup> *Logische Untersuchungen* (Niemayer, 1922) II, 1, p. 125 (hereafter *LU*).

Redness is One; "its" items are Many. The system's universals are not, but correspond to, the foil's (nonrelational) characters. The system's items are not, but correspond to, the foil's individuals. Items are, rather, what the British tradition calls perfect particulars. One salient difference is that, unlike the foil's individuals and characters, items and universals belong to different modes, the latter being classed with what in the foil "merely" subsists. To say the same thing differently, for once taking advantage of the flavor of philosophical uses, if in the foil I were to use 'real', I would insist that individuals and characters are both real. These are good reasons for calling Husserl a nominalist.

Items are not bare. If they were, why call them as they are called,  $red_1$ ,  $sft_1$ , and so on?<sup>8</sup> The recognition pattern thus had its part in shaping the system, even though items, being *hic et nunc*, are in fact never presented twice. Items not being bare, is there anything in or about them to gather them, as somehow they must be gathered, under "their" universals? Those answering Yes will soon bog down in the dialectic of the Third Man. The answer at least implicit in the system is that, say, all "red" items are tied to their universal, red, by the third and last nexus of the system. I call this nexus *participation*, mark it occasionally by '<'.  $Red_1$  < *red* is a fact. Retain that it, too, is without ontological status. Only essential facts "exist." Notice also what from the viewpoint of general ontology is perhaps the major structural difference between foil and system. While the former (aside from the connectives) has only one, the latter has *three fundamental ties*.

Since participation, being an essence, has ontological status, it may, just as the foil's exemplification, be presented to us. In terms of structural economy, items might therefore as well be bare, just as the foil's individuals are. Yet they are not. Such redundancy is a flaw, indicating a tension in the structure. Its plausible cause is aversion to bareness. A plausible effect, we shall see, is that in the second system the items of the first have become hypostatized sense qualities. The choice of the Platonic term, participation, is deliberate, of course. Even so, I shall not defend it historically. 'Conceptualism', which I also used, covers a lot of confusion. To place the One as "concepts" in the mind is a shallow dead end. The expository device of the truncated world makes that even more obvious. Husserl was not shallow. The only serious alternative to either realism<sub>1</sub> or dead-end nominalism is to grant ontological status to both the One and the Many while at the same time setting them ontologically as far apart as possible. Husserl did just that.

<sup>8</sup> For the dialectic of bareness in connection with independence and existence, see E. B. Allaire, "Existence, Independence, and Universals," *Philosophical Review*, 69, 1960, 485-96.

That is why I called him a conceptualist, in the only worthwhile sense of the term I can think of.<sup>9</sup>

The localization pattern was introduced as one of two major motives for the dichotomy of the realms. *The essential (universal) is the intelligible and the necessary.* This is the second major motive. Call it the *intelligibility pattern*. The implied synonymy of 'essential' and 'universal' in this and other contexts is more than authorized by the texts. Historically, it is easy to understand why the pattern swayed one on whose philosophical horizon Kant loomed as large as on Husserl's. It is not at all easy to say commonsensically what the formula might mean. Universals are recognizable (knowable); the distance between certain philosophical uses of 'knowable' and 'intelligible' is not large; there is thus some overlap with the recognition pattern. This, though, is merely a nuance. "All essential facts (truths) and only essential facts are both intelligible and necessary." That is how in the system the formula is understood. That leads to the core. *Red is a color. The triangle is a plane figure. Red and green exclude each other* (in the familiar sense). These are three essential truths. A large part of the tradition staked out a claim of peculiar status for them by calling them and their like *a priori*. Again, this philosophical use of 'a priori' is not easily explicated. But its connection with some uses of 'intelligible' and 'necessary' is at least very familiar. I cannot here possibly go beyond this hint. But I can and shall next show, first, how the pattern may make one insensitive to another flaw in the system; and, second, how the system's notion of necessity cannot even within it do the job it is supposed to do. This is not just a flaw; it is a mistake.

*First.* Green is a color; red is a color; and so on. The colors are Many; color is One. Nor of course are the colors parts of color. A master does not make this kind of mistake. Like participation, predication is therefore threatened by the dialectic of the Third Man. The only way to avoid the threat is, again, to give predication ontological status. The system does just that. Thus predication may be presented to me. The trouble is that if it must be presented for me to know that, say, green is a color, just as in the foil I must be presented with exemplification in order to know that a certain individual exemplifies a certain character, then it is no longer easy to see why this fact, green's being a color, is "intelligible" in some special sense of the word. Perhaps we shall be told that it is intelligible because it is also "necessary." Maybe so. For me, nothing comes through. I merely see another flaw.

*Second.* Red and green exclude each other. Call this essential truth

*S.* We need not completely assay it if the reader is willing to take on trust that all its constituents are essences. Let now  $red_1$  and  $green_1$  be two items and consider  $S'$ :  $red_1$  and  $green_1$  exclude each other. Unless  $S'$  is also necessary, the "necessity" of  $S$  does not do its job. So far, exclusiveness having been introduced as an essence, it is not even clear what the sentence expressing  $S'$  means. The system, as it must, takes it to mean  $(red_1 < red)$  and  $(green_1 < green)$  and  $S$ .<sup>10</sup> The last of the three conjunction terms is necessary; the other two, since they contain items, are not. Hence,  $S'$  is not necessary. This is the mistake. We had better explore its cause immediately. That requires mention of (mental) acts, which in the truncated world surely are out of place. But I shall once more compromise with the strategy lest the combination of abstractness and disjointedness become unbearable. The new notions of the next paragraph will be taken up in Section Four.

We have two eyes, one the mind's, one the senses', the latter being blind without the former, the former staring into the void without the latter. The metaphor is as old as it is beautiful; so beautiful that one is tempted to call it a pattern. Of course it is not unrelated to the recognition pattern. In the system it lives in the distinction between two kinds of acts. (Some) items are the intentions of (acts of) *sensory intuition*; (some) essences (things and facts) those of (acts of) *eidetic intuition*. Assume now that an act intuiting  $red_1$  is immediately followed by one intuiting  $red$ . If so, the former is a part of the latter. If that part-nexus itself immediately becomes the intention of a third act, the highest degree of evidence is bestowed upon  $red_1 < red$ . Phenomenologists may find this account a bit rough. For our purposes the roughness does not hurt. (My callousness indicates rejection of certain familiar excesses of phenomenological microscopy.) What does matter is that "evidence" is held to pertain to an act or acts and not to the intention  $red_1 < red$ , which is, we notice, the first constituent of  $S'$ . The high degree of evidence thus bestowed on but not pertaining to the first two constituents of  $S'$  is, I submit, the reason why it was not seen that necessity cannot consistently within the system be attributed to them and, therefore, not to  $S'$  itself. More crudely, what pertains to the intention (the "object") has been put into the act (the "subject"). That is the essence of psychologism. Husserl, of course, was its most implacable enemy. Yet, at this subtle point he became its victim. That is why the mistake is bad indeed, not just a subtlety missed.

### III

To be louder, larger, later, are all *relations*. In the foil some relations are entities (simple characters), some are compounds. The latter are

<sup>10</sup> *LU*, II, 1, p. 256.

<sup>9</sup> For further comments on conceptualism, see R. Grossmann, "Conceptualism," *Review of Metaphysics*, 13, 1960, 243-54.



accounted for in terms of the former. The details don't matter. In the system, no entity is a relation. How then does it account for any? The answer requires another glance at the part-nexus.

Pitch and loudness are parts of tone. Neither part can be without the whole and, therefore, without the other. Two such entities are said to *found each other*. Consider next our dichord. There can be a tone without a dichord, but there cannot be a dichord without two tones. That is expressed by saying that while the tones jointly *found* the dichord, tone(s) and dichord do not found each other. All this goes for items as well as essences.

Our dichord is a third. Add another, the fifth on the same base. How is the difference between the two accounted for? In the foil the answer is obvious. To make it short, assume that  $hg'$  and  $hg''$  are simple relational characters, the first exemplified by any (ordered) pair of (tone) individuals which make a third; the second, by any pair making a fifth. In the system, the two intervals, call them *thrd* and *fth*, are wholes, even though not "independent" ones, since pitches and loudnesses found each other. That, though, does not matter here. Consider now (1) ( $c_1 \mathbf{C} \textit{thrd}_1$ ) and ( $e_1 \mathbf{C} \textit{thrd}_1$ ), (2) ( $c_1 \mathbf{C} \textit{fth}_1$ ) and ( $g_1 \mathbf{C} \textit{fth}_1$ ), (3) ( $x \mathbf{C} z$ ) and ( $y \mathbf{C} z$ ). (3) shows that as far as their part-whole structure is concerned, (1) and (2) are indistinguishable, which shows in turn that the difference between the two intervals cannot be accounted for in terms of this structure alone. Nor does the system attempt to do that. It accounts for it in terms of this structure and of something else.

I spoke about items. I could instead have spoken in terms of the three universals,  $c$ ,  $e$ ,  $g$ . So far, that would have made no difference. The something else, however, lies in the realm of essence. What it is will be better understood if we first understand what it is not. If there were two relational universals corresponding to the foil's  $hg'$  and  $hg''$ , then the two intervals could be distinguished from each other, e.g.,  $c_1$  and  $e_1$  making a third, could be construed as ( $c_1 < c$ ) and ( $e_1 < e$ ) and ( $hg'(c, e)$ ).<sup>11</sup> Within the system at least, that would be an adequate solution. From the outside, all one could say against it is that it betrays once more a tendency to impoverish reality in favor of essence. This, however, is not what is done. In the system nothing is a relation.

What then is that something else? We are told, first, that  $c$ ,  $e$ ,  $g$  all have their own "natures." If that is taken to mean that they are recognizable then it can be understood. We are told, second, that these

<sup>11</sup> The parentheses in the third conjunction term are borrowed from the logical notation to stand for predication.

(nonrelational) natures "found" the (relational) intervals; e.g.,  $c$  and  $e$  jointly found the third. This, too, I understand if I may take it as before. But then, we saw that by itself their part-whole structure does not suffice to distinguish the intervals. Hence it must mean something more. What is this something more? The only answer I can think of leads to catastrophe. Consider in addition to  $c$  and  $e$  the pairs  $d, f$ ;  $e, g$ ; and so on. They are all thirds. Hence, they must all have something in common with each other but not with, say, the pairs "of" the fifth. This something, we saw, is not a relational essence predicable of these and only these pairs. The only other alternative is that there is a something that is shared by the "natures" of the two members of each pair of, say, the third but not, of course, by any other pair. The interval thus is the One; the pairs, the Many. Hence, as twice before, the Third Man threatens. Seen from the foil, the only difference is indeed that this time we deal not with exemplification between individuals and characters but, rather, between characters of the first and the second type. The first two times the threat could be avoided, even though at the price of a flaw. This time it is fatal.

A plausible reason why all this was not seen is not hard to come by.  $C$  and  $e$  making a third is counted as an essential truth and therefore as intelligible. The threat remained hidden behind the blur produced by the notion of intelligibility. Recall an Aristotelian pattern preserved in ordinary speech, for the most part quite harmlessly, like an insect in amber. "It is in the nature of this thing to have that property; hence its actually having the property is intelligible." That makes the occurrence of 'nature' at this point a give-away cue. The point is that the notion of an intelligible nature blurs the distinction between things and facts. The two things in the case are the two (nonrelational) universals; the (relational) fact, their making a third. Whether or not this diagnosis is correct, the system fails to account for relations. Such failure of so great a master seems almost incredible. So I cite the text.<sup>12</sup> Yet, Husserl is not the only one to have failed at this point. I am becoming ever more convinced that Russell was the first who really understood relations. That is one measure of his greatness.

Much of space and time is relational. Hence this large part of them cannot be accounted for either. Nor is that all. Assume for the sake of the argument that the system's account of all other relations is adequate. It would still be inadequate for all spatial and temporal ones, unless moments and places are counted as items so that "their" uni-

<sup>12</sup> *LU*, II, 1, p. 283.

versals may have (or be) natures. The first system is thus committed to making the "objective" space and time of nonmental reality absolute.<sup>13</sup> The only alternative is to make both space and time wholly mental or "subjective." This is of course what happens in the second system, where everything real is mental. Space, since I must limit myself, I shall ignore. To time, since it is crucial in the transition from the first system to the second, I shall return.

## IV

The time has come to introduce *mind*. In the first system, that requires of course new entities, items as well as essences, but no new "ordinary" kinds<sup>14</sup> in either realm nor, at least explicitly, a new nexus. The same goes for the foil, except that there a new nexus is needed. The foil thus really has two nexus: exemplification, which is pervasive; and one other, as yet unnamed, which is the hallmark of mind. The vehicle of awareness in both system and foil are (mental) *acts*. 'Awareness' is used generically. The several species of this genus are perceiving, remembering, imagining, thinking, doubting, and so on. In the foil, though not in the system, sensing is also an act.

*The foil's act is a fact*, an individual's exemplifying two simple characters. These three "new" entities are called mental. All mental entities are of course phenomenal ones. As the words are here used, the converse does not hold. *Sensa* and their characters, though of course phenomenal, are not mental. In the last Section that will become important. Mental individuals, like all others, are momentary and bare. As such, a mental individual is therefore not an awareness. (It has no "nature.") Loosely speaking, though only loosely speaking, the two characters it exemplifies make it an awareness, just as certain other characters make the individuals exemplifying them tones. One of the two mental characters I call a *species*; the other, a *meaning*. The several species are perceiving, remembering, imagining, and so on.

A meaning *means* its *intention*. When I doubt that it will rain tomorrow, doubting is the species of the act; its raining tomorrow, the

<sup>13</sup> This fits well with the affinity to Leibniz which later on Husserl himself stressed. Concerning the important sense in which Leibnizian space and time are absolute, see the Leibniz essay in *Meaning and Existence*.

<sup>14</sup> Since the first system is here identified with the *Untersuchungen*, it should perhaps be mentioned that this is not quite accurate for the transitional sixth Inquiry where, to say the least, the concern with Self comes to the fore. Since Selves (and Time) are the only continuants, one will want to call them a "new" kind.

intention. 'Means', I shall sometimes mark it by '*M*', stands for the foil's second nexus. When in a second act I am aware of one of my acts, the intention of the second act is phenomenal. The intention of an act of perceiving, say, that Peter is blond, is a perceptual fact, Peter's being blond. Some may wonder why I consistently avoid the more common 'physical' and 'material', using 'perceptual' instead. The reason is, simply enough, that it helps to keep out from where it does not belong the further question about how we come to replace what we perceive, say, a chair, by the denizens of science, say, a cloud of electrons. *A meaning and its intention are always two, never one*. That is, of course, the great lesson of Brentano.

*The foil's intentions are all facts*. Facts are expressed by sentences. That is why elsewhere I call meanings propositions. In the system intentions are either things or facts. Later on I would therefore have to speak of propositional and nonpropositional propositions, which is very awkward. So I replace here 'proposition' by 'meaning', which as it happens is also the best translation of Husserl's own word, *Bedeutung*.

*M* is a nexus, connecting the act, which is phenomenal and even mental, with its intention, which often is neither. That is one of the pillars of the foil's structural realism<sub>2</sub>. It also raises an immediate question. One term of the nexus is a meaning which, being simple, exists and is exemplified whenever the act occurs. But how about the second term, the intention, in case of, say, a false belief? A detailed answer may be found elsewhere. However, since the point is structurally crucial, I shall comment briefly. First. The difficulty is, of course, that the intention of a false belief, say, the fact of the moon's being made of green cheese does not exist (is not the case). Commonsensically we speak without hesitation about facts not existing. Those trying to get us into trouble are starting on the dialectic of the philosophical uses. Second. The foil is a thing ontology. Thus in it no fact "exists." Third. Let '*S*<sup>1</sup>' be a meaning; *S*, the fact which is its intention. In the foil '*S*<sup>1</sup>*MS*' is analytic. Everyone accepts '*S* or not-*S*' as analytic, even though one of the two constituent facts is not the case.

That will do for the foil; now for the system.

About one half of the *Untersuchungen* is an analysis of the act, interwoven with a penetrating examination of the tradition as well as a good deal of psychological material. The whole is of a subtlety and richness which make it an imperishable masterpiece. This I now appreciate. Yet we need not be overawed. In many respects the system's and the foil's analyses agree. The differences are of three kinds. Some do not matter for what really matters. Some, without being important in

themselves, merely reflect important differences between the two ontologies. Three, we shall see, are crucial.

*The system's acts are real things.* An act is thus a "new" item. Every act has two parts. Being themselves items, the two parts are not, but correspond to, the foil's species and meaning. This, though, is just one of those differences which flow from the difference in the ground plan without making much difference for our purpose. No harm will therefore come to us if we call these two part items of an act item its *species* and its *meaning*. Neither a species nor a meaning is ever simple; they are themselves wholes; of this presently. *A meaning and its intention are always two, never one.* In the language of the system, even (what I call) a phenomenal intention is never literally a part of its act. This is again the great lesson of Brentano. Husserl acknowledges it with the generosity of one who can well afford to be generous.

How are a meaning and its intention connected? In the system they remain unconnected. That is the *first crucial difference*. If it seems surprising, consider that in ontology fundamental ties and relations (in combination with fundamental ties) are the only means of "connecting" anything with anything else. Participation and predication are obviously unsuited for the purpose; and we have seen that an act's intention is never a part of it. Yet there are no other nexus in the system. Nor are there "ordinary" relations. But one need not rely on inference. We are told most explicitly that while meanings are non-relational they do yet by their "nature" point beyond themselves at their intentions. They are, as it were, intrinsically relational. This is absurd. So I cite again the text.<sup>15</sup> Failure to understand relations as well as lack of clarity<sup>16</sup> concerning the distinction between fundamental ties and relations are two plausible reasons why the absurdity was not felt. Whether or not the diagnosis is correct, there is in the system no ontological bridge between the perceptual world and that of the mind. Calling them two worlds rather than one is therefore not just a metaphor. Small wonder, then, that in the second system the perceptual world no longer "exists." That is why the difference is crucial.

The system's meanings are all wholes. How then are their constitu-

<sup>15</sup> *LU*, II, 1, p. 368, 435. The "intentional relation," we are told, must be "purely descriptively understood as the intrinsic nature" of the (nonrelational) act. Remember the two pitches which, though nonrelational, by their intrinsic natures found the interval. The case in hand is only more extreme.

<sup>16</sup> That is most strikingly revealed by *LU*, II, 1, p. 280, where in a polemic against Twardowski Bradley's problem, whose solution as we know depends on recognizing the need for fundamental ties, is used as an argument against granting ontological status to relations.

ents held together? In the foil, all meanings are simples. Hence the question does not arise. This is the *second crucial difference*. In the system, the only consistent answer is that a meaning's ultimate constituents are its simple parts. Presently we shall see that this answer is not available, which makes the difference crucial. To understand that in detail, one must first understand the third difference.

In the foil sensing is an act. In the system it is not. This is the *third crucial difference*. What, then, is the system's account of *sensation*? Even though the word *sensation* (*Empfindung*) is Husserl's, I use it reluctantly since, as G. E. Moore pointed out in the *Refutation*, it blurs the distinction between sensing and the sensed. To this extent, Moore, too, knew the great lesson. It has been conjectured that it came to him from Brentano, either directly or through Stout. Perhaps that is why, at least after a fashion, British philosophy could afford to ignore Husserl. Yet it is a pity.<sup>17</sup> In the foil, of course, 'sensation' is expendable. There are *sensa* and their characters; there is the species called sensing; and there are the suitable meanings.

The system's sensations are not bare. In this one respect they are like items. A case could perhaps be made that officially they are items. Really they are not; or so at least I am prepared to argue. They are too amorphous for that, as it were; they are all  $\epsilon\lambda\eta$  and, except for not being bare, completely devoid of  $\mu\omicron\pi\phi\eta$ . The Greek words are again Husserl's own, taken from the *Ideen*.<sup>18</sup> The idea is already in the *Untersuchungen*. Two modifications I shall permit myself in arguing the point will help to bring it out without distorting it and, at the same time, simplify the exposition. In the second system there are Selves. I shall introduce them into the first. That is one modification. Sensing not being intentional, if there are Selves, what else could sensations be but (momentary) properties of (continuant) Selves? I shall assume that they are just that. This is the second modification. Both merely anticipate the second system. Husserl also speaks of sensory qualities. But one must not be misled by either 'property' or 'quality.' Since these entities are (and remain) real, they are of course not universals. Still another warning about words may help. When you sense red, you have, Husserl says, a *Rotempfindung*. In German a single word is conveniently available. In English we must choose between 'sensation

<sup>17</sup> Husserl's students haven't helped, alas; least of all the existentialists who acknowledge a debt to phenomenology. Nor I suppose has Ryle's completely negative, though in certain respects very acute review of the Farber commentary in *Philosophy*, 21, 1946.

<sup>18</sup> *Ideen zu einer reinen Phaenomenologie und Phaenomenologischen Philosophie*, Erstes Buch (Niemayer, 1928), p. 172 ff. (hereafter *Id*).

of red' and 'red sensation'. The first phrase suggests intentionality; the second that the entity it stands for is complex. Both suggestions mislead. The second phrase seems to me the lesser evil, if only because in writing it can be mitigated by a hyphen. So I shall speak of red-sensations, green-sensations, and so on.

Represent a Self by a solid sphere; its now having a red-sensation, by the sphere's surface now being red all over. Think of the red surface as a coat that can be put on and lifted off the solid. Imagine that there are many such coats, to be put on and lifted off, one for each sensory quality. When the Self has several sensations simultaneously, the solid wears more than one coat. When, for instance, two color spots are perceived, since extensions are sensed, there are (at least) four coats. These coats surround the solid in a certain order, say, in the direction from the center, first the two color-coats, then the two extension-coats. In this respect the representation is richer than what it represents. There is no order or any other sort of structure among simultaneous sensations. Notice, too, that the two color-coats, each covering the sphere all over, are in this sense compatible. Since color-coats are not color-items, there is no contradiction; yet there is food for thought. All this shows what I meant by calling sensations too amorphous to be items. What in particular could possibly be meant by saying that any two of them, say, two all-over extension-coats support a part-whole nexus? I, for one, find the whole doctrine absurd, if only because I am not acquainted with those amorphous entities. That is why I resorted to a representation. Yet this is unquestionably Husserl's doctrine, in both systems. Nor is it just his. It is indeed a large part of the meaning of the metaphor that the eye of the senses is blind. One consequence of this strange doctrine is easily explained. Yet, structurally crucial as it is, it deserves a Section of its own.

## V

Return for the last time to the dichord as I now hear it; writing it  $[(c_1, sft_1), (e_1, ld_1)]$ . Call the wholes corresponding to the two parentheses *tone<sub>1</sub>*, *tone<sub>2</sub>*, respectively, and that corresponding to the bracket, which is the dichord itself, *ch<sub>1</sub>*. Consider next the alternative dichord  $[(c_1, ld_1), (e_1, sft_1)]$ . Call its three nonsimple items *tone<sub>3</sub>*, *tone<sub>4</sub>*, *ch<sub>2</sub>*. *Ch<sub>1</sub>* and *ch<sub>2</sub>* and their subwholes differ; the simples founding them are the same, *c<sub>1</sub>*, *e<sub>1</sub>*, *ld<sub>1</sub>*, *sft<sub>1</sub>*. Their part-whole structures as such are also indistinguishable. The only difference is that while in *ch<sub>1</sub>*, for instance, *c<sub>1</sub>* and *sft* are parts of a subwhole, in *ch<sub>2</sub>* they are not; and so on. Simples not being bare, this difference suffices, *objectively* or on the side of the intentions, to distinguish between the two dichords. The example is so

chosen that the system's inadequate account of relations does no harm. For the argument at hand one may even assume that this latter account is adequate throughout. That merely strengthens the argument and illuminates the strategy.

*Subjectively* or on the side of the acts, the two meanings having the two chords as their respective intentions must differ; otherwise we wouldn't know the two chords from each other. Yet they are both *colligated* from the same material, a *c*-sensation, an *e*-sensation, a *sft*-sensation, and a *ld*-sensation. Everything will therefore be well if and only if the "nexus" I just called colligation establishes among these four sensations the same structure as the part nexus establishes among the simple items of the chords.

Sensations, we saw, are too amorphous to support the part nexus. What, then, could colligation be? In the first system there is no answer. The only way out is to make it issue from the Self. In the representation, imagine a hand reaching out from the center of the sphere and, in order to produce the meaning which goes with *ch<sub>1</sub>*, first colligating the sensations corresponding to *c<sub>1</sub>* and *sft<sub>1</sub>*, then the two corresponding to *e<sub>1</sub>* and *ld<sub>1</sub>*, then the two products with each other. Correspondingly for *ch<sub>2</sub>*. How does the hand or Self know in which of the two alternative ways to proceed when one of the two dichords is perceived? The answer is that it doesn't. That spells disaster. As once before, what is "objective" has been put into the "subject." The first time it was a subtle point about necessity. This time the account of perception has collapsed. This time therefore the charge of psychologism is not strong enough. We are half way on the road to idealism.

The hand performs an *act*. The word is old; the meaning is new. In performing those "acts" of colligation, the hand is "active" in the categorial sense in which an Aristotelian or scholastic Self is active. Colligation is neither passive nor an item. An act in the original sense of the first system is both. In this system there is of course no Self and no hand. Nor did I claim that it is explicitly idealistic. I merely undertook to show that the later idealism is implicit in its structure.

'Colligate' has been suggested to me by the French *colliger*, which is one of the key words of the *Méditations*. In this very late book there is very much about wholes. But these wholes are all products of colligation and all the colligating is done by a very "active" Self. It is indeed, as the author insists, virtually a Leibnizian Self.

The "active" Selves of the tradition are all continuants and they are not bare but have "natures." That holds also for the Self of the second system. Of this later. One structural reason, though, for the Self which has been anticipatorily introduced not being bare is im-

plicit in what has been said already. To make it explicit, it will be best to start from the foil.

The foil's mental individuals (loosely: awarenesses) are both momentary and bare. Again, when sensing something, say, a single qualified sensum, I am not thereby aware of my sensing it. As Husserl says, poetically rather than accurately,<sup>19</sup> I live not in the act but in its intention, the qualified sensum. Yet, an act of sensing is there and its being there accounts for there being consciousness (awareness) of the qualified sensum. What then, one may reasonably ask, accounts in the system for a property of the Self, whether sensory quality or act item, being conscious? The only answer I can think of is: It is conscious because it is a property of the Self. But to say that and to say that the "nature" of Self is consciousness is ontologically one thing and not two. One is reminded of Descartes' Self whose nature is indeed consciousness (thought) and which therefore, since it is a continuant, always thinks.<sup>20</sup>

## VI

Looking at the ink spot on the blotter, one may say 'This spot is red'. How does the first system ontologically assay what the sentence expresses? The answer can be read off from its transcription into the notation we incidentally developed. The only possible transcription is '(red<sub>1</sub> C spot<sub>1</sub>) and (red<sub>1</sub> < red) and (spot<sub>1</sub> < spot)'. Nor is it implausible; in the system, therefore, it will do. But assume now that on the same occasion 'This is red' has been uttered. This even simpler sentence cannot within the system consistently be transcribed. To be precise, the difficulty is not to transcribe 'This is red' but, rather, 'This is red<sub>1</sub>'. For, once a transcription of the latter sentence is available, one of the former can immediately be obtained, in the spirit of the system, by conjoining it with 'red<sub>1</sub> < red'. In the *Untersuchungen* the difficulty is clearly stated but not resolved. Its resolution in the second system is not only explicitly idealistic but very close to the core of the idealism if not, perhaps, its very core. That is the claim of this Section. Before arguing it, it may be well to locate the claim in the tradition. That will show that it is neither as bold nor as extravagant as it may seem.

Items have here been marked by attaching subscripts to the names of universals, red<sub>1</sub>, red<sub>2</sub>, and so on. Husserl speaks instead of *this red*

<sup>19</sup> Thereby hang some differences between system and foil which are anything but negligible, even though here they can safely be neglected, in the account of perception. For the latter, see "Dell'Atto."

<sup>20</sup> Eventually the Self, whether or not it actually thinks (is aware of something), becomes indeed "the pure cogito." See, e.g., *Husserliana*, IV, pp. 102-105 (Nijhoff, 1952), which is the second book of *Ideen*.

or *that red* or a red-item. (*Rotmoment* is conveniently one word.) The verbal distance between the phrase and the sentence, 'this red' and 'this is red', is small. The difference between what they purport to express is large; that is why I resorted to numerals. Yet, both expressions are blurred. Items are not bare. That accounts for the adjectival component of either expression. The second component, be it numeral or demonstrative, is the cause of the blur. Directly or as such, items cannot be recognized. (Nor, as we know, can *sensa* or chairs.) In other words, there is nothing in the item itself to make it either *this* or *that*, or the *first* or the *second*. The second component of either expression therefore marks merely the times one has encountered a red-item, which is something "subjective" and not "objective." Objectively, therefore, the second component is redundant.<sup>21</sup> Negatively, it merely reminds us that in the context 'red' does not stand for a universal. Positively, it tells us that 'red' is used as one "name" to name indifferently more than one thing. I do not know what it means for a name to name more than one thing; hence the quotation marks around the word. The *common-name* doctrine is nonetheless one of the classical gambits of nominalism. Husserl, making red<sub>1</sub> < red available elsewhere in the system, escapes one of the difficulties most variants of the gambit are up against. He does not escape another. If 'this' and 'red<sub>1</sub>' both stand for the item—one as a proper, the other as a common name, as one says—then the copula in 'This is red' cannot but stand for identity. But this is not what the sentence purports to express. Hence, the sentence cannot be transcribed. That is the difficulty, shared with all other variants of the common-name doctrine, which the first system does not escape. Let us next inquire into the form it takes there, or, if you please, how it came to be noticed.

*First*. Meanings, being items, are not bare. If they were, how could they participate in recognizable universals? Nor are we surprised. We know by now that nothing is bare. *Second*. A propositional meaning is a whole. Its parts are the meanings of the words that occur in the sentence expressing it.<sup>22</sup> And, of course, every act has a meaning. *Third*. The propositional meaning of 'This is red<sub>1</sub>' has as its parts the meanings of 'This', 'is', and 'red<sub>1</sub>'; just as three acts with these three partial meanings are among those founding the one with the propositional

<sup>21</sup> For a closely related argument, see R. G. Turnbull, "Ockham's Nominalistic Logic: Some Twentieth Century Reflections," to appear in *The New Scholasticism*.

<sup>22</sup> Words in this sense are those of "pure grammar," which in a natural language may have to be expressed by phrases. With the notion of a pure grammar Husserl clearly anticipates certain aspects of what is now called an ideal language.

meaning. *Fourth.* Consider now these three acts. Treat 'red<sub>1</sub>' frankly as a common name and you will convince yourself once more that the partial act intending the item has a meaning which is not bare. Whatever the difficulties connected with 'is' may be, the nexus it stands for is recognizable. Again, therefore, the act intending it has a meaning which is not bare. Not so for the act relating to 'This'! To put it as before, numeral or demonstrative pertain to the act, not to its intention. That does not mean that all acts intending a This and nothing else do not have something in common. Only, this Something pertains to them, not to their intentions. The meaning of these acts would therefore be bare. I say would because, in the first system and not only there, such an act is an absurdity. That is how the difficulty arises there and is noticed.<sup>23</sup>

The resolution is one of the themes pervading *Erfahrung und Urteil*. Thus there is no need to quote or cite much. This text, one of the latest, is of course most explicitly idealistic. It also carries phenomenological microscopy to extremes. I am aware of a red-item in an act of sensory intuition. The microscopist notices that sometimes in becoming aware of the item, in focusing on it, as it were, all one is fleetingly aware of is a wholly indeterminate Something, a This, a *τόδε τι*.<sup>24</sup> He concludes that even the simplest act of sensory intuition is already founded (a whole). As the characteristic founding part he proposes an "act" by which the Self hypostatizes (objectivates, externalizes, posits) one of its sensory qualities, i.e., the sort of thing I call phenomenal, into a Something or This, of the sort I call perceptual, without as yet further determining it as, say, a red-item. To use once more the metaphor, at the risk of straining it, this time the hand reaching from the center of the sphere does not just colligate what it finds on the surface. In this particular instance it does in fact not colligate anything. Rather, it grasps what it finds there and, piercing the surface, holds it out into space, thus making it into a simulacrum of something neither mental nor even phenomenal. This is the founding "act"! I need not, I trust, once more justify the quotation marks. It is not an act in the original sense but, rather, the activity of a Self creating the world. *Vergegenständlichung ist immer eine active Leistung des Ich*.<sup>25</sup> We are in plain idealism.

Preferring an anticlimax to loose ends, I raise two questions. Has the

<sup>23</sup> *LU*, II, 1, p. 83 and II, 2, pp. 18-22. The first passage, from the first Inquiry, where the difficulty is noticed, is cited in the second, from the transitional sixth Inquiry, where the idealistic "solution" is all but explicit.

<sup>24</sup> *Id.*, p. 28, cited in *Erfahrung und Urteil* (Academia-Prag, 1939), p. 160.

<sup>25</sup> *Erfahrung und Urteil*, p. 64.

difficulty, as it originally presented itself, really been resolved? The answer is, perhaps, that in the second system the craftsmanship is not as exquisite as in the first. Does the realm of essence, too, eventually lose its ontological status? The answer is Yes. Consider an act of eidetic intuition intending the universal red. It is founded by the one of sensory intuition just considered. And from nothing nothing comes. Simulacrum spawns simulacrum, as it were.

## VII

The strategy must by now be obvious. Step by step the system has been unfolded against the foil. At each step a tension point came into view, each a corrosion of nonphenomenal existence. Their effect is cumulative. Moreover, they make a *crescendo*. The first was a subtle point about necessity. With the last we landed, *fortissimo*, in plain idealism. Yet idealism is hard to swallow. Swallowing it took Husserl some time, probably also some struggle. *Which pattern or patterns controlled this last decisive step?* Before the job is done, the question must be answered. Three further ones were left pending. The foil's building stones (simples) are all phenomenal entities. *How can such an ontology be realistic<sub>2</sub> in structure?* A Self was introduced as an expository device into the first system. *How and why is it actually introduced into the second?* Finally, *how is time eventually accounted for?* The answers to all four questions depend, though of course not exclusively, on a single pattern. That is why they are gathered together in this single Section. After they shall have been answered, one last task will remain. In the introduction Husserl's movement from realism to idealism was attributed, though again of course not exclusively, to two major "mistakes," his nominalism and his failure to understand relations. Formally, this diagnosis is the major claim of the study. The justification, such as it is, of that claim is its body. The last task and proper conclusion will be to spell it out.

Everything we know is analyzable in terms of what we are *acquainted* with (otherwise we would not know what we are talking about). The parenthetical clause shows not only that as it stands the formula is epistemological but also its ontological impact. As we ordinarily use 'acquainted', we have acquaintance with phenomenal as well as with perceptual objects. Yet there is a difference. Phenomenal objects are the only ones with which we are *directly acquainted*. That is one traditional way of expressing the difference. If our formula is taken to speak of direct acquaintance only, it becomes the formula of the *Cartesian turn*, which was the true Copernican revolution in philosophy.

What sort of thing is the "analysis" the formula mentions? We need



not tarry to answer beyond pointing out a connection all uses of 'analysis' and 'simple' preserve. One thing having been "analyzed" in terms of some others, the latter are said to be "simpler" than the former. That suggests combining the Cartesian turn with the simplicity pattern. The result is a further pattern. All "*existents*" are *phenomenal* (simples). Call it the *acquaintance pattern*. Many philosophers adopted it because they were convinced that large blocks of the traditional dialectic cannot be mastered without "in the last analysis"<sup>26</sup> resorting to phenomenal entities. The trouble is that they seem thereby committed to phenomenism which, being a kind of idealism, is hard to swallow.

Commonsensibly, there are (exist) minds as well as bodies. One who has executed the linguistic turn always speaks commonsensibly. Literally, therefore, the foil could not possibly accept any pattern. Yet it accepts the Cartesian turn. After a fashion it therefore also accepts the acquaintance pattern; insisting that all statements mentioning anything nonphenomenal can be replaced, *adequately for all purposes of philosophical analysis*, by statements mentioning only phenomenal simples. Method and tradition being what they are, that makes all ontological building stones phenomenal. The italicized clause must of course be dialectically defended. If the defense fails, so does the foil. This is not the place to defend it once more. Nor can I here fully expound how such an ontology manages to be realistic<sub>2</sub> in structure. But I must briefly state six points on which the case rests.

1. To say that statements about chairs can for certain purposes be replaced by statements about *sensa*, is not to say that chairs are or consist of *sensa*. This point was seen clearly by the so-called linguistic phenomenists who flourished earlier in the century. 2. Since commonsensibly there are phenomenal as well as perceptual things, one who appreciates the fundamental distinction between ordinary and philosophical uses could not possibly take the acquaintance pattern to mean that there are only phenomenal things. To the extent that they more or less implicitly appreciated the distinction, the linguistic phenomenists more or less clearly saw this second point, too. Both points are *negative*. Thus they do not by themselves suffice to refute the charge of a "phenomenalistic structure." In the case of the linguistic phenomenists the charge is indeed irrefutable. The remaining four points are all *positive*.

3. The simples of the foil, though all phenomenal, are yet of two radically different kinds. *Sensa* and their characters are the only non-

<sup>26</sup> The phrase is barbarous. Yet here for once it serves well.

intentional entities.<sup>27</sup> Every mental individual exemplifies a meaning which by *M* is tied to the fact it intends. 4. Sensing something and being aware of sensing it, one is directly acquainted with both sides of a meaning nexus. Direct awareness contains, as it were, a model of perception. 5. While of course not directly acquainted with what we perceive, we are so acquainted with the species perceiving. 6. Since mental individuals and the two characters each of them exemplifies are simple, even if one were to use 'exist' philosophically as in the acquaintance pattern, one would have to hold that bodies and minds enjoy the same ontological status! Such counterfactuals are I think very useful in demonstrating that an ontology in the new style, in this case the foil, has the same structure as some classical ontology, in this case some realistic<sub>2</sub> ones.

Like all modern masters, Husserl always held fast to the Cartesian turn. The distinction between the two uses he did not make, naturally not, since it was still far in the future.<sup>28</sup> That alone suffices to set up, by the acquaintance pattern, a drift toward idealism. There is quite a skein, though. The localization pattern and, in conjunction with the notion of eidetic intuition, the intelligibility pattern are as decisively involved. To disentangle the skein one must first consider another question.

What makes phenomenal entities so desirable as a last resort? Two features stand out. (a) They are what they appear to be. That is *certain*. To *doubt* it doesn't even make sense. (b) If presented at all, they are *wholly presented*. That is part of their being *hic et nunc* (the localization pattern!). Universals or, for that matter, characters not being in space and time, (b) causes a difficulty. There are three ways of handling it. One may introduce a special device. Husserl's special device, not unrelated to the intelligibility pattern, is eidetic intuition. Or one may get lost in some kind of dead-end nominalism. Or one may sever the idea of being wholly presented from that of *hic et nunc*, insisting that when, say, sensing a green *sensum*, one is wholly presented with the color character it exemplifies. This is done in the foil.<sup>29</sup> Nor do I see what else a consistent realist<sub>1</sub> could do.

<sup>27</sup> This neglects "affective" individuals and characters. See the later remark about their neglect in the account of the system.

<sup>28</sup> This is not to say that Husserl's sensitivity and skill in making linguistic distinctions are not among the most extraordinary on record. The *Untersuchungen* abound with examples. The chapter on the thirteen (!) uses of 'Vorstellung (idea)' is as richly satisfying as a Bach concerto.

<sup>29</sup> See the essay on Elementarism in *Meaning and Existence*.

When I perceive a chair, there is not necessarily a chair; I may be the victim of error or even illusion. (To those who now object to this use of 'perceive' I point out that, first, there are no intrinsic criteria of veridical perception, and, second, the act involved is in both system and foil a perceiving.) A phenomenal *hic et nunc*, on the other hand, necessarily is "as it presents itself." The phrase in quotation marks drops out only too easily. The verbal distance between 'necessarily is' and 'necessarily exists' is short. The verbal bridges among 'necessary', 'indubitable', and 'certain' ((a) above), treacherous as they are, have been much trodden. Appreciating all this, one will not find it strange that in the *Ideen* Husserl proclaims what he now takes to be the one proper and essential sense or meaning of 'exist'.<sup>30</sup> In this sense, act items and their constituents exist; chairs do not. That shows how, negatively, (a) and (b), with the patterns involved, account for the last step in the transition to idealism.

Positively, Selves and Time are the "new" existents of the second system. Nor do they just exist, they are "absolute" existents. Yet a Self, being a continuant, is not *hic et nunc*; nor of course, whatever else it may be, is Time. How, then, is their exalted ontological status secured? Eidetic intuition does the job. Acts and sensory qualities, unlike Selves and Time, are momentary. They are also experiences (*Erlebnisse*). The universal, experience, is supposedly available to eidetic intuition. Eidetic intuition, we remember, presents, with the highest degree of evidence, not only some universals but also some essential truths. The following are held to be three essential truths so presented. (1) Experience presupposes an experiencer. (2) Every experience has duration. (3) Duration presupposes time. The idiom of presupposing in (1) and (3) can be replaced by that of founding. The experiencer in (1) is a Self. (3) is unpacked to mean that a duration, even if short enough to be contained in a *nunc*, cannot be "conceived" except as a "segment" of "Time." (*Nunc* is indeed not a mathematical point but more nearly a specious present.) This is how the ontological status of Selves and Time is secured.

The last paragraph states the gist of the *Ideen*. The elaboration there is very rich, of course, and it is indefatigably continued in all later writings. Disciples and commentators have dwelt on these ideas at the expense, alas, of that masterpiece, the *Untersuchungen*. Once more, there is therefore no need for documentation. For our purpose the gist will do. Nor do I wish to be tedious or appear disrespectful to

<sup>30</sup> The several strands are all clearly visible in *Id*, p. 86, where this wide-arched argument begins. Its triumphant conclusion, as far as that book is concerned, is on p. 296.

Husserl by presenting criticisms which are familiar, belong to a different tradition, and, worst of all, fall outside the rather severely limited dialectic of this study. Four comments, though, all within the limits, will serve the purpose.

*First.* In the second system acts and their constituents, including sensory qualities, are indubitably properties of Selves.<sup>31</sup> What then, one may reasonably ask, is the nexus between a Self and one of its properties. Both are real. Predication connects only essences. Hence the nexus cannot be predication. Is it exemplification? Textually, perhaps because of the lesser craftsmanship of the later years, the question is moot. Structurally, exemplification is the most reasonable answer. That illuminates the importance of the nexus which in the foil singly holds the truncated world together but has no recognized place in either system. *Second.* In the first system  $red_1$  and  $spot_1$  belong to reality. The fact  $red_1$  C  $spot_1$ , because of its essential constituent (C), does not. Nor does it fit any other ontological slot. That is why I once called it ontologically homeless. Essential facts (truths) do have a safe slot in the realm of essence. The contrast spots a tension. Its resolution in the second system is radical though no longer surprising. Selves and their properties are the only "existents." They are also real. To be real and to be an "existent" has become one and the same. A Self exemplifying (?) one of its properties is a real fact. Nor are there any others.

*Third.* An experience as lived is, as one says, a Now. Now is an essence!<sup>32</sup> Thus it is all  $\mu\omicron\rho\phi\eta$ . The contrast with the  $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon\ \tau\iota$ , which is all  $\epsilon\lambda\eta$ , is striking. *Hic* and *nunc* have parted ways, as it were. I am equally struck by the fact that if the formula is to be taken literally, then in the second system Time is not only, like everything else, "subjective" but also absolute. *Fourth.* Self and Time are "absolute" existents. Let me show how such things may come to be said by playing for a moment with 'constituting' and 'founding'. The Self, which is a continuant, by colligating and hypostatizing its momentary sensory qualities constitutes (founds) all other momentary existents, i.e., its own acts and their parts, as well as all simulacra of (nonphenomenal) existence. Time and the Self found (constitute) each other. They are the only existents which mutually constitute themselves. That makes them not just existents but the active and necessary ground of all existence (reality). Time lies even deeper than the Self.<sup>33</sup> One may get a glimpse of what that could mean by reflecting that the Self cannot

<sup>31</sup> E.g., *Id*, p. 175.

<sup>32</sup> *Id*, p. 164.

<sup>33</sup> *Husserliana*, IV, p. 103



colligate what does not lie in the same specious present. Unhappily, the same reflection makes one wonder whether anything has been said at all. But one must not be too analytical when standing at the threshold of mystery. For the rest, one is reminded of a Hegelian dictum: *Das Sein des Geistes ist die Zeit*.<sup>34</sup> Literally that is absurd. As an aphorism it is arresting. Time is indeed the substance of the world. Or, rather, that is the aphorism I prefer. However inadequately expressed, the insight is as deep as any. Quite a few have been haunted by it. To be haunted by it is one thing; to articulate it dialectically is quite another thing. Anyone who can articulate it as richly as Husserl did I salute as a master. But, alas, he did not know how to disentangle Time and Self. That made idealism the price he had to pay for thinking so deeply about time. The price is prohibitive.

Two brief comments which fit here as well as elsewhere may forestall puzzlement. The psychologists whom Husserl read and criticized distinguished sensory and affective elements. Not surprisingly, therefore, there are probably also affective qualities in the system(s). If so, they surely remain in the background. Moreover, since they are as amorphous as their twins, the sensory qualities, they make no difference for what has been discussed. So I ignored them. As I speak, one may wonder whether the second system is solipsistic. In fact it is not. If anything, it is Leibnizian. The further step or steps by which that is achieved I do not find very interesting.<sup>35</sup> Nor do they affect what is here discussed. So, again, I ignored them.

The structures of both systems now lie before us. So does the foil's. The differences responsible for the opposite movements, toward and away from idealism, have been pointed out. Even so, I should like to state or restate two of them. The first will not take us long. The sec-

<sup>34</sup> There is more than one Hegelian echo in the later texts. Merleau-Ponty caught this one very well: *Si nous devons résoudre le problème . . . de la subjectivité finie . . . ce sera en réfléchissant sur le temps et en montrant comment . . . cette subjectivité est le temps lui-même, comment on peut dire avec Hegel que le temps est l'existence de l'esprit ou parler avec Husserl d'une autoconstitution du temps. (Phénoménologie de la perception [Gallimard, 1945], p. 278)*. I take the reference from Francesco Valentini's remarkably readable *La filosofia francese contemporanea* (Feltrinelli, 1958), p. 69.

<sup>35</sup> The later Husserl attempted an *Aufbau*, as the logical positivists called it. The point is that in his *Aufbau* "The Other," the "Thou" is reached before the perceptual object. The latter cannot be reached without the former. Whether or not that is merely an idiosyncratic mistake, as I believe it is, it helps one to understand how within one short generation an analytical philosopher of the first rank became one of the patron saints of the existentialist *Lebensphilosophen*.

ond, which deserves closer attention, also provides the promised conclusion by bringing out how fundamental the two major "mistakes" are.

In the second system, sensory qualities are properties of Selves. In the foil, a qualified sensum or two *sensa* exemplifying a relation are the simplest phenomenal facts not involving mental entities. As was pointed out earlier, such facts serve as a phenomenal model of perceptual facts. One reason they can so serve is that they are not characters (properties) of the mental individual that is also there when they are sensed. The characters this individual exemplifies are, rather, the species sensing and the meaning which intends what is sensed. This is the first difference. Restating it concisely will show how crucial it is. In the second system everything is constituted from properties of "minds." How then could there be anything but minds and their properties? In the foil not even *sensa* or their characters are properties of "mind." The reason why 'phenomenal' and 'mental' have been distinguished must by now be obvious. The idea behind the distinction also guided G. E. Moore. Unfortunately, he bogged down in trying to make *sensa* parts of perceptual objects. All this also shows how important structurally it is that in the foil sensing is an act and that all awareness is propositional. The difference between a fact and a character is a bit too gross to be overlooked.

Everyone speaks of perceptual *judgments*. The idea controlling the use of this word is that in a judgment one asserts more than what is, in a suitable sense, presented to him. Call this more the excess of judgment over presentation. Where there is such an excess, the mind is, in an obvious sense, active. In the foil this activity is harmless; even in the first system it is not. That is the second difference. Let us see.

Assume that when judging the tower to be round, I am presented with some phenomenal facts. Schematically, that is in the foil a suitable sense of 'presentation'. I say "schematically" and I said "assume" because literally I hold all this to be false or, at least, grossly inaccurate, if only because while towers are perceived, (nonmental) phenomenal facts can only be sensed and a deliberate shift from perceiving to sensing is not easy to achieve. Even so, the schema does very well for the two points that matter. First, the excess consists of further phenomenal facts. *Excess and presentation are thus of the same kind*. That makes the activity of the mind harmless since it does not, in a sense, add anything. It merely anticipates more of the same. Second, phenomenal facts, as presented, are *fully structured*. *Sensa*, (nonrelational) characters, and relations are all presented as such; so is the nexus of exempli-

fication they support. In this respect, there is no scope for activity. The reason for there being none is that the foil is realistic<sub>1</sub> and adopts Russell's view on relations.

Both systems find an excess wherever the foil does. The suitable sense of 'presentation' is different. That is why even the first system finds an excess where the foil doesn't. To be presented is to be given in sensory intuition. The only things thus given are perceptual items. So dim is the eye of the senses. Hence even the nexus in a fact as simple as  $red_1 C spot_1$  is an excess over what is presented.<sup>36</sup> That makes even the assertion of this simple fact a perceptual judgment, notwithstanding that the fact, or at least all the items in it, is *hic et nunc*. Furthermore, *excess and presentation are not of the same kind*. The excess, which is a universal, is seen only by the mind's eye. The metaphor of the two eyes spots a tendency: *What is seen only by the mind is contributed by the mind*. The tendency is away from Platonism, which is hard to swallow. In the first system Husserl resisted it. That is why his conceptualism is not shallow. But then, the tension was there; or so at least one may judge from the outcome. Given its reins, this tendency makes the structure (essence, form) of (in) even the simplest perceptual fact a contribution of the mind. That shows that this time the mind's activity is anything but harmless. There would be no scope for such activity if the perceptual items, which are all that is ever presented, were not so *unstructured*, i.e., if they were not all, except for not being bare, mere  $\tau\acute{o}\delta\epsilon\ \tau\iota$ . Again, presentation could not be so unstructured if the system were not nominalistic. All this, we now fully understand, hangs by Husserl's assay of a fact as simple as  $red_1 C spot_1$ . When relations enter, the need for a contribution of the mind becomes even more urgent. That we have seen.

<sup>36</sup> *LU*, II, 2, p. 152.

## *The Glory and the Misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein\**

THE *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* appeared in 1921; the *Philosophical Investigations*, posthumously, in 1953. Wittgenstein will live through these two books. The contrast between them is striking. In the author's view, and not in his alone, the second repudiates the first. As his epigones see it, his glory is the second. The first they consider, however tenderly and reverently, a relative failure. As I see it, Wittgenstein's glory is the *Tractatus*; his misery, the *Investigations*. The disagreement could not be more complete. Yet I agree with the epigones that the connection between the two books is very close indeed. I see in the second the reaction, dictated by the council of despair, to the relative failure of the first.

The *Tractatus*, then, if I am right, is a glorious failure. It is also, I am deeply convinced, an achievement of the first rank. Nor is that paradoxical. None of our predecessors achieved more. No one among us and our successors will do better. The fundamental metaphysical problems are too difficult for this to be otherwise. Fortunately, their number is small. Even the secondary ones, though quite a few, are not too many. Good philosophers therefore do not pursue many questions. Rather, they are pursued by a few which they articulate ever more richly and explore ever more deeply, down toward the fundamental ones. The few great among the good can rethink a fundamental problem on their own. Such a problem always consists of a group of dialectically connected questions. To rethink it is either to discover a new dialectical connection within the group or, at the very highest, to affect these connections even more radically by discovering a new

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